
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THE

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MANUAL ON OUT

THE

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DE LA SITUATION RELIGIEUSE DE L'EGLISE CATHOLIQUE ROMAINE, EN FRANCE, A L'HEURE ACTUELLE.

PAUL SABATIER.

LA direction du HIBBERT JOURNAL m'a fait l'honneur de me demander une étude sur la situation religieuse en France. Le sujet est singulièrement complexe et délicat. Il l'est d'autant plus qu'il est traité de tous côtés avec ardeur; mais beaucoup de ces essais, partis des points les plus opposés, ont un même défaut: leurs auteurs paraissent n'avoir qu'une préoccupation, celle de trouver des arguments en faveur des causes dont ils sont les champions.

Le sujet dans toute son ampleur ne saurait être traité en une seule étude, si longue qu'elle fût. Pour le Protestantisme quelques pages suffiraient. Respectable et respecté, il apparaît à nos compatriotes un peu comme une sorte d'aristocratie intellectuelle et morale, à la fois réservée et isolée. Ceux qui le voient de plus près sentent chez lui, depuis quelques années, un recueillement et un travail intime qui présagent, peut-être, la fin de la longue crise théologique et ecclésiastique par laquelle il a passé depuis une quarantaine d'années. L'unité protestante, profondément sentie par la masse des fidèles, vient enfin d'être affirmée dans des assises où les diverses églises issues de la Réforme étaient représentées.

Le facteur le plus important de la situation religieuse de notre pays est sûrement la Libre-Pensée; mais, pour avoir quelque valeur, une étude sur elle devrait être abondamment documentée; et pour montrer les orientations très diverses, et souvent opposées, qui sont englobées sous ce nom, un seul article, même long, ne suffirait pas.

Il y a, en effet, une Libre-Pensée inspirée surtout par des prêtres qui ont rompu avec Rome, qui sont préoccupés d'organiser une anti-Eglise, où la vérité consisterait à opposer aux dogmes catholiques des dogmes exactement contraires. On retrouve là une organisation, une hiérarchie, voire même une liturgie, calquées sur celles de l'Eglise. C'est aussi le même besoin d'imposer des vues uniformes, la même méfiance pour l'initiative individuelle, les mêmes procédés d'intimidation, d'espionnage et de délation.

Si les procédés sommaires de la Curie, si l'incapacité d'une partie du clergé, les scandales qu'il a pu donner çà et là grossissent chaque jour les rangs de cette Libre-Pensée, on la voit aussi éliminer, avec une remarquable régularité, ceux pour lesquels pensée et liberté ne sont pas une vaine étiquette au fronton d'une salle, et auxquels l'infaillibilité anticléricale pèse bientôt plus que l'infaillibilité romaine.

Ces hommes, aussi peu satisfaits de l'anticléricalisme simpliste et grossier que du cléricalisme, deviennent de plus en plus nombreux. Une fois sur le chemin des préoccupations intellectuelles et morales, ils y restent; ils pensent; ils travaillent.

Le mot de Libre Pensée Religieuse a été prononcé à propos de ces efforts nouveaux, et il est tout à fait à sa place, car il y a, au fond de ces tentatives, l'affirmation implicite que notre civilisation qui a créé déjà tant de formes religieuses, utiles et admirables, malgré leurs imperfections, ne s'arrêtera pas, et finira bien par bâtir la nouvelle cathédrale.¹

¹ S'il y a des libres-penseurs préoccupés d'idéal et de vie religieuse, il y a aussi dans l'Eglise des hommes désireux de les comprendre et de fraterniser avec eux. Il y a quelques mois, un évêque contemplait la façade de la cathédrale de Bourges. Du fond de la nef arrivait, comme un murmure, la fin des vêpres capitulaires. Un enterrement civil vint à passer, avec les

Montrer avec quelque précision ce mouvement, en faire toucher du doigt la réalité, est impossible ici. Nous nous bornerons donc à regarder l'Eglise Catholique pour tâcher de marquer sa situation exacte. Et encore faudra-t-il réduire la question à l'étude de sa situation morale. Sa situation matérielle a été beaucoup étudiée à propos de la Séparation des Eglises et de l'Etat. Si peu brillante qu'elle soit, elle est loin d'avoir la gravité et la portée de sa situation morale.

Il y a un écueil que nous aurons beaucoup de peine à éviter: celui qui consiste à confondre l'Eglise avec le S. Siège. Comme les autres gouvernements, celui-ci oublie son rôle et agit comme s'il était l'Eglise elle-même. C'est peut-être très habile, parce qu'on en est arrivé, dans la pratique, à gratifier le pape et ses bureaux non seulement de l'infaillibilité doctrinale, mais d'un privilège magique qui les préserverait de toute erreur. Cet aboutissement logique d'une évolution séculaire de l'autorité constitue un grand danger pour l'Eglise, car le jour où l'attention publique se portera avec suite de ce côté, le jour où elle verra ce que valent moralement les agents de ce gouvernement divin, ses moyens de séduction, ses procédés d'intimidation, il pourrait se faire qu'une vague d'indignation balayât tout ce qui se réclame de lui, et que, dans l'ardeur de l'indignation, on fit expier par l'Eglise entière les péchés d'une poignée d'hommes qui la dirigent, prétendent la représenter et. en somme, ne font autre chose que la terroriser et la trahir.

Il est donc très nécessaire que les lecteurs ne perdent pas de vue cette distinction entre l'Eglise et son gouvernement, même si, sans le vouloir, entraîné par le langage courant, nous

bannières rouges de quelques sociétés positivistes. Grave, subitement ému, le prélat du haut du perron salua le mort. "Que ne donnerais-je pas," dit-il ensuite à son compagnon, "pour ouvrir ces portes à deux battants, et faire comprendre à tout ce peuple qui passe, qu'il fait écho, plus souvent qu'il ne croît, à la psalmodie de nos pauvres chanoines décrépits.

Deposuit potentes de sede Et exaltavit humiles."

¹ Plusieurs évêques ont estimé que l'Eglise n'a pas en France plus de quatre à cinq millions d'adhérents effectifs. Les séminaires se dépeuplent et le denier du culte baisse avec une rapidité qu'on n'avait pas prévue.

venions à oublier de la faire explicitement.¹ Elle est d'autant plus importante que la crise morale qui nous intéresse surtout ici a été provoquée par l'autorité et ne cesse d'être ravivée par elle.

Les troupes catholiques françaises ont été, au cours du xix° siècle, d'un loyalisme à toute épreuve. Elles adoraient le pape avec un élan si naïf, si sincère et si chaleureux qu'on y sentait vibrer des sentiments qui, par delà le pontife universel, saluaient les idées dont on croyait voir en sa personne la réalisation provisoire.

A ce corps d'armée le plus discipliné et le plus enthousiaste de tous, on ne s'est pas borné à demander des efforts exceptionnels; les bureaux romains lui ont donné des ordres nombreux, contradictoires, mal chiffrés, qui laissent les généraux aussi perplexes que les soldats. Puis, comme si cela ne suffisait pas, on s'est mis à attendre de cette armée des manifestations quotidiennes d'attachement et de dévotion. Le pouvoir central a laissé voir qu'il redoutait des défections, et a envoyé dans chaque région des gens qui ne valaient pas mieux que la mission dont on les a chargés, celle de surveiller les évêques.

Le résultat ne s'est pas fait attendre: ces invraisemblables subalternes ont semé l'épouvante, et le découragement gagne de proche en proche.

Il y a pourtant une petite fraction de l'armée catholique qui triomphe, c'est le corps des soldats mercenaires qui n'ont servi le pape qu'avec la volonté bien arrêtée de se servir de lui, dans les luttes politiques qui les préoccupent exclusivement.

On s'est étonné dans les milieux les plus divers de l'indifférence au milieu de laquelle a été mise en vigueur la loi de Séparation. Nous venons d'en donner l'explication.

¹ Ce qui augmente encore la difficulté du sujet c'est que la situation religieuse de la France est très différente de celle des autres pays de l'Europe, sauf l'Italie.

A l'épiscopat français qui s'apprêtait à donner au pays le spectacle d'une Eglise échangeant gaiement sa dotation pour recouvrer son indépendance, fière de montrer ses initiatives et sa valeur civique, le pontife romain a donné des ordres, dictés par l'impie et fol espoir de tirer vengeance de la France républicaine et de son gouvernement.

Que ces perspectives, même si elles avaient eu quelque chance de se réaliser, aient provoqué peu d'enthousiasme auprès de la majorité des évêques et des fidèles est un fait qui devait être constaté, car il est tout à leur honneur.

La Séparation qui, loyalement acceptée, aurait pu devenir pour l'Eglise de France, une occasion de fournir la preuve de sa vitalité et de sa plasticité, est devenue, par suite de l'attitude de Pie X., un affront fait au Siège Apostolique par le Parlement d'abord, ratifié ensuite, d'un bout à l'autre du territoire, dans toutes les élections subséquentes.

Cette défaite sur le terrain politique n'a été que le prélude d'une série d'autres, moins extérieures et moins retentissantes, mais plus profondes et irrémédiables.

C'est, en effet, du côté de la pure et simple morale que les ruines s'entassent avec une effrayante rapidité. Et ici il ne s'agit pas de chutes individuelles qui, si regrettables qu'elles soient, ne sauraient entacher l'honneur d'une collectivité. Non; nous voulons parler du sans-gêne souverain avec lequel l'autorité romaine traite la simple vérité, des équivoques qu'elle crée, entretient et impose.

Alors que notre siècle a de plus en plus la passion et le culte de la franchise, les représentants de l'Eglise ont des habiletés qui sont pires que des mensonges.

L'accusation est trop grave pour ne pas être précisée: au lendemain de l'assemblée plénière de nos soixante et quatorze évêques (fin mai 1906), quelques hommes, parfaitement au courant, racontèrent ce qui s'y était passé: la grande majorité, après avoir adhéré sans discussion à la condamnation de principe, prononcée par le pape contre la loi de Séparation, avait non seulement exprimé son désir de faire l'essai loyal

de la loi, mais elle avait voté un règlement 1 qui respectait à la fois les lois de l'Eglise et celles de l'Etat. 2

En agissant ainsi les évêques de France sentaient fort bien qu'ils n'allaient pas au devant des désirs du souverain pontife, mais ils avaient cru de leur devoir, à cette heure historique, d'exposer leurs vues.

La cohésion de l'épiscopat s'était révélée si compacte, l'acte avait été si solennel que personne ne douta de son efficacité. La fraction de la presse qui, depuis de longs mois, avait mis tout en œuvre pour intimider les évêques, leur dicter les plus folles résolutions, cessa brusquement le feu. Elle attendait inquiète et embarrassée, tant il lui semblait impossible que Rome, malgré son désir de pousser tout à l'extrême, ne tînt aucun compte d'avis qu'elle-même avait provoqués.

L'inattendu et l'invraisemblable se réalisèrent pourtant. Le souverain pontife condamna tout essai de la loi de Séparation.

Mais cette condamnation, si grave qu'elle fût, n'était pas le fait essentiel de la bulle. Le geste du pape, qui, du haut de son infaillibilité, avait imposé ses vues à l'épiscopat, était une conséquence, sinon normale, du moins compréhensible, de l'absolutisme pontifical. Ce nescio vos, jeté par le S. Siège à la face de l'immense majorité de la nation française, aurait eu sa beauté hiératique, s'il était tombé du nouveau Sinaï net, fier et franc.

Quelle ne dut pas être la douloureuse émotion des évêques, lorsqu'ils virent que celui qui peut tout, au lieu de prendre la responsabilité de son acte, avait l'air de mettre simplement son approbation pontificale aux résolutions de l'épiscopat français?

Quelques hommes s'élevèrent çà et là pour rétablir la vérité; on les traita d'imposteurs grotesques! Ils ne pouvaient rien

¹ Etabli par l'archevêque de Besançon, Mgr. Fulbert-Petit, avec la collaboration de plusieurs autres prélats et de jurisconsultes catholiques, examiné et discuté dans tous ses détails par l'assemblée générale.

² Il fut voté par 56 voix contre 18.

prouver, avec pièces à l'appui, puisque, par la volonté du S. Siège, la réunion était tenue à un secret absolu.

Aux évêques qui eurent la naïveté, non pas de demander des explications, mais simplement de poser de timides questions, on daigna répondre que dans leurs résolutions sur l'essai de la loi ils avaient voté comme des enfants; dans sa haute sagesse, le S. Siège avait usé de miséricorde à leur égard, en tenant pour nulles et non avenues toutes leurs délibérations, sauf leur vote initial et théorique sur le principe même de la loi.

Quels peuvent bien être les sentiments des évêques français devant des faits pareils? Il en est quelques-uns qui ne veulent pas voir, qui ne veulent pas se rappeler; le pape leur tient lieu de conscience, ils réalisent l'idéal rêvé par Pie X., mais on peut se demander ce que deviendrait l'Eglise de France le jour où elle n'aurait à sa tête que des prélats de ce genre.

Or, cet acte de Rome n'a rien d'exceptionnel.1 Dans ces

1 Il n'est pas possible de raconter ici par le menu toutes les circonstances récentes où le S. Siège a douloureusement étonné les catholiques français.

A chaque réunion de l'épiscopat, une presse qui se dit catholique et n'est qu'anti-républicaine, annonçait bruyamment que le gouvernement était résolu à interdire ces assemblées plénières et à organiser la persécution. On s'efforcait ainsi d'énerver l'opinion publique. Le ministère, qui n'avait pas songé à des mesures de ce genre, regarda cette agitation avec une parfaite tranquillité. En avait-il deviné le but? Ce qui est sûr, c'est que les organes inspirés par le cardinal Merry del Val espéraient bien que les enfants terribles de l'anticléricalisme prendraient la balle au bond et obtiendraient tout au moins une apparance de persécution.

Quelques mois plus tard les assemblées plénières de l'épiscopat étaient interdites par le S. Siège. Inutile d'ajouter que cette mesure a été prise sournoisement, sans franchise et sans dignité. Pendant que l'épiscopat français, le cardinal-archevêque de Paris en tête, préparait une nouvelle réunion, la Corrispondenza Romana annonçait d'un ton bref que cette réunion n'était ni nécessaire, ni opportune. Un obscur Monsignore signifiait à l'épiscopat de France la conduite qu'il avait à tenir!

Comment ne comprend-on pas à Rome qu'il vaudrait mieux parler en termes moins hyperboliques des sentiments qu'on éprouve pour les évêques français et leur donner des preuves d'estime élémentaires?

Dans les premiers temps après la Séparation, Pie X. consulta les évêques de la région pour les sièges à pourvoir. On ne tint aucun compte de leurs propositions, et, quelques mois après, on supprima jusqu'à la formalité de la consultation.

Les catholiques du monde entier étaient persuadés que le premier acte du

dernières années, elle a refait plusieurs fois le même geste; elle dicte sans cesse, par les intermédiaires les plus inattendus, des résolutions dont elle fait endosser la responsabilité à l'épiscopat.

Il est très sûr que la fameuse Circulaire de l'épiscopat français contre les écoles laïques n'a pas été écrite sous la dictée de Pie X., mais affirmer cela bruyamment, pour faire croire qu'elle est l'œuvre joyeuse et convaincue de ceux qui l'ont signée, est un procédé qui juge ceux qui l'emploient.

Et il en va de même pour les détails. Mgr. Batiffol, recteur de l'Institut catholique de Toulouse, n'a pas été écarté sur l'ordre de Pie X., puisqu'il n'y a aucun document qui le prouve dans les archives de cet établissement ou dans celles du Vatican. Mais, comment se fait-il donc que les évêques protecteurs l'aient éloigné, alors qu'ils étaient si contents de ses services?

On devine les souffrances morales de ceux pour lesquels le catholicisme n'est pas seulement l'obéissance aveugle à Rome.¹

pape, au lendemain de la Séparation, serait de réorganiser en France le choix des évêques dans les formes prévues par le droit canonique. Il n'en fut rien, et c'est encore une congrégation, exclusivement composée d'ecclésiastiques étrangers à la France, qui prépare les nominations, et travaille sur des dossiers fournis par des agents secrets!

On a fait grand bruit dans toute l'Europe de la scène où le pape aurait embrassé le drapeau tricolore. Il aurait des moyens plus efficaces de manifester ses sentiments; par exemple, en comblant sans retard les vides qui se sont produits parmi les membres français du Sacré Collège. Aurait-il peur de vicier la prochaine élection pontificale par la présence du nombre habituel de cardinaux français? Ce ne sont pourtant pas eux qui, au dernier conclave, ont attenté à la liberté de l'auguste assemblée. Pie X. s'est-il jamais représenté les clameurs vengeresses qui se seraient élevées de toute l'Eglise, si un cardinal français avait fait, au nom de son gouvernement, ce que le cardinal Puzyna fit de la part du sien?

¹ On demandera pourquoi les évêques ne se sont pas redressés, n'ont pas protesté contre la façon dont on les traite, contre les manifestations qu'on leur impose.

La question est fort naturelle. Cependant ceux qui la posent, s'ils veulent rester équitables, feraient bien de ne pas condamner trop vite.

Et tout d'abord à quoi bon se révolter? Le protestataire serait appelé à Rome. S'il refusait d'y aller, on le représenterait aussitôt dans le monde entier, comme n'ayant pas même osé se disculper devant le plus miséricordieux des

Avec la loi de Séparation, le S. Siège n'avait, en somme, subi qu'un échec politique. Par la bulle Gravissimo, il a lui-même porté atteinte à son prestige moral. Désormais ses meilleurs collaborateurs savent que le sens, en apparence évident, des encycliques, n'en est pas toujours le sens vrai.

Quoique les évêques aient dévoré leur tristesse en silence l'implacable vérité a fait son chemin. La mort de l'archevêque de Besançon a soulevé le voile, et on peut dire que ceux des prêtres de France qui veulent et savent lire ne peuvent plus ignorer ces faits. Des palais épiscopaux le désenchantement est descendu jusque dans les plus modestes presbytères, il se glisse dans l'âme de beaucoup de laïcs.

pères, comme un lâche et un traitre, abandonnant l'Eglise au plus fort de la bataille. S'il avait le courage de s'y rendre, malgré bien des précédents plutôt décourageants, il se verrait l'objet d'avanies, habilement calculées pour briser sa volonté; menacé et flatté tour à tour, on lui ferait signer des procès-verbaux où il devinerait des pièges cachés; on lui offrirait tous les pardons possibles, mais à la condition qu'il se reconnût coupable d'erreurs qu'il ne commit jamais. Qu'on lise le mémoire de M. Henri Lasserre, le célèbre historien de Notre-Dame de Lourdes, et on verra par cet exemple contemporain ce que sont les procédés de la Curie.

Telles sont les conséquences personnelles d'un acte qui au lointain spectateur paraît tout naturel. Les conséquences ecclésiastiques ne seraient pas meilleures: ce serait abandonner un nouveau siège épiscopal, et fournir l'occasion à la bureaucratie romaine d'augmenter encore le nombre de ses créatures.

Enfin il y a une considération plus profonde encore, et plus angoissante: c'est qu'en se révoltant contre les abus de Rome, les évêques sembleraient, fatalement, se révolter contre Rome elle-même, contre le principe d'autorité. En disant la lamentable incapacité de celui qui, pour quelques jours encore, tient l'ostensoir en des mains trop humaines, l'élève et le présente aux quatre points cardinaux, ne risqueraient-ils pas d'atteindre l'hostie elle-même, de la faire tomber dans la boue, peut-être de la faire profaner? Ils s'arrêtent, tremblants, presqu'effrayés des pensées qu'ils ont tout à coup senti sourdre de leur cœur.

Credo unam sanctam catholicam et apostolicam Ecclesiam. Ils se répètent cette parole en laquelle est résumée l'âme de leur vie et de leur piété. Rome, le pape, sont des symboles précaires, chétifs, provisoires, nécessaires pourtant, et qui commandent le respect. Ils continuent donc à pleurer en silence, pendant que l'Eglise s'achemine, à travers bien des défaillances, vers la réalisation de quelques idées dont, la première, elle a pris conscience, et dont, malgré tout, elle a été la semeuse. Quelques-uns meurent d'amertume comme l'évêque de La Rochelle, Mgr. Le Camus, ou l'archevêque de Besançon; d'autres essaient de se persuader que les voies de Dieu sont mystérieuses.

Après ce coup d'œil sur l'état d'âme d'une partie du clergé, jetons-en un, plus rapide encore, sur les fidèles et leurs préoccupations.

On peut répartir les catholiques de France en trois catégories. D'abord le groupe aussi restreint que tapageur de ceux qui prétendent défendre l'Eglise, et en profitent pour se faire payer fort cher les services hypothétiques qu'ils lui rendent. Ces catholiques politiciens, instruments des partis réactionnaires, n'ont pas cessé de compromettre l'Eglise. L'audace avec laquelle ils se prétendent les seuls et les vrais catholiques n'est égalée que par la docilité avec laquelle l'autorité suprême se laisse régenter par eux. Nous ne pouvons pas entrer dans les détails : qu'il suffise de dire que l'Eglise, qui a établi de si étonnantes barrières entre l'ecclesia docens (clergé et hiérarchie) et l'ecclesia discens (le peuple), voit en France les questions les plus délicates souvent décidées par des journalistes sans autorité, sans mandat, sans responsabilité.¹

Derrière ces meneurs se rangent les masses profondes des catholiques des cantons illettrés. Les régions de misère et d'ignorance sont celles où les députés pontificaux vont chercher leurs électeurs. Dans un pays de suffrage universel cette masse de semi-conscients exerce une influence exagérée et trompeuse, un jour d'élection; mais ils n'ont aucune importance profonde et durable, puisque leur nombre se réduit de jour en jour.

Il y a une troisième catégorie de catholiques très inégalement répartis sur la surface du territoire; ce sont des unités ou des familles isolées, qu'on ne rencontre par groupes importants que dans les régions aisées, où l'instruction primaire est répandue depuis longtemps. Ces catholiques-là sont souvent

¹ Cette main-mise de quelques personnages politiques sur les affaires de France, au moment le plus grave de la Séparation, se montre avec ses côtés burlesques dans la correspondance échangée entre le Secrétaire d'Etat et son représentant à Paris. Elle a été publiée sous le titre: Les Fiches Pontificales de Monsignor Montagnini, dépêches, réponses et notes historiques (in 12 de xvi et 236 p. Nourry, 14 rue Notre Dame de Lorette, Paris).

tout à la fois la joie, l'orgueil et le désespoir des curés trop zélés, car ils sont catholiques à leur manière. Ce qui les distingue nettement des précédents, c'est qu'ils ne peuvent pas souffrir que l'Eglise leur donne un mot d'ordre politique. Ce qu'ils attendent d'elle ce sont des dogmes, non des dogmes morts, mais des dogmes vivants; je veux dire par là que, dans leur esprit avide de réalisme, les phrases du catéchisme sont des formules, auxquelles ils donnent un sens souvent très éloigné du sens officiel, mais dans lesquelles ils logent de bienfaisants souvenirs, des échappées sur la destinée, des élans d'émotion.

Ils aiment l'Eglise pour le cadre de noblesse, de symbolisme et de poésie qu'elle donne à leur vie, pour le sentiment de soli-darité avec le passé qu'elle maintient avec tant de force. Ils veulent être bons catholiques, mais le titre qu'ils ambitionnent, par-dessus tout, est celui de bons citoyens. Ils sentent bien que leur curé les désirerait parfois un peu plus malléables, mais dans le respect que celui-ci leur témoigne involontairement, et qu'il est loin d'avoir pour d'autres brebis plus dociles, ils trouvent le plus efficace des encouragements.

Ces catholiques-là sont les racines par lesquelles l'Eglise est encore profondément implantée sur le sol de France: ils savent voir, lire et observer, et la crise actuelle ne leur a pas échappé. Ceux d'entre eux qui ont des fils au séminaire les voient revenir, chaque année, avec moins de joie, moins d'ardeur pour leur vocation; ils ont appris avec étonnement les précautions prises par le souverain pontife pour empêcher tout écho de la pensée contemporaine à l'intérieur des maisons où se forme le clergé de demain.

Cette peur des idées de ceux au milieu desquels on doit vivre et travailler, cet interdit qui atteint tout dans l'Eglise, et ne laisse de sécurité qu'aux muets, les avait déjà doulou-

L'approbation de Rome elle-même n'intimide pas les chasseurs d'hérésie,

¹ Des livres examinés par l'archevêque de Paris et munis de son Imprimatur ont déplu à certains publicistes parfaitement laïques, et ont été boycottés avec succès par ces étranges inquisiteurs.

reusement frappés; mais leur émotion devient du scandale et de l'indignation quand ils voient les louches campagnes de presse organisées contre les catholiques les plus vaillants, contre les seuls qui aient su créer des groupements de jeunes gens religieux, appartenant aux milieux sociaux les plus divers, pour lesquels la fidélité à Dieu, à l'Eglise et au devoir moral sont des aspects différents d'une seule et même idée.

Les mesures déjà prises contre l'abbé Naudet, jadis encouragé par Léon XIII., celles qu'on va prendre contre Marc Sangnier et "le Sillon," sont la preuve évidente que pour le S. Siège la fidélité catholique n'est pas autre chose que la haine maladive de la démocratie.¹

De tels actes—on pourrait en énumérer bien d'autres—ont vivement frappé l'attention des catholiques réfléchis, et c'est sur eux qu'ils jugent l'autorité. Que celle-ci, après cela, vienne proclamer qu'elle est en dehors et au-dessus des partis politiques, ils ne pourront pas l'en croire; leur confiance sera encore plus ébranlée devant des protestations qui leur apparaissent fatalement comme un effort hypocrite pour donner le change à l'opinion publique.

Il faut bien remarquer qu'en tout cela le modernisme n'est pour rien. Ni les évêques et les prêtres dont nous parlions plus haut, ni les laïcs dont nous venons de voir les perplexités n'ont été contaminés par la fameuse hérésie. Ce

et des livres officiellement visés par le Maître du Sacré Palais ont eu le même sort! La bulle Pascendi a défendu sous les peines les plus sévères de lire des livres dépourvus d'imprimatur, mais on ne sait jamais si l'imprimatur n'a pas été obtenu par surprise. Les prêtres soumis au S. Siège n'ont qu'un moyen de ne pas encourir de graves responsabilités, c'est de renoncer à toute lecture quelle qu'elle soit.

¹ Pie X. qui n'a pas tenu compte des vues de l'épiscopat français pour la Séparation, ne manquera pas d'entrer dans celles de M. Albert Monniot, rédacteur à la *Libre Parole*. Il vaudrait la peine d'établir le rôle de ce publiciste dans les affaires religieuses de ces dernières années, car, si invraisemblable que ce soit, ce rôle est considérable. Si sa campagne contre "le Sillon" réussit, ce qui semble sûr, on aura là un exemple particulièrement significatif du succès avec lequel une poignée de turbulents et obscurs laïcs se sont faits les inspirateurs de l'autorité pontificale.

qui les trouble, c'est que l'autorité ecclésiastique, qui prétend se substituer à leur conscience, est bien loin de prouver sa divinité par son intelligence, son idéalisme, l'efficacité avec laquelle elle guiderait ceux qui s'abandonnent à elle.

C'est une crise strictement morale, ajoutée à la crise philosophique et scientifique du modernisme. Plus grave peutêtre encore, puisqu'elle va atteindre tous ceux qui ont quelque initiative et quelque vigueur. L'angoisse qui serre la gorge de tant de catholiques français ne provient donc ni de la disparition de leur foi, ni de défaillances de conduite, mais de la virilité avec laquelle ils ont essayé d'aimer leur siècle et leur pays, d'agrandir le cénacle et d'aller distribuer à tous le pain de vie.

Pour le moment, Rome ordonne et ils obéissent; mais pour employer l'expression de l'évêque d'Orléans, ils obéissent "dans les ténèbres" et l'énervement. Il n'y a plus, entre les ordres reçus et l'âme qui les reçoit et doit les exécuter, l'harmonie préétablie et profonde qui seule inspire l'obéissance parfaite et l'enthousiasme vainqueur.

Combien de temps un pareil état de choses pourra-t-il durer? Les années importent peu. Ce qui est sûr c'est que quand un gouvernement n'inspire plus ni amour, ni confiance, ni respect à ses administrés, ses jours sont comptés.

Les apologistes répondront par des considérations oratoires, ils diront que l'Eglise en a vu bien d'autres. C'est exact, mais la vieillesse d'une institution n'est-elle pas justement une raison pour prévoir sa fin prochaine? La notion actuelle de l'autorité dans l'Eglise a résisté-non sans être pourtant gravement atteinte-à toutes les attaques venues du dehors.

Aujourd'hui la crise est au cœur même de la place.

Le concile du Vatican, en définissant l'infaillibilité pontificale, Pie X., en tirant avec une logique que rien n'arrête et qui ne manque pas de grandeur, toutes les conséquences de ce dogme, ont constaté l'achèvement d'une évolution séculaire.

Les forces intellectuelles et morales de la catholicité, après avoir collaboré à ce grand-œuvre, se recueillent, regardent,

s'enquièrent, pour voir de quel côté elles iront porter leur labeur et leur enthousiasme.

Pendant ce temps, le peuple de France, dans sa grande majorité attend lui aussi. Il a le sentiment très net qu'une période de son histoire va se clore, qu'il faudra rebâtir le temple. Sollicité, d'un côté, par l'Eglise Romaine qui lui offre une explication enfantine et intéressée du mystère de la vie et du devoir, tenté, d'un autre côté, par une certaine Libre-Pensée qui lui prêche les plaisirs faciles, la vie au jour le jour, la sottise du sacrifice, de l'amour, de l'héroïsme, il se réserve et reste à égale distance de l'une et de l'autre.

Parmi ceux qui suivent la marche des événements dans notre pays, il s'en est trouvé, qui ont vu dans cette attitude une manifestation d'indifférence. Ils ont commis là une grosse erreur. Les deux adversaires qui se sont disputé jusqu'à ces derniers temps la direction de la France apparaissent vieillis et usés. Ce sont des statues de personnages historiques représentant une époque dépassée. Elles ne séduisent et n'effraient plus personne. On les transportera bientôt dans les musées.¹

PAUL SABATIER.

¹ Le présent article est imprimé depuis de longs mois: il n'a pas paru plus tôt, par suite du retard apporté par l'auteur à la correction des épreuves. Depuis lors, la situation du Catholicisme en France n'a fait que s'aggraver. Le grand effort organisé par le Saint Siège en vue des élections législatives a échoué piteusement, et toutes les provocations des politiciens catholiques désireux de se faire persécuter ne sont prises au sérieux ni par le gouvernement, ni par l'opinion publique.

HELLENISTIC PHILOSOPHY.

PROFESSOR GILBERT MURRAY.

This essay is an attempt to indicate the lie of the main highroads through a large and difficult territory, the main highroads and nothing more.

The territory in question is the period which lies between the death of Aristotle and the rise of Christianity. It is the time during which the schools of Greece were "hellenising" the world, a time of great enlightenment, of vigorous propaganda. of high importance to history. It is a time full of great names: in one school alone we have Zeno, Cleanthes, Chrysippus, Panætius, Posidonius. Yet, curiously enough, it is represented in our tradition by something very like a mere void. There are practically no complete books preserved, only fragments and indirect quotations. Consequently, in the search for information about this age we must throw our nets wide. Besides the Hellenistic writers proper, we shall draw on Cicero, Pliny, Seneca, and the like for evidence about their teachers and masters. We shall use some Christian and Gnostic documents and works like the Hermetic writings and the Mithras liturgy. I must also acknowledge a special debt to the researches of Wendland and Reitzenstein

The Hellenistic age seems at first sight to have entered on an inheritance such as our speculative anarchists sometimes long for—a tabula rasa on which a new and highly gifted generation of thinkers might write clean and certain the book of their discoveries about life. For it is clear that by the time of Plato the traditional religion of the Greek states was, at least among educated Athenians, a bankrupt concern. There was hardly one aspect in which it could bear criticism; and in the kind of test that chiefly matters, the satisfaction of men's ethical requirements and aspirations, it was if anything weaker than elsewhere. A religious belief that is scientifically preposterous may still have a long and comfortable life. Any worshipper can suspend the scientific part of his mind while worshippng. But a religious belief that is morally contemptible is in serious danger, because, when the religious emotions surge up, the moral emotions are not far away. And the clash cannot be hidden.

What we have to consider is the Hellenistic Philosophy. I call it Philosophy rather than Religion because, though it ended in Religion, that end was the time of its weakness rather than its strength. It is a fairly clear history. A soil once teeming with wild weeds was with extraordinary speed swept bare and prepared for planting. Skilled gardeners chose carefully the best of plants and tended the garden with love and devotion. But it so happened that the old roots and seeds had never really been eradicated, and at the end of a few generations the much-tended garden was really a garden of weeds again, weeds rank and luxuriant and often in their way beautiful, with here and there a half-strangled garden flower or two gleaming in the midst of them. Does that comparison seem disrespectful to traditional religion? Is philosophy all flowers and traditional religion all weeds? Well, we must remember what a weed is. "Weed" is only a name for all the natural wild vegetation which the earth sends up of herself, which lives and insists on living without the conscious labour of man. The flowers are what we keep alive with difficulty. the weeds are what conquer us.

The great thing to remember is that the mind of man cannot be enlightened permanently by merely teaching him to reject some particular set of superstitions. There is an infinite supply of other superstitions always at hand; and the mind that desires such things—that is, the mind that has not trained itself to the discipline of reasonableness and honesty—will, as soon as its devils are cast out, proceed to fill itself with their relations.

Let us first consider the result of the mere denial of the Olympian religion. The essential postulate of that religion was that the world is governed by a number of definite personal gods, possessed of a human sense of justice and fairness and capable of being influenced by ordinary human motives. For instance, they helped the good and punished the bad, and they tended to regard as good those who paid them proper attention and as bad those who did not.

Speaking broadly, what was left when this conception was proved inadequate? If it was not these personal gods who made things happen, what was it? If the Tower of Siloam was not deliberately thrown down by the gods so as to kill and hurt a carefully collected number of wicked people, while letting the good escape, what was the explanation of its falling? The answer is obvious, but it can be put in two ways. You can either say: "It was just chance that the Tower fell at that particular moment when so-and-so was under it." Or you can say, with rather more reflection but not any more common sense: "It fell because of a definite chain of causes. It was bound to fall."

There is no real difference in these statements, at least in the meaning of those who ordinarily utter them. Both are compatible with a reasonable and scientific view of the world. But in the Hellenistic age, when the best Greek philosophy was spreading rapidly and superficially over minds that were not ripe for it, both views turned back instinctively into a theology as personal as that of the Olympians. It was not, of course, Zeus or Apollo who willed this: it happened by chance. That is, Chance or Fortune willed it. And Tuchê became a goddess like the rest. The great catastrophes, the great transformations of the Mediterranean world which marked the Hellenistic period, had a strong influence here. If Alexander and his generals had practised some severely orthodox Macedonian Vol. IX.—No. 1.

religion, it would have been easy to see that the gods of Macedonia were the real rulers of the world. But they most markedly did not. They accepted hospitably all the religions that crossed their path. Some power or other was disturbing the world, that was clear. It was not exactly the work of man, because sometimes the good were exalted, sometimes the bad, sometimes the Greek, sometimes the barbarian. It was Fortune. Happy was the man who knew how to placate Fortune and make her smile upon him!

It is worth remembering that the best seed-ground for superstition is a society in which the fortunes of men seem to bear practically no relation to their merits and efforts. A stable and well-governed society does tend, speaking very roughly, to ensure that the virtuous and industrious apprentice shall succeed in life, while the wicked and idle apprentice fails. And in such a society people tend to lay stress on the reasonable or visible chains of causation. But in a country suffering from earthquakes or pestilences, in a court governed by the whim of a despot, in a district which is habitually the seat of a war between alien armies, the ordinary virtues of diligence. honesty, and kindliness seem to be of little avail. The only way to escape destruction is to win the favour of the prevailing powers, take the side of the strongest invader, flatter the despot, placate the Fate or Fortune or angry God that is sending the earthquake or the pestilence. The Hellenistic period pretty certainly falls in some degree under all of these categories. And one result is the sudden and enormous spread of the worship of Fortune. Of course there was always a protest. There is the famous Nullum numen habes si sit sapientia: nos te, Nos facimus, Fortuna, deam, taken by Juvenal from the There are many unguarded phrases and at least three corrections in Polybius.2 Most interesting of all perhaps, there is the first oration of Plutarch on the Fortune of Alexander. A sentence in Pliny's Natural History, ii. 22, seems to go back to Hellenistic sources.

¹ Juv. x. 365 f.

² Pol. ii. 38, 5, x. 5, 8, xviii. 11, 5.

"Throughout the whole world, at every place and hour, by every voice, Fortune alone is invoked and her name spoken: she is the one defendant, the one culprit, the one thought in men's minds, the one object of praise, the one cause. She is worshipped with insults, counted as fickle and often as blind, wandering, inconsistent, elusive, changeful, and friend of the unworthy. We are so much at the mercy of chance that Chance is our god."

The word used is first Fortuna and then Sors. This shows how little real difference there is between the two apparently contradictory conceptions-"Chance would have it so": "It was fated to be." The sting of both phrases lies in their denial of the value of human endeavour.

Yet, on the whole, as one might expect, the believers in Destiny are a more respectable congregation than the worshippers of Chance. It requires a certain amount of thoughtfulness to see the simple fact that nothing really happens by chance. It is the beginning, perhaps, of science. Philosophers of the fifth century had laid stress on the ἀνάγκη φύσιος, the Necessity or Chain of causes in Nature. After the rise of Stoicism Fate becomes something less physical, more related to conscious purpose. It is not Anankê, but Heimarmenê. Heimarmene, in the striking simile of Zeno,2 is like a fine thread running through the whole of existence—the world, we must remember, was to the Stoics a living whole—like that invisible thread of life which passes on from generation to generation and keeps the type alive; it runs, causing, causing, for ever, both the infinitesimal and the infinite.3 It is the Λόγος τοῦ κόσμου, the Nοῦς Διός, rather hard to distinguish from the Pronoia or Providence, which is the work of God, and indeed the very essence of God. Cleanthes, in one of his finest hymns, prays to ή Πεπρωμένη.

That is a noble conception. But the vulgar, of course, can turn Kismet into a stupid idol as easily as they can

² Arnim, Fragm. Stoic., Zeno 87.

Eur., Tro. 886.
 Arnim, Chrysip. 913.

Fortune. And Epicurus may have been right when he exclaimed that he would sooner be a slave to the old gods of the vulgar, than to the Destiny of the Stoics.

So much for the result in superstitious minds of the denial, or rather the removal, of the Olympian gods. It landed men in the worship of Fortune or of Fate.

Next let us consider what happened when, instead of merely rejecting the gods *en masse*, people tried to collect what remained of religion after the Olympian system fell.

Aristotle himself gives us a fairly clear answer. He held that the origins of man's knowledge (Ennoia) of the Divine were twofold (fr. 10 ff.), the phenomena of the sky and the phenomena of the human soul. It is very much what Kant found two thousand years later. The spectacle of the vast and ordered movements of the heavenly bodies is compared by him in a famous fragment with the marching forth of Homer's armies before Troy. Behind such various order and strength there must surely be a conscious mind, capable

κοσμήσαι ἴππους τε καὶ ἀνέρας ἀσπιδιώτας.

It is only a step from this to regarding the sun and moon and stars as themselves divine, and it is a step which both Plato and Aristotle, following Pythagoras and followed by the Stoics, take with confidence. Chrysippus gives practically the same list of gods: (Arnim 1076) "the Sun, Moon, and Stars and Law: and men who have turned into gods." Both the wandering and the fixed stars are "divine and eternal animals," self-acting subordinate gods. As to the divinity of the soul or the mind of man, the earlier generations are shy about it. But in the later Stoics it is in itself a portion of the Divine Life. It shows this ordinarily by its power of reason, and more conspicuously by becoming $\tilde{\epsilon}\nu\theta\epsilon$ 05 in its exalted moments of prevision, ecstasy, and prophetic dreams. If reason itself is divine, there is something else in the soul which is even higher than reason, or at least more surprisingly divine.

Let us follow the history of both these remaining substitutes for the Olympian gods.

First for the heavenly bodies. If they are to be made divine, we can hardly stop there. The Earth also is a divine being. Old tradition has always said so, and Plato has repeated it. And if Earth is divine, so surely are the other elements, the Stoicheia, Water, Air, and above all Fire. For the gods themselves are said by Plato to be made of fire, and the Stars visibly are so. Though perhaps the heavenly Fire is really not our Fire at all, but a $\pi \epsilon \mu \pi \tau \delta \nu \sigma \hat{\omega} \mu a$, a Fifth Element, seeing that it seems not to burn nor the Stars to be consumed.

This is persuasive enough and philosophic; but whither has it led us? Back to the Olympians or rather behind the Olympians; as St Paul (Gal. iv.) puts it, to the "beggarly elements." For in the present state of our knowledge it looks as if an early stage of Greek religion had consisted mainly in a worship of just these things, of Earth and Heaven, of the things of Earth and the *Meteôra*. And the great peculiarity of the Olympian religion was to insist that these powers which man worshipped were not blind and irrational powers, but beings with human feelings and virtues.

Almost all the writers of the Hellenistic age agree in regarding the sun, moon, and stars as gods. The rationalists Hecatæus and Euhemerus, before going on to their deified men, always start with the heavenly bodies. But the belief does not seem to have had much religious intensity in it until it was reinforced by two alien influences.

First, we have the ancient worship of the Sun, implicit, if not explicit, in a great part of the oldest Greek rituals, and then idealised by Plato in the Republic, where the Sun is the author of all light and life in the material world, as the Idea of Good is in the ideal world. This worship came gradually into contact with the traditional and definite Sun-worship of Persia. The final combination took place curiously late. It was the Roman conquests of Cilicia, Cappadocia, Commagene, and Armenia that gave the decisive

¹ Diels, Doxographi, 336, etc.

moment.¹ To men who had wearied of the myths of the poets and could draw no more inspiration from Apollo and Hyperion, but who still had the habits and the craving left by their old gods, a fresh breath of reality came with the entrance of "Ηλιος ἀνίκητος Μίθρας, "Mithras, the Unconquered Sun." But long before the triumph of Mithraism as the great religion of the Roman Empire, Greek literature is permeated with a kind of intense language about the Sun, which seems derived from Plato. In later times—in the fourth century A.D., for instance—it has absorbed some more full-blooded and less critical element as well.

Secondly, all the seven planets. These had a curious history. The planets were divine and living bodies: so much Plato gave us. Then come arguments and questions scattered through the Stoic and eclectic literature. Is it the planet itself that is divine, or is the planet under the guidance of a divine spirit? The latter seems to win the day. Anthropomorphism has stolen back upon us: we can use the old language and speak simply of the planet Mercury as Ερμοῦ άστήρ. It is the star of Hermes, and Hermes is the spirit who guides it. Even Plato in his old age had much to say about the souls of the seven planets (Laws, 898 ff.). Further, each planet has its sphere or globe. The Earth is in the centre, then comes the sphere of the Moon, then that of the Sun, and so on through a range of seven spheres. If all things are full of gods, as the wise ancients have said, what about those parts of the sphere in which the shining planet for the moment is not? Are they without God? Obviously not. The whole sphere is filled with innumerable spirits everywhere. It is all Hermes, all Aphrodite. But one part only is visible.

One voice, as usual, is raised in opposition. The veteran Epicurus had seen from the beginning whither all this sort of thing tended and "approved none of these things" οὐδὲν τούτων ἐγκρίνει. However, in spite of the Epicureans, the planets in

¹ Mithras was worshipped by the Cicilian pirates conquered by Pompey, Plut., vit. Pomp. 24.

their seven spheres surrounding the Earth continued to be objects of adoration. They had their special gods assigned them. Their movements made an eternal harmony of music, the most beautiful of all conceivable—though unfortunately circumstances prevent us from hearing it. They became elements in the Kosmos, Stoicheia. But behold a mystery! There were already seven Stoicheia, namely, the seven vowels, A E H I O Y Ω. The seven vowels are the mystic signs of the seven planets. Hence strange prayers and magic formulæ innumerable. Even the way of reckoning time changed under their influence. Instead of the old division of the month into three periods of nine days, we find gradually establishing itself the week of seven days with each day named after its planet: Sun, Moon, Ares, Hermes, Zeus, Aphrodite, Kronos. The history of the Planet week is given by Dio Cassius, xxxvii. 18, in his account of the Jewish campaign of Pompeius. But it was not the Jewish week. The Jews scorned such idolatrous and polytheistic proceedings. It was the old week of Babylon, the original home of astronomy and planet-worship.

For here again a great foreign religion came like water in the desert to minds reluctantly and superficially enlightened, but secretly longing for the old terrors and emotions from which they had been set free. Even in the old days Æschylus called the planets "bright potentates, seen afar in the fire of heaven"; and Euripides had spoken of the "shaft hurled from a star." But we are told that the first teaching of astrology in Hellenic lands was in the times of Alexander, when Berossos the Chaldæan set up a school in Cos. And the philosopher Theophrastus is reported by Proclus 2 as saying that "the most extraordinary thing of his age was the lore of the Chaldæans, who foretold not only events of public interest but even the lives and deaths of individuals." One wonders slightly whether Theophrastus spoke with as much implicit faith as Proclus suggests. But the chief account is given by Diodorus, ii. 30:—

"Other nations despise the philosophy of the Greeks. It is

¹ Æsch., Ag. 6; Eur., Hip.

² In Timæum, 285 f.

so recent and so constantly changing. They have traditions which come from vast antiquity and never change. Notably the Chaldwans have collected observations of the Stars through long ages, and teach how every event in the heavens has its meaning, as part of the eternal scheme of divine forethought. Especially the seven Wanderers, or Planets, are called by them Hermêneis, Interpreters: and among them the Interpreter-inchief is Saturn. Their work is to interpret beforehand την των $\theta \epsilon \hat{\omega} \nu \ \tilde{\epsilon} \nu \nu o i \alpha \nu$, the thought that is in the mind of the Gods. By their risings and settings, and by the colours they assume, the Chaldeans predict great winds and storms and waves of excessive heat, comets and earthquakes, and in general all changes fraught with weal or woe not only to nations and regions of the world, but to kings and to ordinary men and women. Beneath the Seven are thirty Gods of Counsel, half below and half above the Earth; every ten days a messenger or Angel star passes from above below and another from below above. Above these gods are twelve Masters, who are the twelve signs of the Zodiac; and the planets pass through all the houses of these twelve in turn. The Chaldwans have made prophecies for various kings, such as Alexander who conquered Darius, and Antigonos and Seleucus Nikator, and have always been right. And private persons who have consulted them consider their wisdom as marvellous and μείζον ή κάτ ἄνθρωπον."

Astrology fell upon the Hellenistic mind as a new disease falls upon some remote island people. The Epicureans, of course, held out, and so did Panætius, the coolest head among the Stoics. But Stoicism as a whole gave way. And in all the religious systems of later antiquity, if I mistake not, the Seven Planets play some lordly or terrifying part. The great Mithras liturgy, unearthed by Dieterich from a mass of magical formulæ, repeatedly confronts the worshipper with the seven vowels as names of "the Seven Deathless Lords of the World," and seems, under their influence, to go off into its "seven maidens with heads of serpents, in white raiment,"

and its divers other sevens. The various Hermetic and Mithraic communities, the Naassenes described by Hippolytus,¹ the Gnostic bodies most of all, authors like Macrobius and even Cicero in his Somnium Scipionis, are full of the influence of the seven planets and of the longing to escape beyond them. For by some simple psychological law the Stars which have inexorably pronounced our fate, and decreed, or at least registered the decree, that in spite of all striving we must needs tread their prescribed path; still more perhaps, the Stars which know in the midst of our laughter how that laughter will end, become inevitably powers of evil rather than good, beings malignant as well as pitiless, making life a vain thing. And Saturn, the chief of them, becomes the most malignant. The religion of later antiquity is overpoweringly absorbed in plans of escape from the prison of the Seven Planets.

In author after author, in one community after another, the subject recurs. And on the whole there is the same answer. Here on the earth we are the sport of Fate; nay, on the earth itself we are worse off still. We are beneath the Moon, and beneath the Moon there is not only Fate, but something more unworthy and equally malignant, Chanceto say nothing of damp and the ills of earth and bad dæmons. Above the Moon there is no chance, only Necessity; there is the will of the other six Kosmokratores, Rulers of the World. But above them all there is an eighth region—they call it simply the Ogdoas-the home of the ultimate God, whatever he is named, whose being was before the Planets. In this sphere is true Being and Freedom. And more than freedom, there is union with God. For that spark of divine life which is man's soul is not merely, as some have said, an ἀπόρροια τῶν ἄστρων, it comes direct from the true and ultimate God who is beyond the Planets. Though the Kosmokratores cast us to and fro like their slaves or dead chattels, in soul at least we are of equal birth with them. The Mithraic votary, when their wrathful faces break in upon his vision, answers them

¹ Refutatio omnium hæresium, v. 7.

boldly: ἐγώ εἰμι σύμπλανος ὑμῖν ἀστήρ, "I am your fellow Wanderer, your fellow Star." The Orphic carried to the grave on his golden scroll the same boast: first, "I am the child of Earth and of the starry Heaven"; then later, "I too am become God." The Gnostic writings consist largely of charms to be uttered by the soul to each of the Planets in turn, as it pursues its perilous path past all of them to its ultimate home.

We seem to have travelled far from the comparative simplicity of earlier Greek religion. Yet most of the movement has been, and perhaps not quite unconsciously, a reaction towards the most primitive and pre-Hellenic cults. The mystic devotee of Poimandres, the Mithras-initiates, the late Orphic, the seeker after Hermes Trismegistos, even so great a man as Plotinus, who was-so his disciple tells us-united with God in trance four times in five years, discover a curious kinship with the Thracian savages who drank the warm blood of their god-beast, with Cretan Kourêtes and their Zeus Kourês, and perhaps with those strange hierophants of the "Men's House" whose enigmatic message is written on the rocks of Thera. The union with God came through Ekstasis -the soul must needs get quite clear of its body-and by Enthousiasmos (from ένθεος): the God must needs come and dwell in the worshipper. But the means to the union are sometimes of the most primitive and pre-civilised sort. Some people ate their god or drank his blood; or, if that was not possible, ate and drank various surrogates. Some swallowed his name. One of the Hermetic liturgies cries out in ecstasy, $\dot{\epsilon}$ γ $\dot{\omega}$ $\dot{\epsilon}$ ν σοὶ καὶ σ $\dot{\upsilon}$ $\dot{\epsilon}$ ν $\dot{\epsilon}$ μοὶ. Before that the prayer has been, $\dot{\epsilon}$ λ $\theta\dot{\epsilon}$ ές έμε ωσπερ τὰ βρέφη ές τὰς κοιλίας τῶν γυναικῶν.

In all the liturgies that I have read, unless my memory deceives me, there is need for a mediator between the initiand and the god whom he seeks. Most of the Hermetic treatises are put in the form of initiations or lessons revealed by a "father" to a "son," by Ptah to Hermes, by Hermes to Thoth or Asclepios, and by one of them to us. This was

an ancient formula, a natural vehicle for traditional wisdom in Egypt, where the young priest became regularly the "son" of the old priest. It is a form that we find in Greece itself as early as Euripides, whose Melanippe says of her cosmological doctrines, οὖκ ἐμὸς ὁ μῦθος ἀλλ' ἐμῆς μητρός πάρα (Melanippe, fr. 484). It was doubtless the language of the old medicine-man to his disciple. In one fine liturgy Thoth wrestles with Hermes in agony of spirit, till Hermes is forced to reveal to him the path to union with God which he himself has trodden before. At the end of the Mithras liturgy the devotee who has passed through the mystic ordeals and seen his god face to face, is told: "After this you can show the way to others."

But this leads us to the second great division of our subject. We turn from the phenomena of the sky to those of the soul.

If what I have written elsewhere is right, one of the greatest works of the Hellenic spirit, and especially of fifth-century Athens, was to insist on what seems to us such a commonplace truism, the difference between Man and God. Sophrosynê in religion was the message of the classical age. But the ages before and after had no belief in such a lesson. The old medicine-man was perhaps himself the first *Theos.* At any rate, the primæval kings and queens were treated as divine. Just for a few great generations, it would seem, humanity rose to a sufficient height of self-criticism and self-restraint to reject these dreams of self-abasement or of megalomania. But the effort was too great for the average world; and in a later age nearly all the kings and rulers—all people, in fact, who can command an adequate number of flatterers—become divine beings again. Let us consider how this came about.

First there was the explicit recognition by philosophers of the divine element in man's soul.¹ Aristotle himself built an

¹ Cf. ψυχὴ οἰκητήριον δαίμονος, Democritus, 171, Diels; and Alcmæon is said by Cicero to have attributed divinity to the stars and the soul. Melissus and Zeno, θείας οἶεται καὶ ψυχάς. The phrase τινèς τὴν ψυχὴν δύναμιν ἀπὸ τῶν ἄστρων ῥέουσαν, Diels, 651, must refer to some Gnostic sect.

altar to Plato. He did nothing superstitious; he did not call Plato a god, but we can see from his beautiful elegy to Eudemus that he naturally and easily used language of worship which would seem a little strange to us. It is the same emotion—a noble and just emotion on the whole—which led the philosophic schools to treat their founders as heroes, and which has peopled most of Europe and Asia with the memories and the worship of saints. But we should remember that only a rare mind will make its divine man of such material as Plato. The common way to dazzle men's eyes is a more brutal and obvious one.

To people who were at all accustomed to the conception of a God-Man it was difficult not to feel that the conception was realised in Alexander. His tremendous power, his brilliant personality, his achievements beggaring the fables of the poets, put people in the right mind for worship. Then came the fact that the kings whom he conquered were, as a matter of fact, mostly regarded by their subjects as divine beings. It was easy, it was almost inevitable, for those who worshipped Darius to feel that it was no man but a greater god who had overthrown Darius. The incense which had been burned before those conquered gods was naturally offered to their conqueror. He did not refuse it. It was not good policy to do so, and self-depreciation is not apt to be one of the weaknesses of the μεγαλόψοχος. With his generals the worship became more official. Demetrius, Seleucus, Ptolemæus, Antigonus, all in different degrees and different styles, are deified by the acclamations of adoring subjects. Ptolemy Philadelphus seems to have been the first to claim definite divine honours during his own life. On the death of his wife in 271 he proclaimed her deity and his own as well, in the worship of the Theoi Adelphoi. Of course there was flattery in all this, ordinary, self-interested, lying flattery, and its inevitable accompaniment, megalomania. Any reading of the personal history of the Ptolemies, the Seleucidæ, or the Cæsars shows it. But that is not the whole explanation.

One of the characteristics of the period of the Diadochi is the accumulation of capital and military force in the hands of individuals. The Ptolemies and Seleucidæ had at any moment) at their disposal powers very much greater than any Pericles or Nicias or Lysander.1 The folk of the small cities of the Ægean hinterlands must have felt towards these great strangers almost as poor Indian peasants in time of flood and famine feel towards an English official. There were men now on earth who could do the things that had hitherto been beyond the power of man. Were several cities thrown down by earthquake: here was one who by his nod could build them again. Famines had always occurred and been mostly incurable: here was one who could, without effort, allay a famine. Provinces were harried and wasted by habitual wars: the eventual conqueror had destroyed whole provinces in making the wars; now, as he had destroyed, he could also save. "What do you mean by a god," the simple man might say, "if these men are not gods? The only difference is that these gods are visible, and the old gods no man has seen."

The titles assumed by all the divine kings tell the story clearly. Antiochus Epiphanês—"the god made manifest"; Ptolemaios Euergetês, Ptolemaios Sôtêr. Occasionally we have a Keraunos or a Nikator, a god of the thunderbolt or of "Mana'; but mostly it is Sôtêr, Euergetês, Epiphanês—the Saviour, the Benefactor, the God made manifest—in constant alternation. In the honorific inscriptions and in the writings of the learned, philanthropy $(\phi\iota\lambda\alpha\nu\theta\rho\omega\pi\iota\alpha)$ is by far the most prominent characteristic of the God upon earth. Was it that men really felt that to save or benefit mankind was a more godlike thing than to blast and destroy them? Philosophers have generally said that, and the vulgar pretended to believe them. At any rate, it was probably politic, when ministering to the half-insane pride of one of these princes, to remind him of his mercy rather than of his wrath.

Now the early successors of Alexander mostly professed

¹ Lysander too was worshipped by some Asiatic cities.

themselves members of the Stoic school, and in the mouth of a Stoic this doctrine of the potential divinity of man was an inspiring one. Virtue is the really divine thing in man: and the most divine kind of virtue is that of helping humanity. To love and help humanity is, according to Stoic doctrine, the work and the very essence of God. If you take away Providence from God, says Chrysippus, it is like taking away light and heat from fire. This doctrine is magnificently expressed by Pliny in a phrase that is probably translated from Posidonius: "God is the helping of man by man; and that is the way to eternal glory. . . ."²

The conception took root in the minds of many Romans. A great Roman governor often had the chance of thus helping humanity on a vast scale, and liked to think that such a life opened the way to heaven.

I have been using some rather late authors, though the ideas seem all to come from Posidonius. But before Posidonius the sort of fact on which we have been dwelling had had its influence on religious speculation. When Alexander made his conquering journey to India and afterwards was made a god, it was impossible not to reflect that almost exactly the same story was related in myth about Dionysus. Dionysus had started from India and travelled in the other direction: that was the only difference. A flood of light seemed to be thrown on all the traditional mythology, which of course had always been a puzzle to thoughtful men. It was impossible to believe it as it stood, and yet hard—in an age which had not the conception of any science of mythology -to think it was all a mass of falsehood and the great Homer and Hesiod no better than liars. But the generation which witnessed the official deification of the various Seleucidæ and Ptolemies seemed suddenly to see light. The traditional gods, from Heracles and Dionysus up to Zeus and Cronos and even Ouranos, were simply old-world rulers and benefactors of mankind, who had, by their own insistence or the

¹ Arn. 1118. ² Nat. Hist., ii, 7, xviii. 19. Cf. Cic., Tusc. i. 32.

gratitude of their subjects, been transferred to the ranks of heaven. For that is the exact meaning of making them divine: they are classed among the true immortals, the Sun, and Moon, and Stars and the everlasting elements.

This theory received its most famous statement in the philosophic romance of Euhemerus, published early in the third century B.C. It had instantaneous success and enormous influence. It was one of the first Greek books translated into Latin, and it was used long afterwards by the Christian fathers in their polemics against polytheism. The theory was, on the face of it, a brilliant one; and it had, as we have noticed, a special appeal for the Romans.

Yet, if such a conception might please the leisure of a statesman, it could hardly satisfy the serious thought of a philosopher or a religious man. If man's soul really holds a fragment of God and is itself a divine being, its godhead cannot depend on the possession of great riches and armies and organised subordinates. If "man's help of man is God," the help in question cannot be material help. The religion which ends in deifying only kings and millionaires may be popular, but is self-condemned.

As a matter of fact, the general tendency of Greek philosophy after Plato, with some illustrious exceptions, especially among the Romanising Stoics, was away from the outer world towards the world of the soul. We find in the religious writings of this period that the real saviour of men is not he who protects them against earthquake and famine, but he who in some sense saves their souls. Above all he reveals to them the eternal truth; he initiates them into mysteries, the mysteries of Isis, of Mithras, of Hermes, or whatsoever it may be. He leads man's soul on the mystic path which rises beyond Change and Fate and the Seven Planets to freedom and communion with God. Among Gnostic and Mithraic, as well as early Christian emblems, there are some which indicate this. Some Shepherd or Saviour stands reaching from earth

¹ Jacoby in Paully-Wissowa, vi. 954.

above the planets, sometimes lifting his follower in his arms. Poimandres, the Shepherd of Man, has scarcely any quality except this power of salvation, of leading men upon the way he knows. In one most interesting document, the sermon of the Nahash-worshippers, preserved in Hippolytus' Refutatio omnium hæresium, and lately analysed by Reitzenstein, the Saviour who does this work is the "divine Anthropos," the "Man" who is Son of God.

It is strange to reflect, and it shows what queer stuff we humans are made of, that it was these obscure congregations, superstitious and over-emotional, mostly ignorant and often the prey of charlatans, who held the main road of advance towards the greatest religion of the Western world.

I have tried to sketch in outline the main forms of belief to which Hellenistic philosophy moved or drifted. Let me dwell for a few minutes more upon the characteristic method by which it reaches them. It may be summed up in one word— Allegory. All Hellenistic philosophy from the first Stoics onwards, is permeated by this method of allegory. It is applied to Homer, to the religious traditions, to the ancient rituals, to the whole world. To Sallustius, after the end of our period, the material world is nothing but a great myth, a thing whose value lies not in itself but in the spiritual meaning which it hides and reveals. To Cleanthes, at the beginning of it, the world was a religious Mystery, in which the immortal stars were the dancers and the sun the priestly torch-bearer.2 We possess two small but complete treatises which illustrate well the results of this tendency, Cornutus $\pi\epsilon\rho$ $\theta\epsilon\hat{\omega}\nu$, and the Homeric Allegories of Heraclitus, a really brilliant little work of the first century B.C. I will not dwell upon details: they are abundantly accessible and individually often ridiculous.

A by-product of the same activity is the mystic treatment of language. A certain Titan in Hesiod is named Koios. Why?

Perhaps the name is really Egyptian; it is not correct Greek, but it seems to have been understood as ποιμήν ἀνδρῶν.
 Arnim, Cleanthes 538; Diels 592. 30. Cf. Philolaus, Diels 337b, 6.

Because the Titans are the elements, and one of them is naturally the element of κοιότης or quality. The Egyptian Isis is derived from the Greek είδέναι, knowledge, and the Egyptian Osiris from the Greek ὄσιος and ἱρός. Is this totally absurd? I think not. If all human language is, as most of these thinkers believed, a divine institution, a cup filled to the brim with divine meaning, so that by reflecting deeply upon a word a pious philosopher can reach the secret that it holds, then there is no difficulty whatever in supposing that the special secret held by an Egyptian word may be found in Greek, or the secret of a Greek word in Babylonian. Language is one. The Gods who made all these languages equally could use them all, wind them all intricately in and out, for the building up of their divine enigma. It is only to us, who take a non-supernatural view of language, that it seems absurd to explain the Latin word ros, dew, from the fact that the dew of the Gospel was afterwards to be imparted to thirsty souls in Ross-shire.

We must make a certain effort of imagination to understand this method of allegory. It is not the frigid thing that it seems to us. In the first place, we should remember that, as applied to the ancient literature and religious ritual, allegory was at least a vera causa. It was a phenomenon which actually existed. Heraclitus of Ephesus is an obvious instance. He deliberately expressed himself in language which should not be understood of the vulgar, and which bore a hidden meaning to his disciples. Pythagoras did the same. The prophets and religious writers must have done so to an even greater extent. And we know enough of the history of ritual to be sure that a great deal of it is allegorical. The Hellenistic age did not wantonly invent the theory of allegory.

And secondly, we must remember what states of mind tend especially to produce this belief in allegory. They are not contemptible states of mind. It needs only a strong idealism with which the facts of experience clash, and allegory follows almost of necessity. The facts cannot be accepted

as they are. They must be explained as being something different.

Take an earnest Stoic or Platonist, a man of fervid mind, who is possessed by the ideals of his philosophy and at the same time feels his heart thrilled by the beauty of the old poetry. What is he to do? On one side he can find Zoilus, or Plato himself, or the Cynic preachers, condemning Homer and the poets without remorse, as teachers of foolishness. He can treat poetry as the Puritans of the Restoration treated the stage. Is that a satisfactory solution? Remember that these generations were trained habitually to give great weight to the voice of their inner consciousness, and the inner consciousness of a sensitive man cries out that any such solution is false; the poets are noble and great, as our fathers have taught us. On the other side comes Heraclitus the allegorist. "If Homer used no allegories, he committed all impieties." On this theory the words can be allowed to possess all their old beauty and magic, but an inner meaning is added quite different from what they bear on the surface. It may, possibly, be a duller and less poetic meaning; but I am not sure that the verses will not gain by the mere process of brooding study fully as much as they lose by the ultimate badness of the interpretation. Anyhow, that was the road followed. The men of whom I speak were not likely to give up any experience that seemed to make the world more Godlike or to feed their spiritual and emotional cravings. They left that to the barefooted Cynics. They wanted poetry and they wanted philosophy; if the two spoke like enemies, their words must needs be explained away by one who loved both.

The same process was applied to the universe. It is habitually applied by the religious idealists of all ages. A fundamental doctrine of Stoicism and most of the idealist creeds was the perfection and utter blessedness of the world, and the absolute fulfilment of the purpose of God. Now, obviously this belief was not based on experience. The world, to do it justice amid all its misdoing, has never lent itself to

any such deception as that. No doubt it shrieked against the doctrine then as loud it has always shrieked, so that even a Posidonian or a Neo-Platonist, his ears straining for the music of the spheres, was sometimes forced to listen. And what was his answer? It is repeated in all the literature of these sects. "Our human experience is so small: the things of the earth may be bad, and more than bad, but, ah! if you only went beyond the moon! That is where the true cosmos begins." And of course, if we did ever go there, they would say it began beyond the sun. Idealism of a certain type will have its way; if hard life produces an ounce or a pound or a million tons of fact in the scale against it, it merely dreams of infinite millions in its own scale, and the enemy is outweighed and smothered. I do wish to mock at these Posidonian Stoics and Hermetics and Neo-Platonists. They loved goodness, and their faith is strong and even terrible. One feels rather inclined to bow down before their altars and cry: "Magna est Delusio et prævalebit."

Yet on the whole one rises from these books with the impression that all this allegory and mysticism is bad for men. It may make the emotions sensitive, it certainly weakens the understanding. And, of course, in this paper I have quite left out of account the really gross forms of superstition. In any consideration of the balance, they should not be forgotten.

If a reader of Proclus and the Corpus Hermeticum wants relief, he will find it perhaps best in the writings of a gentle old Epicurean who lived at Œnoanda in Cappadocia about 200 A.D. His name was Diogenes. His works are preserved in a fragmentary state, not on papyrus or parchment, but on the wall of a large portico where he engraved them for passers-by to read:

"Being brought by age to the sunset of my life, and expecting at any moment to take my departure from the world with a song of joy for the fulness of my happiness, I have resolved, lest I be taken too soon, to give help to those of good temperament. If one person or two or three or four, or any

small number you choose, were in distress, and I were summoned out to help one after another, I would do all in my power to give the best counsel to each. But now, as I have said, the most of men lie sick, as it were of a pestilence, in their false beliefs about the world, and the tale of them increases; for by imitation they take the disease from one another, like sheep. And further, it is only just to bring help to those who shall come after us—for they too are ours, though they be yet unborn; and love for man commands us also to help strangers who may pass by. Since therefore the good message of the Book has gone forth to many, I have resolved to make use of this wall and to set forth in public the medicine of the healing of mankind."

The people of his time and neighbourhood seem to have fancied the old man must have some bad motive. They understood mysteries and revelations. They understood magic and curses. But they were puzzled, apparently, by this simple message, which only told them to use their reason and their sympathy and not be terrified of death and evil spirits.

There are doubtless truths more complete and faiths more inspiring than those taught by Epicurus and the various thinkers who have trod in his footsteps from that age to the present. Yet these doctrines and the attitude of mind they engender have done for mankind work of priceless value. They have been a steady corrective of the cruelty and madness that have always haunted the outskirts of supernatural religion, and a tonic of the mind to those who would fain flinch from the conflict with reality to comfort themselves in dreams.

"There is nothing to fear in God. There is nothing to feel in Death. That which man desires can be attained. That which man dreads can be endured." But I despair of translating the last two sentences.

GILBERT MURRAY.

 ^{1 *}Αφοβον ὁ θεός. 'Αναίσθητον ὁ θάνατος.
 Τὸ ἀγαθὸν εὖκτητον. Τὸ δεινὸν εὖεκκαρτέρητον.

IDEALS IN EDUCATION.

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THE bitter controversies which in this country gather round educational questions may lead us sometimes to forget the real progress that has been made in the last forty years. Not only has elementary education been broadened in its scope, and its administration become more human and practical, but the Government has taken over the responsibility for a great part of our higher education.

A new system of secondary schools has been created, with national aid and to some extent under national control; the older grammar schools, which once existed in isolated independence only qualified by the fitful and inconsequent interference of the Charity Commission, have now become part of an organised system, more or less adjusted to local and national needs; while the rise and development of the newer public schools, such as Clifton, Malvern, Bradfield, and the schools of the Woodard foundation, witness to the continued belief in an education of the young based upon the discipline of a corporate life.

In the whole range of education, from the primary school to the university, there has been expansion and development. If we are inclined sometimes to think that there is too much system, too much organisation, and to sigh for the good old days of "rule of thumb," let us remember that the change has not been in forms and in material conditions alone. It is a

substantial gain, for instance, that educational endowments nowadays are controlled by the Government, not as an appendage to the charities of the country, but as part of a great national system, embracing in its view the whole of our educational forces and attempting to use them with a just and generous economy. If there were only a change of names-Board of Education in place of Charity Commission—there would be little need for rejoicing: we all know the weaknesses of Government Boards, and we English are not very tolerant Burke's words are characteristic of the Englishman of his day and of ours: "We want no instructions from Boards of Trade or from any other Board." But I believe that the change in our Government system corresponds to a real change in spirit. Take the country at large: we may differ as to this or that subject to be taught, we may quarrel over the machinery of administration and the selection of teachers, but we no longer treat education as a matter of casual charity, but as a substantial element in the life of the people, momentous for good and evil. Consider, too, the widened range. Forty years ago, it meant only what was called the three R's for most of the nation, higher education often ill-considered and ill-organised for a small fraction, and university education for but a handful of the people. In the interval, not only have the two older universities become centres of national education to a degree in which they never were before, but there has been an extraordinary development of new universities and colleges of university type: Manchester, developed from the old Owens College, Liverpool, Leeds, Sheffield, and quite recently Bristol and the university colleges of Nottingham, Exeter, and Reading-all lively centres of higher education. Remember, too, that this vast development of personal teaching has grown up side by side with an immense increase in the production of printed books. That is the best evidence of its In spite of the fact that on nearly every subject nowadays good books are accessible, these new institutions have arisen as a testimony to the value of organised and personal

teaching. This is but one example of that growing sense of the value of corporate life—of the influence of mind on mind in a society with common ideals—which distinguishes this generation from that which saw the passing of the Reform Bill.

There are a few aspects of the educational advance. It may be worth while to consider what is the spirit and what are the aims of this new organisation. Whither are we going? What do we desire to achieve? What are our ideals? It is one great weakness of our national life to-day that in every department we are so deeply immersed in discussions of detail—necessary, it may be, but not vital—that we rarely find a quiet moment to think over the principles which should direct us, the controlling ideas which must govern and guide the whole.

What, then, are we to aim at in education? It is impossible to do more than consider a few main aspects of the answer to this question; but I think it would be true to say that there are three elements which most of us admit as forming part of our ideal: Knowledge, Efficiency, Character. Let us consider them in turn and see how far we can bring these ideas to bear on the education of to-day.

Knowledge.—Those of us who have read Plato's Republic (his description of the Ideal City) know that in his view education is a lifelong process, beginning in childhood and continued, at least for the more chosen minds, from stage to stage of life until it culminates in the perfect knowledge of the philosopher. The philosopher, who is at the head of the State, not only contemplates the highest truth, the very essence of goodness, but is enabled by his vision to direct the State upon its course and to educate his fellow-citizens to be in their turn rulers or obedient citizens according to their capacity. Whatever we may think of Plato's metaphysics or psychology, however much we may disagree with some of the ordinances of his ideal State, I take it that most of us will agree with him (1) that education is a continuous and vital process, (2) that it is bound up with the general life of the community,

(3) and finally—and this is what we are immediately concerned with—that it must be inspired and controlled by an ideal of knowledge or science, of knowledge as good in itself, as the normal goal of man's effort, and as, in some sense, the union of man's mind with the divine thought of the universe. it is said, "All this seems abstract and remote; what has this to do with everyday education? Can the children of the gutter or the slums, can even the children of the well-to-do labouring and middle classes, have any contact with the higher side of knowledge, with the ordered science of nature, with historical or literary research, with philosophy, which attempts to view man's mind in its relation to nature and to knowledge?"-the answer is: all education, from the lowest upwards, if it is to be fruitful and alive, must have some touch of this higher spirit, the love of knowledge for its own sake. Curiosity, the desire to know, however rudimentary, belongs to the earliest years; and early education must be largely concerned in converting this vague curiosity into a keen and intelligent interest in men and things, and in equipping the young mind with the materials which are indispensable for further progress. Reading and writing may seem far away from science and research, but they are the first step; and even these "beggarly elements" may, in the hands of a true teacher, be made to convey some breath of the higher spirit. But this can only be done if the teacher is himself inspired with a belief in knowledge-in other words, with a belief that the world is worth knowing, and that life is worth living, and that to know what life means and to understand the beauty and the movement of nature is one of the highest and purest interests a man can have. The teacher must have faith.

How do we stand, here in England, in regard to this aspect of education—the belief in knowledge and the desire to attain to it? I am afraid it is true to say that, as a people, we do not in our heart of hearts believe in knowledge. We who are countrymen of such great discoverers

as Newton and Harvey, Faraday and Darwin, have never fully entered into our inheritance. "The wind bloweth where it listeth "-a noble and a true saying: but I sometimes think that we English men and women have interpreted these words to mean that knowledge and invention are a matter of chance; that certain people are born what we vulgarly call "clever," and the rest of us are to leave knowledge and research to them; that the pursuit of knowledge is but a byway for certain select and half-uncanny spirits, whom we admire, but do not attempt to understand, and whom we are reluctant to reward or even to keep alive. It is one of the great glories of the French democracy that it has always with unquestioning liberality devoted its thousands to the unproductive pursuit of knowledge. The same is true of our German kinsmen. They have a genuine faith in "Wissenschaft," in the power of science, and are steadfast in its pursuit, whether in the regions of archæology or of scientific and historical research: they afford us in this matter a noble example. For ourselves, we can barely manage to maintain our national museums and libraries, and the sums which we give in the year to historical research would hardly pay for more than the firing of a few salutes from the North Sea fleet. Happily there are signs of a change of mind in this respect, and I believe that a Government which should have the courage to appeal to our democracy to do more in this direction would meet with a hearty response. The reception by the public of the recent grant toward Antarctic enterprise is a good sign. Of one thing I am sure, and that is that the best of our artisan class are more and more coming to believe in the value of scientific knowledge, and to realise that national education is a great and living whole, and that if elementary and secondary education are to be of any permanent value, they must be in living contact with those higher studies which our universities and university colleges exist to foster and promote. The older universities themselves, which have at some periods of our history been in danger of becoming little more than superior finishing schools, were, I believe, never more alive than they are now to the necessity not merely of communicating knowledge, but of pursuing it. If we can spread this spirit through the nation, if we can get Englishmen to believe, as Scotsmen and Germans and Frenchmen believe, in the greatness of science and of learning, we shall have given a strength and solidity to our national education which it has sadly lacked in the past.

"Multi pertransibunt et augebitur scientia," "Many shall go to and fro and knowledge shall be increased," was the noble motto which Bacon prefixed to his Advancement of Learning. It was a fitting motto for an age which had seen the old barriers of the world broken down and new continents opened to man's exploring mind, and it gave a new impulse to European thought. But we, the countrymen of Bacon, have signally failed to absorb his spirit: we have indeed gone to and fro in the world, and individual Englishmen have done great things in every branch of research and discovery, but we have not as a nation taken home to our hearts the belief in the unity and solidarity of learning, the belief in scholarship and science as the work of an organised and progressive society, inspiring from above every intellectual movement, however humble, in the national life. Whatever else we may do, we can never make our educational system satisfactory unless our teachers, in all grades, in our schools, colleges, and universities, have something of this spirit—the spirit of inquiry and wonder and faith—the belief in knowledge not as the chance inspiration of an idle day, but as the slow movement of patient, and persistent, and organised effort.

No national system of education will achieve its end unless it is touched from the first with a live coal from off the altar of knowledge—unless its humbler teachers are in living contact with the higher movement of thought and discovery—so that, however faintly, they may convey to the minds of the young some sense of the greatness of the intellectual world. Such a spirit will foster in young minds

that curiosity which will in a few develop one day into the passion of research or the practical pursuit of science—into the enthusiasm of Browning's "Grammarian," or the adventurous faith of Tennyson's "Ulysses," with his purpose set

"To follow knowledge like a sinking star Beyond the utmost bound of human thought."

Efficiency.—We have heard a great deal in late years of efficiency. If rightly understood, we may well accept it as one element in our ideal of education. Clearly, children must be taught not only "to know," but "to do." Any education stands condemned that produces inefficient men. Schiller somewhere sums up the two views of knowledge:

"To this man she's a goddess tall
That lifts a star-encircled head,
To that a fine cow in a stall
That gives him butter to his bread."

The higher idea of knowledge, as I have just said, is indispensable: all education, like the progress in Dante's pilgrimage, must end in the stars, in

"L'amor che muove il sole e l'altre stelle."

"The love that moves the sun and all the stars,"

Man may not live on bread alone: but he cannot live without bread. In the mid-Victorian age, when the Encyclopædia of Useful Knowledge was published, and when Mechanics' Institutes were almost the only means of higher instruction for the people, this side of education was expressed, perhaps too often, in terms of useful knowledge, and the accumulation of facts. We have made some advance since then. What we ask for now is not so much information, as a trained intelligence, an alert habit of mind, the power of concentration on the one hand, and the free play of a mind at home in its subject on the other. That is what we mean by efficiency. It no longer means the mere learning of useful accomplishments, of typewriting, book-keeping, and shorthand, before we have learnt to write and read. Short cuts to efficiency may lead very far astray. We have first to give to our children the simple instruments of knowledge and some tincture, however slight,

of history and literature. Before we begin on any education which is technical or special, we must at least add to the three R's in the narrow sense the power to read aloud—an art too much neglected-and some knowledge of the history of our country and its kindred nations, and of the wider world outside, and some training, however simple, in the science of nature. It is no doubt a difficult question to decide at what particular point special or technical education is to begin: it will begin earlier or later according to circumstances, but it must be securely based on a solid foundation of general knowledge, however rudimentary. Nowhere is it truer than in education that "the more haste the less speed": we must be content to wait in patience. Special education is necessary, we all admit, for the great professions-lawyers, teachers, doctors; for the artisan, to supply the gap left by the disappearance of apprenticeship; for the country labourer's children, to awaken in them an intelligent interest in the land and its latent powers, and in the wonders of country life: but wherever we apply it, we must remember that what we want to produce is not a highly specialised instrument, which will become useless as soon as the special need that it serves has disappeared, but an alert and active intelligence that will readily adapt itself to new surroundingsa trained and scientific habit of mind—a confidence that there is a right way of doing things, and that scamped work is disgraceful, because it is not only an offence against one's neighbour, but a betrayal of one's own higher intelligence.

The field is a wide one, and there is much still to be done. The problem of maintaining a high level of efficiency among our working class is always with us—and by working class I do not mean merely the artisan and the labourer, but the active men of every calling in the country. In the so-called labouring class the ideal of efficiency will demand prolonged age of schooling and ample provision and encouragement of evening classes; in the professions it will ask for a wider outlook and a wiser blending of theory and practice; in all classes it must

insist on a belief in scientific training, a keener enthusiasm for good work, and the powerful inspiration which is given by the sense of common service; from men of leisure it will ask a closer study of social conditions and a more intelligent application of ideas both to administration—local, national, and imperial—and to the solution of the urgent problems of social well-being. We have plenty of flabby goodwill, plenty of illorganised effort—here, as in so many regions, we want clear thought, concentration, co-operation.

But amid much that is discouraging there are signs of a new spirit. Let me take two instances. I believe it is true to say that the officers of the British Army have in the last ten years gained a seriousness and a sense of the scientific aspects of their calling which perhaps as a class they have never had before; or, to turn to more peaceful things, there is a wholesome movement going on in the public schools for the promotion of civic education-not the teaching of political principles in the abstract, still less of party politics, but instruction in the leading facts of government, in the varied opportunities and claims of public service. Hitherto it has been a reproach levelled against our great public schools (which I name with all respect) that they have been out of touch with the life of the people, and that, in spite of their admirable training of the young in qualities of endurance, independence, courage, and command, they have been too much cut off from the daily life of the citizen; that the public schoolboy is unable to appreciate properly the pinch of poverty in one class, the pressure of monotony in another—in a word, to understand the complex facts of social and administrative life as they present themselves in the great centres of industry. Without such knowledge and sympathy our upper classes must be inefficient.

The same principle of efficiency is appealing to another section of the governing classes—to the artisans and day-workers. The work of such institutions as Ruskin College and of the Workers' Educational Union is a sign that those who represent the living forces of "labour" in the narrower sense have

realised that they cannot be efficient without a deeper and more thorough training in science and the humanities. In all these instances the conception of efficiency is broad and national and alive. These are hopeful signs.

There remains the third element in the ideal of education-character and conduct. The great German historian Mommsen, himself a character as well as an intellect of uncommon force, criticised the English universities twenty years ago as merely schools for what he called "Gentlemanbildung," the formation of gentlemen, instead of centres of scientific impulse and research; and it is true that our higher schools and universities have, in the past, made too little of science and too much of manners. They have embodied in concentrated form the British belief in character and esprit de corps, combined with its rooted distrust of ideas. Among the younger generation of teachers, both in schools and universities, there is indeed a new spirit; but, as I have already said, there is still much educational work to be done before our countrymen will take home to their hearts the idea of ordered science as a condition of national existence. The two sides of education cannot be separated-we pride ourselves on making men or making gentlemen; but without the intellectual element, how insular, how provincial our type of character will be! But for the moment we are concerned with the other side of the question. "Conduct," Matthew Arnold used to tell us, "is three-fourths of life," and conduct is the expression of character. How do our schools stand to-day in relation to character? How is this side of education affected by our new methods? We may say at once that the existence of the religious controversy in education shows that as a people we are still concerned to develop character and not merely to quicken intelligence; for the religious question fundamentally is the question of how the Christian type of character is to be educated and maintained. But while we are fighting over machinery it may be that the moving forces escape us. What is it that we are aiming at? Is it to bring up men and women who can repeat the Christian

creed correctly, or is it to develop that union of strength and gentleness in the individual life and in personal character which is the noblest part of the Christian inheritance? It is right that a man should be able to justify the faith that is in him; that is part of his intellectual training, but we must not emphasise it too early. Discipline at this stage is more important than doctrine. For the young the first condition of wholesome education is the discipline of good habit, the surroundings of a wholesome atmosphere, the influence of character on character, of spirit upon spirit. I trust that in the long-run it will be possible to provide without conflict or friction for the religious instruction of English children. In many parts of Great Britain it is happily already achieved by the co-operation of men and women who, without sacrificing any conviction, recognise that "the half is greater than the whole," and that the day-school, with its ordinary teaching machinery, cannot accomplish the whole religious training—that the Churches as such must do their part, and that parents too have a responsibility which they cannot shirk. But in the school the first condition of all is to get the best teachers. To them I shall return.

Now if this controversy is an expression of our belief in the importance of character, the question behind it all is: What character?

With all our professions of the overwhelming importance of this side of life, we often fail to put before ourselves any clear idea of the character that we wish to produce. And if any unprejudiced person surveys the England of to-day as seen in its newspapers and its daily life, the prospect is not altogether encouraging.

There are three symptoms, it seems to me, of dangerous significance in the popular ideals of to-day.

It is universally assumed that to have what is called "a good time" is one of the first things to be aimed at in life. In the family and in society the reaction from a narrow Puritanism is producing a cult of pleasure for its own sake which threatens to destroy the fibre of our people.

In some measure, perhaps, this has been encouraged by the introduction of new methods in education which have their good side. From the sound doctrine, that all teaching should proceed from the easier to the harder, a false deduction has been drawn that hard work of any kind is to be avoided. and that the paths of learning are to be always paths of pleasantness. There is some danger that the sense of discipline -the bracing, tonic element in education-may disappear. The tendency spreads beyond the schoolroom. It is one aspect. but a distorted aspect, of the idea that self-development, the free play of man's faculties, is part of the law of human life: a sound theory, provided that freedom is not viewed in the abstract, but as guided by wise direction and self-control; a theory fatal to moral fibre and to the best things in life, if it means the surrender of man's nature to the pleasures of the moment.

A second dangerous sign is the tendency to hysteria, and to forced sentiment, which perhaps is only one symptom of the habit of making pleasure the end. The person who consults his own pleasure will be always studying his own feelings and will lose his poise and balance: if he is not careful, he will become neurotic, valetudinarian, hysterical.

There are many books about in men's hands, and even in children's hands, at the present time, which encourage this tendency—which lead to the rearing of prigs and unwholesome sentimentalists.

We have grave problems to face in the world to-day. I need only name two. At home we have what is the problem of the Western world—the social and economic problem of the right relations of labour and capital, riches and poverty. Abroad we have the increasingly acute problem arising out of the neighbourhood of great armed nations. These are momentous questions, which need above all for their solution sympathy without sentimentalism, a calm judgment, disciplined self-possession in word and deed. Are these the qualities which our teachers in the pulpit and the press are encouraging

among us? I wish that we could say "Yes" with a whole heart.

And thirdly, and chiefly, we are rudely reminded from day to day that it is an age, to use an ugly Americanism, of "hustling." Vulgar and blatant advertisements, not only in the advertisement columns, but in large-type correspondence in our newspapers, force on us the conclusion that to strive and cry in the streets is to many minds the highest pathway of effort. Somehow or other we have to see to it that our young men and women achieve independence and individuality without self-assertion. As we watch the tendencies I have described, heightened and encouraged by the swift movement, the mechanical noise and glitter of our city life, we must, I think, determine more and more to seek in those whom we charge with the task of educating our children and young people a spirit that shall counteract these influences. Such symptoms are indeed signs of the stirring of life; they are signs, it may be, that the world is in transition, feeling after new ideals. But if one section of society is struggling after a mechanical reconstruction of the social order, and another is bent on pushing the struggle after wealth and power to its utmost extreme, there are others to whom more spiritual methods make their appeal. We must not despair, but cultivate in ourselves and in those whom we trust with our children the old-fashioned virtues of "self-reverence, selfknowledge, self-control."

How are these virtues to be bred in our society? In the first place, the physical conditions of education must be studied. Much of our hysteria and our clamour is due to over-strain, to bad or foolish feeding, want of exercise, ill-balanced development. There is no need to labour this point—our Conferences on school hygiene, our Mothers' Unions, and many social efforts of this kind bear witness that the modern world is alive to this necessity.

Secondly, we must see to it that in all classes education shall not be ruined by overcrowding. I mean the over-

crowding, not of the house or of the tenement, but of the time-table. Professor Huxley used to tell a story of that eminent poet and man of letters, Southey, who, when he had explained to a member of the Society of Friends the careful distribution of his daily hours among his many tasks, was suddenly surprised with the question, "And when, Mr Southey, dost thee find time to think?"

In school, at college, at home, let us give to all those in whose well-being we are interested some secure intervals of quiet when they can think for themselves, and have time to digest the experiences that crowd about them in life and books. Games are good, and have their proper place in all education—they help to give the faculties fresh spring; but they are not all we need. The mind that is to develop strength must retire into itself.

There is a real danger in England to-day that we should live too much in public. We all belong to too many societies—we are apt to suppose that mere company in itself, without guidance or inspiration, will achieve something for us. We may belong to a score of societies, and be no nearer to the common life unless we have lived and thought ourselves into the principles that our societies embody. The Christian Church, the most potent society for good life that the world has ever known, has recognised in the life of its Lord and Master the profound truth that is embodied in the prelude to His ministry: that only in solitude, returning upon itself to hold communion with its highest thoughts and with God, can the human spirit find strength to face its work.

The "happy warrior," the ideal soldier, is not he whose every working hour has been crowded with the study of tactics, or filled with the controversies of competing military schools, but the man who

> "through the heat of conflict keeps the law In calmness made, and sees what he foresaw."

Somehow or other we must make an effort to secure this tranquil element in education. We must do it partly by not

demanding too much actual achievement in young scholars—let us be content with turning their eyes in the right direction and letting them find their way,—and partly by contriving that in this increasingly noisy world, where so many fair scenes have been defaced or defiled, we may preserve at least islands of solitude and beauty in which we may renew our spirits and return to the workaday world refreshed. There are people—good people, too—who will argue that you should have light railways to carry people to every beautiful solitude, in order that millions may share its beauty. Let us not believe the Light Railway Commissioners or the railway contractors when they use these arguments.

"Three years she grew in sun and shower,
Then Nature said, 'A lovelier flower
On earth was never sown;
This Child I to myself will take,
She shall be mine, and I will make
A lady of my own.

Myself will to my darling be
Both law and impulse: and with me
The Girl, in rock and plain,
In earth and heaven, in glade and bower,
Shall feel an overseeing power
To kindle or restrain.

The floating clouds their state shall lend
To her; for her the willow bend;
Nor shall she fail to see
Even in the motions of the storm
Grace that shall mould the maiden's form
By silent sympathy.'"

It is not every child of man whose imagination will be touched to the same fine issues as the "Lucy" of Wordsworth's poem: but she embodies once for all an aspect of education which we cannot ignore without peril.

"In quietness ye shall possess your souls."

Some of us may have had the good fortune to meet in our wanderings a simple blue-eyed shepherd in the Highlands or on the Berkshire downs, who had never been to a big town, who made one feel a small and poor thing beside the dignity of face and feature moulded amid "the lonely hills"; and there are men and women who have lived the simple life in our colonies, who make us think how gladly we would exchange the restless hysteria of some of our town-bred folk for the serene poise and dignity of these children of Nature.

Another way in which we must aim at securing the same atmosphere of repose, which is one of the first conditions for the nurture of character, is by bringing the minds of each generation into contact with great literature, and in particular with great poetry. No nation has a richer heritage of poetry than our own, and cheap printing has put it within the reach of all; but it needs a key, and no greater crown of glory can be won by a teacher than by setting his children on the right road—by teaching them to see what is best in thought and language, by familiarising them with the beauty of rhythm and expression, and by preparing them to explore for themselves in later days the books of the great writers of the world, Homer and Plato, Virgil and Dante, Shakespeare, Milton, and Wordsworth.

And if this is true of literature, it is true also of art, and the greatest works of art. In the last fifty years we have come to realise that there is a wide difference, however hard to define, between what is good and bad in art, and that in the perfect achievement of the former men can find as artists and as spectators one of the purest pleasures. But if at present the power to understand and appreciate the fine arts is not very widely spread, in music it is to be hoped we are recovering something of the finer taste and surer touch that found expression in the folk-songs of the older English world. The revival of the Old English folk-songs and dances is another hopeful sign that this side of education, the training of the body in graceful movement and of the voice in tuneful sound, may be made to minister to true culture. Even in the early days of school, music and art in their simpler forms may make their appeal, and may help to form that wholesome atmosphere which separates the cultivated life from the vulgar and the brutal. Happy are those children who are set upon the right road when they are young!

And if in literature and the fine arts and music the human spirit finds expression for thoughts and impulses and aspirations which attune the whole life to a finer key, how much more is this true of the atmosphere created by religion! We must indeed recognise that religion will present itself differently to different minds. To some men it will make its appeal in the more mystical form of communion with the divine spirit in nature.

"A sense sublime
Of something far more deeply interfused,
Whose dwelling is the light of setting suns,
And the round ocean and the living air,
And the blue sky, and in the mind of man."

Others will find it in the contemplation of the life and example of a Divine Master, and in the inspiration of a great society founded for the promotion of a common life of the spirit—the victory of man over sin and wrong. But common to all its manifestations will be the sense of a larger existence, in which the struggle of this world is merged in self-surrender, and in which through strife and struggle somehow peace is attained.

"In la sua voluntade è nostra pace."—Par. 3. 86.

"In his will is our peace."

Let us make up our minds as Christian men and women that it is our bounden duty to find some means of reconciliation on the question of religious education, so that children may not grow up with their sense of reverence, of self-sacrifice, of the power of a common life, stunted and starved. At this moment there is a remarkable religious stirring in all the universities of the world—the movement called the Christian Students' Union. Whether we are in personal association with it or not, we must recognise in it a sign that the religious forces of the world are not spent, and that in higher education, as in elementary, Christian fellowship and the Christian ideal have still a great part to play.

I have touched on some of the points of interest in modern

education; one cannot touch them without some criticism of modern English life.

We are driven sometimes to think that our national character is changing, and changing for the worse. Some of the obvious faults of the age have been mentioned—its want of dignity and self-control, its tendency to selfishness and vulgarity; and some of the counteracting influences have been suggested. But all these things are mere idle words, the crackling of thorns under a pot, unless they are embodied in personality. In the last resort our education will depend not on our buildings and equipment, though it is well to have these good, not on the curriculum, though that is important, but on the men and women who give it life. Education is indeed, as we have seen, a far wider matter than the four walls of school and college; it depends not only on the teacher in the narrow sense, but on our clergy, our journalists, and last, not least, on the parents and on the home-life of our people. "It moves together if it moves at all." For a people, in the long-run, gets the education that it deserves to get. Its education, like its other institutions, depends upon its national character. If our national education in the widest sense is to be worthy of the name, we must lift our whole conception of life.

We must have ideals. That is the first condition. And we must find the best teachers possible, and trust them and support them, even if it be at the cost of some sacrifice of personal convenience and preference. If the common life and the corporate spirit, which is its life-breath, are worth anything, they are worth paying for.

We want the best teachers. In the selection of our teachers we must ask ourselves first, not, who is going to earn us the best grant, nor even who has the highest academical honours (though this may count for something), but who is the best teacher, the man who can inspire those he teaches with a faith in knowledge, in sound work, and in sound character—who can give play to their imagination while he can command and control them to the highest ends. This may seem a large

demand—and no doubt the perfect teacher is not to be found; we must compromise, as practical men. But let us, above all, choose men and women who are human and alive, and who have power to inspire in others the faith that is in themselves.

One is tempted sometimes to think that a moral revival is needed in our nation if we are indeed to survive in the struggle for existence. Discipline, thoroughness, docility: if we can add these qualities to our national inheritance of honesty and independence, courage and command—if we can combine a wider outlook, a quickened imagination, with the more solid virtues of our race,—then and only then our national character will have nothing to fear.

In this the schoolmaster has a great part to play. "Schoolmasters," says a shrewd writer of the seventeenth century, "when they are such as they ought to be, have it in their power to new model and set right (by God's blessing) once in twenty years a whole kingdom." But they cannot achieve much unless public opinion is behind them: the reform, if it is to come, must penetrate all classes. Not knowledge alone, nor goodwill alone, can make us better men; but a new spirit.

Much may be achieved, no doubt, by legal enactment—by the raising of school age, and the like; but much remains for the ordinary citizen to do. He may strengthen the hands of the teachers by showing interest without fussiness; he may exercise the strongest influence on good education by promoting to civic honours and duties the wisest and best of his fellow-citizens instead of the most pushing and plausible; he may in his own personal life cultivate the virtues of mind and character which shall sweeten the atmosphere of the growing generation. The task of the great teacher, as of the prophet and the higher statesman, must often be one of lonely struggle. Let us make it our endeavour to discern, if it may be, the spirit of the true leaders and teachers of men of our own generation, and to strengthen their hands while they are yet

with us, instead of waiting to build them sepulchres when they are dead.

Two generations ago Thomas Arnold, in his short life of forty-seven years, gave a new direction and a new impulse to the whole of English education. It is given to few men to make this impression on their age. But we may all, according to our strength, take a part in the work in which he was a leader, and share in his spirit, striving to build up our nation in manliness and wisdom and the love of God.

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THE PRESENT CRISIS OF THE CHRISTIAN RELIGION.

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CHRISTIANITY is the reflection of men upon Jesus of Nazareth and the experience to which Jesus of Nazareth has given rise. Nothing that was strange to Him is essential to it. A man ceases to be a Christian when ideals foreign to Him or conceptions foreign to Him become essentials of his religious life. However deeply we may value the experience of the centuries, we can do more than regard it as a commentary on the Gospels. It is an exposition, a revelation, a disentanglement, if you please, of the spirit of Jesus, but it is informed by Him and must be conformed to Him. If in the course of many centuries the belief arises that, because of the advent of Jesus in the world, men have learned that an infallible pope of an authoritative church is necessary to lead men into His truth, a consensus of opinion on the part of a few thousand of us that it is not convenient just now would not avail to abolish that church; the conviction must arise rather that the church is contrary to the spirit of Jesus of Nazareth before the conviction becomes effective with Christians. Or if in the course of the Hegelian philosophy it becomes clear to a few choice spirits that Christianity is a belief in the incarnation of every soul and in the atoning value of every human suffering, the spread and authority of this conception among Christians will be contingent upon their belief that these dogmas tally with

the purpose and spirit of Jesus of Nazareth. If the world becomes convinced that Jesus of Nazareth has not in some way established a form of life that is authoritative and the highest conceivable and hence divine, then Christianity is done with. We shall be religious, but we shall call ourselves Christians only because of the old gibe of the Jews at Antioch, if we call ourselves Christians at all. We shall no longer call Jesus Lord. If this be true in general, it follows that the present crisis in the Christian religion comes from some sharp attack upon that sum total of influences that Jesus of Nazareth set going in the acceptable year of the Lord. Now it seems to me that this sum total of influences which we designate when we say Jesus of Nazareth may be broadly divided into three great spiritual forces, viz. what Jesus took for granted, what Jesus taught, and what Jesus was.

I am convinced that the present crisis of the Christian religion is due to the fact that all three of these primal Christian forces have been attacked with a vigour, a skill, and an effectiveness never before known in the history of Christianity.

It is a commonplace to say that Jesus never attempted to prove the existence and the power of God. His world took it for granted. So did He. And the God He took for granted was not a vague Spirit but a God with a proper Name. "Hear, O Israel, the Lord, Thy God, the Lord is one," or, as otherwise translated, "The Lord is our God, the Lord is one," which, being interpreted, is: "Jehovah is our God." The God Jesus took for granted created the world in six days, and blew His breath into the nostrils of a curious body of clay that He had prepared for that purpose. He was the Lord of lightnings and thunder, not only sending His sun and rain on the evil and the good, but renewing the jar of meal and cruse of oil for the widow of Zarephath, cleansing Naaman the Syrian, engaging in a continual but triumphant conflict with the demons of which the world was full, and having at His beck legions of angels with which to defend His

own. The God Jesus took for granted was in no sense identical with nature nor bound by its laws. He was Sovereign, and He was taken for granted to such an extent that one of His disciples could say that whoever cometh to God must believe that He is.

It appears to me that, no matter how poetic we make many of the utterances of Jesus, it is quite evident that He believed in a God who was Creator and Upholder of the earth with its attendant stars and sun, and the Succourer at His own free will of the men whom He loved the best.

This conception of God is no longer universal. It is no longer regnant in scientific and perhaps not even in University circles. If Jesus took it for granted and built up from it, we, I think, may not.

Many causes and influences and men have had to do with this change. Certainly one of the most effective influences is embodied in a man whom the last hundred years have admitted to a place among the immortals, Charles Darwin. His own religious history is typical of the religious history of our age.

At first he was convinced of the supernatural God. He relished Paley's theology. But a voyage on the "Beagle" started a distaste for it, and when he wrote the Origin of Species he had virtually given up his belief in the miraculous, and, I think, in Christianity. He, however, still believed in God as the great First Cause of the wondrous evolution of life. Later, however, while never an atheist, he lost his faith, and wrote himself down at the end as an agnostic. It almost seems as if he were speaking for his generation when he describes this course of his frankly, affectingly, as follows: "Another source of conviction in the existence of God, connected with reason and not feelings, impresses me as having much more weight. This follows from the extreme difficulty, or rather impossibility, of conceiving this immense and wonderful universe, including man, with his capacity of looking backwards and into futurity, as the result of blind chance or necessity. When thus reflecting I feel compelled to look to

a First Cause, having an intelligent mind in some degree analogous to that of man; and I deserve to be called a Deist. This conclusion was strong in my mind about the time, as far as I can remember, when I wrote the *Origin of Species*; and it is since that time that it has very gradually, with many fluctuations, become weaker. But then arises the doubt, Can the mind of man, which has, as I fully believe, been developed from a mind as low as that possessed by the lowest animals, be trusted when it draws such grand conclusions? I cannot pretend to throw the least light on such abstruse problems. The mystery of the beginning of all things is insoluble by us; and I, for one, must be content to remain an agnostic."

This hesitating drift toward a possible materialism has, it seems to me, become more marked in certain most influential scientific quarters. Simply, to give two examples, I may refer first to the notable book Darwinism To-day, a most painstaking survey of all recent biological theory, by Vernon Kellogg, Professor in Leland Stanford Junior University, a man who recognises that the drift of biological opinion is toward what he calls anti-Darwinism. He, for himself, stands inquiringly before the mystery of life, which antedates all selection of life types, and examines all manner of theories of its origin and development. But to many Christian men a statement such as this at the close of the book is exceedingly depressing: "No present-day biologist is ready to fall back on the long-deserted standpoint of theology and ascribe to heterogenesis or orthogenesis an auto-determination toward adaptiveness and fitness. Modification and development may have been proved to occur along determinate lines without the aid of natural selection. I believe they have. But such development cannot have an aim" (pp. 375-6). And again: "Unless we start, with theologists, on the insecure basis of teleology" (p. 377).

But this American witness to the trend in large scientific circles is very quiet and low-voiced in comparison with that im-

mense movement in Germany which is known as monism, and which is the outcome of the materialistic speculation of Haeckel, one of the world's foremost biologists. He delights in the word atheism, which Darwin rejected, and says: "Materialism alone (der Mechanismus) gives us a real explanation of the works of nature, because it refers these to real causes, to blind and unconscious motives which are themselves caused by the material constitution of the specific nature-bodies in question" (Welt-räthsel, p. 104). "It ought not to be denied that the belief in a moral order of the world, just as in a merciful Providence, possesses a high ideal worth. It comforts the sorrowing, strengthens the weak, exalts those in misfortune. As long as man remains sufficiently childish and inexperienced, he may console himself with such creations of the imagination. But the advanced culture of the present tears him loose from this beautiful world of ideals, and places him before problems which only the sensible knowledge of reality will solve. Undoubtedly an early adaptation of ourselves to this real world will make the highly educated man of the future not only more intelligent and unprejudiced, but also better and happier" (p. 110). When we realise that this monistic movement is spreading among the working classes as well as among scientists by great leaps, when we note that several thousand men in Berlin alone have renounced the Christian faith publicly in one year, we may understand something of the impossibility of taking for granted what Jesus took for granted. We must either fight for or renounce that which was given Him.

The second constitutive element of the Christian religion is what Jesus of Nazareth taught.

The kernel of that teaching may probably be best discovered in those two commandments which apparently summed up for Him human obligation, the quintessence of human life. It consists accordingly in love to God and man, and in exterminating all that weakens either.

In former days this ideal of human virtue was regarded as an axiom in the Christian world. So axiomatic did it appear

that it was hardly regarded as Christian, rather simply as a great human intuition. It still meets with widespread approval, but with a feeling in some quarters that the second commandment should have preceded the first-that service sums up the Christian ideal, whether one is happy enough to be able to love the Christian God or not. Still, except for the circles in which, as already mentioned, the belief in God has been abandoned, this kernel of Christian teaching still remains binding. But in saying this we are not saying that the teaching of Jesus, as a whole, is unattacked to-day. The names of Nietzsche and Naumann-one violently attacking, the other reluctantly dissenting—are sufficient to remind us that what Jesus taught from His own experience has shared the fate of what Jesus received from the experiences of others. The defection of Naumann from the Church, and his earnest and sorrowful Letters on Religion, are still lamented by many a German Christian as the sharpest blow Christianity has received in recent years. His position is plain from these few words of his: "Here is a man who is a Christian and who loves his neighbour as himself. But when his neighbour becomes his business competitor, his love must cease and fighting begin. The business order demands: Thou shalt covet thy neighbour's house, market, influence. Thou, Nation, must desire what the other nation aims at or possesses. It is not true that the State is built on brotherly love or on the motives which base themselves in Jesus. It is built upon the purpose to make others serve it. It means power and struggle—the struggle to exist; how, then, can a man be a citizen of the empire and a disciple of Jesus? To serve the State is duty, and that duty is not a part of the discipleship of Christ; not all duty is Christian. I vote and work for the German fleet, not because I am a Christian but because I am a citizen and because I have learned to give up the hope of finding fundamental questions of State decided in the Sermon on the Mount. To follow our world-knowledge is the morality of the struggle for existence; to serve the Father of Jesus Christ is the morality of lovingkindness. But there are not two Gods, but one. Somewhere, somehow, they lock arms. But no mortal can say where or how."

Nietzsche is far more violent. There is nothing that he enjoys more than to cast stones at Jesus Christ's fundamental conceptions. "Nothing," he says, "amidst our unsound modernism is unsounder than Christian sympathy. I call Christianity the one great curse, the one great intrinsic depravity, the one immortal blemish of mankind." He condemns Christianity because he considers the will to love, which he found Christ insisting upon, an attitude fit only for slaves, whereas the will to power is the supreme attitude of noble men. One of the marvellous signs of the times is the widespread influence of this brilliant madman.

Yet it cannot be gainsaid that the blazing ferocity of Nietzsche and the reluctant departure of Naumann have made an impression upon orthodox Christian men. To give but one, though a most significant, example: Wilhelm Hermann is, I suppose, at present the leading systematic theologian in the Protestant world. His little book Die sittlichen Weisungen Jesu is devoted to the attempt to show that certain of the precepts of Jesus concerning care, the accumulation of riches, and the obligations of non-resentment are to be deliberately set aside by Christians of the present day because they are opposed to the free utterance of personality upon which Jesus insisted, and because they sprang from a view of the universe and of human government which cannot be maintained to-day. He says bluntly that if a man, instead of defending his rights, were voluntarily to give them away, he would end, not in the "Superman" but in the dirt. His conviction, like that of Naumann, is combined with such an abundant reverence for Jesus that we cannot but feel that it has been arrived at without prejudice and in all sincerity. The teaching of Jesus therefore is attacked to-day by those who revile Him on moral grounds, by those who are forced reluctantly to separate from His company, and by those who still walk humbly after the glory of His person.

The deepest and most ultimate thing in the Christian religion has yet to be mentioned. More personal and more directly productive of the Christian life of the ages than either what Jesus took for granted or what He taught, is what Jesus was. The words of Naumann at this point are so moving and so in harmony with the deepest thought of modern Christians that I cannot forbear quoting them. "He was the herald of the mysterious God, a meteoric stone that suddenly lay upon the earth, a rushing mountain stream. You see the shooting water, you search it, you hear it, you mark that it will never cease, you lose yourself before its might, you surrender all your being to it, think with it and in it. He is Personality itself, without tradition, without environment, without profession, the daring man; the most completely worked out individuality of history. Whoever desires to be himself an individual must go to Him. Whoever desires to learn to be fearless of death, to despise shame, to overcome ingratitude, to labour without seeing the fruit, to give himself without return, to attack old dominions, to build new spiritual worlds, to expand the souls of little men, to be in the world and yet above it, must call on Him. We seek the soul of God's Son, who had nothing but God within Him, the inner vision of the greatest religious power earth has known. We do not merely seek in Him an example: we drink His presence. The race renews itself from its progenitor."

Yet even the person of Jesus, the innermost citadel of the Christian religion, is being attacked to-day. The outer breastworks had long ago fallen. The inner breastworks, which we have been considering, are at least pretty thoroughly riddled, and the enemy has attacked this holy of holies that has been for centuries regarded not only as impregnable, but as unapproachable.

Jesus has been attacked as devoid of the finer reticences of mankind. Even as boys I think some of us shrank from the words: "Ye are from beneath, I am from above," "Ye are of your father, the devil," and all those sentences of give and take recorded in the earlier chapters of the Fourth Gospel. We have also quailed somewhat before His words to His mother: "Woman, what have I to do with thee? my hour is not yet come," and before His open and unhesitating claims to moral impeccability: "Which of you convicteth me of sin?" This attack, however, has been repulsed by the discovery of biblical critics that these sayings of His are all contained in an historically untrue Fourth Gospel.

But scarcely have we been rid of this attack than we have been forced to meet one coming from a directly opposite angle. Jesus may not be unduly blatant, but rather so humble and sincere that He confesses and perhaps exhibits the moral defects of ordinary humanity. Here we are pointed to the stories of the temptation, revealing the presence in His consciousness of unholy and unfilial desire; to His explicit declaration, "Why callest thou me good? none is good but one, that is, God"; to His fundamental prayer, "Forgive us our debts as we forgive our debtors"; and to His cry upon the cross, "My God, my God, why hast Thou forsaken me?"

In addition to this charge of normal human error and consciousness of guilt, implicitly confessed by Jesus in advancing to the baptism in the Jordan for the remission of sins, we have at least two specific charges against Jesus as authoritative leader of mankind. The first is that He believed in the particularism of the Jew, that He sent His disciples and held Himself as sent only "to the lost sheep of the house of Israel," that the few verses which open the door of hope to the Gentiles are of uncertain origin and could be omitted from the parables wherein they appear without marring their unity, that His words to the Syrophœnician, bearing the hallmarks of historicity, best express His mind on the position of the Jew among the races: "It is not meet to take the children's bread and cast it to the dogs." A man who cherished disdain for the larger part of men cannot be their pattern or their Lordcertainly not the incarnation of the spirit of love and tenderness. The second charge is even more serious. It is that

Jesus, while certainly not an impostor, is either a fanatic or an ecstatic-according to the peculiar flavour of the words for the user thereof. From first to last the secret of His inner consciousness, the source of His peculiar power over the demons, in whose existence, like most excitable religious Orientals, He believed as firmly as in His own or in His God's, and the mainspring of the authoritative words which He addressed to Pharisee, Sadducee, Roman, and Publican alike, was His consciousness of being the Messiah, who had come to overthrow the enemies of the Lord in the temporal and spiritual sphere. In order to fulfil the Scriptures and to justify the numerous late prophecies of darkness and disaster, He was to be sacrificed by a deluded public; but before the guilty generation had passed away, before the disciples could cover the cities of Israel, in the very sight of those who accused Him before the high priest, He should come in clouds of heaven with His holy angels about Him, whose succour He refused for the moment of His condemnation, but whose revenging swords would be drawn for Him when He came to set up the rule of God upon earth with His twelve intimates sitting upon thrones judging the tribes of Israel. He regarded His whole earthly career merely as a prelude to that. He came to announce the near approach of the Kingdom of God, not to found it; and the first petition He would have on every lip was not, as we have interpreted it, "Enlarge Thy kingdom," but "Thy kingdom come." The attitude of Paul and of the early disciples in expecting the coming of the Lord in the air, the assurance that all would not sleep but all would be changed into the likeness of the spiritual Lord of the coming kingdom, was thoroughly Christian and quite in accord with the spirit of their Master. This conception of Jesus springing up among the younger German professors has spread into England and seems to have captured the most brilliant and high-placed of English New Testament scholars. The following extract from a private letter to me from one of the leading English New Testament scholars may serve as an illustration of a temper now prevailing widely in biblical circles: "To me the earliest Christianity is a thing fitted to a particular far-off time of catastrophe, and I believe the Christian movement is only alive now because of its fresh developments, its continuously assimilating power, not because so much of what Jesus of Nazareth may have considered appropriate for His time happens to coincide with the ethical thought of the twentieth century. If I may express my views in theological terms, it is because of the abiding presence of the Spirit of God in the Christian society that the society still lives. Jesus set the movement in motion, but without the presence of something divine in the movement it would have stagnated long ago. Therefore I am not troubled when I seem to see a great deal of crudity and of illusion in primitive Christianity. I am not saying it may not all have been a dream, but it was that dream that shook the world, and I am terribly suspicious of phrases like 'sane and well-poised mind of the plain mechanic of Nazareth." And whatever we may think of the other attacks on the person of Jesus, I think we must all of us agree that unless some consensus of opinion among biblical critics justifies us in denying the authenticity of certain of the sayings of Jesus in the Gospel of Mark, we shall find this attack on our citadel the most dangerous in history. For even until now all things sidereal continue as they were since the beginning of the creation.

This, then, in my opinion, constitutes the present crisis of the Christian religion. Feeling uneasy at the attacks on Theism, which Jesus took for granted, we turn to the more original elements of Christianity. Surprised, we find elements of Jesus' teaching which seem scarcely able longer to command universal assent, and, falling back once more to His own person for an explanation of His teaching, for the first time in Christian history we have the terrible fear that even there the ground may slip from under our feet. Can it be that the vast edifice of the centuries may prove inadequate to breast the great storm beating upon it, that it may be found to be built

upon the sand, that the twentieth century may soon witness the most terrible catastrophe of human history and say to the centuries of sadness and gloom to follow, "The fall of that house was great"?

I have thus endeavoured to set forth in some systematic way the extent of the attack against our holy faith. I believe the situation to be most serious. I believe that conviction must gain upon us if the situation is to be met. The axe seems laid at the root of the tree. Can anything be done to increase its fruitfulness and to conserve its fruit? Is there any way out of our crisis? Can we hold our citadel? I believe so, if we do not underestimate the seriousness of our case.

It seems to me that we must choose between three possible plans of defence.

The first is the repulse of the attacking parties. We should, then, separate our forces into three companies: the chief purpose of the first company, officered by such men as Wallace, Lodge, and Denny, being the rehabilitation of the theistic breastwork; the chief purpose of the second, officered by Professor Peabody, Professor Wendt, and others, being the explanation of the teaching of Jesus; and the chief purpose of the third, officered by Sharman, Wrede, Bacon, etc., being the relentless extirpation of the eschatological attack.

This plan of defence is perfectly possible to undertake. Mr Wallace, the co-discoverer with Darwin of the great principle of Natural Selection, who attributes to it more power than did Darwin himself, has laid down in concise and authoritative words in his famous chapter xv. of his book Darwinism, entitled "Darwinism applied to Man," the general plan of theistic defence against naturalistic evolution. He points out the three stages in the development of the organic world where some new cause or power must have come into action—vitality, consciousness, humanity. He also shows that the great rubrics of Evolution, "Survival of the fittest," "Law

of life and death," "Improvement only to point of vital necessities," are completely out of order in dealing with the development of man. And perhaps no one in recent years better than Denny has pointed out the significance of the one imposing miracle of the Christian faith, the resurrection of Jesus Christ from the dead, and the impossibility of ever accounting for it satisfactorily by denying it. Yet I must confess that it seems to me that both biologist and supernaturalist are at least but at the beginning of their proof. They may prevail upon us to leave Theism an open question on the grounds of the history creation and of the Christian account of the miraculous, but an interrogation point is a poor basis for a religion. It is indeed a noteworthy sign of the times that the mystery of the vital forces is being increasingly emphasised by nearly all the leading biologists, and that Driesch, whom Kellogg calls "an extremely able present-day biologist, whose first belief was in a radical mechanical explanation of all life phenomena, and whose brilliant experimental work has furnished many of the examples referred to in all text-books of the modern study of the mechanics of development," should have come to an "uncompromising belief in the impossibility of explaining life-forms on the basis of chemical and mechanical factors, and demands an extra physico-chemical factor which is an attribute of organised being substance alone." But this process is too long and arduous and uncertain and technical to build up a living faith, though it may avail to prevent this particular attack on what Jesus took for granted from sweeping the field.

More capable of repelling at least the present leading attack upon it seems to me the force that defends the rampart of the teaching of Jesus. As men study Jesus' teaching as a whole, it will, I think, become increasingly evident that Jesus is to be understood the best if we place Him in the category of the poets. His constant use of the prose-poem which we call parable; His bold and insistent metaphor; His sovereign handling of Jewish tradition and of the Scriptures, which were

as sacred to Him as to His opponents (and much more holy), in order to find the pearls of truth and to leave them in their settings of beauty, while at the same time making thoroughly clear which was pearl and which was setting; His thoroughly artistic manner, by means of which He disassociates ideas from their complex relations in life and isolates them for our reverent understanding, taking up one mood, one truth, one relationship, one necessity, and considering it alone,-all these characteristics of Jesus will make it more and more evident that the mass of mankind has not misunderstood Him, that poetry after all is the only adequate vehicle of eternal truth, that it is surest of universal and sympathetic response, and that common people understand Jesus more immediately than literalists whether of the Tolstoi or of the Naumann or of the Hermann type. Only it must be clearly confessed that poetry is not rules, and that therefore the very expression "the teaching of Jesus" is somewhat of a misnomer. The words of Jesus are a revelation of life, not an explanation of it, not even a direction to it. So that while we may be able to repel the attack of the Philistines from this rampart, we may not take up our final dwelling there. It was not His savings but Himself that Jesus wanted people to follow. Besides all of which, biblical criticism has not yet been able, and never will be able, to decide with certainty where Jesus stops and early Christian tradition begins.

More vital, and I fear more difficult, is the defence of what has been regarded as the innermost citadel of our faith, the spotlessness of the person of Jesus.

We may for ourselves possess a satisfactory explanation of the words "Why callest thou me good?" and "My God, my God, why hast Thou forsaken me?" but if we have ever attempted to convince longing Christian people of the truth of that explanation, we shall have some realisation of the impossibility of convincing men of the world of it. As long as we do not know the emphasis with which those words to the Syrophœnician woman were spoken, we shall

be utterly unable to clear Jesus of the charge of particularism beyond all peradventure in the eyes of those who reluctantly accuse Him of it. But above all, we shall never be able again, as our records stand, to be sure that Jesus did not expect the imminent end of the world. Wrede has indeed done excellent service in showing the unhistoricity of much of the Gospel of Mark, and Sharman's recent book on Jesus' Teaching About the Future attempts by critical study of the sources to demonstrate that all ideas of the near end of the world were misunderstandings of His words and reflections of the atmosphere of the Apostles. But if any one has attempted to open up the elements of Synoptic criticism to intelligent laymen, he will understand how utterly impossible it is to convince them of the truth of technical analysis so intricate as this, which fails to command the assent of many biblical critics themselves. The entire attempt, however, to make all of Jesus' words as consistent with themselves as parts of a mathematical demonstration, and on the basis of this consistency to separate phrases from His most impressive utterances, as a shepherd would divide the sheep from the goats, fails to carry conviction. To say that Jesus said, for instance, "sitting at the right hand of power" but not "ye shall see him coming with the clouds of heaven" may be to state the exact facts, but again it may not. A scientific hypothesis, no matter how cleverly supported, cannot be an essential constituent of any universal and transforming religion. If it be necessary first to study the intricacies of Synoptic criticism, and, second, to agree upon our results, before we become followers of a spotless and unmistaken Lord, and if that following be Christianity, we must join the increasing number of those who are preparing to bury it. While, therefore, I do not fail to understand that we may keep our attackers at bay by attempting to repel their sharp and well-directed onslaughts, if we divide our forces cleverly and meet their attacks separately, I am convinced that by this method we shall never do more than that, and that Christianity will cease to be an aggressive force in the world. That means, of course, that it will cease to be our religion. But I may quite easily overestimate the force of the attack, and doubtless there are some among my patient readers that feel the triumph of repulsing it.

There is a second way out of our religious crisis. It is the way of the mystic. He is willing to be moved by Jesus as by Jeremiah or by Buddha or by Confucius. But after all those have spoken to him, he goes apart and locks his door and speaks to his God who is in secret, and his God rewards him secretly. It is to his soul that God speaks, and he knows it is God only by the effects of power or peace that come to him. It makes no difference what Jesus says or took for granted or was. That is all merely a fact of history, and history is only the couch where he stretches himself out to receive his own private vision of God. When Jesus says, "Say, Our Father," he replies, "Well, I'll consult my soul on the subject." When Jesus says, "No man knoweth the Father but the Son and he to whom the Son willeth to reveal Him," he murmurs something about the absurdity of any monopoly of the Spirit of God, and shakes himself free from all bondage. If he is fair and just to his historical antecedents, this mystic will admit that it is probable that his spirit has been largely predetermined by the influence of Jesus upon his inheritance; but then he will gravely and sincerely reply: "So much the less need to worry about the fate and influence of Jesus. If I follow my spirit, I shall be following Him, as far as a free man should follow any one. As to being His bond-servant, Paul was simply mistaken here as in so many other cases." If you ask the mystic the way of salvation, he will tell you to believe on your own soul, and as it is a part of the Infinite Spirit you will be saved. If you reply to him that it gives out but an uncertain sound, he will ask you to go sit in turn at the feet of all the great religious teachers, as Elisha sat at the feet of the minstrel, until your own soul springs into life. And if all be still confused and no response comes, he will condole you by

the thought that your confusion is only a sign that the great Eternal Spirit is finding Himself in your soul.

I think that the noble men who take this position have really escaped out of the crisis of the Christian religion. But I do not think that the Christian religion has been so fortunate as they, for they have left it behind. It may be indeed that they have found the Comforter, the Spirit of Truth, whom most of the world cannot receive; and of them it seems probable that John spoke more than Jesus. And I think that for religious men and women this way out is more satisfactory because less blockaded than the first. Doubtless many of my most religious readers take this way out.

The final method of escaping from the present crisis of Christian faith is the one that I myself am taking. Perhaps it is just on that account, or perhaps it is because of some inherent difficulty with the method, that I find it difficult to describe. But I believe that it is essentially the method which Paul took, and by whose taking he made Christianity possible for us moderns. I believe that no one can call Jesus Lord but by the Holy Ghost. I believe that calling Jesus Lord is the essence of Christianity, and I also believe that the Lord is the Spirit, not the flesh. I believe further, with the eighth chapter of Romans, that the Spirit of God and the Spirit of Jesus are identical terms. I believe that the way out of this spiritual crisis is by possessing for one's self the Spirit of Jesus. When a man in reading the gospels comes upon a spirit so mighty and to him so final-or, in Hebrew terms, so messianic -that he falls upon his knees and says, "Thou art the Christ, the Son of the living God," he has escaped from his own spirit into the sway of the Spirit of Jesus, he has left the religion "that has centre everywhere," "that cannot fix itself in form," "that is as vague as all unsweet," and has accepted a religion of authority. He has both a standard objective to himself and a message independent of his own attainments. His goal is not the development of his soul, but the conforming of his spirit to that of the Master. That is, he has a religion that has, so far

forth, the characteristics of all great religions, and that can be made powerful unto seeking and confused souls. He is to proclaim and to transmit the Spirit of Jesus, which his reverence bestows upon him.

It seems to me, therefore, that the task of theologians is to differentiate the Spirit of Jesus from what Jesus took for granted, from what He taught, and from what He was. That the Spirit of Jesus is not what He took for granted is clear from His own consciousness that He had come not simply to confirm but to fulfil. That the Spirit of Jesus is not what He taught is of course as clear as the fact that speech is the servant of thought. And the Spirit of Jesus is certainly not to be arrived at by studying and annotating and combining all the sayings attributed to Him in our gospels. We are absolutely certain, for example, that Mark erred in making Him say that He spoke the parables in order to conceal truth. Hence we cannot be absolutely certain how many other errors are imbedded in our gospels. That the Spirit of Jesus is not what He was, Paul indicates in those profound words: "If I have known Jesus after the flesh, now know I him so no more." The Spirit of Jesus inhabited not only a physical but also an intellectual body. This task of differentiation of the Spirit of Jesus from things which it inhabits and in which it utters itself is too great for me to outline now. In closing, I prefer to make but three remarks regarding it.

First: The Spirit of Jesus is something peculiar and something central to Jesus of Nazareth. It meets us only in the gospels in such force as to overturn our lives and to bring forth the confession of Lordship. Other men who move us point either forward or backward and say, "Come with me." This man alone says "Come to Me." The Spirit of Jesus is what might unacademically be called the original in Jesus.

Second: The Spirit of Jesus, because it stirs reverence and overturns ideals, must consist in the divine, for we mean by divine that which stirs reverence and erects ideals. It must be connected with God.

Third: The Spirit of Jesus stirs our reverence and overturns our ideals by revealing a certain definite relation to God and a definite attitude toward Him. The relationship is that of Son, and the attitude is that of trust. This relationship and attitude to God carry with it the relationship to man of brother and the attitude toward man of service.

Reverence before the Spirit of Jesus and the sense of arrival it bestows upon us pilgrims is, I know, possible to-day. Is it not in the eyes of some of my readers the best way out of our serious crisis, because more religious than the first and more humble than the second?

AMBROSE WHITE VERNON.

BROOKLINE, MASS.

A VISION OF UNITY.

(The World's Missionary Conference, 1910.)

THE AUTHOR OF "PRO CHRISTO ET ECCLESIÂ."

The World's Missionary Conference, which met in Edinburgh last June, included delegates from all Protestant missionary societies. At the outset the Archbishop of Canterbury gave forcible expression to the idea that missionary activity must be the central concern of the Christian Church. Later on neither he nor anyone else would have made such an assertion, because to all that assembly it became self-evident. The brotherhood of man! Christ the only intense joy of human life! The need to share the best of life with all the brethren!—these were conceptions expressed in different ways by such a varied multitude of separate speakers, that the view of the world they involve became insistent. The spread of the kingdom of Christ, in both its intensive and extensive aspects, became identified with Christianity.

For eighteen months eight Commissions, composed of men and women otherwise distinguished for ability and knowledge, had been investigating eight different branches of the missionary problem. In every case they had sought their evidence from the first-hand experience of men and women in all parts of the world. Their reports were in the hands of the delegates a month beforehand, and one whole day of the Conference was given to the discussion of each report. Among the speakers were missionaries from every part, and Christian teachers from

almost every nation. The subjects dealt with by the different Commissions inevitably overlapped. Thus a great mass of spontaneous opinion on vital matters underlying every subject was given, and unanimity in many things made, even on critical minds, an incisive impression.

Gradually certain facts of the present outlook emerged, and seem to sum themselves up as follows:—

The power to rise to the full stature of man is latent in every normal man, of whatever race or nation. Brought into personal communion with God, as shown in Jesus Christ, he is able to become a saint, with all a saint's possibilities of refinement, intellectual growth, and heroism. We have underestimated the uplifting force of the inrush of the spirit of Christ. We must blame the missionary who fails to admit his converts to social equality, but he is only the natural product of his home and nation. Until the home Church realises that social antipathies and racial contempts, nursed upon prejudice and insufficient data, are serious sins in the kingdom of Christ, our missionaries are like men running in a sack race.

Again, man is everywhere raised to his highest through the agency of man. This is a pre-eminently Christian idea. God raises men through the Divine man, through the men who can impart any portion of his character, and through the corporate life of the Christian community—his Church; if any portion of the human race, or any individual man, is ignorant, criminal, vicious, the fault lies with Christian men who could raise them and do not.

As a corollary to this it follows that every real Christian must be, in his degree, a missionary, and that he who may devote himself wholly to missionary activity has the highest opportunity the world can offer. But the majority of so-called Christian parents are agnostic with regard to the honour and reward—i.e. the eternal elevation of character—which Jesus asserted would result from a missionary life. Implicitly they say, "We know nothing about such advantage," and, practical materialists, they early and deliberately lead their

children into every other walk in life. Yet to awaken the souls of men to higher possibilities, to teach them all that they are capable of learning, so to live that the missionary life shall show forth the Lord of life—this is a vocation that demands everywhere the best man and the disciplined exercise of his every power. For years past every missionary society has sent to the front only those who could pass a strict physical and educational test. It was these men - in every way already above the average—who in the Conference clamoured their demand that in future the missionary should receive a higher education, an earlier and more thorough training, a training which should begin as early and as deliberately as the training for any other vocation. Nothing less than this is the natural fruit of active faith in Christian parents. It is futile to call that Christianity which has not for its central inspiration the imitation of that God who "so loved the world that he gave his only Son."

Further, in debating the relation of Christianity to other religions it was agreed that virtue is one, and when practised by non-Christians is to be extolled as pleasing to God; that falsehood and evil are also one, whether expressed in a mistake of the Church or in the delusions of heathenism, in the faults of a saint or the orgies of a savage; that truth enunciated by non-Christian religions is identical with the same truth in Christianity, and is a safe foundation on which to build. Blamelessness of life, or even a high degree of altruism, is not peculiar to Christianity, although Christianity raises the level of morality among the masses higher than any other religion has been able to do. Christianity is the worship of God in the Divine man; the belief that his image is latent in all men; and the practice of Christianity is the eager effort to evoke in all men that image of physical, intellectual, and spiritual perfection.

Implicit in the debate lay the truth that what we call Western civilisation began in the East. In germ our legislative ideals, our philosophic conceptions, the thirst for knowledge of the material universe, came from ancient Egypt and from Babylon. All of value that developed there has latterly found its best expression and development in the West. present the Western soldier and government official, the Western trader and engineer, are taking our civilisation to the East, and with it our agnosticism and materialism. Great solvents these, of use, of wont, and of religion! The work of the Christian missionary is to construct everywhere the higher religion and nobler customs upon the débris of all that is being borne down. Christianity, first sown in the East, first fructifying in the West, is now the one religion able to satisfy the troubled East. When accepted in its entire significance it develops men more perfectly than other religions, because it exercises both the mystical and practical sides of man's nature; and, setting before him the task of conquering the whole world for Christ by the one weapon of loving service, it evokes in him the energies both of serf and warrior, teaching him at once the virtues of a slave and of a leader of men. Those who accept the whole Christian task are bound to rise in the human scale. This is the hope of heathendom, for every sound Christian convert is filled with the ardour of the kingdom. It is also the hope of Christendom.

Again, it was made quite evident that the vice and squalor of Christendom is a great obstacle to the missionary cause. In the bazaars of India, in the schools of China and Japan, the sorry inequalities of privilege and opportunity that exist among us are becoming a subject of criticism. Our competition for wealth is known, our unneighbourliness is known—how the well-to-do amongst us pass comfortably on the roadway of life, while our neighbour, robbed by poverty, wounded by vice, lies on the roadside. The Oriental sociologist has at present good right to say that if ours is a Christian civilisation he desires a better religion. Our subscriptions to missions have this curse upon them until we produce a Christian civilisation worthy the acceptance of non-Christian nations.

It was shown that in many countries dominated by non-

Christian religions the Christian Church is already a native growth. In localities where it is thus established the work of the foreign missionary is now to foster its spontaneity and self-government, and to impart the highest possible education to its children and teachers, looking forward to the time when its schools shall be staffed by its own members and the foreign missionary can withdraw. Kindergartens, schools, colleges, should be established at once, that the children born to the native Christian Church in any nation may grow up in every way the highest product of the nation. It was agreed that the Christian Church in China, India, Japan, etc., ought to be instructed in the history of Christian theology and worship, and stimulated to think out its own forms of Christian teaching and express them by its own symbols and methods of devotion.

At present the Church rising in non-Christian lands is occupied with the contrast between Christianity and other religions. It has not yet grasped the differences between our Christian schools of thought. But it is plain that, however little we may burden them with our theological formulæ, theological differences (probably not ours) are sure to arise amongst them. It behoves the churches of Christendom to discover as quickly as possible some basis of union which will allow for acute differences of opinion and of devotional practice. This was the most important subject before the Conference. Many Christian workers came there bold in the belief that the Christian's personal relation to the living Christ could be alone the basis of a unity visible in one organisation. As one speaker put it, "We do not want theological definition; all that we want is Jesus Christ, the same yesterday, to-day, and for ever." It is, however, obvious to the reflective mind that, in days when growth and evolution, not stability, are the tests of durability, the very doctrine of the unchangeableness of Jesus can only rest on theological definition, theology in any time and place being only the necessary intellectual counterpart of religious emotion and activity. The simple Gospel cannot be presented to Eastern minds-subtle,

indefatigable, or nimble—without ultimately inciting discussion which will be apt to create differing schools. Hence the need for some basis of union not yet found that will satisfy heart and mind and yet comprise great variety. The full truth of Christianity is like light, which is made up of the different colours of the prism. Perhaps the wisdom of the great Oriental nations, each contributing its quota to the sum of Christian truth, will be necessary before a Church organisation arises in which all men may find a common home. In the meantime, the co-operative unity of different Christian bodies is so essential to progress that bodies thus co-operating will reap swift, and perhaps genuine, success, leaving behind any that remain in conscientious isolation, to apparent, perhaps real, failure.

I have said that many came to this Conference with the hope that an organised union of all vital Christian bodies was close at hand; no reflective mind left it with that impression. When men meet, expectant of a vision whose outline they have limned, and behold, not that, but a greater vision that startles as it inspires, faith finds evidence of the working of a transcendent God. The vision drew form and colour from the nebulæ of thought—a line here, a tint there—from the personal experience of men of every race and clime who were not conscious of giving more than practical reflections or details of work. The vision was of the unity of humanity, and of God with humanity. The soul was taken up into an exceeding high mountain by the Christ of God and shown all the kingdoms of the earth as one - men as members one of another, nation one with nation, race with race, man with man a unity; and in every man the latent Heaven; and Heaven brooding over all to bring forth in every man the Divine care for men which is the Christian salvation.

AUTHOR OF "PRO CHRISTO ET ECCLESIÂ."

FRAGMENTS OF A DUAL CONSCIOUSNESS.

A. M. F. COLE.

It may clear the ground of some prejudice if I say that I am, and have been for more than twenty years, a Catholic. As I relate facts in this paper, and as all truth is, in some sense, in the Church, I may claim to write from a Catholic standpoint. But I am not concerned with any particular interpretation of the facts to which I testify.

One October morning I walked a mile, over a treacherous shore, to the edge of the sea. I was then twenty years of age, full of life and vigour and joy; as to religion, agnostic. The tide was out, and I crossed several channel-like dry river-beds, without consideration. A few days earlier we had driven to a town on the other side of the bay, and seen the graves of many drowned people in the churchyard. Some one explained to me that people were overtaken by the tide on the other side, and their bodies were washed up there the next day. As there were no rocks on that coast to bar the way of escape, I wondered vaguely why people who had eyes to see and legs to run were overtaken by the tide; and forgot all about it. I realised the joy of living that morning as I seem never to have realised it before or since. Solitude, sunshine. the smell and the sound of the sea, the salt spray on my face, seemed to intoxicate me; and my own young life was full of promise and possibility. For a long time I stood facing the sea, noticing how each wave came a little further towards me,

and moving backwards to avoid it. At last I turned round to go home, and saw a broad stream of water between me and the shore. On my left the stream stretched away further than I could see; on my right the sea poured into it through a wide channel. The strip of land on which I stood was about six yards wide, and between the incoming sea and the widening stream it narrowed swiftly. The stream was not quite so wide. Of its depth I could not judge, but already little waves rippled over it, and it seemed to run strongly.

Instantly I understood how people were caught and drowned by the sea; that I was caught, and might in a few minutes be drowned. I could not swim. No human being was in sight. Hesitation would mean certain death. I had no idea whether or not I could get through the water. For one instant terror possessed me; then, amazement at the nearness of death. Wonder at nearness of death is the borderland between normal and abnormal self-consciousness. I forgot fear, and was conscious of a faint but distinct sense of exultation. During those instants no imagination of the pain of death, no thought of the meaning of death in itself, came to me. Wonder and exultation, like a sound heard from a great distance, filled my mind. Life was simply "what is," death "what is not." Life was full of sane, healthy joy. But gladness-faint and indescribable-came with the nearness of death. Then I thought of my friends. Vividly-for all those instantaneous impressions were vivid—I realised their anxiety; their long suspense; their horror and grief if my body were washed up the next day. I felt keen regret at causing so much sorrow, anger at my stupidity, and a sort of shame, as if I had committed a fault for which other people must suffer. I hoped I might get back to them safely, and spare them such pain. I did not, for one instant, think of not trying to escape. I believe that, even without thought of my friends, instinct would have urged self-preservation. But the fact that in a few minutes I might be drowned caused me no fear and no shrinking, rather a sense of well-being and faint triumph. All

this flashed through my mind in a few instants. At the moment of action all hint of gladness, all but the will to live, the instinct of self-preservation, vanished. I cried aloud "God have mercy on me!"—plunged down into the stream, nearly lost my feet in the middle, staggered about in the water, and struggled to the shore.

Afterwards I was astonished at what I remembered. I always have had an extraordinary terror of any sort of suffocation. I could not learn to swim because I could not endure accidental dives and the sense of choking. I had no religious belief. I was not singularly unselfish or considerate for others. Life seemed good to me, and I shrank from the possibility of annihilation after death. It was not my normal self that—face to face with death by drowning—felt only exultation, forgot fear, and desired, most of all, to spare my friends suspense and sorrow. Another self had dominated my conscious self during those instants. That self saw death, personal pain, and separateness as illusions. I have never understood why my own pain seemed nothing, and the suffering of others so important.

Many years later a friend disappeared suddenly without word or sign. All I could guess was that the separation was final, and that he was at a distant inland town. Circumstances made inquiry from me impossible, and might equally prevent sign or word from him. He was my greatest friend; life without him seemed impossible. On a certain evening, alone in my room, I knelt by a chair with my head down on my arms, praying, and willing, with all my strength, to get near him, to know something about him. My thought was to hear him or see him, but I had never had any experience of that sort. Sheer desperation drove me to make that attempt.

Suddenly I was close to the sea, green and sombre in the twilight. I seemed to be on the shore a few yards from the edge of the water. A brown boat, empty and apparently anchored, rocked to and fro on the waves near me. I reflected that I was certainly kneeling in my little gas-lighted room far

away from the sea, and that a window, a narrow street, and opposite houses were before me. Also it was long past the hour of twilight. I cannot remember whether I raised my head and opened my eyes. From what I know of myself, I think it probable that I did. I know that I seemed to see this shore, boat, and sea through my natural eyes; that I realised the impossibility of seeing them thus, and that, in spite of that realisation, the scene remained for some time. It seemed to have no meaning, no relation to my prayers and will. Yet I felt unreasonably peaceful, and went to bed without desire to make any further effort. Then I saw my friend; just the head and shoulders, as one sees them in little round photographs. He wore a hat and a thick coat, and what he leant against was the back of a railway carriage. This, also, I saw for some time, and seemed to see through my bodily eyes. The next morning I received a letter from him, written from a seaside town at the other end of England, telling me that he would be at home on the same day that his letter reached me. I had never heard him mention that town, and had not thought of it in connection with him. The illusion of bodily eyesight was complete. It seemed to be my ordinary self that saw with my ordinary eyes. Yet I remembered what actually filled the place where the sea or the railway seemed to be. The "I" that was near my friend seemed to be outside limits of time, as of place; and seemed constrained by my prayers, or by the force of my will, to give me what I desired; indirectly, and with some sort of thrift, yet with absolute sufficiency. Though what I saw first seemed inconsequent, it changed my fear into perfect peace, as if I had been with my friend. Therefore I cannot consider this experience as simple clairvoyance. I am not clairvoyant, and every effort of mine at crystal-gazing has ended in utter failure.

Sometimes the normal self learns instantly, without reason, a fact that it had not known, or had definitely disbelieved. We were taught from our infancy that only servants and

uneducated people believed in "ghosts." Up to the age of twenty-one I was so certain of the non-existence of any sort of apparition that I never even thought of them. If I heard of one, I was certain that its origin was invention or credulity. Such tales were on a par with Jack the Giant-killer. My elder brother took a house, a mile from a large town, on a main road, and very modern and comfortable. It had not been let for some time because it was said to be haunted. A girl had fallen or thrown herself from her bedroom window, and was said to come and bend over the bed in that room. My brother probably forgot the tale, and I heard nothing about it, or even that the house had been unlet. If I had heard everything I should have laughed, and turned my light out without a tremor. I had that room, and I remember that the fire had burnt low, and a little light came through the window from a street lamp. Then I remember seeing a form bending over me in bed. I could not see features or dress in the semidarkness. I felt a cold that seemed to penetrate to my heart, and my hair pricked me. The natural thought of a burglar never entered my mind. I knew with absolute certainty that this was an apparition—a "ghost." As if I had learnt by experience, I knew this cold, this hair-pricking, this horror. I understood why such visitations might kill: it was the horror and the cold that stopped the heart. I told my brother what had happened, and was horrified to hear the facts. He was astonished, but no second-hand evidence could disturb his incredulity. In his place, I should probably have relegated it to the place of extraordinary and unaccountable coincidences. But the disbelief of my normal self was annihilated by the recognition of facts by another self-recognition of the nature of what leant over me, and of conditions of cold, hair-pricking, and overwhelming horror.

Twice I have been consciously identified with that other self. There are reasons why I cannot give the actual details of either incident. I can only put a case that gives the essential points of one. An unarmed passenger in a night train finds himself covered by the revolver of his only fellowpassenger. He has reason to believe that, after robbing him, the man will shoot him and throw him out of the carriage. He waits, still and absolutely helpless. The circumstances in my case were very similar. My helplessness was as complete; the danger of death even greater. I sat, quite still, waiting for the event. After the first shock of fear came wonder and a sense of unreality. It seemed impossible that, in a few minutes, I should probably be lying dead outside in the darkness. Of the pain of death, or of what it meant in itself, I did not think at all. The belief, or the agnosticism, of my normal self seemed of no importance. Life was simply what is; death, what is not. Without conscious transition "I" was apart from that self that had seemed to be the whole of me, contemplating it with wonder and vague pity. I did not seem to be much interested in the danger or the fate of that self. I seemed to be beyond the reach of emotion. The wonder and the pity that I felt were quite calm, wholly different from those emotions in my normal self. I had nothing in common with that other self. Its first violent emotions of fear and amazement seemed, like a loud cry, to have reached me far away, and to have called my attention to the self that cried. I seemed to have come very near, and to await the event. Whether or not I knew what that event would be I cannot tell. It seems to me that nothing that might happen to the self in the railway carriage was of any importance to the "I" that looked on.

The self that was in danger also awaited the event, watchful and alert. It did not hope, fear, or reason. Instinct, pure and primitive, dominated it. At the instant of action it would know what to do, and do it. From the civilised, complex human being ages of evolution seemed to have slipped away, leaving primeval man. Realised proximity of death seemed to disintegrate me in my own consciousness; to separate a material, instinctive self from another self—vague, aloof, but essential "I." The illusion of singularity vanished. During

those instants there was no past and no future beyond the imminent event. All I felt as the onlooker was absolute calm, and the faint wonder and pity that were like an echo of the emotions that had called my attention. Every faculty of the normal self was absorbed in watching and waiting. It called on God for protection. So did primitive man on his conception of Deity. Perhaps the cry of the ox in the slaughter-house, of the rabbit in the trap, has the same sense?

From the instant of amazement till the event the two selves waited, separate and unlike. At the moment of action, conscious identity was transferred to the normal self. (The inexplicable intervention that freed me from a situation that seemed hopeless does not come into this record.)

These and some other experiences impressed permanently on my normal consciousness the existence of another phase of "I." I hoped there might be reason for exultation, or indifference, at the approach of death. I felt less small and "separate," because on no occasion was I wrapped up in the danger to my normal self. Annihilation of time and place gave me an idea of a freedom beyond human imagination. The fact of the apparition made human life wider and more interesting. The first experience of domination by another self gave me a vague, but a vast, confidence in that self; and each added experience made that trust more definite. Always in moments of extreme peril, sometimes in moments of acute pain, that self has come to the aid of my normal self; it has drawn my consciousness up into itself, dominated it, enlightened it, or informed it. Four times in my life I have been face to face with death, sudden and violent. On each occasion I forgot the inevitable pain, and had no fear of death. Indifference to death was no new lesson. "It were well to die if there be gods, and sad to live if there be none," is also written in the heart of man. Yet, in full vigour of youth and happiness, that writing is forgotten, and the possibility of annihilation is abhorrent. And at such a moment in my life I was aware not only of indifference, but of triumph, at the

nearness of death. Some truth is told in the old saying, "Whom the gods love, die young." When I remember how gladness of life and gladness of death met in me, I partly understand that saying. All that I have learnt, consciously, from the other self is clear and permanent in my recollection.

The indifference of the other self to pain amazed me. 1 was distinctly aware that it looked through it, as we, using the X-rays, look through flesh-seeing metal rings and finger bones, and nothingness between. To me, pain is, and was, a present and terrible fact. Behind the feast I see the slaughterhouse; behind the tube of antitoxin, a multitude of shuddering dumb things; behind the cheap hand-work, the sweated women-workers; beside the joy of the victor, the bitterness of failure. No one who observes and thinks can deny that pain is the most prevalent and permanent fact in life. Birth and death involve, as a rule, pain. So, to a vast extent, does food, and in a lesser degree clothing. The effort to live is often painful, the toil of weary man and beast. And besides this, which is part of life as it is, there is much that seems incidental, mere chance. The meetings, so easily avoidable in this wide world, that change all life from peace to bitterness the busy ant-world, crushed by the boot of a passing labourer -the letter lost by some trifling carelessness, that meant explanation, reconciliation, forgiveness. But I touch the edge of immensity, and the little I say is so inadequate that perhaps it were better unsaid. The uses of pain are obvious. But why "pain" instead of some other factor? Were "sensory nerves" the only possible incentive to self-preservation? Was woman's affection the only possible security for the propagation of the race? It seems that the vast, perpetual hurting of dumb creatures, the multitude of sorrowing women, are of no account. What matters is, that man shall be fed and shall multiply. The uses of pain in our own life are sometimes evident. I can realise that pain is nothing in the sense that, once past, it may be annihilated. Yet, for good or ill, I think it leaves a mark. I can see that it is not necessarily evil,

because it sometime ennobles. But I cannot say or feel that pain is nothing. God can only answer the shriek of a world in torment in the symbol of the Crucifix. It is the utmost answer of the Infinite to the finite, in the one language that is between God and man—symbolism. All of God that could be incarnate—crucified. I know that my conscious self is abnormally aware of pain; that my extreme shrinking from it, personal or impersonal, is not far removed from cowardice. And the absolute indifference of the other self to pain, imminent and incidental, perplexed me. Was that self indifferent because it knows something that we all shall know at last? In the remembrance of that absolute calm there is rest and a hint of hope. Perhaps that is the answer of spirit in man to tormented mind of man, in the one language between themthe language of intuition. There can be no privilege and no favouritism for me. So a dim, universal hope glimmers far back in my understanding.

Twice in my life I have seemed to hear through my ears what I knew I did not so hear. The illusion, and my awareness of impossibility, were as complete as when I seemed to see through my eyes. The words had no direct meaning, communications from the other self seem always to be brief, non-obvious, thrifty; but each phrase had a meaning that has expanded with my life and understanding. Without sequence, separate from my thought, quite unexpected, those words came to me, distinct and unmistakable. The voice was clear, penetrating, and quiet. I was not surprised or startled. On one occasion I had just said a last and terrible good-bye. I was leaving my friends and my country, in obedience to what I saw as right. The last wrench had been almost unbearable. The train had just rolled past the platform, and I leant back in my corner, lethargic with excess of pain. At that instant I heard thirteen words spoken that are distinctly in my mind at this moment. They gave no sanction to my act; they ignored my pain; they were quite abstract. But they gave me some peace and some courage,

just enough to make the situation bearable. Those words have given, and will give me, peace and courage in all hardness that comes of following my "right." I cannot tell who spoke them, or another shorter sentence. But I know that "I" heard them: the "I" that stood by the sea in the twilight; that recognised the apparition; that ignores pain, and is indifferent to, or exultant at, nearness of death.

All these experiences came to me before I had heard of Eastern philosophy, or read Hudson's Psychic Phenomena. I did not discuss them with anyone. In spite of exterior activity and preoccupations, I lived in a peculiar solitude, and thought things out in silence. Nothing in the circumstances or environment of my normal self induced or explained those manifestations of another self. At Bordighera there is a polyglot library. (We owe it, with other good things, to George MacDonald.) There I happened on Sinnett's Esoteric Buddhism, and that philosophy threw a light on my experiences of dualism. In man are seven principles, three spiritual and four animal; and each principle functions on its own plane of existence. They are, Physical body, Ethereal body, Prâna (vitality), Kâma (desire), Mânas (the man, the thinker), Buddha (latent in all, but generally known only in its effects; in the great Initiates, the Masters, Saviours, Founders of Religions). Atma, "He who sees me in all things, and who sees all things in me, I shall never separate myself from Him, and He will never leave me" (Shri-Krishna). Under the Eastern terminology we recognise Christianity. Animal Man, Reasonable Man, Spiritual Man, Christ, God. That God and Christ are latent in man, to be developed by detachment from the lower and union with the higher elements of his being, is also Christian doctrine. There can be no difference and no contradiction in truth, and the esoteric is the soul of all true religions; the exoteric is their incarnation on the plane of illusion. Mânas is a dual principle. It is spiritual, and functions on the plane of spirit; but it is also in Man; it is all in him that is distinctively "Man"-intellect.

reason, thought, conscience. This is called the Lower Manas, and its work in man is to enlighten, to teach, to save all that can be immortal in him, and united to the Higher Mânas-Spiritual man. Whoever does not know this philosophy will find clear explanations of the meaning and the uses of this work of the Lower Mânas in Sinnett's book. The Animal Man tends downward. The Lower Manas struggles upward. but it cannot rise without the self to which it is united. In rare and terrible cases the animal may wrench the Lower from the Higher Manas, and drag it down to extinction. Generally, when death disintegrates the animal body, the "God fallen into matter" escapes back to its own plane. Mânas, united with Buddha, is the perfect "Ego." What I have written so far is general teaching. My interpretation of that teaching is that "Mânas" is spirit that "cannot be touched with the feeling of our infirmities." That the Lower Mânas, incarnate in animal man, "learns by the things that it suffers," and carries back that knowledge to the "Mânas." So it seems that the "Man," i.e. the individual as distinct from fleeting personalities, learns gradually by experience the vast understanding and pity that unites it with Buddha, i.e. that principle known to us in its Incarnations; to us Christians in "The Man of Sorrows." In "Nirvana" the Ego keeps the "Sheath of Bliss." The final aim of the Christian is "perfect union with God." To me, the essential idea seems the same.

I mention briefly what has seemed to explain these experiences of dualism because, without "the whole truth," the part may be untruthful. It seemed to me, when I read that philosophy, that I understood a good deal of what I had experienced. Nor did it seem unlikely that nearness of death or mental anguish should transfer consciousness to the spiritual or mental plane. The Lower Mânas might naturally exult at hope of immediate liberation. The Higher Mânas might well be the "I" that looked on with vague pity and wonder; that was indifferent to death, and scarcely interested in me. With respect to apparitions, visions, words, it seemed that the

Mânas knew, saw, heard in me. Consideration for others, compassion that ordained visions and words, and the wisdom of those words, seem more of Buddha than of Mânas. I cannot tell Who spoke. But the Founder of Christianity, "Very God and Very Man," is our revelation of Buddha—of the "Christ."

Some years later I read Hudson's Psychic Phenomena. Hudson keeps strictly within the limits named by that title, and divides man sufficiently into the conscious and sub-conscious Ego. The sub-conscious Ego, rising occasionally above the threshold of consciousness, would account for knowing, seeing, and hearing in that Ego. It accounts, too, for knowledge, apparitions, and visions; for interventions, impressions, voices; even for acquiescence in certainty of death. Without personal experiences of dual consciousness-those I have mentioned and others-I think Hudson's Psychic Phenomena would have seemed to explain all that had suggested existence apart from human life, and the immortality of Man. His sub-conscious Ego seems to be the "Mânas," ending abruptly in itself; the "Man" in a fleeting personality, inseparable from that personality, not necessarily surviving its death. It is many years since I read the book; I write from memory and impression. I cannot remember or imagine anything in that Ego that explains exultation, or utter indifference, at imminent danger of death; ignoring of pain; symbolism and wisdom of the words spoken. In those instants when illusion is dispelled we learn truth. But we cannot communicate conviction. We can only relate facts with scrupulous accuracy, and mention what may seem to throw light on those facts.

A. M. F. COLE.

PARIS.

PHILOSOPHICAL THEORIES AND PSYCHICAL RESEARCH.

JAMES H. HYSLOP,

New York,

THE article of Mr Gerald Balfour, in a recent number of the HIBBERT JOURNAL (April 1910), on "Psychical Research and Current Doctrines of Mind and Body," seems to me a good illustration of the self-created difficulties which students of this problem introduce whenever they imagine that philosophical doctrines have anything whatever to do with the issue but to wait for it to be settled. I do not believe that any philosophical theories like Parallelism, Epi-phenomenalism, and Interactionism in any way condition an answer to the question of survival after death, and it only confuses the issue to discuss them with anything like that implication. It involves more respect for philosophic discussion than I think we require to give it. I say this, too, as a student of philosophy all my life, and a teacher of it for twenty years. I have abundant respect for philosophy. Indeed I think every man's duty is to regard it as a part of his religion, using this last term to mean a serious view of man's relation to the cosmos. some form or other I should regard a philosophy as inevitable. As Olympiodorus reports a saying of Aristotle, "If we expect to have a philosophy we must think one out: if we expect to ignore it we shall have a philosophy nevertheless, and in any case we shall philosophise." But all this does not induce me to assume that any system that I have formed can limit my

acceptance of a philosophy which new facts produce. My previous opinions are not a final test of truth. If they were, we could never admit any new facts at all. I dare say that there would be no dispute between Mr Balfour and myself on that point, and if I interpret his article rightly it would imply just this dispute of the finality of previous conceptions. But the approach to the problem of psychic research, in so far as it affects survival after death, through the several philosophical doctrines named leaves the impression that they have to be reckoned with in coming to a conclusion on the issue. It is this notion that I wish to dispute, whether Mr Balfour can be fairly said to assume it or not. I shall go so far as to say that absolutely all philosophical systems, except atomic materialism, have no ad rem relation to the problem. Even materialism, which is universally accepted as irreconcilable with survival after death, is so only on the proviso that we do not suppose intelligence in matter. It is only that materialism which denies that consciousness can be a function of elementary matter that prevents holding to immortality on a materialistic theory of the cosmos. And again, if we regarded mind, supposing its existence to be a fact, as a form of matter we should have its survival guaranteed with the indestructibility of energy, just as Tertullian maintained in order to get a leverage on the materialists of his day. Then again, whether we supposed it as material or not, if any intelligence in the cosmos existed and was the causal agent either in the production or arrangement of matter, we might suppose that intelligence as capable of continuing life and consciousness as of creating it, and it would be a question of evidence whether it did or not. Indeed the doctrine of the Resurrection, even of the physical body, was quite consistent with a mechanical theory of the physical universe, though we might not think it had any evidence of being a fact. It was only the law of probabilities, not that of conceivabilities, that induced the scientific mind to question it from the evidential point of view, not the metaphysical. Only that atomic materialism which denies a theistic agency in the world can obtain a sceptical fulcrum against survival, and even then only on the assumption that consciousness is not a function of elementary matter. All other philosophic theories seem to me to be so much fustian and rubbish in the controversy on either side, in so far as they can be regarded as ad rem issues.

One little outburst of Mr Balfour might confirm this view, and suggests that the concessions which he makes to philosophic theories is a part of the respect which tradition gets from all who do not feel strong enough to defy it. He refers to "Parallelism," "Epi-phenomenalism," and "Interactionism" as representing names of a barbarous sound, and says that we shall have to get along with them as best we may. I concede them a value in helping us to understand certain relations of facts, but I do not concede them any solvent value. They have even a very limited descriptive value, and possess no capacity at all for deciding whether we shall accept either the possibility or the fact of survival after death. In one statement he says: "I conclude, then," after some discussion of the theory, "that if survival were established, Parallelism must be abandoned, and conversely, if Parallelism is true, survival is impossible." This would seem to imply that the hope of survival would be some form of Interactionism.

For me either theory is compatible with survival or annihilation. They are not yet so clearly defined as to be assured that they either prove or contradict anything but each other, if they do that. Epi-phenomenalism seems to me a mongrel form of Parallelism, so that I dismiss it from account. Whatever be true of Parallelism will be true of Epi-phenomenalism, as I understand them. Hence it seems to me that the controversy must be between the other two conceptions. That Parallelism can hardly be inconsistent with survival might be apparent from the fact that its very purpose is to deny that causal relation between mental and physical phenomena which was supposed to establish a doctrine of materialism. If they are not causally related to each other, it is supposed that

mental events would have to possess some other subject than the brain, and this subject once conceded, the law of indestructibility could be invoked to favour, if not prove, survival. Parallelism thus would be different from, though not inconsistent with, Interactionism. It would maintain that there were two kinds of reality in the world, mind and matter, just as Interactionism would do, but would differ from the latter only in that it denied a causal relation between them.

But even this denial of a causal relation would have its qualifications. The causal relation which Parallelism denies is that represented by the conservation of energy, which, in one form at least, assumes that the antecedent is converted into the consequent. This may be called material causation, or the retention of the identity in kind between antecedent and consequent, as, for instance, in the transmission of motion. But then the idea of causality is not limited to that of material metamorphosis. It also indicates efficient agency, which may be defined as power to make an event to occur when that event is not like the antecedent or cause in kind. So we need to clear up what we mean by causality before we venture on any philosophic inferences from a doctrine of Parallelism. This equivocal fact in the doctrine of causality shows that, with one definition of it, we could affirm, and with the other, deny Parallelism. If we affirm it, the philosopher usually supposes that consciousness must have another subject than the brain, and so survive by virtue of the indestructibility of energy. I do not think that this view follows from the affirmative of Parallelism. Mental and physical events might have no material causal relation and yet be functions of the same organism, as we find in a number of physical functions which are not interconvertible and yet are phenomena of the same subject. Consequently nothing is proved one way or the other about survival, until we get a clearer idea of what we mean by causality, on the one hand, and Parallelism, on the other.

Again, supposing that Parallelism be denied, it is assumed Vol. IX.—No. 1.

that a material causal relation subsists between mental and physical phenomena. This is taken to be materialism, and hence the application of the conservation of energy to mental and physical phenomena is supposed to be the crowning proof of materialism. This theory, then, is assumed to be incompatible with survival after death. But the application of the conservation of energy to mental and physical phenomena as a proof of materialism wholly forgets what the term "materialism" meant before this application. The older materialism anteceding the conservation of energy was based upon the idea that states of consciousness, or mental events, were functions of a composite organism, and that whatever causal relation was assumed, if assumed at all, between mental and physical, was efficient, not material. On this conception, survival was to be determined by the same facts which determined the evanescence or persistence of any other function or activity of the organism. But to attempt to maintain that the application of the conservation of energy to the relation between mental and physical phenomena, in so far as conservation implied identity in kind, only changed the meaning of the term materialism sufficiently to make immortality a necessary consequence of it! It was only illogical reasoning that still held survival to be incompatible with it. The only credentials which scepticism could use in such a situation were based on association, not logic. We might, on this view of the subject, be extremely interested in establishing "materialism" as the basis of spiritualism!

On the other hand, if we take Interactionism, which is supposedly based on the difference between mental and physical phenomena, as guaranteeing the necessity of a difference in subject, the case is a complicated and provisional one. I do not require to question the assumptions of this doctrine about the distinction between mental and physical events. I may concede that. Assume, then, that it demands the existence of something other than the brain as the subject of consciousness, does this prove or guarantee survival? Yes,

if you accept the indestructibility of substance or energy, but it does not carry with it any indication of surviving personal consciousness. Our personal consciousness might be due to the interaction of two different substances, and yet not survive though they do. The Epicurean materialist admitted the existence of a soul or subject for mental states other than the brain, and yet he did not believe in survival either of the ethereal organism or of personal consciousness.

The form of Interactionism which I have just discussed assumes that mental and physical phenomena have different subjects, but there is another form of it which might conceive them to have the same subject and yet have a causal, phenomenally causal, relation between them, as that is conceived in physical phenomena belonging to the same subject. Thus the heat of a body may give rise to its particular colour, and yet both are properties of the same subject. Mental and physical events might thus cause each other without requiring separate subjects to account for them, and if we look at the question in this way, Interactionism would not obtain any leverage for action against materialism and in favour of survival. In either conception of it, therefore, no assured logical consequences follow upon the question of immortality or survival. They may help us to draw distinctions in the discussion of facts, but they do not decide an issue. We are just where we were before, namely, dependent on facts, and not philosophical theories, which cannot go beyond facts.

I might go into various philosophical doctrines at this point, but it would be a fruitless task, and would only tend to confuse the problem of psychic research by continuing or reinforcing the assumption that psychic research awaited the verdict on such questions, when it is psychic research itself that must determine that verdict. A philosophical theory summarises or embodies the results of past and present experience, but it does not predetermine future experience, and must always be held in abeyance for modification by that future. Otherwise it is incompatible with progress of any

kind. Of course, if we are going to convert the philosopher who likes to live in these abstractions as the only criterion of truth, we must discuss the new facts in the light of his theories, but there is no other necessity for approaching the problem in that way. The really scientific method does not obligate us to concede anything to philosophical theories like Parallelism and Interactionism, except the decency of burial, if they insist upon being the criteria of truth instead of being merely vehicular means of description. The scientific problem is to collect facts, and philosophical theories will have nothing to say about their validity as facts. They may set up measures of caution about their general or permanent significance, but they can never dictate their character. Hence to me the problem of psychic research stands like any other scientific problem, namely, independent of any philosophic speculation whatever. Even materialism depends for its cogency against survival upon certain assumptions about matter which may not be true at all. Indeed, the recent doctrine that the very atoms are evolved from the ether, and are not simple, indestructible things as formerly supposed, deprives materialism of its fundamental postulate, and there stands nothing in the way of a theory of creation of matter somewhat like the older theological view. On that view there is not even an ad hominem argument against survival, in some form at least.

Without using any of the complicated philosophical terms in the problem, the simple question is whether personal consciousness is a function of the organism or not. If it be a function of the body like digestion, circulation, and secretion, its destiny is settled in the same way that we decide whether these other functions are permanent or not. That is purely a question of fact, and not of metaphysics of any kind, even though our investigations about the facts may land us in a metaphysics. Interactionism tries to prove that there is a soul, not by facts tending to show that something survives death, but by speculative views about the nature of consciousness. It insists, as Mr Balfour has clearly stated, that con-

sciousness is so different from physical phenomena that it requires another subject than the brain. This is trying to prove that there is a soul as a guaranty of survival. The force of this argument lies in its relation to the indestructibility of substance. But I have shown how little is gained by this view when we wish to know whether the surviving substance preserves the personal identity of consciousness. If it does not, nothing is gained by the supposition of a soul. In the mediæval period the acceptance of the existence of a soul carried with it more probabilities of survival than now, because there was more readiness to make this depend either on the beneficence of Providence or the simple indivisibility of the soul. There are no such tendencies in this day to give an advantage to such an assumption, and, like every other belief in the field of science, the question is one of evidence in present facts, not a deduction from speculative theories about the nature of consciousness.

Mr Balfour states well the usual formula of the materialist, whether of the interactionist or parallelist type, and this is that every mental state is conditioned by or correlated with a corresponding physical action in the brain, and it is generally supposed that this is more or less conclusive against the possibility of the independence of consciousness. I do not take such a doctrine seriously as affecting the real question. It is one thing to regard consciousness as necessarily conditioned by brain action, and a totally different one to regard it as empirically associated with brain action. Now all that we know about them is that they are empirically associated. We have not one iota of evidence that they are necessarily connected. We have never proved the non-existence of consciousness when the cerebral functions have disappeared, and it is a tolerably safe statement to say that we never shall. We certainly have a much more difficult problem to prove its non-existence in a discarnate condition, or, for that matter, in any other condition, than to prove the non-presence of some sensible quality in experience, and we have to prove that nonexistence as a condition of maintaining that brain action is a necessary accompaniment or condition of the mental. The utmost that we know, or perhaps have reason to believe, is that consciousness and brain action are uniformly associated in experience. That the connection is necessary in the nature of things we do not know, and any assertion of it is pure imagination. If we meant that their uniform association was necessary for physical or motor manifestation, the position might be conceded. But when it is extended to mean that the existence of consciousness is so conditioned, I can only say that we have not one iota of scientific proof for this contention. This may seem a bold assertion, but when we consider that the proof depends on showing that consciousness is annihilated at death, that its non-existence apart from bodily action must be established, we may appreciate the truth of the contention. All that we know about the relation is the uniformity of coexistence and sequence between them as a fact, not the necessity of it, and this circumstance excludes all dogmatism about the necessity of the connection. If we could prove that mental and physical phenomena were identical in kind the case might be very different. In fact, it is the principle of identity in all relations, whether real or logical, that determines or constitutes the necessity of the case. Now we have no evidence of this identity, and, indeed, both interactionists and parallelists agree that they are not identical in kind. The result is that we are left without any basis upon which to question or deny the possibility of survival.

The problem, then, which presents itself for the scientific mind is simply the question whether there are any facts that dissociate consciousness from the organism altogether. Normal experience associates them, and the Method of Agreement, as Mill called it, represents them in their normal relations. What is required is the application of the method of Residues, or better, of Isolation or Difference, the method of chemistry in the settlement of a problem, in order to establish whether consciousness can exist apart from bodily conditions as we

know them. And this is the reason that the problem concentrates on the question of personal identity. As we cannot insist on the necessity of the physical conditions for the existence of consciousness, but only the empirical fact in normal experience, the way is open for possibilities which dogmatic materialism and scepticism do not admit. It is a simple question of fact, or of the kind of facts which will serve as evidence (1) of the supernormal, (2) of the personal identity of the deceased, and (3) of that selective and organic unity of the incidents which illustrates that identity more fully than individual incidents. Interactionism and Parallelism may be allowed to pass by on the other side, interesting as they may be for analysis and descriptive purposes, but wholly irrelevant to the problem.

Speaking of the empirical proof for survival, Mr Balfour makes an interesting statement. "Frankly," he says, "I think the evidence falls considerably short of proof. That is my personal opinion. There is abundance of evidence, the simplest and readiest explanation of which would be the hypothesis of spirit-return; but no evidence, I think, of an absolutely crucial character - no evidence, that is, which excludes explanation by some other hypothesis." No quarrel can be had with this statement, and I do not take it up here for that purpose. I may have something to say that will seem like criticism, but rather the intention is to make the statement a text for some better understanding of what seems to me to be the real situation. The student must not forget that Mr Balfour concedes frankly that there is evidence, "the simplest and readiest explanation of which would be the hypothesis of spirit-return," and that he only questions the existence of crucial evidence, and the assertion that it is merely a personal opinion exempts him from criticism. But this is no reason for not subjecting the ideas at the basis of the statement to a critical analysis.

It seems to the present writer that the very nature of evidence of a crucial or conclusive form is constantly forgotten

by psychic researchers. By the very necessity of the case each individual incident which is brought forward by advocates of that theory must be submitted to the severest standards of evidence and must be adjudged as if there were no other facts involving the same interpretation. This gives the impression that the whole case is a piecemeal one. It is assumed that, when each incident is found defective, the collective mass of facts has the same fault. This is not necessarily the case. It would be so if each incident were exactly like all others, such as certain tricks by conjurers. But the fact is that the incidents recorded, whatever their general characteristic of unity and likeness, show conditions and contents so different that the same defect does not apply to each one. Collectively the facts have a value which individually they have not. This is as it should be. In fact I do not believe that there is crucial evidence of this kind for any truth whatever, even in physical science, to say nothing of any other field of human knowledge. There has been too much of a tendency in psychical researchers to assume that we must have some crucial incident to decide the question, and hence for a while some of us thought that the reading of a posthumous letter would decide it. But the moment that we discovered that we should have to face clairvoyance instead of telepathy we paused and began to see that it is a collective question. It is the same in absolutely all scientific problems, but the fact is concealed by that situation which enables a new discovery in physics or chemistry to have more weight in the single instance than in the more obscure science of psychology. Even there it is rather the crucial experiment than the crucial evidence that is concerned. If the crucial experiment could not be repeated so as to become collective we should hesitate even in the acceptance of discoveries in physical science. Hence, in the last analysis, it is the existence of a collective and organic mass of facts that establishes any scientific truth, and psychic research is no exception to this. The crucial evidence in it is not any single

incident, however valuable such may be for silencing an objection, but a collective mass of incidents having an organic unity that makes any opposing hypothesis applying to the individual incident seem unreasonable. We should never look for the crucial individual incident. It will not exist. This is just as true of telepathy as of any other hypothesis. Single incidents prove nothing anywhere, if proof be conceived as establishing anything scientifically. They may convert an individual, but they do not convert the majority. It is the collective mass of facts continued through long periods of time that establishes a theory. This is the only crucial evidence of anything.

There is another aspect of "proof" also worth considering. It is a very elastic conception, running all the way from the only rational working hypothesis to what is called absolute demonstration. Consequently any one is at liberty to regard a thing as proved for him which may not seem proved to another. It is just here that the ambiguous nature of the conception appears. Sometimes "proof" means the established facts which coerce or ought to coerce belief on the part of intelligent people. But in actual experience the "proof" is as much in the insight of the man that believes as in the circumstance of supplying the facts. The man who is under the incubus of his traditional environment cannot always see "proof," though it is abundant and clear. He goes on saying a thing is not proved when it only happens that he is not convinced. This was the reception of Copernican astronomy when its author proposed it. The fact was the theory was "proved." It was not believed, and too many people take their own beliefs as the measure of "proof." This was manifested in Newtonian gravitation and Darwinian evolution. They were "proved" long before they were believed. Hence we have to regard statements about crucial "proof" with some caution. The "proof" may be complete and the only difficulty is in the prejudices of those who still stand out against it. The practical measure of crucial evidence is acceptance,

intelligent insight, not freedom from the opportunity for intellectual conjuring. Scientific proof is furnishing the facts, not conviction. This latter must be supplied by the subject to whom the evidence is given. Hence whether we have any evidence at all, to say nothing of crucial evidence, depends as much on the public as it does on the scientific man.

Mr Balfour expresses some surprise that telepathy has received so ready an acceptance by the public, as it involves such a revolutionary conception of nature. But I think he entirely misunderstands the point of view from which this public regards it. Mr Balfour has had to accept it sceptically, but the public not only shows no scepticism about it, but accepts and uses it in the most amazing form without any evidence at all that it is true. The reasons for this are very simple. In the first place, the Society for Psychical Research devoted its investigations to these phenomena in lieu of the less respectable phenomena of spiritualism. It began with this phenomenon as a means of limiting or displacing spiritualism, and everywhere associated intelligence and respectability with telepathy, and while it professed to be seeking for evidence of spirits the intellectual world sneered at such a thing as a spirit. Those who had the respect of the scientific man in mind and who made scepticism a mark of intelligence and respectability soon gave their allegiance to telepathy, not because it was any better an explanation of the facts, but because it received the imprimatur of the scientific man, or at least such of the scientific world as was playing with spiritualism and saving its standing by flirting with telepathy. The public was determined to be on the side of respectability, and it cared not for the question whether telepathy was revolutionary or not. It saved the public from the superstition and bad odour of spiritualism, and as æsthetics and respectability are a more powerful influence upon belief than logic or fact, telepathy was a welcome resource for escape from bad company.

I do not mean by such remarks either to dispute the fact of telepathy or the circumstance that it does properly limit the evidence for spiritistic theories when it classifies incidents which are not pertinent to the personal identity of deceased persons and represent coincidences which occur between living minds. I quite agree with sceptical inquiries that there is plenty of evidence that telepathy restricts the hypothesis of survival in certain types of phenomena. But its respectability as an escape from a disagreeable theory was a more powerful influence in producing its acceptance and extending its assumed explanatory efficiency than any scientific fitness of the conception to meet the demands made upon it. The public will abuse any doctrine that the scientific man adopts in his straits. "Suggestion" is a good illustration of this. The scientific man uses it to describe a situation, or to denote what is called a "symptom complex" in medicine, but the public makes a perfectly promiscuous miracle of it and tries to explain nearly as much by it as gravitation explains in physics, the fact being that it explains nothing.

Mr Balfour, in telling the incident of a writer in the HIBBERT JOURNAL who could swallow miracles if you called them telepathy but would not believe them if you referred them to spirits, expresses his own appreciation of this situation, and I imagine would not find any disagreement with what I have here said. He is certainly not lacking in the sense of humour which so much credulity about telepathy excites, especially when those who believe it in so large a sense speak and think of it as if it were a perfectly understood thing. What Mr Balfour says about the possibility of a large interaction between mind and mind in the form of telepathy is well suggested in what is known of such interaction in the physical cosmos between centres of matter. But nothing is said about its limitations in both fields. The universal interaction between particles of matter is limited to certain functions of its influence, and in others that interaction either does not exist or is conditioned by various limitations that permit or prevent its occurrence according to circumstances. Telepathic interaction is a very limited thing in the very nature of mental relations

as known normally. It is not merely an exception to normal relations between minds, but, when it occurs at all, it must actually overcome the barriers which nature has set up against it. As we know mind in its normal conditions, communication with it is impossible. We never communicate thoughts in any way whatever in normal experience. We can only produce, whether directly or indirectly makes no difference, physical effects, and from these we infer that other minds have the same states or experiences as ourselves. We do not communicate ideas in any way whatever, interpreting "communication" as it is usually understood in the transmission of motion. We are as completely insulated from each other in this respect as the Leibnitzian monads, and there is no interaction whatever of a mental type, but only of a physical. They seem designedly separated and excluded from mental interaction. Telepathy, such as the evidence supports, is sporadic and without any analogies in normal life. Whether it is direct interaction between living minds or not I think we do not know. It is but a term for coincidences not due to chance, and does not carry with it any evidence of direct interaction. That is still, to me, the open question. All that the term telepathy expresses to me is a fact of causal nexus, not the mode of it, and we wait in vain, so far as present knowledge goes, for a means of interpreting the phenomenon consistently with physical science and our normally symbolic methods of "communicating" knowledge. It is itself the thing to be explained, and not the agency with which to explain. The only reason for not denying its explanatory powers is our ignorance about it. If it had any defined limitations in the public mind we might say something about it, but this unlimited and infinite interaction attributed to it only makes it like an appeal to special Providence, an explanation which no one can deny but which no one will believe.

I think much the same can be said of the talk about the subconscious or subliminal activities of the mind. The subconscious denotes certain phenomena that fall outside the

range of normal consciousness, and in so far as they are distinct in their contents from what we know in normal consciousness they are still sub judice and not usable for explanation. They need analysis and discriminating interpretation, and until these have been given them the terms can only be mystifying and not clarifying. The subconscious includes at least three wholly distinct groups of phenomena, that are distinct in kind, though chronologically they may often be related. They are (1) subliminal mental actions whose contents or objects have been derived wholly from normal experience; (2) the phenomena of automatism or apparently mechanical responses to some sort of stimulus, whether intraorganic or extraorganic; (3) the functions alleged in the phenomena of the supernormal and associated with telepathy, clairvoyance, and premonition.

These include the highest and the lowest in the scale of mental actions, and do not contain the same implications. Some of them presumably have no relation to normal experience, and others have no other relation. The first group of facts denoted by the term assumes that the normal channels of experience are the source of the ideas expressed, and the third assumes that supernormal channels are the means of acquisition. This fact alone makes it absurd to employ the term to cover both fields. The second meaning of the term neither implies intelligence nor makes clear an intraorganic origin. It was probably Mr Myers's illustration of the spectrum that has caused all the trouble in this connection. He employed the spectrum as represented in normal vision to denote an analogy with normal consciousness, which he called the supraliminal. All that was above and below the limits of the two ends, the ultra red and the ultra violet, represented the subliminal. This included the lowest and the highest phenomena in the same conception, and thus made a dichotomous division with the infinite as one of the terms, and this was the "subliminal." The infinite is not an explanatory term at all. It is only a reservoir into which we throw

the unknown, and affords the intellectual conjurer many an escape from an intelligent explanation or confession of ignorance.

The first meaning of the term excludes supernormal faculty in the acquisition of knowledge, and the third meaning excludes normal faculty. The second meaning is indifferent to both the others, but expresses the idea of a passive medium for the transmission of energy or ideas, and so implies that the origin of what is expressed by its action is extraneous, at least to the particular centre of automatic action. If we employ the term subconscious in the first sense, we have no means of making the phenomena represented by the third meaning intelligible. We should only be equivocating with The intelligible feature of the first meaning of the term is found in the relation of identity between its contents and those of normal experience. Otherwise the simplest meaning of the subconscious would be wholly unintelligible. But there is no such identity of contents or processes between the subconscious as implying the supernormal and the ordinary channels of knowledge, in so far as the subject manifesting it is concerned. The one is distinctly like the normal and the other is not. The evidence of the existence and limits of subliminal action are found in the same facts associated with the normal, in so far as the subconscious is recognised as such by normal psychology. There is no such evidence for supernormal "faculty," as long as we have to admit the existence of automatic functions which may be the vehicle for the transmission of foreign influences. The facts of supernormal information are there, but the source of them is not so clear. The term becomes thus only a name for phenomena to be explained, not for a process explaining. I do not think we have, as yet, any satisfactory scientific evidence for the larger aspects of the subliminal as maintained by Mr Myers and those who extend such functions into the infinite. It was all very well to extend its possible meaning as a caution against hasty conclusions in other directions, but a device of prudence was not evidence of a fact.

Another way of indicating the confusion attending the use of the term is to call attention to the equivocation in the conception of the subconscious as both automatic and intelligent. These are contradictory ideas. We have constantly to recognise that there are functions outside of normal consciousness that are automatic, and this means that they act in a sort of mechanical manner and without intelligent adjustment or creation of the data expressed. Huxley's use of the conception in automatism implied an internal force of some kind originating the result, but it was not conscious and not volitional, and, in spite of its mechanical character, it was not initiated from without. On the other hand, the subconscious is as often defined by intelligence of a high order, and excludes the mechanical conception of action, whether internally or externally initiated. The consequence is that the term embodies now the conception of non-intelligent and again that of intelligent action, in addition to not making it clear whether the phenomena produced are subjectively or objectively initiated. With such confusion attending the conception it is no wonder that sceptical wizards can bewilder ordinarily sane people and clear thinkers. A conception that does service for everything, including latent memories, the supernormal, and mechanical functions, is no doubt a term to conjure with and is sure to mystify most of the men who use it, to say nothing of that confiding public that has to accept the authority of science and that cannot distinguish between the juggler and the real man in it.

Something like the following, I think, should have been done in this field. Accepting Mr Myers's analogy of the spectrum to start with, we might apply the subliminal to what lies below the threshold of normal consciousness, as in orthodox psychology, and confine this to the processes that deal with the material of normal experience though they are not mnemonically connected with the normal. We might consider these functions as identical in kind with the normal, even though associated with automatism, and as dependent on

normal experience for their data or material of knowledge. They would be distinguished from the normal only in the absence of normal memory and introspection of their objects. The liminal point would be that between the subliminal and the normal consciousness, and might be made as variable as facts require. It would not need to be a fixed point either in the individual or in different persons. Then what has usually passed as the "supraliminal" in the classification of Mr Myers might be called the colliminal, implying all that lies above the limen or liminal point and below an upper threshold which may be supposed to distinguish the normal from the hypernormal. We should have in this field of the colliminal the area of normal consciousness representing the spectrum between its two limits. Lastly, and above it all, would come the field of the supernormal, and which might be called the supraliminal, or perhaps better the supracolliminal, if we wish to preserve more etymological accuracy. But apart from literal and etymological usage the terms subliminal, colliminal, and supraliminal might denote the three stages of mental action, with the hypernormal, or supraliminal (supra-colliminal), remaining as an open question, but clearly distinguished from both the subliminal and the normal mental functions both as to character and contents, though representing the law of continuity as desired. The automatic functions might then lie outside all of them and naturally below the subliminal, and representing functions of a more mechanical character though possibly associated very closely with the subliminal. We might then understand more clearly how to distinguish between the contributions of each function to any complex product, while we keep open for investigation and debate the nature and limitations of the alleged hypernormal functions of mind. The important limiting agency on their existence and contribution would be the automatic functions of the subject associated with the possible intrusion of foreign intelligence into the products of observation and experiment.

Much of this talk about the enormous powers of the

"subliminal" or "subconscious" has no scientific foundation whatever. It comes from confusing a proved fact with one that has no scientific evidence whatever for it. If the distinctions which I have made above were observed this would be apparent. Those who talk so glibly about what the "subliminal" does or may do never seem to take account of the remarkable limitations of it that are established by the contrast between what is attributed to it and the accomplishments of this alleged "subliminal" (supra-colliminal) and the automatic agencies of the mind. In all my observations and experiments I find that this "subliminal," when it is supposed to transcend normal experience, constantly falls below what we should expect of the subconscious as known in orthodox psychology. Just when it should be most naturally expected to do wonders it can do very little. If we would only recognise that the automatic functions were active and that foreign intelligence was acting under difficulties, we could easily reconcile the apparent contradictions of the supernormal and limited results. But when you assume that this "supraliminal" or hypernormal "faculty" is practically infinite in capacity and resources and is constantly displaying simulation and deception to an amazing degree, it is certainly a contradiction to find it more limited than the most finite conception we can form of the orthodox subconscious. Why is it that, with plenty of resources from normal experience, it cannot impersonate, when it can impersonate infinitely without any such resources? This situation should make our credulous sceptics smile in their policy of duping the public. In some way we must distinguish the four entirely distinct set of conditions from each other, where we have been accustomed to lump three of them together with equivocations which produce as much illusion on the public as they suggest quackery on the part of soi disant scientists.

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New York.

PRISONS AND PRISONERS.

THOMAS HOLMES,

Secretary of the Howard Association.

It is impossible to imagine a subject upon which there is a wider divergence of opinion than that of prison life and prison management; and this divergence of opinion is not only inevitable but quite natural. I may add, too, that it is impossible to conceive a more difficult task than that of successfully managing a prison.

I mean successful in the sense that the life of its inmates does not tend to demoralisation, but rather that its discipline is restraining and reformative.

Prisons at their best are unnatural institutions; and though unfortunately they appear to be necessary at the present time, it is easy to believe that in the near future most of them will disappear. "There is," said Sam Slick, "a great deal of human nature in man." There is, and human nature not only makes it certain that bad men will be made worse by the infliction of cruelty, but also makes it certain that idle rogues will not be brought to honest and industrious ways by short periods of dull monotony. Human nature is many-sided—it has as many facets as a well-cut diamond, and it is this many-sidedness that makes it impossible to establish a satisfactory prison discipline.

The fact that a number of men are detained and shielded from the temptation to commit certain offences to which they are prone, renders it the more certain that many of them will again commit those offences when restored to liberty: with liberty comes opportunity, and with opportunity temptation and fall, for moral strength cannot grow in the absence of temptation.

Roughly, the men and women who inhabit our prisons may be classified under five heads: first, the feeble-minded; second, the physical weakling; third, the vagrant; fourth, the casual offender; fifth, the habitual offender. I believe that all our prisoners can be placed in one or more of these divisions, though of course there will be variations. Should this be approximately the case, it is certain that a tremendous difficulty arises when the discipline and routine of any one prison, however well conducted, is made to serve for the whole of the classes.

This is where our prisons fail, and must continue to fail if the present methods are continued; for in our endeavours to administer equal justice to all classes we commit the greatest injustice, and in our attempts to be merciful we are cruel to many of our prisoners.

For the feeble-minded, the weakling, the vagrant, and the habitual, prison has no terrors: to them it is at once a sanatorium and a lodging-house. It is as necessary for their health and personal cleanliness as quarantine is for those smitten of the plague. To them the bath, the change of clothing, the clean cell, and the regular food are comforts, even refinements; but to the casual offender such things may be sickening and maddening almost beyond endurance. To the former, the semi-idleness of prison, which makes no demand on their physical or mental powers, is grateful and comforting; but to the man of industry, brain, imagination, and culture this idle monotony is exasperating to a degree, unless he be endowed with philosophical stoicism.

The effect of prison discipline, however, is determined not by the rules and routine of any particular prison, but by the temperament of the individual under detention.

It must, I think, be admitted that generally our prisons

fail either to deter or reform; but this failure must not be attributed to the prison system altogether, or to any lack of sympathy in the prison officials, but rather to the fact that our prison population is made up of a strange and motley collection of individuals, divided, it is true, into a few general classes, but each individual differing widely from his fellows in temperament and taste, in physical and mental capacity.

In these days it is sometimes necessary to point out that even the fact of a man having broken his country's laws does not prove him to be an estimable fellow, for the reverse is sometimes true, even of first offenders. But the converse also holds good, for though a man may have served many imprisonments we may not assume that he is altogether worthless. Some of the most contemptible and worthless fellows I have met in the course of my long experience were first offenders of good education. On the other hand, I have known some men whose convictions were numerous, who had lived many years in prison, for whom I felt considerable respect and in whose company I experienced pleasure.

I have found my study of prison humanity more than interesting, for sometimes it has been enthralling. No single day passes without some ex-prisoner sitting in front of me telling me his prison experience or asking some guidance or help. I should certainly have missed my opportunities if I had not closely observed the effects of prison life.

Now all this leads me to say that men who have "done time" are in my judgment the least fitted of all men to give an unbiassed opinion on prison life.

An educated and refined man, one who loves liberty and social life, must of necessity find prison a terrible place, unless he be a philosopher. But should he be of a nervous, imaginative, or morbid temperament, why, then, he suffers the torments of hell. He knows in his heart that he has been a fool, probably he is never tired of reminding himself of the fact; but he gets no comfort from his knowledge, it adds no

reasonableness to his disposition. He reviews his life again and again, not with feelings of shame or sorrow, but for the purpose of finding some excuse for himself or fixing the blame upon others. He is full of fear for the future, but he has no sorrow for the past; he has no desire to undo the wrong he has done, no particular desire to avoid such wrongs in the future.

He lives in a state of chronic irritation; he is morose or excitable by turns. He does not find the officials sympathetic or courteous, for they too are human, and even in prison like meets with like. The sufferings of these men are intense, the iron enters their souls; and though their sufferings are largely self-created, they are none the less real.

Ask such a man to give a description of prison life, and he will give one worthy of Charles Reade.

But suppose we ask a different type of man to give us his opinion: he may be equally well educated with the former, he may have served a similar sentence in the same prison, at the same time; none the less will he present us with a striking contrast.

He will tell you that the prison was dull and monotonous, but just what he expected; that the food was unpleasant till he got used to it; that many things disgusted him in his early prison days, but he put up with them; that he kept all the rules, got all his "marks," and so obtained full remission of sentence: in a word, he made the best of things.

He will tell you he had no real hard work to do, that the officials were all good to him, but they had their duties to perform, and that he never insulted them. There was nothing of much interest going on, and that really formed his punishment, for he had many interests in the outside world.

Let me select another: this man may be considered an authority, for although he is under sixty years of age his sentences amount to more than forty years. He knows Portland, Dartmoor, Parkhurst, and of course many local prisons; he has had as much as fifteen years at a stretch, and, as I understand he is again in prison, it is quite possible

that ultimately, unless Mr Gladstone's Preventive Detention Act takes possession of him, the accumulation of his sentences may outnumber the years of his life.

For he too gets all his "marks," and has never failed to get three months off every year served. Singularly enough, this man is industrious, skilled, and intelligent. There is not an idle bone in his body; he loves liberty; to him the song of birds and the smiling of the flowers are pleasant; he is kind to dumb animals, and to him children are a joy. His health is not broken, his intelligence is not atrophied, he is still alert and brisk—in fact, too much so. He knows what there is to be known about prisons, and he knows the "ropes" too.

At liberty, he makes war upon society; in prison, he bows to the inevitable, and makes the best of things. He is, and always has been, prepared to take the consequences, if caught, of his crime; he has never yet persuaded himself, or tried to persuade himself, that he is a fool. If again allowed liberty, he will cheerfully prepare for another campaign and hope for a "good run"; he weighs things up, for he is a logician, and so many crimes are equal to so much detention.

I have scores of this man's letters written from various prisons. I have details of his daily life. He tells of being in the hospital and of his better food; he tells that he is hoping for liberty and means to see me again. But he never makes any complaint; neither does he complain when at liberty. Many hours have I sat with him discussing life and liberty, crime and prison, but no complaint about his treatment has he ever uttered.

Although habitually criminal, he considers himself much better than the bulk of prisoners, and he will tell ingenuously enough "that prison is too good for most of them." Yet he had carried firearms and shot a policeman. He was not well educated, but he had read a great deal while in prison, where he had picked up a smattering of French. He was a clever workman, and had developed a special branch of his trade

during his many detentions. As a prisoner he is perfect, as a citizen he is atrocious and impossible.

If we ask the half-mad fellow who is constantly in prison for deeds of violence, to whom uncontrolled liberty means joy and life, we shall be able to read his answer in his eyes: they tell us that revenge is his great hope. But ask the aimless and hopeless wanderer who has been certified again and again as "unfit for prison discipline," and you will find no evidence of passion, no sense of grievance, no signs to indicate that prison was an undesirable place; for did not old "Cakebread" go cheerfully to prison although her detentions numbered over three hundred?

If we seek an opinion from tramps and vagrants, they, if honest, will tell us that from time to time the prison is a necessity to them, and that if they cannot obtain entrance for vagrancy, why, then, they will break somebody's window and so make sure of prison comforts, for it is "better than the workhouse."

If we consult youthful ex-prisoners, i.e. juvenile-adults, of whom unfortunately I know many, we get an altogether too favourable picture of prison life. Many of them do not hesitate to tell us that they can "do it on their heads"; though physically this may be an exaggeration, yet the expression conveys a pretty accurate description of the effect imprisonment has had upon them. I may here remark that though I have seen hundreds of youths weeping bitterly when awaiting in police-court cells their first conveyance to prison, I cannot call to mind a single instance of a youth weeping or showing signs of fear when awaiting his second term. The reason is not far to seek, for one short month had been sufficient to remove fear: they felt that after all prison was not such a terrible place, and after the first disgrace it did not matter if they got there again.

By the kind permission of the authorities I am permitted regularly to lecture to youthful persons on any subject that I can make interesting, and were it not that I am concerned for their future, I would say that I have had very happy times with youths in prison. I find them content, even cheerful, quick to smile, and ready with responsive answers to my questions. I find no traces of abject fear, no evidences of shame or sorrow; they are well treated, and they know it. Whether they should be there at all is a different matter. But here is a description, taken from my pile of manuscript, written by a youth who underwent six months:-" After the first fourteen days I was put in the bookbinder's shop, and my days were as follows: arose 6 A.M., in the shop from 6.30 till 7.15, breakfast 7.15 till 8.30, chapel 8.45 till 9.30, drill 9.40 till 10.40, school 10.45 till 11.45, and dinner 12 o'clock till 1.30, school 1.45 till 4.45, tea 5 o'clock; after that time I was in my cell, but on Wednesday I went again to the schoolroom at 5.30 to 6.30, when a gentleman lectured to us; I was in the choir, and went to practice on Friday nights from 5.30 till 6.30. I was confirmed in prison. Sundays were the worst days, for we had supper about 4.15, and as I could not sit about idle in my cell I went to bed at 5 o'clock. The food I got used to, and was perfectly satisfied with it. I obtained all good marks possible, and earned 20s. (gratuity) while doing my six months. The governor, the chaplain, and all the officials were good to me. The last day of every month I was weighed."

It will be seen that the writer of the above accomplished less than four hours' gentle work each day; it will also be seen that his spiritual, moral, and physical condition was attended to, for he was confirmed and weighed, lectured to and drilled.

But an intimate acquaintance with young offenders makes one the possessor of knowledge that conduces to serious reflection. For many years I have noticed that many of them are physical weaklings, and that many of the others suffer from some disease, deformity, or disablement. My observation is confirmed by the testimony of official authorities, for in the year 1898 a careful examination was made of all the youths

detained in Pentonville between the ages of sixteen and twenty. This disclosed the fact that both as regards height and weight the evidence of physical deficiency among young offenders was abundantly clear. As a class they were two inches below the average height, and weighed fourteen pounds less than the average weight of the general youthful population, and 26 per cent. of them were afflicted with some disease, deformity, or disablement.

In 1908 an examination was again conducted, and practically the same results obtained.

Another startling fact was revealed by these examinations, for the highest proportion of reconvictions was in this class, no less than 40 per cent. of these unfortunate youths being reconvicted. Yet this latter item need be no matter for wonder. seeing that every industrial school and reformatory in the British Isles would have refused them in their early days, for all these institutions demand certificates of mental and physical health from every youthful offender. And the weakest still go to the wall, for Borstal will not welcome them: even its gates are closed against young offenders who have not clear brains and well-set-up bodies. This procedure is not only cruel, but it is arrant folly; and I am bold to affirm that no sensible reduction of our prison population will ever take place till the State takes some thought and makes some reasonable provision for its criminally inclined defective youths. present State and philanthropic bodies alike are very careful to offer their advantages to youths who can do without them, and refuse their help to those who have greatest need. Society offers nothing to these youths but a continual round of short imprisonments, unless indeed they qualify for longer sentences.

So far my remarks will, I hope, have led the reader to understand in some degree what a heterogeneous mass of humanity congregates in a large prison, and to appreciate something of the difficulty that inevitably arises in finding a system that is at once disciplinary and reformative. To emphasise this important lesson, let me ask the reader to

stand with me in the pulpit of a London prison and take one searching look at the congregation below and in front of us. It is Sunday morning, the time is ten o'clock, and the sun is streaming through the lofty windows, lighting up every corner of the prison chapel. From our obscure seat we see a great congregation of men, row behind row according to their "class" and age. We glance at the front row of prisoners, many of whom have the privilege of being in the choir, but the glance troubles us. In measured tones, with clear voice, the chaplain reads the old service with which the prisoners are familiar. Loudly and apparently heartily the vast congregation joins in the responses: the psalms for the day are well sung; by and by the organ peals and the glorious strains of the Te Deum fill the building—"We praise Thee, O God." How they sing, those thousand men! The volume of sound is impressive beyond words. We notice a black man in the choir singing with as much earnest enjoyment as though he were singing a favourite plantation song.

A little more of the service, followed by a well-known hymn, and then we ascend the tall pulpit and see for the first time the whole of the congregation. At once we realise something that cannot be realised without this view. In front and below us are the juvenile adults, some with vacant faces, some with intelligent faces, some with mischievous faces -here and there one or two of lusty strength and athletic figure, but most of them undersized and ill-fed, some of them with twisted bodies, smitten, stricken, and afflicted. Behind them sit the older prisoners, a motley and fearsome lot-old men on the verge of the grave, young men in early manhood, middle-aged men with families dependent upon them, or on charity. There the tramp who knows every lodging-house and every casual ward, and next to him a delinquent clerk from a London office; yonder sits the incorrigible from a workhouse, and beside him an educated man who is eating out his own heart.

Strange faces are there, and strange figures too: the diffi-

culties of life, the temptations of life are personified. Some sinning, some sinned against, some sane, and many insane; every shade of guilt and many varieties of innocence. Whim, passion, idleness, stupidity, drunkenness, irresponsibility, and poverty have all contributed their quota to that great congregation. Our look fascinates us, bewilders us; but as we look on them, with pitying eye our hearts also go out to the band of men who have charge of them and whose hard task it is to control and, if you will, to reform them, for truly it is a stupendous task under any conditions. It may give some insight into the mental condition of our prisoners when I state that in England and Wales alone about 1000 have been placed on an official register during the last three years classified as feeble-minded, and that every year 400 others are added to that list; but this does not include the insane, for last year alone 135 prisoners were classified insane in local prisons.

Surely, then, prison officials demand our consideration, and personally I am delighted to know from my delinquent friends that they at any rate have no complaints to make about the conduct of the warders. To some extent the danger lies in the opposite direction, for prisoners can and do persecute their warders and make their duties almost intolerable. A few days ago, when speaking to a clerk who had undergone two terms, one of two years, the other five, I asked him, "How did you get on with the warders? Did any of them persecute you?" and he replied, "Certainly not! they know better; why, we should report them. I did report one who spoke rudely to me, and he got a sharp reprimand." I have known some prisoners that were extremely well posted up in the Home Office regulations and rules, and as quick to detect any departure from them as a "workhouse lawyer" is to detect and enlarge upon any departure from the Local Government Board regulations.

But do not let it be thought that I hold any brief for prisons; I do not, for I think prisons the most imperfect of all our institutions, demanding instant and great reform.

But while I advocate thorough reforms, I cannot find, and never have found, in any of our prisons the sickening horrors put before the readers of this Journal in the April issue.

For the writer of the article one is bound to be profoundly sorry; undoubtedly his sufferings in prison were intense, yet the perspective of time does not appear to have lessened the sense of his sufferings. Nay, the flight of time appears to have enlarged his sufferings so much that now he finds in his personal experience horrors that may have existed at some time or other in some of the many prisons in the British Empire. But I venture to say that during the last fifty years no single prison could furnish us with a tithe of the evils he so graphically details. This is where the writer misleads: he incorporates the statements of others with his own experience till it is impossible to differentiate between the two, and I cannot help feeling that his article would have been more effective had he kept entirely to his own experience, giving us the date of his imprisonment and the particular prison in which he served it.

Without this information we cannot very well rebut, though we may be inclined to deny, many of his statements.

Some of his observations appear to require a little extension.

"Arrest, to a man who has never been placed under duress, is shockingly demoralising." Perhaps so; but I would ask whether the appropriation of other people's money to his own use does not also demoralise a man? Some people are wise enough to believe that it is the action and not the arrest that constitutes the real disgrace. Arrest is no doubt a painful experience—it ought to be; may the time be far distant when it is otherwise,—but so long as men injure others and break their country's laws, arrest will continue to be necessary unless we abolish prisons altogether.

"The bedding is frequently so foul that a scum remains on his body after contact." However filthy prisons may have been in the bygone days, such conditions do not now exist in any prison that I know, or in any British prison that I have heard of; the cleanliness of prison is "painful" to many prisoners, and apparent to anyone who may be permitted to inspect.

"He must at once divest himself of boots, outer shirt, trousers, and put them outside his cell door." Only determined prison - breakers are compelled to do this; ordinary prisoners, that is, nine hundred and ninety-nine out of every thousand, retain their clothing during the night in their cells.

So we might go through the whole of the terrible statements made by the writer of the article, and find a modicum of truth extended till it becomes a huge enormity.

He tells of planned attacks upon warders by men driven to desperation by persecution, but he does not tell us that many men are in prison because of their murderous instincts, and that prison is the result and not the cause.

He tells us that men are driven mad in prison, but he does not tell us that madness was the cause of the actions for which they were imprisoned; neither does he tell us that last year 130 prisoners were certified to be insane in England and Wales alone, "most of them showing signs of insanity on admission."

As to work in prison! why, the prisoners laugh; in all my experience I cannot call to mind an ex-prisoner who complained of overwork. But I have known scores who would have thanked God for a bit more of it, either physical or mental.

I have watched men in prison workshops, I have watched convicts in stone-quarries, and my experience is that every movement tells not of feverish haste but of lethargic leisure.

It is the lack of work, not its abundance, that is the great evil of our prison system.

While I am persuaded that prison officials, from governor, chaplain, doctor, down to the despised warder, are absolutely misrepresented by the writer of the article, yet I must confess myself surprised to find them as good as they are, con-

sidering their duties, and bearing in mind the individuals they have to control.

Lest it be thought that I am satisfied with prisons as they are at present, I will point out the reforms which I consider necessary in our penal system and our prison administration.

I. There is too much indiscriminate and unnecessary gaoling; prisons should be the last resource, not, as too frequently happens, the first.

In England and Wales alone 100,000 persons are committed to prison every year because they cannot promptly pay fines that have been imposed for minor offences.

I hold that every offender fined, if she or he possesses a settled home, should be allowed adequate time to pay the fine.

Probably this would keep 40,000 first offenders out of prison every year, with a corresponding reduction in the number of second offenders in the following years.

What folly can equal the plan of bundling a decent man or youth into the prison van and putting all the machinery of prison into operation because he cannot pay forthwith a few shillings?

II. The old law of restitution and reparation must be revived. The First Offenders Act, now superseded by the Probation Act, was not an unmixed blessing, for, while it kept thousands of dishonest persons out of prison, it never convinced them of the serious nature of dishonesty. To use their own expression, "They were jolly well out of it"; consequently the wrong done to the individual was not impressed upon them. The law had been satisfied; to them nothing else mattered.

At the instigation of the Howard Association, Mr Gladstone added a clause to the Probation Act empowering courts of summary jurisdiction to order restitution for goods or money stolen up to the value of £10. But magistrates do not put this clause in force; yet such a clause is not only just but merciful.

Nothing can be worse for a young rogue than to know that he has stolen a considerable sum of money and spent it in wicked waste without anything happening to him: undoubtedly prison is bad for such youths, for a month soon goes; but during that time, character, aspiration, and industry go also. For the life of me I cannot see why orders for restitution should not be made, neither can I see any objection to our numerous probation officers having charge of these cases and collecting by instalments the money ordered. Nothing will so effectually bring home to dishonest youths the enormity of their offences as compulsion to pay back that which they have stolen. Restitution would also be the greatest punishment for adult offenders in this direction.

For the forger, the burglar, the maker of counterfeit coins, the manufacturer of spurious notes, and all clever, calculating, and persistent rogues, other methods should be tried, for prison cannot demoralise them. But for a first offender, even though he be of years, who has committed some breach of honesty, restitution seems the most effective way, the only reasonable plan for the prevention of demoralisation and the expense of prison.

Given, then, reasonable time for the payment of fines, a thorough application of the Probation Act and the establishment of compulsory but limited restitution—given these, half our prisons may be closed.

Quite recently the governor of a large London prison declared that one-fourth of the daily average of his prisoners ought not to be in prison at all. I believe his statement to be below, not beyond, the truth. We can easily see that, if our prison population were reduced by one-half, great reforms would naturally follow in prison administration. Practically there would be the same amount of work to do in prison, for the various Government departments would still require the commodities that prison labour supplies. Prisons would then become hives of industry instead of castles of indolence, and prisoners would of course be given a much larger financial

interest in the work done. Under such conditions prisons, too, would naturally become pathological and psychological observatories.

With proper men and proper time to make the observations, prisons would reveal to us some of the dark wonders incident to the strange mixture of humanity we thoughtlessly dub criminal.

When that happy day comes, we shall be able to differentiate between crime and disease; we shall no longer punish men for their afflictions, but we shall treat them as patients in places other than prisons.

Look for a moment at that growing, ever-growing army of people, the feeble-minded and irresponsibles, who are perpetually haled to prison, and to whose ranks 400 are added every year. From prison to the streets, from the streets to the police station, from the station to the police court, and from thence to prisons, forms the vicious circle of their hopeless lives.

Certified as "unfit for prison discipline," yet everlastingly in prison; not fit for liberty, yet constantly thrust into liberty; homeless, hopeless, friendless, battered from pillar to post, eyesores to humanity, they tread the vicious circle.

Oh! I protest that the very contemplation of this thing makes me sick and ill, for I know so many of the stricken, wretched beings. And we call them habitual criminals because they commit certain actions that we call crime, the nature and quality of which they are not able to appreciate.

Some day we shall pity them and care for them and give them, under control, as much childlike happiness as they can appreciate, such work as they can do, with simple comforts and controlling discipline; but no useless liberty, no opportunities of perpetuating their kind, no more of the vicious circle, and no more prison.

And the tramps and the loafers too must be taken in hand, and not with a gloved hand either. For prison is no place for them: the month or six weeks is soon up, they have been cleansed, they have recuperated, then, heigho! for the hedgerows if it is summer, the Embankment or shelters if it is winter.

Their vagrant days must end, and end in detention in some place where the wholesome Pauline advice may be carried out—if they will not work, neither shall they eat! But with no chance of a second generation.

And there is another class of whom I must speak, but I do so with fear and trembling: I refer to the wild and gross women who live upon our streets, and whose convictions number anything between twenty and four hundred. Look! during the year 1906, 933 women, each of whom had served more than ten imprisonments, were once more in Holloway Gaol.

Some hundreds of them had been in that gaol more than twenty times each! Many of them were known personally to me, for I have seen them in the cells, and I have seen them at liberty, I have seen them drunk, I have seen them sober.

But whether sober or drunk, they are slaves of gross, overmastering passion, elemental in its intensity; to them nothing else matters.

The State dubs them inebriates, and treats them as such. I can almost laugh at the irony of it, for drink is but an incident, an effect; the cause lies deeper, much deeper; down through generations some germs have come and found an abiding place in them, bearing fruition in their terrible and hopeless lives. Is prison a place for them? I trow not! Is one month, two months', or six months' detention of any avail? Ask the prison authorities or consult the records, and you will get your answer. Do the claims of humanity ask for no consideration? Has science nothing to say upon the matter? Are we to go on for ever tinkering with a vital question by giving such women an endless succession of short imprisonments, which only serve the purpose of renewing their health and lengthening their days, that their lives may be devoted to the most fearful purpose to which any human will can be subjected?

But when all these unfortunate classes are properly cared for, we shall still require prisons; but they must be specialised prisons, and our officials must be properly qualified and equipped for their work.

The science of healing must play a more important part: the doctor must be a student of mental as well as physical diseases.

When the days of short imprisonments are ended we shall probably have a "receiving prison" to which the offenders will be sent on conviction for "observation" and "classification," and thence drafted to different prisons suitable to their age, condition, and ability.

A plan of this description would bring the duties of governors, doctors, chaplains, and warders within the sphere of possibility, for failing this, strive as they may and do, we ask them to perform the impossible.

But in the prisons of the future, specialised as they will be, classification will still have to play an important part, and classification will be no longer governed by the number of convictions a youth or adult has received, but by the real character, temperament, and ability of the prisoner.

And in the prisons there will be work demanding the use of muscle and fingers, opportunities for the use of brains, and some chance for the emotions of the heart to have play.

Consider for a moment the life of a man undergoing a five years' sentence. It is one of deadening routine! With mechanical certitude his actions are controlled and ordered; the same food in amount and kind, at the same time each day, and served in the same manner.

The same amount of cell, the same amount of bed, no opportunities of doing kindnesses, no opportunities for receiving kindnesses; brain, heart, and muscle alike stagnant; yet he schools himself to deceive, for he knows that if he plays the hypocrite long enough he will reduce his sentence by fifteen months. Consequently he develops a servile manner and a low cunning.

Let any otherwise decent man live this life for three years and nine months, always having before him the one object, that of shortening his term, and I need not ask what the psychological result will be.

Yes! this bribe to good behaviour must be abolished, even though Captain Maconachie arise from his grave to defend it, and the prisons of the future will know it not, for the prisoner's release will be determined by other conditions than mere mechanical obedience. And with the passing of the "ticket of leave," "police supervision" will also pass: truly it is time that both were dead and buried. Perhaps I may astonish some folk by stating that police supervision, notwithstanding its impressive sound, is a farce, absolute and complete. An ex-convict has no fear of it-he can even "report" himself by letter, and I have never, though I have often inquired into such complaints, found the complaints made about detective and police interference with the employment of discharged prisoners justified; neither do I know any "old lag" that finds the supervision irksome in the least degree.

The conditions are too easily fulfilled: an occasional visit to the police station, and the rest by letter will suffice.

But we are apt to forget that even employers and the public have a right to consideration equally with discharged prisoners. I also know that a number of the police, some in influential positions, would be glad if the so-called supervision were abolished. They know that practically it is of no effect, and they know too that the public is often excited over the complaints made by ex-convicts before magistrates of interference by the police. I shall not be revealing an official secret when I say that the archives of Scotland Yard contain numerous reports of inquiries made into these complaints, and that few if any have been found genuine. Nevertheless I am convinced that there are cases where it is the bounden duty of the police to warn employers. Supposing, as not infrequently happens, that a dangerous rogue obtains a situa-

tion of trust by the aid of forged character and references, what can the police do and what ought they to do, if honest? But I am quite certain that any officer who needlessly interfered with an ex-convict that was honestly trying to obtain a livelihood would get scant mercy from his superiors: the police and detective force know this quite well.

Mr Gladstone's Preventive Detention Act will do much to lighten the labour of Scotland Yard; the pity is that it limits a sentence of preventive detention to ten years, for at the expiration of this time, whatever be the age, mental and physical condition, or past record of the prisoner sentenced under the Act, he must be discharged, though homeless, hopeless, and friendless. He may of course be discharged much earlier if circumstances warrant, especially if he has friends and work to take up.

Now the men who qualify for the provisions of this Act are of two classes, the determined and persistent criminal, who lives by crime, desires to live by crime, and to whom no other life has any attraction. Against these men, after being adjudged by a jury to be habitual criminals, we ought to be safeguarded, even as we protect ourselves against known madmen.

The second class are criminals because they are irresponsible—a helpless class of individuals who have not the ability to maintain themselves, who can do nothing useful unless under control. Most of the men who comprise these two classes are of middle age, many of them decidedly old; but when their preventive detention expires they will be ten years older, so I question the mercy as well as the justice of thrusting these old men into useless liberty; better by half detain them under reasonable conditions and let them quietly die out, in the hope that few will be found to take their places. And in the days to come that most woefully afflicted human, the epileptic, will not wear the criminal badge or the convict's brand, and the hideous cruelty inflicted on these unfortunates will be no longer perpetrated. Their sorrows and their suffer-

ings will make no vain appeal to our pity and care; we shall protect them and ourselves in a humane and scientific way. But not in prison. And when that time comes, the horrid term "criminal lunatic" will also disappear from our vocabulary. For it is high time this abortion was buried and numbered with the monstrosities of the past.

I protest against this phrase and the consequences that attach to it. Verily it passes the wit of men to conceive how anyone can be a criminal and a lunatic at one and the same time, for if he be the one he cannot be the other. So Broadmoor will become "the State Asylum," and the cruel farce of putting undeniably insane people on their trial will no longer be tolerated, for quietly and mercifully, after due certification, they will pass to the mental hospital with no brand of criminality upon them. Are we to be for ever impotent before diseases of the brain? are physical afflictions and deprivations to remain for ever unconsidered when justice holds the scales, and when punishment is decreed?

I think not! Nay, I am sure, for in the prisons that are yet to be the paternal hand of the State, while exercising a restraining power over its stricken children, will consider their afflictions and limitations and have mercy upon them.

Then blighted youth—blighted through poverty, disease, malformation, or accident—will be no longer neglected even though it be criminally inclined. Then the reproach that the State helps only those that can help themselves will be wiped out. Then even in our prisons the weaklings will receive some portion of their due, and the days of criminal neglect will be ended.

THOMAS HOLMES.

LONDON,

THE WORDS OF INSTITUTION AT THE LAST SUPPER.

M. A. R. TUKER.

"For I have received of the Lord that which also I delivered unto you, how that the Lord Jesus in the night in which he was betrayed, took bread; and when he had given thanks, he brake it, and said, This is my body, which is for you (or broken for you): this do in remembrance of me. In like manner also the cup, after supper, saying, This cup is the new covenant in my blood: this do, as oft as ye drink it, in remembrance of me" (1 Cor. xi. 23-25).

No one who reads the accounts in Mark, Luke and Matthew can fail to see there the nucleus of a description of the supper separable from these words of S. Paul. In all three there are traces of a narrative telling of an appointed meal at which the Lord declared he would eat no more with them as he was then eating, and at which he blest a cup (the "cup after supper," or fourth cup of the passover meal, called the cup of 'benediction') which he told all present to drink of, because he would not drink it with them till the coming of the Kingdom of God. M. Loisy, in his monumental work on the Synoptic Gospels, published in 1908, considers that these words and actions alone are to be attributed to the Lord, and that the italicised words in the passages which I have arranged below are interpolated from the Pauline account of the institution in 1 Cor. xi. above cited.

"A. Luke, where Paul is followed most closely and where the Corinthian passage is interpolated after the (alleged) original passage: With desire I have desired to eat this passover with you before I suffer: for I say unto vou. I will not eat it, until it be fulfilled in the Kingdom of God. And he received a cup, and when he had given thanks, he said, Take this, and divide it among yourselves: for I say unto you, I will not drink from henceforth of the fruit of the vine, until the Kingdom of God shall come. And he took bread, and when he had given thanks, he brake it, and gave to them, saying, This is my body which is given for you: this do in remembrance of me. And the cup in like manner after supper, saying, This cup is the new covenant in my blood, even that which is poured out for you,"

"B. Mark, where the (alleged) original narrative is recorded by the Synoptic passage about the cup, intercalated with the Corinthian passage: And as they were eating. The took bread, and when he had blessed, he brake it], and gave to them, [and said], Take ye: [this is my body]. And he took a cup, and when he had given thanks, he gave to them: and they all drank of it. And he said unto them, This is my blood of the (new) covenant, which is shed for many]. Verily I say unto you, I will no more drink of the fruit of the vine, until that day when I drink it new in the Kingdom of God."

"C. Matthew, where the Corinthian passage about the cup is again intercalated in the midst of the (alleged) original passage: And as they were eating, Jesus [took bread and blessed, and brake it]; and he gave to the disciples, [and said], Take, eat; [this is my body]. And he took a (the) cup, and gave thanks, and gave to them, saying, Drink ve all of it; for [this is my blood of the (new) covenant, which is shed for many unto remission of For But I say unto sins]. you, I will not drink henceforth of this fruit of the vine, until that day when I drink it new with you in my Father's Kingdom."

There is probably no restoration of the Gospel text which could equal the one here suggested in general interest if not in intrinsic importance. It is not a new idea to critics of the New Testament that the command to repeat what was done at the Last Supper may not be original; that of the Synoptics Luke alone records the words "This do in remembrance of me" and that he is here clearly following the Pauline passage. M. Loisy goes further. He tells us that the original narrative in our synoptic gospels is contained in the words concerning the cup which precede the eucharistic passage in Luke's text.

Whether or not we are to suppose that the Lord never

spoke the words "Take, eat, this is my body," "This is the new covenant in my blood which is shed for you," it is evident enough that some emendation of the three synoptic texts is necessary if we are to recover, among the variants offered, the actual form of words spoken, or are to reconcile these variants with the account which Paul "received of the Lord," What M. Loisy regards as the primitive narrative makes mention of the cup but not of the bread. According to S. Paul, the Lord blessed bread and gave it to his disciples as his body. All the gospels refer to what was eaten as well as to what was drunk, "With desire I have desired to eat this passover with you before I suffer"; and in Matthew and Mark the words "and as they were eating" indicate the same tradition—that he gave, that is, a significance to the supper at the beginning, when they were set down to meat, and were eating, and that no record of it could be adequate which did not represent this preparation of their minds in the course of the supper for the special significance which he was about to give to the "cup after supper"—the eucharistic cup. Moreover, it is indeed to be believed that the Lord's habitual manner of breaking bread, its gravity, his gesture, his personal majesty, had already impressed the disciples. No one can read the post-resurrection description, "They knew him in the breaking of bread," without believing it. [Let us here note that we have no evidence that the two who went to Emmaus had seen the last supper actions.] May it not be held that it was the repeating of some such tradition about the Lord's way of breaking bread which gave to Paul the pregnant idea that when the Lord took bread and blessed and brake it that last time, he took it, held it, used it, as the body he was about to offer for them?

According to S. Paul, again, the Lord ordained that whensoever these things were done they should be done in remembrance of him. With desire the Lord had desired to eat the last supper with his disciples. Can we not imagine that what he then did, the words he used, and the manner of

them, so greatly impressed the brethren that when they were repeated to Paul he saw in them the material for an intensification of their significance? The disciples may not have repeated to him any such words as "This do in remembrance of me," but the words which were actually used easily suggested a moment that the Christian could and would make permanent. The Lord's own character and the unforgetable circumstances of the Last Supper may well have taught those who witnessed it to see a perpetual significance of some sort in the words "I say to you I will no more drink of it till I drink it new with you in the Kingdom of God." Had not Paul discovered in these very words the 'Christ eternal,' the Lord of the Gospel, whose office was not bounded by his earthly life—the indwelling Christ who was to live on after an heavenly manner in the Christian consciousness? Does he not, in those words which he 'received of the Lord,' seize on the eternal element involved in a phrase which takes the action onwards, forwards, and gives it a significance not merely present but future? For his own words, "till he come," are but an echo of the Lord's:

"I say unto you I will not drink of it till the Kingdom of God be come." Whenever therefore ye do these things, ye do show forth the Lord's

death till he come."

The elements were, therefore, all there; what was not there was a specially Pauline and specially Jewish direction of thought about them. The identification of the bread and wine with the body and blood of sacrifice of course recalls the worship of the Temple. Jewish and Pauline also is the idea of the 'new covenant.' This is introduced in the third and fourth chapters of Galatians, but it is in Hebrews that the theme of the new covenant in the blood of Christ is developed, and Paul's adoption of it in the eucharistic passage may be due to Apollos or some other Christian of the school represented by that epistle. It cannot be doubted that Paul was influenced by the ideas recorded in the Epistle to the Hebrews. It is in this epistle that the blood of Christ and the new

covenant are always set together, the two ideas being inextricably joined with the dominating theme of the epistle-the sacrifices. 1 Cor. xi. 23-28 would be sufficient evidence by itself of the influence of these ideas. Now the idea of a new covenant between God and man, so conspicuous in Paul and in Hebrews, is not to be found in the Synoptics except in the eucharistic passages, and is equally absent in Acts. The conjunction of "remission of sins" and the "blood of Christ" occurs nowhere but in the eucharistic narrative as reported in Matthew: 1 in the four Gospels and in Acts there is no other allusion at all to the Lord's blood, a theme so common in the Epistles. [The one exception being Acts xx. 28, and here it is Paul who is speaking.] It must therefore be realised that the passage in Corinthians and the eucharistic passages in the Gospels introduce ideas which are otherwise new to the Synoptics, and which are not utilised even in the Johannine narrative.

Nevertheless, when we turn to the Synoptic narratives referred to, we shall find that even if all but the bare "Drink ye all of it, for I say to you I will not drink of it till the Kingdom of God be come," be interpolated, there remains a sentence in the interpolated portion which does not occur in Paul at all:

"which is poured out for you,"

or

"which is shed for many"

(to which Matthew adds:) "unto remission of sins."

I suggest that this sentence is a mere amplification for the cup of what is already recorded by Paul in the case of the bread—"my body which is for you," or, as an alternative reading has it, "which is broken for you,"—joined to an echo of S. Paul's gloss "For as often as ye eat this bread, and drink the cup, ye proclaim the Lord's death till he come." What may be termed this passion gloss at once became part of the eucharistic 'tradition,' and the apostle's solemn condemnation of all who should fail to discriminate

¹ Cf. Heb. ix. 22, 25, 26, 28; and cf. Paul in Acts xiii. 38-39.

the blessed bread and wine by which they were partakers in the body and blood of the Lord offered for our salvation, perhaps made the addition inevitable. The importation of a gloss into the narrative as a part thereof is consistent with a not uncommon practice in early writers; we have an instance in John iii. 16-21. There was no clear demarcation between what was actually said and what might have been said; between the words used and appropriate comment. As a matter of fact the Pauline gloss is not only textually incorporated in several early liturgies, and embodied in some way or other in the anamnesis which follows the recitation of the institutional words, but it is placed in the Ambrosian liturgy in the mouth of Christ himself: "(Commanding also and saying to them): These things whensoever ye do them, ye shall do them in commemoration of me; ye shall preach my death, ye shall announce my resurrection, ye shall hope for my advent, until I come again to you from heaven."

I have noted elsewhere 1 another remarkable variant which occurs in the Roman and Ambrosian canon and nowhere else.2 The words for the cup are:—"Take, and drink ye all of this; for this is the chalice of my blood, of the new and eternal testament; the mystery of faith; which shall be shed for you, and for many, to the remission of sins." The words "eternal covenant" recall Heb. xiii. 20.3 I have suggested that "the mystery by faith" is a record of the traditional ministry of the cup by the deacon, and the deacon alone; for it is of him that in 1. Tim. iii. 9 it is written, "holding the mystery of faith in a pure conscience." The pastoral epistles were very probably written from Rome; if so the inclusion of these words about the cup in the canon of Roman origin (the Roman and Ambrosian) receives further elucidation.

Whether we are to assume or not that the two themes-

¹ Part iv. of the Handbook to Christian and Ecclesiastical Rome, chap. v. "The Ecclesiastical Orders," p. 512.

² In the Maronite canon they are imported from the Roman.

^{8 &}quot;The great shepherd of the sheep with the blood of the eternal covenant."

the Synoptic and the Corinthian—were present to the Lord's mind at the Last Supper, we know that the breaking of bread and the tradition of a cup were observed from the very first, and are alluded to in the Acts and the Epistles. The passage in the Apocalypse ii. 17 cannot be explained unless as a reference to the sacred eucharistic tradition: "To him I will give of the hidden manna, and I will give him a white counter, and upon the counter¹ a new name written which no one knoweth but he that receiveth it." The Last Supper, then, as an institution in the sense of the Corinthian passage is an apostolic tradition, and it may be held that it represents an inspired interpretation of the Lord's meaning.

Should it not be said that Paul himself leaves us no loophole for seeing in 1 Cor. xi. an echo of the teaching of the Twelve? In Gal. i. 11, 12, 16, and 17 he gives us a solemn account of the manner in which the gospel came to him by revelation and without reference to the gospel as preached by those who had been with Jesus. It is not conceivable that any sentences could be more conclusive and absolute. And it is in relation to them that we are to refer the equally solemn asseveration in 1 Cor. xi., "I received of the Lord that which also I delivered unto you." Why else does he say he received this of the Lord, this being-above and beyond all things (save only that doctrine of the kingdom of heaven of which Paul makes so little use)-what could have been and should have been learnt from the disciples? S. Paul acknowledges three sources for his gospel: direct revelation from the Lord; the tradition of Cephas and the other apostles; his own opinion ("yet not the Lord, but I"). What was said and intended at the Last Supper was, he tells us, received by direct revelation. That Paul, on occasion, confused spiritual vision with historic reality is very obvious from his account of the appearances after the resurrection in 1 Cor. xv. 4-8; and for those who are accustomed to believe that to him is due the christology

¹ The word is that used for the voting counter in Greece, having the name of the electee on it.

eventually received by the whole Church, and that he had his teaching by revelation, the notion of a free-lance apostle able to add to the Lord's message as revealed to the Twelve what had been personally revealed to himself, presents no very great difficulty. That S. Paul for fourteen years taught a gospel and established a christology which finds no echo in apostolic preaching, and which may be summed in two or three cardinal doctrines easy for readers of his epistles to disengage, admits of no disproof. If we also owe him an interpretation of the words and actions at the Last Supper which was hidden from the disciples who were present, it does not take us much further. Even with this proviso it is not to be disguised that the apparent consequences are startling. That the eucharist, marvellous in its simplicity and majesty, which has survived every social and religious upheaval for two thousand years, should be due not to Christ's spiritual genius but to Paul's! That the τοῦτο ποιείτε around which centuries of controversy have raged, was not said by Christ at all!

In any and every case S. Paul is certainly the earliest authority for the Corinthian tradition. It would be difficult indeed to believe in its interpolation in any synoptic document in apostolic times, or in the celebration by Peter, James, or John of a Last Supper based upon it. The silence of the Johannine narrative-founded upon the apostle's memory of the events narrated-becomes far more interesting if the Corinthian passage is not genuine. It is not difficult to trace the formation of the concluding chapters of that gospel: the two themes are there (a) the Lord tells them they will see him no more, (b) but yet points them to a meeting with himself (xiii. 1; xiv. 1-6, 18-20); (c) he speaks of the fruit of the vine. There is no allusion to the synoptic last supper. Why? Because the Pauline tradition was by this time established everywhere—the synoptic tradition would have satisfied no one; but a disciple of John would not have inherited the Pauline tradition. The result is what we see. It is not less interesting that the Pauline tradition should be developed in

an earlier chapter into the mystical discourse on the bread which came down from heaven; as the synoptic tradition is developed, in the last chapters, into the discourse on the True Vine.

Once more, if the apostolic tradition was for a time uncertain, it would account for the curious Didachê description; for the utter absence of any reference to the institution, or to the body and blood of the Lord, in a place which, like either Egypt or Jerusalem, would be out of Paul's beat. It is a eucharist or thankful memory of the name of the Lord Jesus at meat and drink, with a special mention of the holy vine (of the Kingdom?) "which thou dost show to us through Thy child Jesus."

Now there are certain traditional ideas connected with the institution as it has been handed down to us which are of the first spiritual and mystical importance. If Christ is not responsible for the words of the Corinthian passage, the historical Last Supper does not yield us the august ideas of the bread of eternal life, the spiritual eating of Christ, the 'we that are many are one bread,' our food being the one Bread, Christ, who is the Bread of life, and last but by no means least the idea of the spiritual covenant set in men's hearts. Beautiful as these ideas are they are not Christ's, they are not even for the most part Pauline. Where they are not the fruit of the Christian consciousness, they are Johannine or due to the writer of the Epistle to the Hebrews.¹

The idea which our Lord puts before us is that of the Kingdom of God; the meaning of the Last Supper, as it is preserved for us in the Synoptics, is a memorial of the Kingdom. He knew that the end was come, and he desired with desire to say to the disciples that it was no end, to carry their thoughts onward to the reality of the spiritual kingdom, to fix their attention not on his own death but rather on the life of the kingdom, his own true life. He foresaw the discouragement to be voiced within a few hours by the

¹ John vi. 30-66; Heb. viii. 6, 8-12; ix. 16-18; xii. 24. Cf. also the Corinthian passage with 1 Cor. x. 15-17.

travellers to Emmaus: "We hoped that it was he who should redeem Israel!" And he wished to leave with them an impression of achievement, of what was spiritually quick, not failing but becoming. "I go hence. Lift up your eyes, lift up your hearts! for the Kingdom of God is come nigh to you, even at the doors. Not the shame, the betrayal, the agony, the crucifixion—not what I do by dying, but what is so living in me that it will bring me and you to life in the mystical kingdom, is what I bid you remember. The cup is a pledge: I pledge you to the Kingdom, to the idea, the memory, the expectation of the Kingdom. Drink it all of you, for I say unto you, though you see me no more as you now see me, I am present with you always in the Kingdom of God. And what I have desired with desire to say to you is this, I die, but in the Kingdom I live."

So for the Christian the significance of the Last Supper is the memory and the gospel of the Kingdom. The Lord of the gospel took this impressive means of fixing his message in the heart of the disciple. Could they ever forget that he called the Kingdom to their remembrance at this very last meeting? Could they miss the meaning, "Remember the Kingdom; remember the cup of which you all drank, a pledge between you and me of that in Me which will never die"? And to them he also suggested a spiritual eating, not, indeed, a participation in Himself, but his and their participation in the banquet spread in the Kingdom of God. An invitation to the sacred convivium of the spirit in the kingdom of heaven. The Last Supper, then, was used by Christ to call attention to another Supper; he appointed his disciples to eat and drink with him at the Table which is perpetually spread, because it is always new-the banquet of the spirit: the 'kingdom,' surely, representing newness of things, a new spirit; a looking forward, not a looking back-"until I drink it new with you in the kingdom."

For the fundamental thought of Jesus, the core of the gospel, is not redemption from sins, not the Son's work of

atonement, not the founding of a divine society—the Church, nor the fatherhood of God. It lies in a conception more fruitful than any of these-the conception of the Kingdom of God, the most fruitful, perhaps, of all religious ideas, the noblest "fruit of the vine" of the spirit; participating in which we are at one with the seers and prophets of every race and clime. When our Lord sent forth the disciples to preach. his message was 'The Kingdom of God is come nigh unto you'; when he sits at the last supper, what he speaks about is this Kingdom of God: but what Paul makes him speak about is the new covenant. For the idea of the kingdom, which formed no part of Paul's gospel but which the Lord had ever present to his mind, i Cor. xi. substitutes an idea which is not once to be found in the evangelists. The idea of the covenant is local and historical in character, is conceived in the particular, theocratic, Jewish spirit—it involves at least the assumption that God once wrote a covenant on tables of stone, not in the heart; the idea of the kingdom is spiritual and universal, making no demand upon theocratic history-for all time, for all faith.

When we place the two traditions—the synoptic and the Pauline—in juxtaposition, we see at once that the Pauline alone has survived; in our eucharist we make no commemoration at all of the gospel tradition. It will be seen, too, that in the Synoptics the cup plays the chief part; and it is therefore the more remarkable that in very early days—sub-apostolic days—the communion of the bread was held to be sufficient:

"With desire I have desired to eat this passover with you before I suffer: for I say unto you, I will not eat it till it be fulfilled in the Kingdom of God. And he received a cup, and when he had given thanks, he said Take this, and divide it among yourselves: for verily I say unto you I will no more drink of the fruit of the vine until that day when I drink it new with you in the Kingdom of God."

"The Lord Jesus . . . took bread; and when he had given thanks, he brake it, and said, This is my body, which is broken for you: this do in remembrance of me. In like manner also the cup, after supper, saying, This cup is the new covenant in my blood: this do, as oft as ye drink it, in remembrance of me."

Paul had 'received it of the Lord'; he makes no use of the evangelists' narrative. The acceptance of the Pauline tradition not only in Asia Minor but in a great Church like that of Rome, and this side by side with the teaching of one or other of the Twelve, presents no difficulty. For if Peter taught in Rome, so did Paul—the Roman Church is the heir of both traditions. The certainty that S. Paul celebrated in Rome the Last Supper of the Lord's body and blood is ample explanation of the primitive and universal prepotence of the Pauline over the synoptic tradition.

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THE FALLACY OF THE SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGIST.

G. C. FIELD.

There is at the present time a widespread and well-grounded dissatisfaction with the ordinary lines on which political thinking and discussion are conducted. Thoughtful politicians everywhere are looking anxiously for a new method of political reasoning which will offer some reasonable hope of improvement; and there is perhaps a slight tendency to seize too eagerly at any novelty without a proper examination of its claims. A cautious and critical attitude is therefore at the present time the one thing needful. We must admit the existence of the malady: but that should make us doubly careful not to snatch at any quack medicine that is offered. At the best it will do no good, and it may be much worse than the disease.

One of the lines of advance that has recently been proclaimed as promising the greatest results is the application of psychology to politics, and the consequent rise of a new science, Social Psychology. We no longer think, it is said, that the political actions of the great mass of mankind are guided by a train of intellectual reasoning: we recognise that the vast majority of actions are the result of non-rational impulses of one kind or another. And it is therefore the first requisite of sound political thinking to distinguish and classify these impulses on a scientific basis. Out of a fairly large mass of recent literature on the subject, two books may be selected as typical expositions of the new science: Dr McDougall's Social Psychology will serve to show the kind of results that it may be made to produce at the hands of professional psychologists, while Mr Graham Wallas's Human Nature in Politics is an example of the practical application of these results by a man of wide and varied experience in political life.

The aim of the present paper is very limited in extent. It does not profess to be a criticism of the new science as a science: it does not raise doubts—which might well be raised—as to the possibility of such a science at all. Nor, on the other hand, does it aim at criticising on psychological grounds any of the results which have been already reached. It is simply an attempt to form some idea as to their practical value, the use which those who are actually engaged in politics will be able to make of this science. It is an examination of the claims of Social Psychology to provide the needful remedy for the ills from which present-day political thinking suffers. And if these claims are rejected, it is possible that the critical work which will be necessary may suggest to us the true lines on which progress may proceed.

It is a little difficult to make out exactly what practical results of value the exponents of the new science expect to follow from it. The practical application of his results which Dr McDougall attempts in the last chapters of his book seems to consist almost entirely of statements as startlingly original as his discovery that "if the reproductive instinct could be abolished in any people, that people would very soon disappear from the face of the earth"; or, of the same instinct, "it is probable (!) that in every society there have been persons in whom it was decidedly less strong than in the average human being"; or again, "the most serious task of modern statesmanship is, perhaps, to discount and to control these outbursts of collective pugnacity." These hardly amount to a revolution in our political attitude. Mr Graham Wallas says, as might be expected from a man of his experience, much that

is true and very illuminating. But it is difficult to see the connection of his most valuable conclusions with the study of psychology, and it is possible, without any such study, to be convinced of their truth. The only definite suggestion Mr Wallas gives us is his statement that the study of psychology will increase our power of "forecasting the results of political causes." And that, indeed, is what one might fairly demand of a new science, if it is to make good its claims to our favourable consideration. But exactly how it is to do this, or what else it is to do, is never clearly stated.

But the difficulty here would seem to arise from a deeper difficulty still. For, strange though it may seem, it is yet a fact that it is nowhere made clear exactly what the social psychologist wants the politician to do. At times it seems that all Mr Graham Wallas demands is that those who are concerned with politics should examine closely and systematically the kind of feelings and impulses which are actually influencing the people of the country with which they deal, and should try to find out what appeals most to them, and what ideas are most capable of moving them. Of such a study as this, of course, no one would wish to deny the importance. But it can hardly be this which is the distinctive function of the new science. And that for the reason that political observation of this kind is not new, and is not in the strict sense a science. It is the kind of study undertaken by Bagehot in his English Constitution, to name only one of the ablest works of that kind. And, perhaps in a less systematic manner, it is the study which every political agent and party manager undertakes now. Obviously, therefore, if such work is to be done at all, it is desirable that it should be done as well as possible. But it is work for the man of practical political experience, not for the laboratory psychologist. And a great deal of Mr Wallas's book differs only from other work of the same kind in so far as his wide experience and his faculty for understanding concrete individual human beings enables him to do the same work a little bit better. But Social Psychology seems to claim

more novelty than this. Certainly the impression that Dr McDougall leaves is that no one was competent to pronounce an opinion on any political or moral question before the publication of his book. And Mr Graham Wallas creates an impression of originality by inventing a fictitious Oxford man who holds all the silly opinions that he finds it so easy to refute.

What, then, is there that is new in Social Psychology? So far as one can judge from Dr McDougall's book, the novelty consists in the classification of the different feelings and emotions on "scientific" principles. The instincts are distinguished from other motives of action as "innate specific tendencies of the mind that are common to all members of any one species." A sentiment is "an organised system of emotional tendencies centred about some object." The different emotions are reduced to a few primary ones, which form the elements to which all others can be reduced by analysis: thus, sorrow is "a painfully toned binary compound of tender emotion and negative self-feeling," and reverence is "a highly compound blend of wonder, fear, gratitude, and negative self-feeling." We are not concerned here to discuss the scientific value of these definitions, or to raise doubts as to whether the process of analysis does not, of necessity, end in leaving out just that distinctive flavour which makes the particular feeling what it is. But what is important here is to point out wherein a science of this kind differs from that observation of human nature which is necessary to the politician.

In the first place, the two make use of entirely different principles of classification. The difference may be roughly expressed by saying that, whereas the psychologist, by his analysis, classifies the feelings according to their causes, the politician is chiefly interested in their effects. It is not difficult to find instances of how this difference works. Dr McDougall speaks of the instinct of pugnacity and the tendency to litigiousness as being manifestations of the same feeling. Mr

Graham Wallas provides an even more striking example. "A man," he says, "whose life's dream it has been to get sight and speech of his king, is accidentally brought face to face with him. He is 'rooted to the spot,' becomes pale, and is unable to speak, because a movement might have betrayed his ancestors to a lion or a bear, or, earlier still, to a hungry cuttlefish." This may or may not be true: though one would have certainly thought that the science which makes such statements as these was in need of a little philosophical "criticism of categories" which would induce it to ask itself exactly what it means here by "the same" or "because." But the point to notice here is that, while the psychologist is interested in the identity of these feelings, the politician is concerned with their differences. No practical statesman could treat litigiousness and pugnacity or awe and primitive, instinctive fear as the same feelings, nor, as statesman, would it interest him to know that they were so. They have no connection in their developed form: one may find a bashful soldier or an amateur lawyer who is for peace at any price. And in dealing with men in the concrete the historical relations of these feelings are of no importance.

But there is a point of even more importance than this. And to illustrate it we may turn once more to Mr Graham Wallas. "It would be an interesting experiment," he writes, "if some professor of experimental psychology would arrange his class in the laboratory with sphygmographs on their wrists ready to record those pulse movements which accompany the sensation of 'thrill,' and would then introduce into the room without notice, and in chance order, a bishop, a well-known general, the greatest living man of letters, and a minor member of the Royal family." Now, supposing that the exact parallelism between soul and body had been established to an extent sufficient to make us certain that a record of physical changes would provide us with a safe guide to the strength of a mental emotion: supposing that

¹ Italics my own.

we could believe that the artificial conditions in a laboratory would not make the result valid for that occasion and for that occasion only: supposing that the average of the class would provide any guidance to the average of the people outside: supposing all this-and they are pretty big assumptions-it is yet difficult to see what practical value the experiment would have. From the point of view of politics, at any rate, it is entirely unimportant to know how strong one particular emotion is, unless we also know the comparative strength of the other emotions. It is the feeling which will result in action that we want to know: and as there are an infinite number of possible differences in the relative strength of different emotions, it is difficult to see how an experiment such as the above is going to help. Mr Wallas says the result would be "of real scientific importance." It would be a fact, of course, and as such would possess a certain interest. But it would be an interest of much the same kind as that excited by the facts with which we are regaled in the pages of Tit-Bits: "There are 977 unmarried milkmen in London," "The Bishop of Oporto is the only bearded Catholic bishop in the world."

It is worth while working out the implications of this argument a little further. It has been said that the politician is concerned with the feelings as they appear to us in direct perception, and is not, qua politician, interested in their analysis or historical origin. He would classify them, so far as he does classify them, by the actions in which they resulted. And that, as we have seen reason to believe, would greatly increase the number and complexity of the facts with which he would have to deal. To take another simple instance in addition to that suggested above, the instinct of fear would no longer be one simple thing to him: he would have to consider it in all its countless varieties, according to the different objects by which it was excited, and the different kinds of action in which it resulted. But beyond this, and more important still, is the further point. The politician is called on to consider,

before all things, which of these particular feelings is going to be the effective one, and move the people, or the section of the people, with which he is dealing, to action. The classification of the emotions by the psychologist will help him nothing towards deciding in any particular case which emotion will prove the strongest: and there will obviously be an infinite number of possibilities. It is this which makes it impossible to count political observation, however thoroughly and systematically it is conducted, as in any sense a science. It is impossible to express it in any universal or necessary rules. Our only guide as to how a particular nation or body of people will act, is knowledge of those same people and observation of the way in which they have acted before. Our conclusions will only be valid for those particular people, and even then they will be at best only statements of probabilities, and will have to be periodically revised to meet the continuous changes in national or individual characteristics. This empirical work is constantly being carried on: and by some it is done well, and by some badly. But it is absurd to suggest that there is anything new about it, or that a necessary condition of its successful prosecution is a knowledge of the standard works on psychology.

It would be a safe challenge to ask for an instance of a single political truth of importance which the science of psychology has taught us, and which could not have been learnt as well or better without it: certainly no such instance has been given as yet. Mr Graham Wallas has much that is interesting and valuable to say on practical political problems. But it is difficult to see the connection between his contributions to these problems and his psychological studies. Take his objections to the system of proportional representation. He argues at some length, and very convincingly, as to the impossibility of the voters getting a proper knowledge of a large number of candidates. It is not an original objection, though it is not often put with such ability. But the point is to notice the grounds of the opinions on either side. Mr

Wallas puts down the opinions of the supporters of that policy to the "intellectualist" fallacy: but, then, he is rather apt to ascribe every political error and every difference from his own opinions to that cause. But it is really simply a question of how people will act in a particular case under existing conditions. And that is entirely a matter of experience. It is not a question between the student of psychology and the student of anything else. It is a question between the student of anything, or rather the mere student, and the man of practical knowledge: knowledge, that is to say, of concrete and individual men and women, not "scientific" analysis of the different emotions. And that is the root of the whole matter.

Do we then come back in the end to nothing but the apotheosis of the "practical man"? By no means. That would, indeed, be a confession of failure: for the whole discussion to which this paper is a contribution, starts from a recognition of the unfortunate condition in which politics finds itself under the "practical man's" guidance. And the basis of our objection to the claims of Social Psychology may be summarised by saying that, so far as it is of any value in politics, it simply is an appeal to the experience of the "practical man": while, so far as it is anything beyond this, it is entirely irrelevant and valueless for the politician. Even if we accept Mr Graham Wallas's confusion between practical experience of men and a science of psychology, we shall still have the charge to bring against it, that as a remedy for the evils of political life it fails by leaving out just what we want to know. It tells us what is wrong-at least, practical experience does: it shows us all the irrelevant emotions at work, which destroy the power of political thinking. But it gives us no remedy. Mr Graham Wallas is evidently uneasy under the consciousness of this, and the most interesting part of his book is the concluding chapters, where he ceases to be a psychologist and becomes a philosopher.

What is the evil with which we are faced? For an account of this it is impossible to go to a better source than Mr Wallas's book. And incidentally we may secure a confirmation of our suspicion that it is as a man of practical experience and not as a psychologist that Mr Wallas reaches the results which are of real value, by comparing his work with the production of Dr McDougall, who never seems to be conscious that there is any evil to be remedied at all. Mr Wallas, on the other hand, is ready with any number of instances of the intrusion of irrelevant emotional and non-rational considerations which destroy the possibility of sound political reasoning. "The tactics of an election," he writes, "consist largely of contrivances by which this immediate emotion of personal affection may be set up. The candidate is advised to 'show himself' continually, to give away prizes, to 'say a few words' at the end of other people's speeches. . . . His portrait is periodically distributed, and is more effective if it is a good, that is to say, a distinctive, than if it is a flattering likeness. Best of all is a photograph which brings his ordinary existence sharply forward by representing him in his garden smoking a pipe or reading a newspaper." Then as to "suggestion": "We discover in our mind a vague impression that Simpson is a drunkard, and cannot recollect whether we ever had any reason to believe it, or whether some one once told us that Simpson had a cousin who invented a cure for drunkenness. When the connection is remembered in a telling phrase, and when its origin has never been consciously noticed, we may find ourselves with a really vivid belief for which we could, if cross-examined, give no account whatever. When, for instance, we have heard an Early Victorian bishop called 'Soapy Sam' half-a-dozen times we get a firm conviction of his character without further evidence. . . . But in politics as in the conjuring trade, it is often worth while for some people to take a great deal of trouble in order to produce such an effect without waiting for the idea to enforce itself by merely accidental repetition. . . . 'Another German Insult,' 'Keir

Hardie's Crime,' 'Balfour Backs Down,' are intended to stick and do stick in the mind as ready-made opinions." This is the real evil. Many will think that Mr Wallas greatly exaggerates its extent. But its existence is undeniable—though we did not need a new science to tell us so.

But mere recognition of these facts does not help us. Observation tells us that what we want to do is not always what we ought to do: or, to put it on broader grounds, that the things we want to do often stand in the way of each other, that we are always being pulled this way and that by contradictory impulses. All these impulses and prejudices, not being fully conscious or explicit, are allowed to influence our actions when they are really opposed to our other desires, with the result that we are always defeating our own ends. The voter who votes for a candidate because "he was photographed in a Panama hat with a fox-terrier" may be helping to defeat his own chance of getting an old-age pension, which, if the choice were put plainly before him, he would really prefer. And Mr Wallas suggests many other instances.

But the very terms of the problem of themselves point to the remedy. It is no good insisting on the fact that the great majority of actions are not done from rational motives. We should try to secure that they should be. An exposure of the "intellectualist fallacy" is only valuable in so far as it incites us to greater efforts to make it not a fallacy but a truth. The whole situation shows clearly that what people are in need of is a process of intellectualising the emotions. That is to say, we must make conscious and explicit all the desires and impulses which are moving us to action. We must know exactly what are the different things which we want. And then we must criticise them, place them side by side, compare them, and weigh them against each other. We must realise that we cannot satisfy all the desires which contradict each other, that if we want to vote for the member whom we like best personally we may have to abandon the hope of securing some particular measure that we desire, or that to secure a

measure that appeals to our patriotism we may have to put up with one that will make calls on our purses. We must endeavour to get all this clearly, and then, whatever our choice is, we shall at least have taken it with our eyes open.

But perhaps the psychologist will object that it is the whole object of his arguments to show that in asking this we are asking an impossibility. And we may readily admit that in few, if any, can this process be brought to perfection. But this is obviously no reason why we should cease to make any effort. And that much can be done-how much it is impossible to say-not even the most hardened psychologist would deny. Mr Graham Wallas's book itself is a standing illustration of what can be done in the way of intellectualising emotional impulses, of making them conscious and explicit, and subjecting them to a searching criticism. Once a man can attain to this position and can, as it were, examine his emotions from outside, then the work is nearly done. more clearly we can see what we really want, the less easily are we led away by the intrusion of irrelevant impulses. And as a means of attaining such an end a book like Mr Wallas's is invaluable. No one who reads it can help being moved in some degree to ask himself how far his own actions are the result of irrational impulses. It would hardly be an exaggeration to say that if everyone read the book it would thereupon cease to be true. And this would, indeed, be a desirable consummation.

This, then, is one of the means by which something may be done to remedy the evil under discussion, an open exposure and criticism of all the factors which make rational political thinking so difficult. And the sole value of studies like that of Mr Wallas lies in the impetus they give to the efforts for the alteration of the state of affairs which they reveal. But, besides this positive method, there is a negative means by which much also could be done. If all who have reached a position when they can realise this, would studiously refrain from obscuring the issues in political questions by irrelevant

emotional appeals, then one of the greatest steps in advance would have been taken. And here there is grave fault to be found with Mr Wallas. He quotes the President of Yale, who says: "Every man who publishes a newspaper which appeals to the emotions rather than to the intelligence of our readers, attacks our political life at its most vulnerable point": and then he proceeds to fall foul of this remark as another instance of the intellectualist fallacy. But though President Hadley may have expressed himself somewhat unfortunately, yet, if we consider the ordinary usage of language, it is surely perfectly obvious what he means. It is not the appeal to any emotion that he deprecates. No one wishes to crush the fundamental political emotion, the desire for the good of other human beings. But it would have been unnecessary to mention that. President Hadley was dealing with the present state of things, and was protesting against the great evil of the appeal to irrelevant emotions in politics. The fact is that practically all particular political questions, such as are discussed in the newspapers to which the President of Yale was referring, are questions of the means by which to reach an end that is already agreed upon. And the best means to an end cannot be discovered by the emotions. We must have an emotional desire for the attainment of the end: that is assumed-not disregarded-by the people whom Mr Wallas criticises. But, given that, it is surely obvious that into the consideration of the means as little emotion as possible should be allowed to enter. If we are discussing the fiscal question, it is doubtless desirable that we should feel as strong a wish as possible to remedy unemployment or the other material evils under which the poorer classes suffer: some such feeling is necessary before we shall be willing to set out on the necessary investigations at all. But it will not do anything to help us to discuss the economic principles which are at stake, or to deal with the complicated mass of statistical and other information in which is contained the accumulated experience of ourselves and other countries. This is a purely intellectual matter. And

ideally it would be treated as such, without the intrusion of these emotional appeals which at present overlay the true points at issue—dislike of the foreigner, dislike of any taxation, or—most common of all—personal distrust or personal affection for the particular person who happens at that time and place to be advocating one view or the other. This is what is meant by deprecating appeals to the emotions. And it is essential to the proper political education of the people that all who realise the truth of this should make every attempt to secure that the true issues and the true issues alone are laid before the electors.

But in the end it is necessary to realise that the matter is ultimately in the hands of the individual citizen himself. He is not going to rationalise his emotions without an effort on his own part. How he may be led to make this effort is another matter: it will be done partly by an extended and more rational system of national education. It will be done more by direct propaganda work, by systematic preaching of this ideal, by showing people how they are defeating their own ends by being led away by irrational impulses. And it will be done and is being done most of all, strange though it may seem, by the very system of elective government that we have been criticising. When the contradictory emotional appeals are put so directly over against one another as they are by the opposing sides at an election, when we have each party so anxious to expose the electioneering devices of the other side, it is impossible to prevent, even if we wished to, the constant stimulation of political thought and criticism. But one thing is clear, and that is that it will not be done by "psychological" electioneering methods. We shall not get clear thinking in politics by the creation of a Clear Thinking party, with a "strong" local candidate, telling posters, an effective party cry, and all the other "dodges," which Social Psychology would sanctify as the subject-matter of a new science. Social Psychology—if we mean by that the examination of the kind of emotional appeals that tell under present

conditions—may reveal to us where the evil lies. But for its remedy we need that systematic "criticism of categories" and examination of assumptions which is called Philosophy. And we come back to the solution of the Republic: it will not be well with the State until our rulers have become philosophers.

But philosophy is not to be regarded as a science, a collection of facts or a system of ideas which can be taught dogmatically, nor is it the special property of any one profession or body of men. It would be far more truly described as an attitude towards all life and all experience. It is, namely, the attitude which results in that systematic examination and criticism of ordinary assumptions and ideas which we have been advocating. And when it is the assumptions made most particularly in politics which are being examined, then it becomes one particular branch of philosophy, namely, Political Philosophy. We make explicit and criticise the ideas which underlie our own political thinking, we try to do the same for other people who cannot do it for themselves, and we compare our results with those of other people who can. When we have done this sufficiently to our own satisfaction, we may put these results in a book. But the work of the profoundest political philosopher is only the completer carrying out of the process begun by the humblest voter whose awakening intelligence begins to ask the fundamental question, What, after all, do I want to do with my vote?

Of course, this is far from being a complete account of the work of political philosophy, of the principles on which it should be studied, and of the results that we should hope to obtain from it. Such an account, if it were to be at all adequate, would at least double the length of the present paper. But, by the help of an instance drawn from Mr Wallas, some slight indication may be given.

One of the most interesting points to which he draws attention is the necessity of the substitution of what he calls quantitative for qualitative political reasoning. We are not, that is to say, to discuss whether liberty or organisation is the

best, but to ask, How much liberty? and How much organisation? "For many Socialists and Individualists," he writes, "the mere attempt to think in such a way of this problem would be an extremely valuable exercise. If a Socialist and an Individualist were required even to ask themselves the question, 'How much Socialism?' and 'How much Individualism?' a basis of real discussion would be arrived at—even in the impossible case that one should answer, 'All Individualism and no Socialism,' and the other, 'All Socialism and no Individualism." Now, all this is very true and valuable. It is difficult to see its connection with Psychology. And it is not exactly new: Aristotle's doctrine of the Mean is in essentials precisely the same. But in political argument at the present time it is too often forgotten, and it is important that it should be remembered. But the point to notice here is this. Neither Aristotle nor Mr Graham Wallas explain the real justification of this, nor how the truth of it is to be discovered. Yet it should be perfectly obvious that the result is reached only by a philosophical process, a systematic criticism of "the grand and eternal commonplaces of liberty and self-government" or of other political conceptions. Bentham's criticism of the idea of natural rights is a standing instance.

Such criticism would reveal to us, in the first place, that it is not in every case that we can apply the quantitative method of political thinking. We are not going to ask, How much political morality? for instance. We shall not wish to emulate the provincial mayor who boasted that he had always striven to keep the straight path between the extremes of partiality on the one hand and impartiality on the other. And this would suggest that there are some things in politics which we want merely for their results, merely as means to something else, and other things which are valued for themselves. Certain things—Liberty is a notable instance—have been treated as ends in themselves. But when the question has been fairly asked, it has dawned upon people that they are only means to an end. And it has further been seen that there are many such

things which are important factors in the attainment of our end, and that if one of these factors is elevated to the position of an end in itself, then the others are necessarily sacrificed. This is the justification of the quantitative treatment. There is no magic in the mathematical mean. But we have to balance these different factors so that together they will produce as much as possible of the results we want. And the principle on which we shall weigh them against each other will depend upon our conception of the end to which they are subservient.

This is the whole work of political philosophy. It is an attempt to discover and make clear the end and aim of politics, and to criticise incomplete conceptions by showing that they really amount only to the discovery of valuable means. It aims at making explicit what we are really wanting in politics the whole time. Mr Graham Wallas falls foul of Mr Bryce for talking about the ideal democracy which is not actualised in any state. But in reality the most important part of political thinking lies in the construction of ideals: what we really want must be an ideal, and cannot be already fully actualised, or we should not waste our time striving after it. And the first thing needful in political thinking is to make clear to ourselves what we really want. It must be again repeated that this is ultimately a work that everyone must do for himself: and we may meet with insoluble differences of opinion. But a basis of agreement is often reached; we have at least unanimously resolved to discard certain incomplete conceptions of the end. And much disagreement will be found to be due to the fact that the question, What do you really and ultimately want? has not been clearly and persistently asked. The teaching of political philosophy is nothing but a systematic attempt to make people ask that question.

What is the result of all this? The first part of our argument is based on a distinction between practical experience and psychology, a distinction which Mr Graham Wallas seems inclined to ignore. Of practical experience no Vol. IX.—No. 1.

one wishes to deny the value. But there is nothing new about this. It is merely the empirical knowledge which all politicians must possess and do possess, though in varying degrees. It can only be derived from experience. And it is in no sense a science. Its results are, at best, probabilities. And its subject-matter, besides being so infinitely complicated, is constantly changing and shifting. This is particularly so, because the student and his subject-matter are in a sense the same. It is the study of the nature of human beings by human beings: and as we saw, and as Mr Wallas himself points out, the very progress of the study will change the nature of at least those human beings who are studying it. Practical experience, then. is seen to be necessary: but the new element in what Mr Wallas advocates, the science of psychology as represented by Dr McDougall, offers nothing of which the practical politician can make use. That is our first point. It is important to know how people will probably act: but this can only be purely empirical knowledge.

But the second point is more important. This empirical knowledge is really only a part, and the less important part, of the necessary qualifications for a politician. He must know how people will probably act. But it is far more important that he should make up his mind clearly as to how they ought to act, or how he wishes them to act. He cannot be a mere passive spectator of human nature as it develops. He must take an active part in its development, and to do this he must have a clear idea of the direction in which he wishes to guide this development. The first necessity for the political thinker is to get his ideas clear. It is to the neglect of this that the present unsatisfactory condition of politics is due. And it is from this direction that efforts for reform must come. And they will only come as the result of clear thinking and constant criticism of assumptions—in a word, of Philosophy.

G. C. FIELD.

PRINCIPAL CHILDS ON WOMAN SUFFRAGE: A REJOINDER.

FRANCES H. LOW.

PRINCIPAL CHILDS' able, temperate, and enlightened essay furnishes one of the rare occasions upon which it is possible for the supporter and opponent of "Women's Suffrage" to meet on common ground. I am never so convinced and certain of the soundness of my position in this controversy as I am when listening to the rhetoric and "reasons" of the woman leaders of the suffrage movement; and, I am bound to say, the only occasions upon which I find myself compelled to re-examine my position are those when various prominent anti-suffragettes state the reasons for the faith that is in them. And I confess the irresistible strength of our position seems to me to be unrecognised by the official anti-suffrage movement, with its hairsplitting, and, it seems to me, unscrupulous theories that women may play any rôle in politics but that of voting. If our cause has a raison d'être for existing at all, it is in the fact that there is a distinct and inevitable antagonism between the personal influence upon the national life that we believe to be the right one for women, and the more obvious rôle of party politician, which is, in our opinion, opposed and supremely mischievous to this personal and fine agency. Principal Childs' courageous and disinterested concession to the conviction that we anti-suffragettes have always held, with both knowledge of the facts and truth of reasoning, viz. that the possession of the vote will not raise wages, undermines the whole foundation of the suffrage position, the argument that has induced the vast majority of uneducated and industrial workers to give their adherence to it.

In a short paper of this kind, when so much ground must necessarily be traversed, it is not possible to bring forward the convincing evidence that exists on this point; but to my own mind, even if the converse were correct, it would rather weaken than strengthen the suffrage position; for the raising of women's wages by political agency and terrorism, and without regard to the far more important question of the wages of men, is not to be desired. It is an immense gain to have won this admission from an opponent of such weight; and though the ladies eloquent upon the subject of their "wrongs" will continue to mislead and delude their credulous excited followers by telling them that the vote will secure them higher wages, it is to be hoped that no one who regards truth as of more value in this controversy than the gaining of temporary advantage will again use this fallacious argument.

Principal Childs is so scrupulously fair, and so conscientious in balancing his arguments, that it is not easy to take any one statement or position and gainsay it. But, so far as I understand his summing up, his plea for the suffrage is based upon two main grounds—the growing consciousness of women as citizens, and their new economic condition. As a womanworker who knows the conditions of the Educated Woman's Labour Market au fond, I am greatly astonished at the extraordinary manner in which the words "economic condition" are employed, revealing once more what 90 per cent. of the people who talk of the employment of women (I am not here including women of the industrial class) reveal—a complete lack of knowledge of the utter chaos and anarchy existing with regard to the "economic position" of the money-earning woman.

What does Principal Childs mean by the "economic independence of women"? Does he recognise that, with the exception of one or two classes, not ten per cent. of

women wage-earners (I can give chapter and verse for my statements) are able to maintain themselves wholly, that is, to provide for old age? Is it not known that some 50 per cent. of the women whose wages range from the £55 a year of the Civil Service clerk or the £60 of the clerk in the "Prudential," are partly supported by their parents, paying a sum at home for maintenance which in no way covers the cost of living? Is it not known that a large proportion of greedy women who have come into competition with the penniless breadwinning secretary, journalist, actress, singer, etc., are subsidised by wealthy husbands or fathers? In what sense, then, is the "economic independence" of a woman (other than as being economically dependent upon some male employer other than her nearest relatives) used? Before it is possible to discuss this proposition, the unique conditions prevailing in the Educated Woman's Labour Market must be recognised and understood, when it will be found that, excluding an insignificant number of successful women capable of maintaining themselves in comfort and providing for the future, the words "economic independence," as applied to the remainder, are most fallacious.

There remains Principal Childs' contention that women are wakening to their citizenship, and demanding the full rights of this citizenship. Here, again, a mass of evidence might be brought forward to show that it is questionable whether the highly artificial political qualification produces any such consciousness even in men, and that the feverish and fanatical agitation which has been carried on so vigorously of late years betokens no real corresponding growth of political consciousness in the great majority of thinking women.

Why, then, do these women oppose the giving of the vote? Principal Childs bids us regard this matter solely from its "political" side, and it is precisely here where I think he shows his weakness. We are asked to agree to a revolution which will incontestably have *some* influence on the moral and social welfare of the nation, and exclude everything but

political considerations. But a revolution which will turn vast masses of women of all ranks of society into vehement party politicians is of too far-reaching a nature to be regarded from the narrow standpoint of merely voting for Tweedledee or Tweedledum once every four or five years.

Our objection is of a far more profound nature; and as it is rarely stated honestly, for fear of the taunt of "sentiment,"—as if sentiment did not govern our lives from the cradle to the grave,—and more or less irrelevant arguments bolstered up instead, I set it down here as it presents itself in two or three leading forms.

The principal objection, then, is that we conceive there can be nothing more fatal for the nation than that women should be transformed into ardent political partisans. Women should have a moral force to be exercised at all times through the Individual, the Home, and the Society; a force higher than that wielded by any party and able to make itself felt, collectively if need be, in times of national danger. We do not think highly enough of political "necessities" to wish to see women compelled to take one side or the other. The argument that women "need not vote," even if they have the power, is one that need not be discussed here.

Secondly, the immediate and inevitable result of the vote would be to turn all reform, all personal effort, into political questions, political movements. Even now scores of hard-hearted women, caring nothing for humanity, nothing for the welfare of the children—if anyone wants an object-lesson on this point let him read Lady Constance Lytton's remarks ("Votes for Women," Sept. 1) upon Mr Robert Samuel's noble words on caring for the children—spend their energies and time in "committees and boards and political federations," in which all sorts of admirable "reforms" are for ever discussed, whilst not one single child is made happier or cleaner, one single wretched mother helped or sustained. Women need to exercise personal influence more than ever, for we are in much danger of trusting to legislation and political organisation for

doing what we could do personally with a little sacrifice of our own selfishness and greediness.

An instance of this occurred a few months ago. At one of the Royal Commissions some of the manufacturers solemnly declared that there would be less sweating if women did not incessantly change their fashions, for they said they "could not lay in stock, and therefore keep the worker steadily and definitely employed." Immediately several of the strike agitators rose up to declare that this was "absurd"; there must be "legislation," etc. etc. No woman arose with the determination to start a crusade to alter and modify this incessant and mad craze for change of fashion. Our vanity, our extravagance, our love of finery and shopping are very personal matters that would be closely involved in this kind of "reform," so we greatly prefer having things remedied by political legislation. Yet such a crusade steadily worked throughout the four hundred women's papers, and appealing to the thousands of women who read them, might have vast results, and benefit our industrial sisters more effectually than Wages Boards, and the like.

It is apropos to say here that, bound up with this opposition to woman's suffrage, is our opposition to the wage-earning of women on any large scale as morally and socially retrograde and economically wasteful. As I have indicated above, our position is this: that whilst we materially affect political life by our influence on women, asserted in a thousand ways, through the moulding of the child, the future citizen, in the home, his environment in society, we contend that the proper objects of this influence are not female politicians or female county councillors, but—wives, sisters, mothers, sweethearts, daughters.

And the more the influence of woman in politics, notably in canvassing, which we hope will be made illegal, diminishes, the greater will be her personal influence—the greater opportunity for influence that is not tainted by party spirit.

There is, of course, no novelty in the above statements,

and one is familiar with the kind of criticism which it will evoke. Nevertheless, we need to emphasise the fact that there is antagonism between the personal and the public rôle. And though, no doubt, a certain small number of women may be useful in the latter capacity, the majority of women will more usefully carry on the work of the State in non-party, non-political functions, and exhibit their citizenship in the maintenance and efficiency of the nation's homes. Moreover, we are in danger of assigning far too much importance to the wage-earning woman, who is a necessity of modern conditions rather to be endured than encouraged. In ninetynine out of a hundred instances she does cheaply what men could do more efficiently.

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LONDON.

THE BELIEF IN GOD AND IMMORTAL-ITY AS FACTORS IN RACE PROGRESS.

PROFESSOR HARTLEY B. ALEXANDER,

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Nel mezzo del cammin di nostra vita Mi ritrovai per una selva oscura, Che la diritta via era smarrita.

WITH these words Dante opens the *Divine Comedy*. He was thirty-five years old at the time to which he alludes—"midway of the journey of life"—an age at which a thinking man might naturally pause to take stock of his progress and estimate his life's meaning.

What does living signify? What does it mean, and count, to undergo the sum of experiences, the cosmic adventure, we call a human life? What is a man? What man's place in Nature? What are human destinies as measured by world destinies? This is the question to which the Divine Comedy is Dante's answer. The great poem is a criticism of life as a whole, of Nature as a whole, of world meaning. Human society is treated in the large and in detail; in respect to its meaning for the individual man, and in respect to its meaning for nations. Humanity is treated in its relations to cosmic destinies; human nature is judged in the light of the Eternal Purpose.

Sooner or later Dante's problem must come to every man. And it must be met squarely, and answered with even temper and with that courage which the sense of manhood, the sense of human dignity, should give. What ideal of nation, race, kind—of destiny, individual or universal—is to dominate the thoughtful mind? What ideal of the beauty of life, or of its spiritual worth, can so illumine life's toil that a man shall rejoice to give his best to his work, and his fellow-men be glad and grateful to receive it? Between what ideals of life must he choose?

In entering upon the consideration of these questions, let us see, first, what ideals human experience and human thinking have thus far developed. Let us examine the types of living that have been chosen or necessitated in the course of human events.

By way of broad generalisation we may say that these ideals have been of two sorts: (1) The ideal of a life devoted to some interest beyond its own powers of realisation—a life devoted to a community, whether this be family, tribe, nation, church, or the total of humanity; and (2) the ideal of a life bent upon realising to the full its own possibilities, whether of sensuous pleasure, of personal aggrandisement, or of spiritual exaltation. The individual ideal, and the communal ideal—these appear throughout the history of mind, either in antagonism or in compromise, as fundamental life-motives.

I.

Obviously, the primitive ideal is the communal. The very existence of human society, under primitive conditions, is dependent on the notion of fidelity to the commune—to clan, or tribe, or nation.

In a more advanced stage of culture, characterised by fixed settlements—by a fatherland, reverence for the tombs of ancestors, and that sense of a hallowed soil which the ancient imagination expressed to itself under the manifold forms of the di indigetes,—the ideal of the City and the City's future, all that a nation and a nation's posterity can mean to the nation's builders, replaces the simpler ideal of a more primitive culture. So we find developed the classic conception of civic patriotism:

devotion to one's native city, not for the sake of its rulers, nor for the sake of one's fellow-citizens, nor yet in any altruistic sense for the community, or the common interests of its individuals, but for the city itself as an ideal, in all the power of its imaginative appeal: Athens for what Athens meant to the Athenian; Rome for its Roman Imperium.

The world-view developed by ancient culture was one of a great world-polity, an organised commune, which yet derived from its organisation an imaginative value vastly greater than that to be derived from a mere aggregate of members or citizens. It is a value that can only be expressed as that of an organic whole, with reference to which the individual is a part. It is the impressiveness of this whole, the fact that it transcends individual lives, absorbs and transmutes into higher destinies individual destinies, builds a nation's fate out of the particular fates of men, that gives such a social whole the value that requites men for the service it requires of them. Faith in the nation's life and destiny becomes a sufficient reason for the individual's toil in its behalf.

As we pass from the ancient ideal to that of Christendom, our change at first is only one of degree. The Church is the church-militant, demanding of its followers unquestioning service, unhesitating sacrifice. The Church is humanity's common and higher expression, the outward realisation of an interest which demands not merely that each soul be saved, but that there be a multitude of saved souls. Heaven must ring with such a general chorus of hosannas that it shall seem as one eternal voice rising from the congregated nations of the earth. And so we find arisen that augustness of tradition which gives to the Roman Church its tremendous plea as the visible embodiment of Christendom. Jesuit zeal is the ecclesiastical version of the efficient life, and the temporal power of the papal throne is made the symbol of the eternal destinies of nations.

Thus we have again the conception of an ideal city, though the City of God is but mortally symbolised by the earthly Church. Christian thought at its best needs not the earthly dominion to symbolise the Dominion Beyond; yet, even at its best, it never escapes this social conception—the Heavenly City is still a city, an idol of man's earthly estate.

II.

So much for communal ideals. There remains to be considered the conception of the individual life for its own sake—the worth of a man's life to himself, apart from any social element.

Even in primitive society we find this conception asserting itself; at least there is a clear indication of a sense of the prize in personal life, and of that delight in the mere exercise of vital function, which we customarily think of as the essence of the "pagan" spirit. We have in us too much of the heritage of Christian asceticism, with its long-cultivated contempt for the world of the flesh, to feel spontaneous sympathy with the ancient delight in riot of sense and zestful play. The notion that a child should be grateful to the parent solely because the latter has brought to him the "most sweet light" of this life, startles us when we meet it in Cicero; and I am afraid that we have even less sympathy than Plato with the lament of age:—

I cannot eat, I cannot drink; the pleasures of youth and love are fled away; there was a good time once, but now that is gone, and life is no longer life.

Paganism takes the mere joy of living to be the sufficient justification of life. But paganism is a mood rather than an ideal of life; it is a sort of natural Hedonism, not with any reflective consciousness of pleasure as its end, but bent upon activity just for the sake of the exuberance activity brings. It belongs to the child-life of the race, having in it all the naïveté of childhood, and it cannot be perpetuated into the years of our race maturity.

Paganism philosophised is Sensuism. And we find this outcome realised as soon as the pagan mind had come to

philosophical self-realisation. The ideal of the Cyrenaics was the life of sensation for its own sake, the test of the worth of sensations being their power to yield pleasure. Sensuous pleasure, in other words, is made the measure of life's worth.

This is susceptible of various interpretations, and has received them. In the first instance we have the earthy ideal of gross gratification of appetite: "Let us eat and drink, for to-morrow we die." Such an ideal is more or less furthered by materialistic philosophies, and is become a factor to be reckoned with in modern ethics. It is an entirely intelligible conception of good, and is capable of unanswerable defence, once the individualistic right to judge on purely individual grounds is conceded. Like solipsistic scepticism, its logic is invulnerable if its premises be granted.

A second phase of paganism is the sophisticated living for mere breadth, mere multiplicity of contacts with the world of sense. This usually appears as a defence for the licence often demanded by the artistic nature. At its best it resolves into Æstheticism—the quest of delicate perfumes, of subtle harmonies of tone and colour, luxuries of refined indulgence. It may even take a properly ethical cast, urging a world-ideal of the "life beautiful" for the sake of its æsthetic appeal. Pater is, of course, the modern exemplar of this type of theory, which was by no means without adherents in the decadent years of ancient culture.

A third development of the pagan ideal is that which finds its realisation in appropriation: in the attainment of goods and, above all, what goods stand for and enable—worldly power. "The ego's desire of appropriation is boundless," says Nietzsche; and it is Nietzsche who develops to the extreme this ideal, in his conception of the man of the future as "the great blond beast" ravaging the world of benefits according to the measure of his strength. Even in this there is a certain element of sound logic, the logic of irony, which an American philosopher (for philosopher one must term him) expresses in the aptest of allegories. I mean Oliver Herford's—

My child, observe the useful ant,
How hard she works each day.
She works as hard as adamant
(That's very hard, they say).
She has no time to gallivant;
She has no time to play. . . .
She scurries round from morn till night;
She never, never sleeps:
She seizes everything in sight,
She drags it home with all her might,
And all she takes she keeps.

Thus, in every line of development, paganism comes into conflict with all that we customarily call morality. It is a philosophy of self-gratification, which the individual may make reasonable to himself, but which society cannot accept and still remain society. The anti-moral of the pagan ideal is compatible only with social anarchy.

But there is another type of individualistic theory, the Christian doctrine that the true object of life is the salvation of the individual soul. The main hypotheses of this conception are:—(1) That the life we live is not good in itself, that its sole purpose is to prepare us for the vastly more significant life to come; and (2), that it is each man's business, first of all, to see to the saving of his own soul. That the salvation offered by Christianity is to be attained through self-sacrifice, is due rather to the fact of its Founder's character than to the logic of its philosophic foundation.

The Christian view has important points of resemblance with the world-ethics of the ancient Pythagoreans and of the Hindus. In common with these, the Christian attitude toward life is pessimistic: Evil predominates over good; the corporeal world is a prison-house of the soul; our present life is a mere preparation for the future, and the evil of our present life is expiation for the sin of the past (though here, in a minor detail, the Christian parts ways with Hindu and Pythagorean, the "original sin" of the first parents replacing with him their doctrine of guilt inherited from sin in previous incarnations).

It is obvious that such a philosophy of life is intensely

individualistic, and also that it must lead to an ideal of conduct precisely opposite to the ideals springing from paganism. We can trace these ideals in three distinct phases.

First (where Christianity is again at one with Pythagoreanism and Hinduism), we have the ideal of the ascetic life—the life which endeavours in every possible way to escape the normal life of the natural man. Virtue consists in denial of appetite, in physical torture, in the cultivation of physical deformity, in race suicide—in every possible means of defeating the malevolence of the creative powers.

A second type of life-value, characteristic of Christian influence, though by no means exclusively Christian, of which, again, the aim is escape from normal activities, is the mystical conception. The mystic trance or mystic consciousness is regarded as the supreme good, and usually as a foretaste of the bliss of the life to come. Man's voyage through the carnal seas of terrene experience is worth while chiefly for the occasions it offers for the manifestation or indulgence of the mystic state. The striking traits of this consciousness are:-(1) Some degree of anæsthesia, the world of sense being wholly or partially blotted out, which perhaps partly explains (2) the sense of total self-surrender; (3) an inner perception of the harmony of the cosmos, a feeling of union with God; and (4) an accompanying emotion of ineffable bliss. "In the orison of union," says Saint Teresa, "the soul is fully awake as regards God; but wholly asleep as regards things of this world and in respect of herself." And another saint, writing of the mystic revelation, says: "A single one of these intoxicating consolations may reward the soul for all the labours undergone in life."

It is obvious that if the lives of men generally were ordered with respect to the attainment (even at rare periods) of this state of bliss, we should speedily develop into antisocial decay, at best into monasticism. And it is therefore not a little interesting to find at the present day perhaps the purest development of the mystic life among the American

Indians, a race whose hopes for social realisation in this world have long since vanished. The Ghost-Dance religion is the supreme expression of this ideal, an effort to realise in trance and dream an ideal of national life which the hard circumstances of their contact with the whites have denied to the Indian in reality. How truly the Indian type of experience corresponds to that of the saints of the Church may be shown from the words of a poor dreamer of the Squaxin tribe of Puget Sound, a man half-Christianised but wholly ignorant:

At night my breath was out, and I died. All at once I saw a shining light—great light—trying my soul. I looked and saw my body had no soul—looked at my own body—it was dead. My soul left body and went up to judgment-place of God. . . . I have seen a great light in my soul from that good land; I have understand all Christ wants us to do.

And, I may add, this dreamer reformed the habits of his tribe, making them temperate and industrious men.

But there is yet another outcome of Christian theory, for thoughtful men the most important of all. There is not one of us, I believe, who, whatever his theoretic conviction, could find himself practically capable of a whole-souled reversion to paganism. In our moral nature there is an element of restraint, of Puritanism, of which we can never rid ourselves. Conscience, the sense of duty, the sense of sin-these are elements which Christianity has intensified in the human mind in manifold ways. And no matter what our philosophy may be, however materialistic it may become, we cannot escape this Christian consciousness which marks us off from the non-Christian races of men. For it is, let us note, an individual conscience, an individual sense of duty, individual sense of sin. Social duty, noblesse oblige, is certainly as strongly developed among the Japanese, for example, as with us; but that inner control which bites the spirit of a man in its solitude, giving him for his sins a sense of transgression against God which makes hell intelligible—that is largely the creation of Christianity. It has become in us a kind of moral instinct, and no matter how we rationalise our ideas of self-development,

they always contain a full measure of the Christian demand for the soul's salvation.

Hedonism, in other words, is bastard to the Christianised mind. If happiness be made the ideal of the human race, it must first make terms with our Christian instinct for self-sacrifice. And this I believe to be the reason why the hedonistic theory in modern times has seemed rational to the European mind only as generalised into the "greatest good of the greatest number," which, of course, means the final socialisation of the Christian conception and the abandonment of individualism as an ethical ideal.

But modern thought has given another, a conclusive reason why individualism (at least when understood as unadulterated egoism) can never be a paramount life-ideal. The reason is single and conclusive. Pure egoism means race suicide. We cannot say to any given man that he shall not make individual pleasure the guide of his conduct; but we can say, and say authoritatively, that no race of men can do this and survive upon the face of the earth.

Nature herself, in making man a gregarious animal, has determined him to social ideals; and if the history of nations tell us anything, it is that races or peoples who are temperamentally careless of the future are the decaying and vanishing races and peoples. The fungus populations of gold-hunters' camps are the veriest ephemeræ compared with the towns of the corn-raisers who follow them. Spain ravished the gold of the New World; poverty and decay are the rewards of her lack of foresight. And we ourselves—bent on material splendour, inebriated by the licence of easy gain—are we not already seriously asking if we have not sold the birthright of our race, mortgaged its promise of a great part in human affairs, by the selfishness and senselessness of our self-indulgence?

We may not deny to the individual his right to a life of self-gratification. But the race or a nation is no mere aggregate of individuals: it is itself an individual of a larger

power, an organism; and to every race and nation we may and must say that the duration and efficiency of its life must be in proportion to its realisation of a social ideal.

III.

Our review of communal and individual life-conceptions leads us, then, to a complex problem. What is to be the attitude of the modern man, the man of education, able to estimate all the factors involved, all the consequences of his action, toward his personal ideal of conduct? How is he to order his life without offence to reason or the sense of duty? How is he to choose between the two ideals which he must take into account: the egoistic ideal—what his life shall mean to himself; the altruistic or communistic ideal—what his life shall mean to his kind?

"It is," says Rousseau, "a grand and beautiful spectacle to see man issue as it were from naught by his proper efforts, dissipate by the light of his reason the shadows in which nature has enveloped him, elevate himself above himself, mount in the ardour of his spirit even to celestial regions, traverse with a giant's pace, like unto the sun, the vast expanse of the universe, and finally, what is yet greater and more difficult, enter within himself in order there to study Man, to know his nature, his duties, and his end."

Rousseau here summarises a point of view which I take to be characteristic of the scientific thought of our present generation. To the most advanced minds among the Romans, as among the Hebrews, the imagination could figure no nobler destiny than the continuous rule and continual aggrandisement of their race:

> Hic domus Æneæ cunctis dominabitur oris, Et nati natorum et qui nascentur ab illis.

The Virgilian passage irresistibly recalls the covenant with the father of Israel:

Neither shall thy name be called Abram, but thy name shall be Abraham; for a father of many nations have I made thee,

And I will make thee exceeding fruitful, and I will make nations of thee, and kings shall come out of thee.

And I will give unto thee, and to thy seed after thee, the land wherein thou art a stranger, all the land of Canaan, for an everlasting possession.

"An everlasting possession!" The ancient geocentric view of the universe could allow such a conception: an unending race dwelling in an everlastingly fruitful land. But the years have brought us wisdom, and such ideas are now unthinkable. Let us see what the modern conception substitutes.

First, the idea of Mankind, the Human Race, replaces that of a particular race or people. Patriotism gives place to humanitarianism; the destinies of particular nations are of paltry distinction as compared with the destiny of the whole race. It is not the spectacle of evolving France that strikes home to Rousseau, but the vastly more significant spectacle of the evolving race.

Second, in the hundred and fifty years since Rousseau wrote, the scope of even his humanitarian thought has been far transcended. For the life of the race is no final measure of thought, and now, behind it, before and after, we see the life of the Cosmos. Man's destiny is set against world-destiny, and is become dwarfed in comparison.

Ethical zeal, moral enthusiasm, is possible to the humanitarian view. A man may live for his race, as for his nation, and still find inspiration in his life. And this ideal of devotion to race is, in fact, urged by writers on morals as a motive and reward of sufficient vitality to give energy even to a sceptical age, and social efficiency to men who have no thought of reward in a life to come.

But it is a real question whether this moral zeal can persist when men have generally attained the cosmic view of life, at least in its materialistic form. The mental attitude which it induces is at best one of contemplation, not one of activity. Stoic endurance, never ethical enthusiasm, is the highest mood it permits. I am aware that this is not universally admitted. There are many who claim to find the spectacle of the Cosmic Machine in itself an inspiration giving worth to men's lives. But I thoroughly believe that where this view is not bombast it is sorry self-deception. Let me quote from a recent expositor of the materialistic world-view:—

It seems to me that the fact of the Conservation of Matter, teaching us that there shall never be one lost atom, nor ever has been—considered with the nebular theory, which teaches us afresh and with the authoritative voice of mathematical science, the lesson of Heraclitus and Herbert Spencer, that the Cosmos pursues an eternal succession of cyclical changes—reveals to the imagination a vista of sheer sublimity. My pen can but adumbrate it, yet surely the reader, accepting the simple statement of matter and energy eternally pursuing this cyclic course, and ever and again giving rise to sentient and reasoning creatures such as himself, may agree with me that here is an Epic indeed.

Now it may be that the doctrine of blind cycles is true, that the last word of Science is indeed uttered, and that a constricted imagination is, in sooth, the proper gauge of reality. It may be that the monstrosity is real; but, if it be so, let us at least be spared the Epic, the emotion! To venerate inanity because it is indestructible, a machine because it is huge, a motion because it is perpetual, to abase oneself before Chaos because of its senseless repetitions—this is an incubus too galling! The Hindu with his similar (or identical?) doctrine of the eternal inbreathings and outbreathings of the spirit of Brahm, the everlasting succession of meaningless creation and meaningless destruction, is at all events consistently and patiently pessimistic; comprehending the naked destitution of his philosophy, he comports himself within its proprieties. Have we no right to expect equal grace of Science? There is an abnegation in the acceptance of brute truth as truly brutal which, if it cannot be inspiring, may yet be dignified. In the still reception of the deadly sentence there is manliness: but glorification of one's gallows-this smacks of pitiable braggadocio. Cruel where cruelty is demanded, Shakespeare did the thing more humanly:

Ay, but to die and go we know not where;
To lie in cold obstruction, and to rot;
This sensible warm motion to become
A kneaded clod.

Of course, it is not to be dogmatised that the Cosmist's view may not, in some sense, be true to the fact. Human knowledge is too limited even to pronounce against its own limitation. All the labouring ages of mankind may have been fooled in their ideal of overruling powers and destinies. But conceding this, Nature has at least made us what we are, Nature has at least compelled us to such form that human values are the only ones for us; not even the Cosmist escapes this fate. Which so, if we accept the Cosmism, let us, true to ourselves, accept it for what to our view it must be—a hideous huge anarchy, only travestied with the name of law.

Certainly, the common man will so view it. Human to the core, for him perception that the big dead universe is but meant to thwart him, that he exists but as its idle sport, will only serve to set him in his resolve of snatching from the archenemy what good this world can offer. Hard-headed, he will build, as materialism ever compels men to build, not for character which may be eternal, but for the hot success of the hour, the big plunder of the moment:—

The Bird of Time has but a little way To flutter—and the Bird is on the Wing.

Least of all will he be affected by any "sheer sublimity" in the spectacle of disorder, or any poetry in the joyless "Epic" of Chaos. There is poetry in the melody of a bird's call, in the lithe grace of children at play, in the winsomeness of maids' faces,—there is music and loveliness in these, ephemeræ though they be. But in an indestructible horde of atoms gyrating through a perpetuity of senseless motions—in this there is only monstrosity.

IV.

But Æsthetics is not Ethics. The spectacular quality of the world, whether it be the pageant of human history which appealed to Rousseau's imagination or the "Epic" of the Cosmos, has, when all is said, only an æsthetic appeal. It leaves no room for the exercise of other than a contemplative frame of mind; and, granted that such a mental mood may be the summum bonum of the Christian mystic, of the Hindu sage, or even of the modern man of science in his most specialised and least human development, it is not passing bounds to maintain that the rule of survival negates any universal recognition of such good as supreme. The race or type of man that is to do the world's work must be one that finds in efficient action the proper realisation of life's worth.

This, it seems to me, is a commonplace of biologic fact. The problem before mankind as a whole is to make this earth of ours as habitable as possible, for as long a period as possible. The life-instinct itself demands this; and consequently that race which has this instinct in the keenest degree, coupled with ability to adapt environment to the man and the man to environment, is bound to be the race of the Overman. If the recent observations of Mars have not yet demonstrated a Martian population, they have done something of far more practical significance: they have brought home to us the conception of a mortal race harnessing and economising all the resources of its natural habitat, maintaining its integrity against desperate odds, and struggling to the last ditch (I will admit the double entente) to utilise the chances of life wrung from a parsimonious nature.

It is obvious that such a struggle—infinitely dwarfing the wars of nations and races—implies a degree of social solidarity not yet foreshadowed, even dimly, in any human society; but it is equally obvious that it is a degree of solidarity to which the Man of the Future must and will attain. Whether that future man is to spring from the black race, the white race, or the brown race, or an amalgamation of races, is the problem confronting us to-day.

I believe that it is entirely a question of life-ideals. The type of man, the race of men that is willing to sacrifice self for

others, the present for the future, is the type and race spiritually best fitted for this high place in human destiny. But for such an equipment and such a rôle it is also necessary that each man's life should offer in itself some source of inspiration capable of stirring him to great action, some ideal of human worth and dignity in the order of Nature. The social ideal must be supplemented by an individual reward, for, after all, the work of society is achieved by the aggregate of individual efforts.

For the type of this balance of social and individual ideals let us turn to ancient life. Herodotus gives a brief résumé of a speech made by Themistocles to the assembled Greeks about to enter into action at Salamis. The gist of it was that in all that pertains to human nature and circumstance there is a nobler and a baser side, and that it was for them to choose the nobler. What that nobler part is appears in various forms throughout Greek history: an ideal of selfrespect, issuing in Temperance; an ideal of devotion under the domination of reason,—represented in Homeric times by that aidos or chivalric shame which forbade injury to the weak and helpless, even on the part of the marauder; and in the settled life of the age of cities by apern, virtue, which found the fullest realisation of human personality in a wholly selfconscious and self-respecting devotion to the body politic, a virtue which might induce a man to give up his life to the State even against that other reason in which he maintained his own right as an individual. "Their bodies," says Thucydides of the Athenians, "they devote to their country, as though they belonged to other men; their true self is their mind, which is most truly their own when employed in her service."

Such a conception of life combines and balances the individual and communal elements; or, to put it in psychological terms, gives sufficient share alike to the mind's need for inspiration and its need of action. That this conception could and did develop among the Greeks, was undoubtedly due to the nature of their political and philosophical conceptions. To

Greek thought the State was no mere abstraction of powers and functions, as with us; rather it was the public household; it was a living body, a vital and energised expression of human mutuality. Each man has, as a part of his individual self, a social self; each human being is not only an ego, but a part of that solidarity of wills and needs which we call Mankind. The Greeks realised this not only in the unconscious laws of conduct which make human society anywhere possible, but they realised it consciously in their civic life, which was for each man an organic part of the living body politic. Moreover, being thorough anthropomorphists, they realised it also in their philosophies. To the Greek mind the World is only a more inclusive Household, a more inclusive State. For the Pythagoreans the central fire of the Cosmos is Hestia, the central Hearth, playing the same rôle in the general harmony as the household hearth in the building of the home; but it is not only this cosmic Hestia, it is also the throne of Zeus whence proceeds Cosmic order. Nearly every Greek philosopher conceived the World as a living and developing body, comprising within itself a multitude of lesser living bodies no less individual and free, because the essence of their freedom lay in ordering their own tasks and wills to the Supreme Will of the Whole.

In other words, Greek thought was evolutional, resting upon that very hypothesis of organic development which is to-day transforming modern thought. In our political life, the strait-jacket of Militarism, man's mastery of his fellow man, has given way to that process of his mastery of Nature which we call Commercialism. In thought we may compare this to the sloughing-off of the strait-jacketing mythic allegory in favour of the more efficient conception of World-Mechanism. But we are not stopping with Mechanism; under the influence of the doctrine of evolution we are acquiring once again the conception of the world as living—the world as a vital organism. And has this view not already begun to remould our political ideals, so that, again with the

Greeks, we are approaching the ideal of a living social organism under the sway of human reason?

The ideals of Socialism, where these ideals are at all realised, point in this direction: the man's body belongs to the State, but his mind is his true self. "Apart from religion," said Locke, "the end of man is to secure a plenty of the good things of this world, with life, health, and peace to enjoy them." Such a sentiment is hopelessly antiquated: not that it has no followers to-day, but that it is certain to have none in the morrow of the race. Unquestionably we have mainly outgrown the ascetic's contempt for the "good things of this world," but as unquestionably we are finding and must find, if we are to survive, the supreme good in an ideal of human character which it is the destiny of the race to evolve. We know well that, whether it be a million or a hundred million years hence, the time is coming when our kind will have disappeared from the earth. All the material works of men's hands will have come to naught, as if they had never been; but Man, the high ideal of the worthy human experience and the noble human life, Man's character at its noblest-shall not this have been added as a definite asset and achievement of the Cosmos? Having faith in the truth of Nature, we cannot doubt it.

V.

Let us clearly understand ourselves. The man of the future is to be one willing to devote himself to the development of an efficient physical life on this earth. He is to do this, aware that in the course of nature all his material works, all his physical achievements, must come to naught. A dead and ruined planet is the ultimate goal of his physical efforts.

Now if such end and such result were to be his sole inspiration, I believe and affirm that his rôle would be an impossible one. Only two courses would then be open which human nature, being what it is, could possibly follow. First, that individualistic Hedonism which results in anarchy and decay: "Let us eat and drink, for to-morrow we die."

Second, the race-suicide which pessimistic philosophy, whether German or Hindu, demands as the due logic of intelligence: when man realises the horror of his situation, when instinct falls at last under the domination of intelligence, then life destroys itself, as the sole revenge upon the brutishness of creative forces. This is Schopenhauer's *Ansicht*; and that it is no mere theory, but is based upon actual facts of human psychology, finds daily confirmation in this materialistic and hence pessimistic age. "What's the use?" is the laconic message left by a suicide the other day—a man of scientific training, a physician, one who had every right to believe his life-work valuable if any life-work is of value.

Now what is to save the man and the race of the future from this pessimism and its logical outcome?

Only one thing. The physical life, the life of the great Commune of Man here on earth, must be valued not for its own sake but for the sake of the ideal human character which such a life is to develop. The ideal man and his partial realisation in individual men—this must be the ground of inspiration.

And what does this life and character imply? Surely it means more than a life to be relentlessly snuffed out by the Cosmos which has created it! It has ever been the cue of those who see in the Cosmos a colossal machine grinding out slow fatalities, to summon man to the realisation of his own weak, paltry, and precarious being: he is to consider himself the helpless factorum of vain and foolish destinies, in whose whim he must humbly acquiesce.

But such a view of Nature is utterly incompatible with human perpetuity. If the ideal life is to be but a dream, a wraith, a vain chimera of reasonless Chaos, it can be only meaningless to men's minds; it can inspire no enthusiasm, no effort.

The man of the future must have faith in Nature. He must believe, as the Greeks believed, that the world is alive, or at least that it is governed by reason; and he must believe

also that his life and what he does with it is important in the plan and purpose of this world-intelligence. In other words, he must believe in and trust a God.

But the individual factor is not yet wholly satisfied. A God for whom this earthly life is a mere spectacle leading to naught beyond, a God whose interest in creation is no better than the appetite of a Roman populace for gladiatorial shows—such a God deserves neither the labour nor the loyalty of the human soul. There must be, in the order of Nature, not only an ethical salvation in this world, but a consummation of the life here begun in a world to come, in order to satisfy reason. Wherefore, the man and the race of the future must have faith in a life in a world to come, belief in human immortality.

These two great *Credos* of human history, common to all expressions of the religious instinct—belief in God and belief in immortality—are, I affirm, bound to prevail on the earth. All the teachings of history and biology, every principle of evolution, enforce this view. Races that deny these beliefs must disappear from the earth, in favour of the better-adapted members of their kind.

I am not asserting any a priori certitude that there is a God to whom man's destiny is meaningful, nor that that destiny does not cease with this earthly life. But I do affirm that Nature decrees that the man who survives, the race that persists, must believe these things. They are a part of the equipment of the fittest to survive.

Further, I think I may safely add that all natural science and natural laws, the order and meaning which man finds in Nature, all that makes a Cosmos rather than a Chaos of the universe, is maniacal illusion unless Nature keep faith with the intelligence which she has generated.

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DISCUSSIONS

N.B.—The contributions under this heading refer to matters previously treated in the "Hibbert Journal." Reviews of books are not open to discussion. Criticism of any article will, as a rule, be limited to a single issue of the *Journal*. The discussion ends with a reply from the original writer.—Ed.

CONCERNING IMPRISONMENT.

(Hibbert Journal, April 1910, p. 582.)

I HAVE waited till the July Hibbert Journal was out, thinking it probable that someone would surely animadvert on the vigorous article "Concerning Imprisonment." It might be inferred that there could be no answer. Not everyone is aware that it is a tacit rule in the public service that officials refrain from public discussion. But I can, without breach of such understanding, and from an inside working knowledge, traverse the wholesale statements which the writer inconsequently flings about, as far as the officials, whether warders, chaplains, or governors, are concerned. I was for a time acting chaplain of one of our largest prisons in this country, and was in and out daily all times of the day. Except the chaplain, all the officials had to pass in and out of the principal entrance and be checked by the gate-keeper in charge. The chaplain alone of all the officials was provided with a private entrance, so that he could enter and leave the prison at his discretion. I never once during the whole of my stay there saw any ill-usage or heard any brutal language on the part of a single official, from the lowest to the highest, -in fact I was particularly struck with the patience of the warders and the diplomatic way in which they managed their charges: neither were they or the other officials the hardened or depraved creatures as alleged; they were both human and humane. Further, I stood in a peculiarly intimate and confidential relation with the prisoners, and not one of them ever hinted to me any grievance. I think it is only bare justice to give my working experience. for our prison officials have to perform an extremely difficult duty, which, on the whole, they execute with fairness and squareness.

THEODORE P. BROCKLEHURST.

PRINCIPAL W. M. CHILDS ON "WOMAN SUFFRAGE."

(Hibbert Journal, July 1910, p. 721.)

The writer presents a very fairly balanced view of the position both from the sentimental and practical standpoint. But it seems he misses one great point against the extension of the suffrage to women, at any rate upon the lines of Bills that have been brought forward up to this time, and in particular on those of the so-called "Conciliation Bill." He argues, and rightly, that the demand for the vote comes from women who by education and work have attained to economic independence; and that it is because of this attained independence they feel the injustice of a denial of the mark of citizenship—the vote.

Now it is just because of the peculiar, and I will say the unnatural, position of these women that some of us are antagonistic to the extension of the suffrage on any of the lines at present proposed. By far the great majority of these women are spinsters. They suffer a serious disability by reason of the condition of our society, particularly of British society. They are deprived of the natural outlet of maternity, and for them the great humanising influence of the feminine temperament is shut off. Lacking this most healthy, natural, and refining of influences, their judgment is not matured. Indeed, with education and the capability of understanding and reflecting, their view becomes embittered and warped by the unconscious sense of their loss.

The outlook of the mother towards humanity is profoundly modified by her experience, so that her influence becomes steadying, refining, mellowing, and wholesome in the highest degree, and in marked contrast to the almost neurotic restiveness of the compulsory celibate. I cannot put my point better than by giving the reply of a lady to a question put in the course of a discussion on woman suffrage. She is a lady in the "thirties"; one of a large family, who has taken a high university degree, and who is now the mother of sons and daughters. To the question, "How has maternity affected your point of view towards humanity?" the lady replied, "It has given me a more kindly feeling towards the men part of the community." A more significant reply could scarcely be found.

We men trust our "mother-women" without question: almost unconsciously we realise their profound experience has opened their eyes. They have learned the knowledge of good and evil from the fruit of the tree of life, and they see even as the gods! In a sense the mother-women come over to the men's side, that is, they are not antagonistic to men, but realise that they are doing their utmost to make the best use of their opportunities for the good of all—women as well as men. To the spinster this experience has not come, and cannot come in its fulness, not even to those in whom the maternal instinct is most fully developed; whilst with those in whom this milk of human kindness has been soured by unsatisfied yearnings, there is an added bitterness, so that they, and particularly the educated ones, come to hate men, not as individuals, but

as a sex. This phenomenon is not confined to women. It is to be seen in men also. Men of straight, clean lives, good men in every sense, but who, from circumstances beyond their control, are perforce celibate, not infrequently develop an embittered feeling towards women, not as individuals, but as a sex.

It is for this reason some of us dread and antagonise the extension of the vote to women who have not learned in nature's school the way of life. Could we give the vote to the mothers, fewer persons would be found to object. To the spinster we say—No. We sympathise with you, regret the loss you sustain by the unnatural conditions of civilisation and population; but by very reason of the nature of your disability, we cannot surrender to you the well-being of the body politic, nor the future of the nation to you who have no real stake in its future.

N. BISHOP HARMAN, F.R.C.S.

HARLEY STREET, W.

REVIEWS

The Fourth Gospel in Research and Debate: A Series of Essays on Problems concerning the Origin and Value of the Anonymous Writings attributed to the Apostle John.—By Benjamin Wisner Bacon, D.D., LL.D., Buckingham Professor of New Testament Criticism and Exegesis in Yale University.—New York: Moffat, Yard & Co., 1910.

Any work from the pen of Professor Bacon is sure to command respectful consideration, and his recent volume on the Fourth Gospel will be welcomed by those who have been interested in the various articles on which it is founded. The book, though avowedly written "in the interest of research pure and simple," is at the same time frankly "controversial," and does not always show that anxious weighing of evidence, apart from personalities, which true criticism demands. For those to whom truth is too high and holy a thing to be made the subject of controversy, with its partisanship, personalities, and misrepresentations, this feature of the work must necessarily be repellent. In spite of his kind and far too laudatory references to myself in his preface and elsewhere, he gravely misrepresents my work. It is a matter of very small importance to the theological world, and quite irrelevant to the problem under discussion, whether I am myself partial and incompetent; but, as Professor Bacon seems to think it essential to his purpose to destroy whatever repute I may have for candour and good sense in dealing with the Johannine question, I must crave the indulgence of the reader while I engage in the very disagreeable task of egotistical explanation.

On his very first page our author appears to be somewhat nettled by certain "self-styled 'defenders' of the Fourth Gospel," and proceeds to quote from Lightfoot a passage in which he finds an "imputation of evil motives"; and further on he anticipates that for some time to come "it will even be treated as heresy and disloyalty to Christ to question the authorship long imputed to these writings" (p. 14). In this way his polemical spirit has, perhaps not unnaturally, been aroused. If he has suffered under a charge of "heresy and disloyalty to Christ," every sincere lover of truth and freedom will sympathise with him, and join with him in hoping that this kind of imputation may pass for ever from the domain of scholarship. But he must not suppose that all who differ from him are ready to make this charge. He is no doubt aware that, however faulty my own work may be in other respects, at least this particular fault is absent

from it. I have never imputed evil motives to those from whom I differ. and the notion of my ascribing to my revered teachers, Tayler and Martineau, "heresy and disloyalty to Christ," would, I hope, be too ludicrous even for controversial consumption. I think I may safely say that I have never introduced personal controversy. I have always wished to deal with evidence, apart from every personal consideration; and when I have mentioned names, I have done so simply because I respected the writers, and thought their arguments the most worthy of consideration. What else could possibly have been the source of my frequent references to Dr Martineau, from whom it was always painful to differ? This, I submit. is the proper critical attitude. The controversial spirit necessarily destroys impartiality; and the problem of the Fourth Gospel must be solved, if it be capable of final solution, by the judicial weighing of evidence, and not by personal antagonism. I regret that the latter feature is not altogether absent from Professor Bacon's volume. He seeks to undermine such influence as my work may possess, not by pointing out instances in which I have wilfully misstated or garbled the evidence, but by endeavouring to show, through a process of misrepresentation, that my judgments are so antiquated and partial as to be worthless. But here let me say that I impute no motives. I have no doubt that Professor Bacon thinks that his representation is correct, and puts it forward in what he conceives to be the service of truth; but I think, nevertheless, that his judgment has been warped by his zeal in the cause which he advocates.

He admonishes me that "Baur's theory of the origin of the Johannine writings is as obsolete as the Ptolemaic geography." This statement certainly seems to imply that my book is mainly directed against Baur, and so wins an easy victory over an exploded position. Now, Baur is referred to just three times in my book: 1 once in the very cursory historical sketch of the problem; once in a note, in which it is stated that Baur admitted that Tatian cited the Fourth Gospel (is this obsolete, and disproved by the recovery of the Diatessaron?); and once in another note, in which it is stated that Baur, as well as others, believed that Justin used the Gospel according to the Hebrews. If I decided against that view when it was almost a critical axiom, and it has now become obsolete, I do not see how these facts prove the incompetence of my judgment. It is strange reasoning that because I judged correctly in one phase of the question, my judgment is therefore worth nothing in an altered phase. If half of the critical edifice has so crumbled into ruins that it is not worth noticing, there might be a little less confidence in the stability of the remainder. Professor Bacon also implies that I was writing against Supernatural Religion, and that therefore my views are quite antiquated. The references to Supernatural Religion in my volume occupy rather less than two lines. Moreover, the recent republication of that work shows that it is not quite as old as Ptolemy.

A little before this convincing attempt to relegate my book to an ¹ I rely upon the index, which was carefully compiled.

obsolete past he makes the curious statement that it "was but a development and enlargement of work in which he had already engaged as an ally of Sanday so early as 1875" (p. 18 seq.). I suppose the Professor has not deliberately invented this; but where he has picked up such a curious statement is not obvious. I can only say that it is entirely untrue. I never had the honour of being an "ally" of Dr Sanday's, and was not even acquainted with him for many years after the time referred to. I need not say that I should have been glad and proud at any time to have had Dr Sanday's help; but as this fiction is brought forward with the object of throwing discredit on my work, I must state that from first to last Dr Sanday and I have worked in the most absolute independence of one another. If the Professor received from others the misstatement which he so confidently makes, he cannot be congratulated on his discernment of the value of testimony; and if he has constructed it by a process of higher criticism, his skill in the exercise of that difficult art must be singularly deficient. There are some indications that the misstatement may have originated in the higher criticism, for he says that Dr Sanday "admits that Drummond's book gives the appearance of being 'written round' certain articles contributed by the author to the debates of twenty or thirty years ago" (p. 35). But Dr Sanday does not say this. His words are as follows:-"The book, indeed, makes upon one the impression of having been 'written round' the three or four considerable monographs which have appeared previously in this country or in America" (Hibbert Journal, April 1904, p. 617). This "impression" is derived from the fact that "the book is not quite constructed to scale," and that I have failed to notice some recent writers. Dr Sanday's suggestion as to the mode of production of my book is not, in fact, correct; but I acknowledge at once the defects which he points out. If the work appears to his practised eye "not quite constructed to scale," I have no doubt that it is deficient in proportion, and it is probable that I may have limited my investigations too exclusively to the original evidence, and that Jülicher and Schmiedel ought to have impressed me more than they did. My object was, undoubtedly, not to be a controversialist in opposition to other men's views, but to present the results of independent investigation, and the reasons which weighed with me, and this may have led me to dwell at disproportionate length on certain difficult portions of the subject. This defect, so kindly pointed out by Dr Sanday, affords no justification for Professor Bacon's assertion. The latter would do well to study more accuracy when he quotes, and to read the context. If it will afford him any pleasant controversial triumph, I may state that the whole book was in complete form some years before it was published. To scholars who are not "controversial" and precipitate it may appear an advantage that a work should be subject to repeated reconsideration and revision; but this fact may explain the inconsistency which Dr Sanday points out in my references to current literature. In an inquiry such as that into the authorship of the Fourth Gospel, where our knowledge is not, as in the

case of natural science, constantly growing, the date of a treatise is of the very smallest importance, its value depending entirely on the thoroughness and candour with which the ancient evidence is presented and estimated. I may also point out that my articles on Justin Martyr in no way committed me to the acceptance of the Johannine authorship; for Justin may have regarded the Gospel as one of his Memoirs, and have largely based his theology upon it, and, nevertheless, not have ascribed it to the Apostle. On the insinuation that, having once expressed an opinion, I would never alter it, if further evidence called upon me to do so, I forbear to remark.

After the foregoing observations it is needless to dwell on the Professor's misstatement about the date of composition of my article on Basilides.

Having thus led his readers to suppose that my work was quite antiquated, as dealing only with obsolete questions, he endeavours to destroy such value as may be attached to my judgment by representing me as grossly prejudiced, and takes Dr Sanday to task for commending my impartiality. He says I have "merely written round" the brief I presented "as an advocate some thirty years ago" (p. 36). In fact, I never held a "brief" on the subject. My articles on Justin Martyr were the result of a careful investigation, undertaken for the simple purpose of satisfying myself how the facts really stood. Of course I would not have revised and republished these articles unless, on further consideration, I still thought their argument sound. My book was not "written round" this imaginary brief. I have never pretended to be an incarnation of pure reason, or to have read the whole of the enormous literature dealing with the Johannine question; and subtle influences, of which I am quite unaware, may have affected my judgment. But, so far as I know, every conclusion I have formed has been the result of independent investigation, conducted with a single desire to know the facts; and I have invariably endeavoured to discover the strongest arguments against the positions that seemed to me most probable. If some of the conclusions which I reached are now so generally accepted that the discussion of them has become obsolete, that surely is a point in favour of, and not against, the accuracy of my judgment. The true lesson to be learned from the obsolete position of Baur is that critics ought not to be quite so confident, or so certain that those who differ from them must be under the influence of dogmatic prejudice. In his time Baur was the great hierophant of the critical school, and in some quarters those who ventured to form their own judgment, and to dissent from his conclusions, were looked upon as poor creatures, full of apologetic interests. It would appear that Hilgenfeld too, though he died only a few years ago, already sleeps with Baur in the limbo of the obsolete. So transient is the glory of criticism, and such is the honour which critics pay to their distinguished predecessors. Perhaps at some future time even Professor Bacon may be as obsolete as Baur and Hilgenfeld, whose great learning and genius ought not to be treated with such contempt.

But enough of this most unwelcome task. It would be impossible in a brief notice to review the Professor's arguments. He has not made me in love with controversial methods, which are ill suited to an old man, who hoped to spend his few remaining years remote from the strife of critics, and who now, as always, is far more deeply interested in the spiritual meaning and application of the Scriptures than in questions of date and authorship. But perhaps it may be useful to suggest some sources of divergent judgment among men who, we must assume, are equally anxious to discover the truth. So long as our conclusions depend upon a great mass of probabilities, many of them delicately balanced, it seems inevitable that judgments will differ, however painstaking and conscientious inquirers may be. We are seldom conscious of our own bias, and the men who boast most loudly of their candour are frequently the most prejudiced and dogmatic. But even those who, fully aware of human infirmity, make the most anxious efforts to survey the evidence with the eye of pure reason, may have some internal impulse which, when the probabilities are nearly equal, will determine their judgment on one side or the other. If, however, we set aside these very obscure causes of varying opinion, we may observe that, in the case under consideration, much depends on the original conception of the problem, and on the method of investigation.

If we start with the assumption that the Gospel according to John was published as an anonymous work, and circulated for many years among the churches as the treatise of an unknown author, and was first ascribed to John by a conjecture of the higher criticism when the Gospels were collected together, we shall naturally esteem of little weight the opinion of men who lived at the end of the second century. The case is necessarily very different if we assume that the Gospel was published, and received from the first, as the work of the Apostle. Now, Professor Bacon on his titlepage describes the Johannine writings as "anonymous"; and I must submit that by this description he creates a prejudice in the mind of the reader from the very beginning of the inquiry, and his own judgment may have been unconsciously influenced by this presupposition. I am not acquainted with any evidence that the Gospel was anonymous. According to all surviving authorities it bore a title which connects it with John; and John, to the early Christians, seems to have meant the Apostle, just as Shakespeare among ourselves means the great dramatist. The simplest form of title, which stands in the oldest codices, is found as early as Irenæus, Katà 'Iwavny. This was understood as an ascription of authorship, although that is not necessarily denoted by the kará. The title, if we complete it by the understood addition of εὐαγγέλιον, means "The Good Tidings according to (or, as presented by) John"; and, while this is by no means inconsistent with the ascription of direct authorship to John, it might properly be applied to a work which was a record of the teaching of John, written by some unknown man. It was not, however, understood in the latter sense; and it has been pointed out that if this meaning had been originally attached to the title, our second Gospel would not have been Κατὰ Μάρκον, but Κατὰ

Πέτρον. Books, in ancient as in modern times, were authenticated by their titles; and unless proof to the contrary can be given, we have as much right to ascribe anonymity to the Greek tragedies or the Platonic Dialogues as to the Fourth Gospel. Take away their titles and they become anonymous. Remove the title-page and the subscription to the preface from most modern books, and they too will be anonymous. We may make this point clearer by referring to the Epistle to the Hebrews. This is properly described as anonymous; for the oldest title is simply Πρὸς Ἑβραίους. It is difficult to suppose that the author was not known when the epistle was written, but as his name does not appear in the title or in the letter itself, it was forgotten; and though in course of time the work was conjecturally assigned to Paul, the early writers are content to accept it as anonymous, unless indeed we except Tertullian, who incidentally ascribes it to Barnabas. Similarly, we may suppose that the early writers would at least have exhibited some traces of uncertainty in regard to an anonymous Gospel; and accordingly, while Professor Bacon starts with the assumption that it was anonymous, I should feel myself constrained to look upon it as most probably pseudonymous if it were proved not to be by John. This initial (purely literary) difference in our point of view may sufficiently explain our varying judgment upon many items of evidence.

Another source of difference in men's judgments may be found in the order of investigation. If we start with an examination of the rather scanty remains of early post-apostolic literature, and with the latent assumption in our minds that every writer who knew the Fourth Gospel, and ascribed it to an Apostle, would have frequently and unmistakably referred to it, we shall easily find conclusive evidence that in the first age it was little known and less regarded. But if we begin with the writers who give us complete knowledge of their belief, and, having estimated carefully what this most probably involves, feel our way back into the more obscure period, we may think it proper to give a different interpretation to signs which are in themselves uncertain. The supposition that writers in the first half of the second century must, with prophetic foresight, have provided for the needs of critics in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, would appear to me, even if it were impossible to test it, to be absolutely baseless; but, fortunately, a test is at hand. We may turn to Tertullian, whose view of the Fourth Gospel is not in dispute, and what do we find? The Apologeticum and the Ad Nationes have no references to the Gospel. The Adversus Judwos quotes from an Evangelist a few words which are in Matthew, and from the Fourth Gospel, without any reference, a few words spoken by the people to Pilate. It quotes "He was a burning and shining light" as said by Christ to the Jews; refers to the Baptist's saying that Jesus was the Lamb of God, and to the saying, "Ye did not stone on account of works, but because he did them on the Sabbath." It states that the Jews slew Jesus on the first day of unleavened bread. Thus the apologetic works, while exhibiting some faint traces of a source akin to the Gospel, leave us in absolute darkness about its nature and authority. Several writings intended for Christian readers show even more strongly in what little regard it was held. The De Panitentia has no references to John, but a few to Matthew and Luke, who are not named. The De Fuga in Persecutione has no references to the Fourth Gospel, but quotes Matthew fourteen times, and Luke three times, but without naming them. It refers to John by name in quoting the First Epistle, and mentions the Apocalypse. The De Testimonio Anima has no references to Scripture. The De Corona uses the words Saculum enim gaudebit, vos vero lugebitis, but without intimation that they are quoted. The Ad Scapulam has no references. The De Patientia has neglected to use suitable passages from the Fourth Gospel, but quotes Matthew nine times, and refers to passages in it twice, as usual without naming the source. The Scorpiace throws no light upon the Fourth Gospel, but quotes Matthew nine times, and refers to passages in it four times. Here, then, is a large body of writing, which leaves us totally in the dark about the Fourth Gospel, and betrays a far closer acquaintance with Matthew. If Tertullian's other works had been lost, how triumphantly would he be quoted to prove that in the province of Africa at the end of the second century the Gospel was either quite unknown, or looked on as an anonymous work, with no ecclesiastical authority.\(^1\)

In Clement of Alexandria's Cohortatio ad Gentes, if I have counted rightly, there are fourteen certain or probable references to Matthew, without mention of the source. In one quotation the source is referred to as "the Scripture"; in another it vanishes into a που. There are eight apparent quotations from the Fourth Gospel, sometimes without the slightest indication that they are quotations. Once the source is indicated by που; and once there is an express quotation κατὰ τὸν Ἰωάννην, but without a word about a Gospel. Having repeated, as though it were his own expression, "In the beginning was the Word," he presently quotes Titus, with the introduction, "According to that divine Apostle of the Lord," allowing one to suppose that "In the beginning was the Word" did not proceed from an Apostle. The που tends to show that he was using some unfamiliar source, perhaps the Gospel of Peter. John's πάντα δι αὐτοῦ ἐγένετο becomes ῷ τὰ πάντα δεδημιούργηται. John's σὰρξ ἐγένετο appears as ἄνθρωπος γενόμενος, and it may fairly be argued that, if Clement had been acquainted with the very marked and characteristic Johannine phrase, he could not possibly have resorted to one so commonplace.

Perhaps it is worth while stating that, taking at random the Fourth Book of Irenæus, I find, if I have counted correctly, the following results:—
There are 22 citations from John without any mention of the source, I cited as "in the Gospel," and I introduced by "as John in the Gospel related." But from Matthew there are 101, of which only 2 are referred

¹ For the references I have relied upon Oehler's notes, but have examined the passages.

to a "Gospel." There are 31 from Luke, and 1 from Mark, thus making 133 citations from the Synoptics, as against 24 from John, giving an enormous preponderance to the former. The proportion, it may be said, is not so striking as in the case of Justin; but then the works are entirely different in character, and addressed to a different class of readers. It should also be remembered that the proportion in Justin is not at all that which is given by Professor Bacon. We must properly withdraw from the 170 references to the Synoptical material 40 facts relating to the virgin-birth, which is not in the Fourth Gospel, and a considerable number of other facts which are in all four Gospels. And we must also bear in mind that a large proportion of the quotations are intended to illustrate the ethical teaching of Jesus, and are very naturally taken from the Sermon on the Mount, or some similar source. It is quite clear that the Fourth Gospel is not equally well suited to the latter purpose. Moreover, if we once allow that Justin made any use of the Fourth Gospel, several features in his works, in addition to the three quotations 1 (Otto's index gives 26), may be traced to that source; and he makes ample use of it as a basis for his theology. To say that his Logos doctrine is different from that of the Gospel proves nothing; for this is true also of the doctrine of Athanasius, and still more of that of the fathers of Chalcedon. If it is a Greek development and interpretation of the doctrine in the Gospel, this only shows that the latter must have already been operative for a considerable time in the thought of the Church.

Arguments which are confessedly futile in relation to Tertullian, Clement, and Irenæus ought not to be regarded as valid when applied to earlier writers, of whom we have more limited knowledge. Accordingly, if we begin our inquiry with the later testimony and its implications, we may fail to be convinced by those who commence operations by groping

amid the darkness of the earlier period.

To these sources of divergent judgment I think we must add a third, which is profoundly influential—our imaginative reproduction of the author's personality. If we think that an immediate disciple of Jesus must have been an ancient Boswell, the question is decided: an Apostle could not be the author of the Gospel. This is not, as it might seem, a frivolous suggestion. I have myself been clearly conscious of the difficulty. I believe many inquirers reason thus, sometimes consciously, sometimes perhaps unconsciously: had I been an immediate follower of Jesus, and written a Gospel, it would have been entirely unlike that which the Fourth Evangelist has given us. No modern professor, no modern biographer, would have written such a book. But if we can picture to ourselves an oriental mystic and visionary, and one who, among mystics and visionaries, had a peculiar

¹ As regards one of the three quotations, $\epsilon_K d\theta_{l} \sigma \epsilon_F \epsilon_{R} l$ $\beta \eta_{\mu} a \tau \sigma_S$, Professor Bacon thinks I am utterly demolished by the production of Stanton's verdict. But he makes no attempt to estimate the evidence on the other side, which is fully given in my volume. I have a great respect for Stanton, but did not know he was infallible. It is no doubt easier and more summary to knock a man down with the bludgeon of authority than to point out where his reasoning is erroneous

temperament, in which the inward experience completely dominated the outward, one, too, living in an age in which the whole religious atmosphere favoured the mystical and allegorical, and induced devout men to look upon outward events as fading symbols of eternal truth, the case is altered, and we have to ask ourselves whether such a man may not have been found amid the first band of disciples. It seems sometimes to be forgotten that the difficulty is not really removed by transferring it from a known to an unknown man. The Gospel is there, with all its peculiarities; and for my part I find it easier to believe that an Apostle, content on the whole with the synoptical account, may have written this "spiritual" Gospel, than that it was composed by some obscure man after the synoptic tradition had become the Church's accepted record. Even from our modern point of view I think one who had been the intimate friend of a great teacher through a brief and exciting period would be more likely to present a portrait stamped with his own individuality than a later biographer who had to rely on material which was well known and regarded as authentic.

In this connection I have always found it difficult to believe that when so many writers and champions of the militant and suffering Church were known and celebrated, the greatest genius of them all, who thought that Christians ought to lay down their lives for the brethren, was utterly unknown, and yet able to lay his commanding spell upon the entire Church from that time to this. Why did he lurk in the shade when every man of strength and talent was needed in the fighting line? And why was his work ascribed with such strange unanimity to the Apostle John, when, at least at the time of its publication, every one knew that he had been for years in his grave? These are perplexities for which I have never seen a solution that appeared to me plausible.

When we next meet with Professor Bacon, I hope he will have exchanged the character of a controversialist for that of a patient and careful investigator. Long may he engage in the service of sacred criticism, ready to brave charges of heresy, and to sacrifice everything for truth. If he again visit Oxford while I am still alive and well, no one will be more ready to give him a hearty welcome than

JAMES DRUMMOND,

OXFORD.

Christologies Ancient and Modern.—By William Sanday, D.D., LL.D., Litt. D., Oxford.—Clarendon Press, 1910.

It is a significant fact that most of the famous Lives of Christ have been written by young men. The task is one which requires great constructive power even more than wide learning. There are few minds which are not thrown into confusion by the constant accumulation of facts and comparison of views involved in modern methods of study. Many theologians learn to read, but few to think. The value of a Life of Christ depends upon the thoroughness with which the different parts of the composition,

and their relation to the whole, have been thought out. No amount of learning in matters of detail can compensate for lack of firmness in the essential outlines of the figure.

It is the more remarkable that Dr Sanday should set himself, as his final work, the crown of his theology, the task of attempting to write a Life of Christ. It is certain that, if the work is ever finished, it will be a masterpiece of learning and sound judgment. A sketch of its contents has already been given in the author's Outlines of the Life of Christ. Particular parts of the problems raised in it have been treated in a trilogy of preliminary studies-The Criticism of the Fourth Gospel, The Life of Christ in Recent Research, and the present volume. This, Dr Sanday says, "is the last of the preliminary studies which I have found myself compelled to make in approaching the larger task which lies before me of writing, or attempting to write, what is commonly called the Life of Christ" (p. v). It is the last, and it is the most important, because it deals with the central problem, the nature and person of Christ. We know already the width of Dr Sanday's learning. We feel that his mind recapitulates in its development all the essential features and movements of contemporary theology. But hitherto we have not known his own convictions sufficiently well to forecast his treatment of the central problem. In Christologies Ancient and Modern a solution is at last attempted, and we are able to judge whether or not it is hopeful for the Life that is to follow.

The book falls into two parts, the first critical and descriptive, the second constructive. About the first of these there is comparatively little to say. Probably Dr Sanday is on safer ground when dealing with modern than with ancient forms of Christological theory. At any rate his treatment of the former is very slight, and may leave considerable doubt in some minds. For instance, it is hardly adequate to say no more of the earliest stages of development than that "The total net result of the Apostolic Age—or we may say, of the preaching and life of two generations of Christians—was that the Church at large thought of its Founder as divine" (p. 6). And to describe the point of view of the leaders of the first generation as "theology held in solution" (p. 7) begs the question whether or not it was theology at all. If there is to be any standard of orthodoxy, such as is set up in a later passage (p. 22), it is of the utmost importance that the original tendencies of theological development should be carefully examined. Growth of thought, like growth of body, is most rapid in its earliest stages. The élan vital of all modern Christologies is to be found in the Gospels.

The treatment of Modern Christologies is necessarily shorter, and therefore less satisfactory, than in the lectures reprinted in *The Life of Christ in Recent Research*. Its interest lies in the contrast with which it ends between two schools of thought, which Dr Sanday—not without some qualms—identifies with a "fuller type" and a "reduced type" of Christianity (p. 97). The classification is awkwardly subjective; for though Dr Sanday is "conscious of a certain call to offer to mediate between" the

two points of view, he has no doubt towards which he himself inclines (p. 97). The real point of difference lies in the attitude of Gospel critics on either side towards the other documents of the New Testament (p. 119). Dr Sanday is inclined to be sceptical about the adequacy of the Gospel materials, and to reproach the "reduced" school with not making a proper use of these other authorities. "Broadly speaking," he says, "all the rest of the New Testament, with more or less of emphasis according to circumstances, θεολογεί τον Χριστόν, treats of Christ as God; and the Church Universal has done the same from the time of the Apostles until now" (p. 120). But is it fair to speak "broadly" of such a varied body of evidence, which (not to mention the Church Universal) includes the Epistle of James, and so critical a document (especially in its early chapters) as the Acts? And is it the liberal Christologists who ignore this body of evidence? The strength of the "reduced" position lies largely in its proof of Christological development running through all the books of the New Testament. This argument must be met on its own ground. By speaking too "broadly," it is the "fuller" Christians who are in danger of refusing to face the facts.

The critical part of the book soon passes into the constructive. The transition is marked by a treatment of Mysticism, with a number of extracts from Dr Moberly and Dr Du Bose. This is explained by the fact that in the middle of his lectures Dr Sanday "found the argument developing in a direction which he had not himself exactly anticipated at the outset" (p. v). The real connecting link seems to be the idea of Divine Immanence (p. 132). Man has something divine in him, yet remains a man for all that: may not an analogous formula enable us "to assert at one and the same time the full humanity of our Lord without detriment to His deity, and the real deity without detriment to the

humanity"? (p. 133).

It is with this thought in our minds that we are introduced to the main constructive idea of the book, which may be called the divinity of the Subconscious. Many strange uses have been made of the discoveries of the Salpêtrière and the records of the Psychical Research Society, since they were popularised with such admirable skill by Professor James and Mr F. W. H. Myers. But surely none is stranger than this. Dr Sanday is quite right in wishing to find a formula for the unity of the divine and human natures in Christ—"He is not two, but one, Christ." He sees, too, that the root difficulty lies in psychology, and he naturally seizes on the admission which is made (almost too readily) by modern psychologists, that the most important parts of our thinking are not, strictly speaking, thoughts at all, but "uprushes" (whatever that may mean) from the "subconscious." But it is one thing to accept subconsciousness as a better hypothesis than consciousness: it is quite another thing to find in it a different and a higher form of personality. It is true that Professor James himself is inclined to identify the sphere of the subconscious with the "mystical or supernatural region," and so, in

some sense, with God (vide quotations, p. 148). But, in doing this, he is relying upon a comparatively small part of the evidence, and, in particular, upon the phenomena of religious conversion and mysticism. His hypothesis cannot, at present, be squared with all the facts. And for this very reason it is a dangerous ally for Christology.

In the first place, although it is quite true that some of our deepest and divinest impulses come to us unbidden and unexplained—a fact which the Church has always recognised in its use of meditation—it is equally true that much of the subconscious consists of mechanical reactions, and memories long laid by, which give rise to all manner of useless and frivolous states of mind. The value of the subconsciousness seems to lie, not in the material which it presents to us, but in our capacity to make conscious use of it. There is really no reason to suppose that our subconscious states have any more value or authority than those which are conscious.

Again, the subconscious has no moral character. Dr Sanday seems at some points to admit this. "It is true," he says, "that the proper seat of the really divine—as well as, I am afraid, the really diabolical—in man is that part of the living self which is most beyond his ken" (p. 163, italics added). Nevertheless he quarrels with Sir Oliver Lodge for saying that this element in man is "not anything divine, but greater than humanity" (p. 193), and in the constructive part of the book this great difficulty tends to fall out of sight. The fact is, the subconscious is bigger than the conscious, just as what falls outside the focus of eyesight is bigger than what falls within it. But because there is more of it, and because it is too much out of focus for us to see clearly what it is, it does not follow that it is more real or more important than the parts that are distinct. Intellectually, it may be foolish as well as wise. Morally, it may be devilish as easily as divine.

In any case—and this is the final objection—the subconscious is part of our common humanity. No doubt, Christ shared it with us. But if it is divine in Him, it is divine in us as well. Dr Sanday's theory is, in fact, an illuminating description of the humanity of Christ; but it is in no sense an explanation of His divinity, unless His divinity be something that is present to some extent in all men. Dr Sanday would probably recoil from this last way of putting things: it is too characteristic of the "reduced" Christologies. But it does not appear that, on his own line of thought, there is any escape from such a conclusion. As a piece of alternative construction, Dr Sanday's theory has failed.

Whether or not such a construction is possible upon other lines is the chief question that lies before our theologians at the present moment. It would not be difficult, for instance, to construct a theory similar to Dr Sanday's upon the basis of Bergson's distinction between the spheres of instinct and intelligence. But it would be open to the same criticism. Indeed, we are soon brought face to face with the doubt whether any formula can be found for the divinity of Christ, so long as that is regarded

as something inherent in Him alone, and not as the expression of a relationship between Him and the Church.

In any case, if we cannot accept Dr Sanday's use of the subconscious, we can at least endorse the guiding principle of his Christology—the unity of the human and the divine in Christ. That unity—often presented under forms in which faith was as plentiful as logic was lacking—has been the root-belief of Christianity for many centuries. Dr Sanday, indeed, goes further. In an apologia of singular naïveté he avows that he traces the influence of God "in the ultimate decisions, the fundamental decisions, of the Church of the Fathers," and finds it "incredible that He should intend the course of modern development to issue in direct opposition to them." "If I find my own thought," he continues, "leading me into such opposition, I at once begin to suspect that there is something wrong, and I retrace my steps and begin again" (p. vii). That is to say, Dr Sanday accepts the Catholic formularies as an adequate expression of the Catholic experience.

But providence must surely be credited with modern theology as well as with ancient. God is not an archæologist: He looks forward as well as back. The theology of the Fathers contains principles that are eternal, but it often expresses them under forms that are poor and transitory. The first we must reverence; the second we may have to change. Indeed, Dr Sanday himself has gone further than he thinks in the direction of restatement. His youthfulness of mind has led him into a great theological adventure, of which the outcome is most uncertain.

It is to be hoped that Dr Sanday will reconsider the particular theory which this book suggests before he makes it the central principle of his Life of Christ. It is a young man's theory, and it will be unable to bear the burden that Dr Sanday's learning threatens to place upon it.

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The Quest of the Historical Jesus. A Critical Study of its Progress from Reimarus to Wrede.—By Albert Schweitzer, Privatdozent in New Testament Studies in the University of Strassburg.—Translated by W. Montgomery, B.A., B.D. With a Preface by F. C. Burkitt, M.A., D.D., Norrisian Professor of Divinity in the University of Cambridge.—London: Adam & Charles Black, 1910.—Pp. vii+410.

VERY few students of theology would have either the leisure or the opportunity to wade through the immense mass of literature which is summarised in this substantial volume, so that it is a distinct gain to have the results brought together so conveniently to one's hand. The author must have devoted a great deal of time and pains to the mere mastering and arranging of his material; he has his own theory to maintain, and of necessity he has criticisms to make on all the Lives of Jesus which he analyses for our benefit. The work reads like an original in the English

tongue, which is equivalent to saying that the translation is well done. It is interesting from beginning to end, but requires attentive reading; and while the account of the various "Lives" is easily followed, there is more trouble in grasping the author's own contribution to the controversy. However, to a careful student the mastery of the argument will present no real difficulty. Except for a rather frequent omission of the interrogation-mark at the end of a question, the printing is careful and accurate, perhaps the only noticeable misprints being "seventy-six" for "sixty-seven" on p. 238, and the interchange of "Matt." and "Mark" on p. 264.

Dr Schweitzer's study avowedly deals almost exclusively with German theology; nevertheless he notices work done in France, such as Renan's Vie de Jésus and the Roman Catholic Didon's Jésus-Christ, with others. His survey includes England, and he shows acquaintance with Stalker's Life of Jesus Christ and Gardner's Exploratio Evangelica, and even with Robertson's Christianity and Mythology and Ingraham's Prince of the House of David, while on p. 267 there is a reference to an article by Dr Charles in the Expository Times. This being so, it is strange that Dr Sanday's valuable labours on the subject are ignored. In a study which comes down so late as H. F. von Soden in 1904, and Otto Schmiedel in 1906, we might have expected some allusion to Dr Sanday's Outlines of the Life of Christ, which in its original form appeared as an article in Hastings' Dictionary of the Bible as far back as 1899. However, where so much has been provided it is ungrateful to ask for more; in this country we can supply the omission for ourselves, but one may be pardoned for wishing that the German reader had received some account of the most authoritative work done in England. What Dr Schweitzer has to tell about so many Lives of Jesus makes us look the more eagerly for the definitive Life which Dr Sanday's preliminary studies have led us to expect.

In chapter i. our author plunges at once into a statement of the problem which he is to discuss. "We are here dealing with the most vital thing in the world's history. There came a Man to rule over the world; He ruled it for good and for ill, as history testifies; He destroyed the world into which He was born; the spiritual life of our own time seems like to perish at His hands, for He leads to battle against our thought a host of dead ideas, a ghostly army upon which death has no power, and Himself destroys again the truth and goodness which His Spirit creates in us, so that it cannot rule the world. That He continues, notwithstanding, to reign as the alone Great and alone True in a world of which He denied the continuance, is the prime example of that antithesis between spiritual and natural truth which underlies all life and all events, and in Him emerges into the field of history." The difficulties which are alleged to lie in our way may be summarised thus: 1. The discrepancy between the first three gospels and the fourth, our authentic information being derived only from the former. 2. The want of any thread of connexion in the material offered by the sources. sources give no hint of the character of the self-consciousness of Jesus.

4. In the sources there is a striking contradiction. "They assert that Jesus felt Himself to be the Messiah; and yet from their presentation of His life it does not appear that He ever publicly claimed to be so." 5. "We do not know whether the expectation of the Messiah was generally current, or whether it was the faith of a mere sect." 6. We have no information as to the form of the Messianic self-consciousness of Jesus.

The critical study of the life of Jesus falls into two periods, before Strauss and after Strauss. "The dominant interest in the first is the question of miracle." Strauss's argument was, of course, that the miracles are merely myths. The Tübingen school established the necessity of choosing between John and the Synoptists. Then the question began to be asked, "What was the significance of eschatology for the mind of Jesus?" And with this question was associated the problem of His selfconsciousness. At the present time the problem is to explain the contradiction between the Messianic consciousness of Jesus and His non-Messianic discourses and actions: and we are offered two solutions, a historical and a literary. The former seeks to arrive at "a conception of His Messianic consciousness which will make it appear that He could not have acted otherwise than as the Evangelists describe"; the latter denies that Jesus had any such Messianic self-consciousness, alleging it to be "a later interpolation of the beliefs of the Christian community into the life of Jesus."

The twentieth and last chapter, a very short one, sums up the results of the study: "The Jesus of Nazareth who came forward publicly as the Messiah, who preached the ethic of the Kingdom of God, who founded the Kingdom of Heaven upon earth, and died to give His work its final consecration, never had any existence. He is a figure designed by rationalism, endowed with life by liberalism, and clothed by modern theology in an historical garb." That Jesus actually existed is affirmed emphatically, but the historical Jesus was dominated by eschatological conceptions which turned out to be mistaken, and so "it is not Jesus as historically known, but Jesus as spiritually arisen within men, who is significant for our time and can help it. Not the historical Jesus, but the spirit which goes forth from Him and in the spirits of men strives for new influence and rule, is that which overcomes the world." Between the first chapter and the last is traced with a firm hand the outline of the achievement of 130 years, from Reimarus to the end of the nineteenth century, or rather to the opening years of the twentieth. For this sceptical theologian Dr Schweitzer has a special predilection, because he was the first advocate of the eschatological theory, the theory which is advocated, though in a different form, in this book. "In the light of the clear perception of the elements of the problem which Reimarus had attained, the whole movement of theology, down to Johannes Weiss, appears retrograde. In all its work the thesis is ignored or obscured that Jesus, as a historical personality, is to be regarded, not as the founder of a new religion, but as the final product of the eschatological and apocalyptic thought of late

Judaism. Every sentence of Johannes Weiss's Die Predigt Jesu vom Reiche Gottes (1892) is a vindication, a rehabilitation of Reimarus as a historical thinker." We are told of the rationalists, on whom the author is particularly severe; and even of the imaginative writers who depicted Jesus as the agent of a secret society, and one of whom, Noack, thought that Judas, the beloved disciple, arranged the "betraval" with the connivance of his Master, and was subsequently the author of the Fourth Gospel! Bruno Bauer arrived at the conclusion that "there never was any historical Jesus." That this is not the final conclusion of scientific study is evident, else had this account of the Quest not been written! But the final conclusion is not yet reached. Dr Schweitzer himself is a thorough-going advocate of the eschatological solution of the problem. He holds that the ministry of Jesus did not cover many months, and that when He sent out the apostles on their mission He believed the Parousia would occur before their return. Disappointed in this, He was obliged to recast His plans, and it was the divulging of His Messianic secret, first by Peter to the other disciples, and then by Judas to the priests. that brought about the catastrophe.

This necessarily brief sketch brings the conclusion too abruptly, but even when it is arrived at with all the skill and learning of the book before us, one feels that after all, describe Him with what glowing enthusiasm he may, the author depicts Jesus as a deluded enthusiast. The historical part of his work is of great value, but his own contribution to the discussion will help only in a limited degree to the readjustment of our ideas which is necessary from time to time. Getting away from the desk and the midnight oil and looking out into the world, we see Christianity a potent force in life to-day. Would the Jesus of the German theologians have grown into the Christ who supplied the motive-power to the grand history of Christian missions? Would He, for instance, have regenerated Uganda? "He was not a teacher, not a casuist; He was an imperious ruler"—so writes our author; but great as he believes Jesus to have been, the mighty forces which He put in action proclaim Him to have been greater still.

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The Odes and Psalms of Solomon.—Now first published from the Syriac Version. — By J. Rendel Harris, M.A., Hon. D. Litt., LL.D., D. Theology, etc.—Cambridge: at the University Press, 1909.

Ein jüdisch-christliches Psalmbuch aus dem ersten Jahrhundert [The Odes . . . of Solomon, now first published, etc.], aus dem syrischen übersetzt von Johannes Flemming bearbeitet und herausgegeben von Adolf Harnack.—Leipzig: J. C. Hinrichs'sche Buchhandlung, 1910.

In every respect a noble work, which, both from the editor's extensive range of scholarship and the congeniality between him and the newly

found Odes of Solomon, will never lose its interest or value. It is in fact the latest bloom of the fair tree of Hebrew Psalmody that is now disclosed to us. Here is a fair average specimen, as rendered by Dr Rendel Harris. It is part of Ode xvii.:—

"I was crowned by my God; my crown is living; ² and I was justified in my Lord; my incorruptible salvation is He. ³ I was loosed from vanity, and I was not condemned. ⁴ The choking bonds were cut off by her (his?) hands; I received the face and the fashion of a new person; and I walked in it and was saved; ⁵ and the thought of truth led me on. And I walked after it and did not wander, ⁶ and all that have seen me were amazed; and I was regarded by them as a strange person; ⁷ and He who knew and brought me up is the Most High in all His perfection. And He glorified me by His kindness, and raised my thought to the height of His truth."

There are no such individualistic and mystical psalms in the canonical Psalter, and the want of such is the excuse—the sufficient excuse—for the mystical individualistic interpretation which Churchmen of the most various schools put upon the familiar words of the old Psalms. There was a time, however, when there might almost have been an appendix to that Psalter, containing food for that individualistic type of religion which had the promise of the future. For the recently discovered book, of which I have undertaken to speak, was originally intended, as Dr Harris thinks, as a devotional aid to members of an early Judeo-Christian community, and we know for certain that it very nearly made its way among Scriptures of deutero-canonical authority. Why it did not quite succeed is a problem. It was at any rate much read, and even now many parts of it retain their ancient power alternately to stir and to soothe our spiritual nature. My own tribute, however, to the manifold merits of this Psalter must be reserved for the second part of this review. for my point of view is rather that of Professor Harnack than that of the first editor; and I would express the hope that since October in last year Dr Harris may have somewhat modified the views which, however natural on a first examination of the Psalter, hardly commend themselves perhaps to those who read at leisure and build upon the discoverer's foundation.

Appearances are favourable to the general accuracy of the Syriac representation of the contents of the Odes. The elaborate critical methods required for the canonical Psalms are inapplicable to the newly found Psalter. Not only is the original Hebrew text—if such ever existed—still undiscovered, but if it were to be discovered, we cannot suppose that it would revolutionise the interpretation. It would at any rate not be less mystic in its ideas than the Syriac version of the Greek, not less superior to the trammels of the time-world. How different in this respect (and not in this alone) are the so-called Psalms of Solomon, with which both here and elsewhere our Odes are associated! It is true that Dr Harris may somewhat exaggerate the clearness of the background of the former. "They were made," he says (p. 53), "under the stress of national exigency, and the troubles stand out from the Psalms with their

dates on them." "Pompey," he adds, "is written large over several of the Psalms; and when Rome is not expressly mentioned, it is distinctly felt. The great dragon of the Psalms of Solomon is a classified specimen. We can tell him a mile away." But comparative Semitic mythology may suggest a doubt whether "we" see altogether right.

This is not the only occasion on which, as it seems to me, Dr Rendel Harris speaks too confidently about references to Pompey. In his comment on Ode xxii.—the ode which, among other appropriate titles of God, contains this: "He that overthrew by my hands the dragon with seven heads"-I find this remark: "Any political monster may be a beast or a dragon; so in the present case we have to hunt around among the fallen gods (i.e. tyrants?) to find him." After considering the possible claimants, including Pompey, he "leaves the question (as to the individual intended) for the present unsolved." It should be plain, however, that no individual oppressor is intended, but the great oppressive world-power, which assumes various forms, and, at the end of this zeon, is to be finally destroyed. Both in Ps. Sol. ii. 26 ff. and in Ode xxii. 5 the language is anticipative. In the former passage (as Kosters has already pointed out) it is a vision of the destruction of the dragon which the psalmist receives. The dragon has not yet really been slain (as one mythic tradition declared that he would be) on the mountains, nor has he been shattered (as another tradition expected) on the face of the waters. But Faith is confident that he will be. To localise the second great mythical contest between God and the dragon in Egypt was doubtless bold, but the Second Isaiah had already done it (Isa. li. 9, as usually explained); and as for the combination of traditions, we may illustrate it by Ps. lxxiv. 13 f., and especially Enoch lx. 8. On this and other grounds I conclude that Dr Harris and Professor Wellhausen are mistaken in dating the second Psalm of Solomon towards the end of the first century B.C., about seventeen years (so Wellhausen) after the murder of Pompey Toos To κασσίω ὄρει (Dio Cassius). The slaving of the dragon is still in the future, and the description of the outrages on Jerusalem is composite, and suggested by all the sieges and captures which the Holy City had suffered down to the time when the Solomonic psalmist wrote. The passage reminds us of Ps. xci. 13, where the pious community receives the promise of trampling on the lion and the dragon. All such passages are eschatological.

The question of the date of the Psalms of Solomon is specially important for this reason, that the association of the Psalms and the Odes in Biblical lists is presumptive evidence that there is no very great interval in time between them. It is true, the two books have widely different characteristics. For instance, the one is imitative, the other is highly original; the one is written in the name of the religious community of Israel, the other is, in the main, descriptive of the inner experiences (so far as these are normal) of the individual. But both the imitativeness of the one and the originality of the other proclaim that the old order

of things has passed away. Some readers may perhaps suggest that the originality of the Odes may be due to the new, life-giving impulse communicated by our Lord. That, however, is by no means clear. The Jesus of the Synoptic Gospels is not a mystic in the same sense as the author (if there were not, rather, authors) of the Odes. Scholars are agreed that there was a late Jewish mysticism which owed nothing to primitive Christianity; and the question arises, Whence did the mystical school, the watchword of which is "eternal life," and which is visible both in late Judaism and in early Christianity, proceed? At any rate, we may be pretty sure that it was not perceptible in Palestine when the Psalms of Solomon were written; and as the period of those Psalms we may (as traces of some underlying late Hebrew and the description of Jewish parties combine to show) safely indicate the first century B.C.

Dr Harris deals at length with the question of the date of the Odes in the Introduction. He finds several more or less possible points of contact with history, but the only one which seems to me plausible is that derived from Ode iv. The opening verses, as rendered by Dr Harris, are as follows:—

"1 No man, O my God, changeth thy holy place: 2 and it is not [possible] that he should change it and put it in another place: because he hath no power over it: 3 for thy sanctuary thou hast designed before thou didst make [other] places: 4 that which is the elder shall not be altered by those that are younger than itself."

There is no discernible connection between this and the rest of the ode, and it has therefore struck me that verses I to 4 may once have stood in another context, which cleared up what is now obscure. As the text stands, it certainly seems as if the "elder" sanctuary were that of Jerusalem, the pre-existence of which was a dogma of Judaism, and which was destroyed by Titus in 70 A.D. But who were those who desired to substitute another sanctuary? When and in what circumstances did they form such a plan? And where was it proposed to erect this new sanctuary? To these questions neither Dr Harris nor Professor Harnack appears to me to give a satisfactory answer. The former suggests that the Odist may refer with disapproval to the erection (B.C. 160) of the temple of Onias at Leontopolis in Egypt. In 73 A.D. this temple was destroyed by the Roman general Paulinus, and the Odist, who evidently accepted the Jewish dogma spoken of, may, it is thought, have been stirred up by this event to express his disapproval of the schismatical action of Onias. Professor Harnack, on the other hand, is of opinion that the Odist, though not absolutely rejecting the Leontopolis temple, disapproves any attempt of its partisans to depreciate the temple at Jerusalem. Both temples, he thinks, were still standing when Ode iv. was written. To me, however, it seems very improbable that such words should have been indited if a rival sanctuary to that of Jerusalem already existed. The object of the Odist is not simply to express disapproval of some more recent sanctuary, but to prevent a new temple from being erected elsewhere. But why should

anyone propose such erection unless the Jerusalem temple had been destroyed? We have indeed no record of such a proposal. But we do know (in my judgment) that after some pre-Christian destruction of the Jerusalem temple a prophetic writer opposed its being rebuilt, whether on the temple mount or elsewhere (Isa. lxvi. 1). The currents of feeling and opinion which existed among the Jews when this writer lived may surely be supposed to have existed in similar circumstances at a later date. If so, we can safely place the composition of the Odes very soon after the fatal year of the destruction of Jerusalem.

That this mystically-minded psalmist still attaches importance to a material temple is doubtless surprising; it is apparently a drawback to his consistency, for in Ode xx. 1, 3 he says (or is it another Odist?): "I am a priest of the Lord, and to Him I do priestly service: and to Him I offer the sacrifice of His thought. . . . The sacrifice of the Lord is

righteousness, and purity of heart and lips."

The drawback, however, is a very slight one. It is plain from Ode vi. 5-11 that his reverence for the sanctuary is due, not to its being the place where sacrifices are offered, but to its being the source of the mighty stream of the knowledge of God (Isa. ii. 2, 3). "Blessed," he says, "are the ministers of that draught who are entrusted with that water of His" (v. 12). The priests, then, of whom our mystical Odist is one, are simply "ministers of the word" (Luke i. 2), and the temple is the symbol of the immediate knowledge of God. In Ode xxx. all those who are athirst are invited to "the living fountain of the Lord"—another symbol. How little our poet is bound to the material temple is plain from Ode iv. 6, where the well-known words of Ps. lxxxiv. 11, "for one day in thy courts is better than a thousand," receives this fine mystical alteration: "For one hour of thy Faith is more precious than all days and years."

I have endeavoured to do honour to the gifted editor even while criticising him. It will, however, be best to pass on from the "editio princeps" to the fine contribution of Harnack in the Texte und Untersuchungen. Here I must confess that I feel more at home. Able and instructive (even on folklore) as Dr Harris's introduction is, it suffers through his not having recognised that the passages which are most plainly Christian are interpolations. It must be admitted that there are a number of odes about the character of which a difference of opinion is possible, but it is not difficult to show (and Harnack, I think, has shown) that the original work (the Grundschrift) is not Christian, but Jewish. Among the most certain interpolations is Ode iii. 9, "because I love Him, the Son, I shall be a son." Who does not see what an improvement is effected by omitting these words? The whole passage will then run thus, accepting a necessary correction of Harris's:—

I am united (to Him), because I have found love to the Beloved; For one that is joined to Him that is immortal, will himself also become immortal, And one that is accepted in the Living One will become living. It is fair to mention that Harris, to whom the correction "the Living One" for "life" is due, retains the omitted words, and interprets "the Living One" of Jesus Christ. I would myself rather regard both this and

the parallel phrase as titles of "the only true God."

Another certainly interpolated passage is xxiii. 19, 20. The ode evidently closes with v. 18, which describes the fate of the opponents of the will of God as declared in the "letter." The interpolation is Christian, for it contains the statement that "the name of the Father was on it (viz. the latter), and of the Son, and of the Holy Spirit." And not only the appendix is a Christian insertion, but also-one cannot help believing-v. 16, which refers to "the Son of Truth from the Most High Father." Altogether there are twelve odes in which the phrases "the Son of God" and "the Anointed" have been shown by Harnack to be interpolations. But these are not the only traces of the work of a Christian editor. The little ode upon the Cross (xxvii.), to which the opening verses of Ode xliii, are a doublet, is surely Christian, in spite of the existence of a symbolism of the Cross in pre-Christian times. Ode xix., too-so fantastic and unspiritual a work-is a Christian insertion; not only in the Trinity referred to, but the painless (contrast Apoc. xii, 2) bringing forth of the Son by a Virgin. Elsewhere Jewish and Christian elements stand side by side; notable examples of this are Odes vii., xxxi., xli., xlii. In the last of these (vv. 17-35) we have a picturesque account of the Descensus ad inferos-a suggestive belief of mythic origin which had a fascination for early Christianity.

This may at least give some idea of the task undertaken by early Christian editors of Jewish works, such as the Testaments of the Twelve Patriarchs (lately edited by Dr Charles) and the Odes of Solomon; only the Christian element in the latter is relatively more abundant than that in the former. Such editing was doubtless necessary from an ecclesiastical point of view, and the result has an historical right of existence. Still it is much more interesting to study the original Odes apart from the Jewish insertions and additions. I am therefore in favour of a redistribution of the several parts of the hymn-book, viz., i, the original Jewish Odes and fragments of Odes, ii. the Christian insertions, iii. the Christian Odes and fragments of Odes. The material should, of course, be arranged in parallel lines, and in the middle commentary—that relating to the text—the results should be given of a critical search for the underlying Greek version, and even for the Hebrew which that Greek text may represent. Dr Harris, indeed, says (p. 72) that "we cannot tell what Greek lies behind the Syriac except in a very few cases" (especially by the help of the quotations in the Pistis Sophia). But the attempt ought to be made. Valuable corrections of the Syriac have already been made by the editor, by Professor Nestle, and by Dr Flemming, and such ingenious scholars may fairly be expected to devise new means of overcoming the difficulties.

Certainly no effort can be too great to improve the outward form of this beautiful work. It would be no slight service even to separate the Jewish from the Christian elements. That there was a want of a Christian manual of mysticism I do not doubt, but it was not well that the Christian editor spoiled a fine Jewish Psalter by interpolating the shibboleths of his religion. Not till these insertions have been removed can we appreciate the soaring flights of Jewish mysticism. In these flights the poet only claims the privileges of one who knows God, and it is an ill service to Jesus to weaken this claim by representing it as made by Another. The utterances of one in whom Christ (for Judaism, too, had its Christ) had been so fully "formed" ought not to have been impoverished; not such was the true way of honouring Him who sought not His own glory. I should not like to join those who speak of the cringing piety of the old Latin and Anglican prayers, but I must confess that the unknown author of the original Odes, not less than St Paul and St John, strikes a higher note.

That there were other great early mystics, Christian as well as Jewish, is an inevitable conjecture. When St Paul (or a successor of St Paul) wrote these well-known words, "speaking to yourselves in psalms and hymns and spiritual songs (spirit-taught odes), singing and making melody in your heart to the Lord" (Eph. v. 19), we need not suppose anything much below the standard of the Odes of Solomon. Just as the lyric outbursts of the Second Isaiah imply a rich contemporary development of spiritual poetry, so the impassioned tone of passages of the Pauline Epistles permits us to conjecture that the writer was well acquainted with an early Christian poetry, independent both of St John and of St Paul, and yet Johannine and Pauline.

T. K. CHEYNE.

OXFORD.

Faith and its Psychology.—By William Ralph Inge, Lady Margaret Professor of Divinity at Cambridge.—Duckworth & Co., 1909.

It may be well to quote the opening words of the preface to this volume. Its main objects, Professor Inge says, "are threefold. Firstly, to vindicate for religious Faith its true dignity as a normal and healthy part of human nature. Next, to insist that Faith demands the actual reality of its objects, and can never be content with a God who is only an ideal. Lastly, to show in detail how most of the errors and defects in religious belief have been due to a tendency to arrest the development of Faith prematurely, by annexing it to some one faculty to the exclusion of others, or by resting on given authority." He does not think that we can "hope to understand or co-ordinate all the highest experiences of the human spirit." And, in fact, we are prepared to expect no close synthesis upon a large scale, but rather a preparatory and critical work, tending to correct or break up premature syntheses and arrestive and one-sided developments. This is indeed a most important task, though we cannot quite admit that philosophy, as such, can long afford to be so modest. By its very nature

it seeks an absolute centre and an ultimate ground, and therefore at least an implicit comprehensiveness. For, on the other hand, systems, as systems, need not be too much preached by their authors; and when our generation has learnt to take a larger view of the meaning of Truth, we shall be able to recognise the need of a variety of coexisting systems each of which conveys, or may convey, to its author the key which he personally needs to the understanding of Reality.

But meanwhile we owe no small debt to philosophical critics who are not system-builders. Professor Inge is one such. He is not primarily a metaphysician, but has been drawn into metaphysics by his study of Mysticism. And he is guided in his many clear and sound criticisms by the ideal of a really inclusive philosophy—inclusive not merely in the sense that it seeks to explain everything (even Naturalism does that), but in the sense that it seeks to explain away nothing. He will have no tampering with complete and integral personality—feeling, will, and intellect in their indissoluble unity. And he will no more tolerate a ragged and dislocated universe than he will tolerate a one-sided or mechanical psychology.

And therefore Pragmatism, exclusive Intellectualism, and emotional Theism are disallowed. There is a careful balance of the claims of thought and action, being and value, as of truth, beauty, and moral goodness. But of course this balance is the more easily sustained where there is no definite search for a datum. Professor Inge is known to the world as the sympathetic exponent of Mysticism. How far is he really a mystic? He tells us (p. 46) that he adheres to "moderate realism," and holds that "we are in contact with external reality, and that we may trust our faculties when they tell us (as they do with the utmost emphasis) that our knowledge is not merely of our own mental states, but of facts which exist independently of our mental states," but that "this confidence is a matter of reasonable Faith, and can never, from the nature of the case, be anything more." But surely it is reflection, not our faculties themselves, that tells us that, To deny that this writing-paper exists objectively may be—as we agree that it is-false philosophy, but it is not bad eyesight. And surely it is a question of a priori reasoning, not of empirical probability, however strong. Now it is true that Professor Inge is not here dealing directly with religious consciousness; but it may be asked whether philosophic mysticism, if it is to be a starting-point for a coherent philosophy, will not be found to imply a more boldly intuitional theory of ordinary knowledge than is compatible with the "correspondence theory" of Truth to which he leans.

"The primary ground of Faith is a normal and ineradicable feeling.... that behind the world of phenomena there is a world of eternal values, attracting us to itself.... It contains vast implications, which can only be unravelled by the full experience of life, developing our personality along the lines of thought, will, and feeling "(pp. 53-54). It transcends experience, endeavouring to find harmony in apparent discord. The undifferentiated Faith-state requires to be "unravelled, as it were, through will, thought, and appropriate action" (p. 69. The italics are ours). Now this

amounts to saying that Faith is cognitive and possesses an object which, even as such, has attributes and relations which are implicitly experienced before reflection can define them: in other words, religious knowledge proceeds essentially by deduction and experiential verification—the latter because the data for deduction are already ideas and therefore do not lie at the absolute centre of immediacy, but must be purged in it again and again.

Such is the view of Faith and experience to which Dr Inge's exposition so far points. Faith presses ahead of experience; but is it not, after all, experience itself, on its active side, applying its gains to the clearing and cultivating of waste land, and thereby increasing those gains? But if so, Dr Inge seems to place the religious consciousness in rather too tight a position. Feeling in itself is dismissed as having no cognitive character, and yet "immediate certainty, which does not rest upon feeling, is little more than a refusal to listen to arguments on the other side" (p. 62). We may agree thoroughly with his remarks as directed against various imperfect explanations of religious knowledge; but we should like to know exactly in what sense Faith "unravels" itself. Intuitionism, of course, is in the wrong when it refuses "to admit the necessity of an act of Faith." But does not Faith start from intuitions and lead to higher intuitions? Are we to choose between feeling which is a mere reflection of ideas already given and a baldly assertive Intuitionism?

Professor Inge's Mysticism, whether or no he has made the best philosophical use of it, is in itself quite decided. But before Mysticism can really come to its rights it must develop its speculative resources. It must not be simply, as with Plotinus, the pinnacle of a rational system, tapering off into ecstasy. Now it would seem that Dr Inge's treatment of the ontological and cosmological arguments rather illustrates this difficulty of finding a key to the essential correlation of mystical insight and speculative thought. In the former case he prefers the quasi-empirical modification: "The real force of the ontological argument lies in the reasonable and stubbornly confident claim of the human spirit to be in some sort of contact with the highest reality. The very conception of objective truth is most reasonably accounted for by supposing it to be a revelation from Him who is the Truth" (p. 182). Surely there is a mystic implication in the ontological argument, when purged of scholasticism, which Dr Inge might advantageously have used.

It is well indeed to take one's stand on "the whole personality become self-conscious and self-directing, with a full realisation of grounds of will and feeling" (p. 197). But still we want to know how personality functions in the sphere of basal knowledge. For, after all, intelligence is included in personality, and cannot, even in its widest scope, be reduced to it. The problem is how to focus consciousness so that will and emotion receive their full due. For the result must be in terms of consciousness.

But it would not be fair to press these points in criticism of a work which does not profess to set forth an articulated philosophy of Faith. Only it is well to see in what direction the student should try and work his

way if he is convinced by Dr Inge's main arguments and yet desires to find a somewhat more definite point of departure, with the valuable assistance the author himself gives. We find, further, in this book a clear and cogent treatment of the subject of Authority in Religion, in which it is maintained that "external authority, in whatever form, cannot be a primary ground of Faith, and that the authority of Jesus Christ, for the well-instructed Christian, is not external, but is a voice which speaks within us as well as to us." It is this, assuredly, not bare Rationalism, that must supersede the worship of the letter.

In dealing with the æsthetic ground of Faith, beauty is maintained to be an end in itself, co-ordinate with truth and moral goodness. And yet the author is careful to guard against the idea that art can ever afford to lose touch with science and morality. And "there seems to be a mysterious law, that to aim directly at a thing is not the way to hit it." There is a careful balance here, but we are not sure that there is perfect adjustment of the two sides. But all in sympathy with Mysticism should heartily assent to his adoption of Plotinus' elevated and profound view of

art as a return to creative principles.

This work is full of matter for thought: it has only been possible, of course, to touch on a few salient points. It is an excellent introduction to the subject, the more so because it does not offer a completed theory. The writer encourages no short cuts and facile solutions: clear and concrete, he yet pays no court to the "man in the street"; and he does not make a fetish of democracy.

A. R. WHATELY.

LOWESTOFT.

The Common Sense of Political Economy.—By Philip H. Wicksteed.—Macmillan & Co., 1910. xi+702.

MR WICKSTEED has written an interesting and a notable volume, of which one could make a splendid book by the application of scissors and paste, and the reduction of its 700 pages to 200. As it is, its real value may easily be obscured, partly on account of the author's extraordinary prolixity, and partly through his attempt to address two quite distinct audiences at the same time. The value of the work lies, first, in its containing a fresh and original investigation into what may be termed the philosophy of Political Economy, into its underlying assumptions, and into the human psychology which it presupposes; and secondly, in its somewhat novel presentation of the manner in which the leading conclusions of the marginal theory of Economics can be arranged and expounded. All this can only be properly appreciated by a reader who is already acquainted with the orthodox treatment of these topics. For, although Mr Wicksteed seldom cites an author by name, or explains exactly what view he is criticising, a great deal of his work is essentially critical, and would prove tedious and confusing to the general reader. But there are long passages, on the other hand, whose minute detail of explanation, and deliberate repetition, are evidently intended to force acquiescence from the class—whom all economists know—who by some natural malformation of the mind doubt or cannot understand certain elementary points which inevitably crop up in any exposition of the marginal doctrine. To those who understand these points such elaborate explanation is tedious, and those who do not are unlikely to have sufficient power of mind to apprehend such long-drawn-out and fine-spun arguments. It would be dull to give instances. This is a fault of which every reader must necessarily become conscious. But, in spite of it, the present reviewer has persevered, and has been rewarded. To a reader who will skip boldly and fortunately, this book will give a better introduction to the philosophy of the modern economics than any other.

Political economy is concerned, Mr Wicksteed maintains, not with man under the influence of certain supposed economic motives, but with man, whatever his motives, when he stands in certain economic relations. Such relations are entered into for all kinds of reasons. But because they are not necessarily egoistic, we must not fly to the opposite extreme and suppose that economic forces have any inherent tendency to ally themselves with any ideal system of distributive justice. It is characteristic of an economic relation that each party enters into it in furtherance of his own purposes, not those of the other party to it. "Business" is a vast network of organisations by which we can direct our resources and powers to the accomplishment of our purposes through the assistance of others who are relatively indifferent to our purposes, but are (like us) keenly interested in their own. The business man, Mr Wicksteed says, "wants to make a good bargain or do a good piece of business, and he is directly thinking of nothing else. All manner of considerations of loyalty, of humanity, of reputation, and so forth are no doubt present to his mind . . . and they may easily be precipitated and emerge into consciousness at any moment of vacillation and reflection; but in making his bargain the business man is not usually thinking of these things. . . . Neither is he thinking of the ultimate purpose to which he will apply the resources that he gains. He is not thinking either of missions to the heathen, or of famine funds, or of his pew rent, or of his political association. But neither is he thinking of his wife and family, nor yet of himself. . . . He is exactly in the position of a man who is playing a game of chess or cricket. He is considering nothing except his game. It would be absurd to call a cricketer selfish for protecting his wicket. . . . The fact is that he has no conscious motive whatever, and is wholly intent on the complex feat of taking the ball. If you want to know whether he is selfish or unselfish, you must consider the whole organisation of his life, the place which chessplaying or cricket takes in it, and the alternatives which they open or close At the moment the categories of egoism and altruism are irrelevant."

The administration of resources in which man is engaged in his economic relations is directed towards obtaining as much as possible of those things which are *relatively* high in his scale of preferences. Those exchangeable objects which, in Mr Wicksteed's phrase, enter into the

"circle of exchange," as opposed to personal qualities which do not enter into it at all, and actual enjoyments which only enter into it indirectly, have different relative positions on the scales of preference of different individuals. If one is relatively higher for one party, and another for the other, exchanges will take place which are beneficial to both, until the diminishing satisfaction derived from each unit which, by an almost universal psychological law, accompanies increasing quantity, has brought the preferences for further units of each to the same relative position. In this general way, with abundance of illustration and explanation, Mr Wicksteed arrives at the fundamental theorems of the marginal doctrine of economics, showing carefully upon what psychological assumptions it depends, and how far it is necessary, in fact, to admit exceptions.

On the basis of these he develops the theory of value, wages, rent, and interest on a uniform scheme, showing that in each case an exchange is involved, and that the nature of all these exchanges and the point to which they are carried depend upon ultimate identity of the relative marginal efficiency in the two objects of exchange to the two parties. He even goes so far as to deny any theoretical difference between the positions of buyer and seller, by supposing that the place of the goods in the seller's scale of preferences is determined by his reserve price. It naturally follows from this that he allows cost of production a very subsidiary place in the determination of value, and derives what influence it does possess from its effect on the seller's reserve price.

The economist will see that there is nothing novel in the theory which underlies Mr Wicksteed's exposition. But the thoroughness and uniformity with which his principles are carried out, and the constant appeal to psychological fact, make the emphasis he gives to the various elements somewhat different from that which they receive in such a book as Dr Marshall's. Dr Marshall has held the balance very evenly between the marginal school and earlier economic doctrine. Mr Wicksteed evidently believes that the time has come to break away from Ricardian traditions, and seeks to show that there is a far greater unity in economic theory and a far closer dependence upon the ultimate facts of human psychology when it is expounded with the emphasis he gives. The question is primarily one of exposition-more so, perhaps, than Mr Wicksteed sometimes realises-but it is not for that reason the less important. To anyone who has ever felt doubts as to whether the accepted body of economic doctrine is now taught and written in the most satisfactory form, Mr Wicksteed's Book i. must prove highly stimulating.

Book ii., in which Mr Wicksteed endeavours to lay the foundations of the diagrammatic method, is, in spite of several interesting passages, much less satisfactory. He is often unnecessarily polemical when his criticism amounts to a restatement, and not, as he often seems to suppose, to a contradiction of the orthodox doctrine; and it is a great exaggeration to say, even roughly, that "everything we read in economic works as to the pure theory of distribution, whether it refers to wages, interest, rent, or profit, is either false when asserted of the category under discussion, or else true of all the others as well." Book ii. concludes with a rather superficial chapter on Money and Banking; and the Quantity Law is disposed of by quoting it, from an unnamed "treatise on currency," in a form which would not be accepted by any of its modern defenders.

In Book iii. a number of current questions of practical importance are briefly dealt with in a manner which is, in almost every case, interesting and suggestive. Mr Wicksteed's remarks on Tariffs and Unemployment, and on Socialism, and his analysis of the economic effect of subscribing a

guinea to an Indian Famine Fund, are quite admirable.

It is worth while, in conclusion, to call attention to Mr Wicksteed's discussion, in chapter viii. of Book i. and elsewhere, of what he calls the microbe of the disease of civilisation, and to which he justly attributes the popularity of many of the fallacies of Protectionism on the one hand, and of Trades Unionism and Socialism on the other. The following quotation will show how well Mr Wicksteed has put it :-

"Every man who lives by supplying any want, dreads anything which tends either to dry up that want or to supply it more easily and abundantly. It is to his interest that scarcity should reign in the very thing which it is his function to make abundant, and that abundance should reign everywhere else. . . . Hence the paradoxical situation that the advance in well-being which we all desire and are all pursuing becomes an object of dread to each one of us in that particular department in which it is his business to promote it. . . . The extinction of any desire on the part of mankind, however vicious and destructive, the abolition of any established practice, however vile, will throw a certain number of men 'out of work'; that is to say, will render the exercise of the faculty upon which they depend for the supply of all their wants economically impotent. And, in like manner, the more abundant supply of any desired thing, however wholesome the need which it meets, and however great the gain to the well-being of society in general which it secures, may plunge some members of the social organism into penury. . . . Hence the 'humpof-labour' way of looking at things that so largely pervades working-class economic theories. 'What the British workman wants is more work'; that is to say, 'I desire that men should be, and should be kept, in relatively keen want of what I and my companions can give them. If anyone else supplies them, he is a traitor or a sneak. He has stolen or filched away what is mine. He has taken "my work," i.e. he has made that abundant which I have an interest in keeping scarce."

The reviewer must take leave of this work with mixed feelings. It is, as it stands, well worth studying; but he cannot help feeling how much better Mr Wicksteed, with his attractive style of writing, and with so much to say that is worth saying, might, by judicious omission, have

made it.

Histoire du Dogme des la Trinité des Origines a Saint Augustin. Tome Ier: Les Origines.—By Jules Lebreton, Professor of the History of Christian Origins at the Catholic Institute of Paris.—Paris: Gabriel Beauchesne et Cie.—Pp. 569.

FATHER LEBRETON has made an important contribution to orthodox theology. Adequate in scholarship, clear in thought, temperate in judgment, his work is better than anything we have in English of a similar kind. The book is in three parts: the first is devoted to "le milieu hellénique," and contains an exceedingly clear review of the religious conceptions of the Greeco-Roman world. Especially noteworthy are the account of the philosophical development from the monism of the early Stoics to the dualism of Plutarch, and the chapter on the Logos. Father Lebreton thinks that Plutarch's dualism can be adequately accounted for from Greek sources without supposing any late oriental influences. His chapter on the Logos contains interesting paragraphs on the cult of Hermes and the identification of Hermes with the Logos and with the Egyptian Thôt, "who, according to the legend, produced the world by the sole power of his word." The second part of the book is devoted to "la préparation Juive." Here we have a review of the relevant conceptions of Old Testament theology and Palestinian Judaism, followed by a long chapter on Alexandrian Judaism,-a chapter which is devoted chiefly to an excellent account of Philo. One notices in passing that Father Lebreton retains the common translation of Deut. vi. 4, without mentioning the alternative translation for which much is to be said-" Hear, O Israel, Jehovah is our God, Jehovah alone." The third part of the book deals with New Testament theology, and in this part the author very properly writes as a historian careful to trace the development of a doctrine, rather than as a theologian anxious to discover the rule of faith (pp. i, ii).

What is the origin of the doctrine of the Trinity? Our author shows clearly that the doctrine has unmistakable verbal connections with certain conceptions found in Hellenic and Jewish thought, but he does not think that those connections are really genetic. According to him, the New Testament doctrine has its primary source in the person of Jesus Christ. It was created, not by an inference from or a synthesis of earlier conceptions, but primarily by what Ritschlians would call the "impression" of Jesus upon the hearts and minds of the first believers. For them, Jesus Christ was not merely a teacher, not merely the centre of a new development of doctrine. He was primarily a new object of faith, and His person was the starting-point of the Christian development. One or two relevant passages may be quoted.

"We have found in the Old Testament many traits which we find once more in the doctrine of the Trinity: the belief in the fatherhood of God, and in the sanctifying action of His Spirit, the conception of His Wisdom (and secondarily of His Word), as of a being distinct from Him and sufficiently clearly personified, the affirmation of the transcendence of the Messiah. Can one say that, on the eve of Christianity, all these doctrines had already re-acted one upon the other, and tended to organise themselves into a coherent whole? Or is it necessary to recognise that these several elements remained dispersed—each living its own proper life and developing independently of the others? It seems to me that the second conception is nearest the facts. I do not see that the doctrine of the Spirit developed side by side with that of Wisdom, or that the Wisdom-theology had enriched Messianism and combined with it. All these traits were presently to combine in the unity of one belief, but only after they had become apparent to us in the unity of one person" (pp. 124–125).

"All these approximations explain perhaps the term employed, but not the new signification with which it is charged. The Philonian Logos was never conceived as a person; he was called 'God' and 'secondary God' only very rarely, and (as Philo himself said) 'by abuse.' He is only an idea of God, only a support of the world, only (in a word) an intermediate being. By him, God could create a material world without declension; in him men, who could not attain unto the inaccessible God, could at least contemplate an image of God. The Word of St John is no longer such an one. He is God—the whole gospel is written only to show this. His power, His knowledge, His holiness, His action are identical with those of God. He is the revelation of the Father: whoever beholds Him will not see any higher term. In seeing Him, one sees the Father.

"If one asks why Christian theology has repudiated all the lower categories, why its Word (like its Messiah) is found lifted to equality with God, history has only one reply—faith in Jesus could not stop short of this" (pp. xviii, xix).

Clearly, Father Lebreton believes that the affirmations of this "faith in Jesus" are veridical. They faithfully describe, they do not mythologically transform, the Person who is their object.

Our author does not think it necessary for his purpose to discuss "all the questions of authenticity and historicity" which have been raised concerning the books of the New Testament. He is content to accept those books as "documents which express the common faith of the Primitive Church" (209, footnote). One may doubt whether this position can be a final one. Many tell us that those documents are the result of developmental processes which we can more or less clearly trace, and that, behind what our author calls "the common faith of the Primitive Church," there is another and different faith. If this were proven, Father Lebreton's appeal to the person of Jesus Christ would (to say the least) have to be re-stated.

I have space to notice only a few of the interesting points with which Father Lebreton's book abounds.

Son of God.—(1) "A good many liberal exegetes, when they find in the gospel the name 'Son of God' applied to Jesus, regard it as a mere equivalent of the word 'Messiah,' and suppose that that meaning was the ordinary and traditional meaning of the name. It was nothing of the sort. One finds, it is true, certain very rare texts in which Jehovah calls

the Messiah His Son, but neither in the Old Testament nor in the apocryphal books does one find the title 'Son of God' applied by the writer to

the Messiah" (pp. 121).

(2) Father Lebreton tells us that "the word 'son' in Aramaic, as in Hebrew, is susceptible of very different interpretations, which are far removed from the idea of filiation" (p. 246). Is this quite adequate? If we presuppose an Aramaic original for the term "Son of God," we may not isolate the word "Son"; and if we take the Aramaic locution as a whole, it seems clear that it would primarly express identity of nature with God, and not generation by God. When Father Lebreton describes "the mystery of the Son of God" as the "luminous centre" of faith (p. xxv), even a very friendly critic may feel that there is some danger of a false emphasis—of a misleading emphasis—on "Son."

Genesis i. 26.—Our author quotes the comment of Father Lagrange: "Man is created in the image of God. The author insists so much upon this character that we cannot suppose that the Creator talked with the angels,—man is not created in the image of the angels. God speaks to Himself. If He employs the plural, this presupposes that there is in Him such a plenitude of being that He can deliberate with Himself as several persons deliberate with one another. The mystery of the Holy Trinity is not expressly indicated, but it gives the best explanation of this expression" (p. 445). Father Lebreton does not make this comment his own, but he says: "This interpretation is, I believe, the one most conformable to the thought of the Fathers." That may be, and yet one would desiderate some notice of the interpretation which sees in this text a survival from early Semitic polytheism.

The ignorance of the Day of Judgment.—Father Lebreton gives a valuable summary of patristic and mediæval interpretations. This occupies several pages, and includes an important note on the heresy of the Agnoëtæ. His own conclusion is as follows:—

"In the Divine Word knowledge is always perfect and infinite, and the Incarnation does not veil it. On the other hand, the human soul of Christ has from His divinity an intuition as immediate and perfect as a human soul can possess. The Divine revelations were not measured out to it as they were to the prophets: it possesses them all dans leur source plénière. Under these conditions it is clear that Christ could not be ignorant by a necessity of His nature, and (as a matter of fact) several passages in the gospels show that He possessed a superhuman knowledge. On the other hand, in relation to certain objects, ignorance can be, in His humanity, the result of a voluntary renunciation, and such the Fathers (whose doctrine we here defend) have understood it to be" (p. 469). Christ, then, was voluntarily ignorant of certain matters. But did His voluntary ignorance permit the presence of error? How does Father Lebreton's conclusion affect the well-known argument of Christus Comprobator?

Baptism in the Triune Name.—In the Hibbert Journal for October 1902 Mr Conybeare argues that the Trinitarian formula of baptism is

later than the "Eusebian" formula-"in my name." Father Lebreton gives a very careful summary of the evidence, and reaches these conclusions:-

"The form which is called 'Eusebian,' (1) is not found in any manuscript or version; (2) is totally unknown to the controversialists of the fourth century; (3) does not exclude, in Eusebius himself, the Trinitarian form, and seems due to a textual corruption; (4) is not found in any of the texts of the first three centuries, while the Trinitarian form is often found in them" (p. 488).

Philo's doctrine of the Logos and the doctrine of the Son in the Epistle to the Hebrews.—"The Christology of the Epistle to the Colossians and that of the Epistle to the Hebrews approaches the Philonic philosophy in two notable points:—it applies exemplarism to the analysis of the relations which unite the Father and the Son; it sees in the Son Him by whom

God has created and preserves the world."

This approximation cannot be explained by a direct dependence. One could not, by such a hypothesis, account for the difference between the two vocabularies. One cannot reasonably explain this approximation by an influence of Philonism upon St Paul, or upon the author of the Epistle to the Hebrews. To explain it in this way would be to ignore the constant and radical opposition between the two conceptions. On the one hand we have a metaphysical or mythological being—the idea of God, the model and support of the world. On the other hand we have the Son, who became incarnate to ransom us by the sacrifice of the Cross.

These objections are decisive only if one considers Philonism in its integrity and as a system. If, on the contrary, one isolates the conceptions and tendencies which find expression in Philonism, it will be recognised without difficulty that several of the elements in Philonism-for instance, exemplarism or allegorism-were diffused throughout all hellenistic Judaism, and had some influence on Pauline theology (pp. 505-6).

The doctrine of the Logos in Philo and St John .- Father Lebreton gives us a long note directed to show that essential differences separate the Philonic from the Johannine conception of the Logos. The following extract will give some idea of his conclusions :-

"(7) The personality of the Logos.—Here the opposition is yet more conspicuous. For Philo, the Logos is not a person but a force, an idea, a metaphysical or mythological being. For St John, the Word is Jesus Christ -that man whose discourses he reports, whose life and death he recounts.

"All historians are to-day unanimous in recognising this difference, but to appreciate it fully it is necessary to notice that it is the personal recollection of Christ which has determined the doctrine. If the theology of the Logos appears so profoundly transformed in St John, it is because the person of Jesus (to which it has been applied) has compelled this transformation of it. It is in order not to betray the reality which is represented that the Word is conceived, not as an instrument, but as a Creator; not as an imperfect image of the Father, but as His complete revelation; not as an intermediate being, but as a God" (p. 521).

The Three Heavenly Witnesses.—Here, again, we have a valuable summary of the evidence. Father Lebreton quotes the Tridentine decree which anathematises those who "libros ipsos integros cum omnibus suis partibus, prout in Ecclesia catholica legi consucuerunt, et in ueteri uulgata Latina editione habentur, pro sacris et canonicis non susceperit." He quotes also the reply given by the Holy office in 1897—a reply which rejects the suggestion that the authenticity of this particular text can safely be denied or doubted. He appears to think that the decree is irrelevant, and the reply obsolete or obsolescent. His own conclusions are given in the following sentences:—

"(1) The verse of the three heavenly witnesses is wanting in all the oriental versions. (2) It did not belong to the original text, and found its way into the Greek text only under Latin influence. (3) It is not found either in the old Latin version or in the primitive text of the Vulgate. (4) It appears for the first time in Spain in the fourth century, and it is from Spain that it spread throughout the Latin world. (5) It is probable that it owes its origin to a mystical interpretation of

verse 8, such as we find in St Cyprian, St Augustine, and others."

ARTHUR BOUTWOOD.

LONDON.

Theories of Knowledge: Absolutism, Pragmatism, Realism.—By Leslie J. Walker, S.J., M.A. [Stonyhurst Philosophical Series].—London: Longmans, Green & Co., 1910.

In this interesting work Mr Walker critically examines the theories of knowledge peculiar to Absolutism and Pragmatism, and contrasts their leading features with the Realism of Aristotle and Aquinas. He maintains that these three contain amongst them the only possible solutions of the problem of knowledge, and that that Realism is a higher synthesis which, while eliminating what is false, retains what is true, and reunites it in a system of truth that is fuller and more significant than the systems to which it is opposed. Mr Walker has an extensive knowledge of the modern expositions of Absolutism and Pragmatism in English and in German and French, and displays considerable skill in bringing out salient points of agreement in treatments of these subjects which are externally very diverse. Nor does he ignore their origin in the critical philosophy of Kant, but endeavours to show that Absolutism has evolved from the intellectualism of the First Critique, Pragmatism from the practical philosophy of the Second, and that both, for this reason, are one-sided and incomplete.

The book falls naturally into three divisions, each of which treats of one aspect of the threefold problem of cognition. The first deals with the psychological analysis of the processes by which knowledge is acquired; the second, with the metaphysical conditions of knowledge; and the third, with its epistemological value. I will limit this notice to the more con-

structive part of the book, and try to indicate its bearing by reference to one or two criticisms of the opposing theories.

Realism—says Mr Walker—adopts the standpoint of common-sense. Both the thinking of the plain man and that of the philosopher is based on experience and is governed by the same laws. Common-sense beliefs should therefore be systematised, and not explained away. Now the one belief that common-sense can by no means avoid is the belief in a world of real objects independent of each other and of the thinking self, and psychological analysis of the data of experience confirms the truth of this In perception and ideation the real qualities of external objects reveal themselves. The activity of the mind in its purposive selection, and analysis and synthesis of sense data, does not affect the "content," which is always determined by the nature of the object itself. The psychological basis of Absolutism and Pragmatism are incompatible with the existence of real objects. The tendency of both is to regard the object of knowledge as sentient experience; and further, while Absolutism treats of knowledge in general, and fails to explain the human point of view, Pragmatism generalises the concept of purpose beyond the limits within which it is applicable, regarding it as affecting the "content" as well as the "intent" of thought.

As regards the metaphysical conditions of cognition, the realist, on the one hand, assumes the existence of an external world, consisting of a plurality of independent finite substances, each with distinct individuality, and of a God external to these, by reference to whom their creation, conservation, and systematic arrangement are explained. And on the other hand, the realist assumes the existence of a plurality of finite subjects between which and the external world there is constant interaction by means of sensation and ideas; sensation being id quo percipitur and ideas id quo intelligitur. At the same time finite substances are not entirely passive in their changes, but the character of the change in any substance is partly determined by its own nature as well as by the nature of the external object. From this it follows that truth must consist in the correspondence of ideas or judgments and things. Lastly, in determining the epistemological value of cognition, the problem for the realist is to discover when thought has been determined by the object and when it has not; and since he sets out by trusting the ordinary faculties of cognition, he is concerned with criteria of error and not criteria of truth. Error can generally be avoided by ascertaining whether the conditions under which sense impressions are received are normal, and whether purpose has been prevented from interfering with the content of thought. According to Realism, then, knowledge of objects is possible, whereas Absolutism sets up an ideal of truth which is of necessity unattainable by the human mind, while Pragmatism regards truth as infected with the subjectivity of human needs.

It seems to me, however, that Mr Walker's statement of his own position is somewhat dogmatic, and that there is too little discussion of radical difficulties. I will content myself with noting one or two

points. And first as to the assumption of a plurality of independent finite substances. Mr Walker seems anxious to retain the independence of finite substances inter se, in order to establish their individuality, but his own theory hardly justifies the assumption. Finite things form a system governed by universal laws; a living organism is a single substance which is composed of a number of less complex substances whose forms are for the time being dormant; in growth the quantity of "material" in some finite thing is increased by importation from without; and finite substances, in interacting, are active as well as passive. It would appear, therefore, that no finite substance can attain complete development per se, and is not this what is generally understood by its dependence? Whilst agreeing with Mr Walker that the so-called external thing possesses agreeing with Mr Walker that the so-called external thing possesses objectivity, I should maintain that it only finds its true being in its presentation to mind, and, vice versa, that mind only finds its true being in apprehending the objective world. In independence on each other they would not possess the necessary qualities which are revealed in their union. Secondly, I fail to understand why Mr Walker fears that finite things would lose their individuality by being intimately united with the Absolute Reality. On account of this apprehension, he prefers to regard the world as a machine rather than as an organism. But have not the members of a living organism a more definite character than the parts of a machine? And, although a finite mind depends for its very being upon its relation to other finite minds and to the world of objects, does not its own individuality increase as this relation becomes more intimate? Surely, the way to let slip the individuality of a finite mind is to conceive it as severed from other minds and from things. Unless the Infinite Reality is to be abstract and meaningless it must be capable of diverse expression, i.e. admit of individuality in its parts. Mr Walker seems to imply that the more individual the parts the less fundamental the unity of the whole, and vice versa; but the contrary would rather seem to be the case. Finally, why should truth for the Absolutist be of no value because absolute truth is unattainable? The realist only tries to avoid this difficulty by the distinction between adequate and valid knowledge. Knowledge of external things is valid whenever the thing reveals to the mind its own nature, but since it can never reveal this fully such knowledge is not adequate. True but inadequate knowledge can become more adequate, but such growth in knowledge is rather by additions from without than by development from within. Is this, however, an accurate description of the facts? Consider such a concept as "Beauty." Does it not develop in the individual and in the race, and does not such development take place by means of internal growth rather than by external additions? It is true that with development the first rudimentary conception becomes transformed, and that even the highest conception of which the finite mind is capable is subject to further modifications; yet it is not on this account valueless, nor does it lead to scepticism. Provided we have some criterion of degrees of truth, the theory is as satisfactory as

that of the realist, and—what is more important—is a more accurate description of experience.

GEO. H. LANGLEY.

READING.

Unconscious Memory.—By Samuel Butler. London: A. C. Fifield, 1910.—Pp. xxxv+186.

It is nearly thirty years since the first edition of *Unconscious Memory* appeared, yet the problem of which it mainly treats is as much to the front to-day as it was then. Mr Fifield's reissue is therefore very welcome—the more so as Butler's views, after temporary eclipse, are gaining ground among scientific men of philosophical habit of mind. Francis Darwin's eulogy of Butler, in his presidential address to the British Association in 1908, was a significant and well-deserved tribute.

Charles Darwin, in explaining the origin of species, gave the principal place to Natural Selection: variations which were serviceable in the struggle for existence were preserved, while organisms which developed disadvantageous variations were weeded out. Butler, laying less stress on natural selection, insisted on purposiveness within the organism. If an organism felt a need, it tended to grow an organ which would satisfy the want; if the giraffe has a long neck, it is largely because it saw that a long neck was desirable, and tried to have a long neck,—and not chiefly because the short-necked ones were weeded out by natural selection. In this Butler follows Lamarck and Erasmus Darwin. He believes in an evolution that is teleological from within.

But how are variations and tendencies preserved? Here comes in his "unconscious memory," which also explains instinct. Each individual is not a new and original being. It—or part of it—has existed already in the bodies of its parents; and those cells which so existed bring down their memories of what they did and what they wanted to do. The perfect action of pecking at grain in a newly-hatched chicken is due to its having repeatedly done it before in its parents. In short, heredity is memory.

The theory has far-reaching consequences. It involves the attribution of some sort of psychical life, not only to cells, but even—as with Haeckel—to molecules and atoms. And, indeed, if we speak of chemical affinity, this attribution is implied. In a word, Butler's Weltanschauung is a panpsychism—a manifestation of spirit through matter—such as is more and more becoming the philosophical creed of the twentieth-century man of science.

Professor Marcus Hartog supplies a useful introduction, sympathetic, yet discriminating. For Butler, though one of the greatest writers of the nineteenth century—as his friend G. Bernard Shaw has said—was nevertheless an amateur in biology, and is not to be followed blindly. His philosophy is better than his science. And his literary quality—his artistry as writer—is perhaps better than either.

J. ARTHUR HILL.

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THE

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THEOLOGY AND THE SUBCONSCIOUS.

THE RIGHT REV. C. F. D'ARCY, D.D., Bishop of Ossory.

The psychology of religious experience is now recognised as a branch of study eminently worthy of the attention of philosophical and scientific minds. We owe this excellent result in the main to the late William James of Harvard. His Varieties of Religious Experience may truly be said to have given a new direction to the investigations of the psychologist, and to have revealed in a new way to the world the importance of religion as a fact, quite apart from the truth of the ideas which it involves.

Out of the discussion which has thus arisen there has emerged a new problem for theology. The study of morbid and abnormal mental conditions, as pursued on the Continent, had directed attention to the existence of elements in our psychical constitution which, in some sense, must be regarded as outside consciousness. They were termed subconscious, or, more doubtfully, subliminal, as being below the threshold of our conscious life. James found that this kind of mental fact is very deeply involved in religious experience.

It was undoubtedly the conjunction of these two influences which brought the whole subject into prominence, and made the existence of the subconscious appear to be a new dis-

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covery. Yet it is not new. German and French psychologists in the earlier years of the nineteenth century had investigated it to some extent, and more than fifty years ago Sir William Hamilton was in the habit of discussing it in his lectures under the name of Latent Mental Modifications.

Professor Sanday, in a recent work, has applied the idea to the central problem of Christian Theology in a way which seems to render a thoroughgoing discussion of it an imperative necessity at the present time. The weight of his opinion is so great and the question is so important that those who feel that there is danger in a hasty acceptance of the doctrine he propounds may well ask for a careful consideration of its psychological basis. Already from pulpit and platform may be heard the proclamation of this new theory, as though it were the solution of all our problems. True it is, indeed, that Dr Sanday presents his view as a tentative theology. His characteristic modesty and reserve are apparent in his expression of it. But his doctrine is so striking in itself, and so opportune in the moment of its appearance, that its persuasiveness may easily carry his readers further than he intended.

Dr Sanday sums up his doctrine in two propositions. He holds that, first, "the proper seat or locus of all divine indwelling, or divine action upon the human soul, is the subliminal consciousness"; and secondly, that "the same, or the corresponding subliminal consciousness, is the proper seat or locus of the Deity of the Incarnate Christ." These propositions arise out of the discussion of the nature of the subliminal. "The subliminal region is, as it were, divided into zones; and in proportion as we go down deeper through these zones, our power of describing and understanding what goes on there diminishes; the processes become more complex and more remote from common experience" (p. 156). Dr Sanday describes the lower regions of the subconscious as far fuller, richer, and more precious in their contents than the upper.

¹ Christologies Ancient and Modern. Clarendon Press, 1910.

The "surface impressions are one thing; the deeper storage of thoughts and emotions, and the deposits of past thought and emotion, are another." "The deposits left by vital experience do not lie together passively side by side, like so many dead bales of cotton or wool, but there is a constant play, as it were, of electricity passing and repassing between them. In this way are formed all the deeper and more permanent constituents of character and motive. And it is in these same subterranean regions, and by the same vitally reciprocating action, that whatever there is of divine in the soul of man passes into the roots of his being" (p. 157). Pursuing this line of thought, Dr Sanday compares our ordinary impulses to the movements of a needle on a dial, indications of the variations of the moral character which is out of sight, "down in the lowest depths of personality." Further on, he introduces another image, and one which evidently seems to him more truly expressive of the relation of the subconscious depths to the superficial consciousness. According to this, the human consciousness is like the "narrow neck" of a vessel. narrow opening is covered with a porous material, through which all that comes up from the depths of human nature has to pass if it is to enter our consciousness. "The process is like that of filtering."

Again, "the narrow-necked vessel has an opening at the bottom which is not stopped by any sponge. Through it there are incomings and outgoings which stretch away into infinity, and, in fact, proceed from, and are, God Himself."

These considerations lead to the second proposition mentioned above: that the subliminal is the proper seat or locus of the Deity of the Incarnate Christ. Instead of drawing, as it were, a vertical line between the divine and the human in Christ, Dr Sanday would, as he expresses it, draw a horizontal line.

There can be no question as to the extraordinary suggestiveness of this contribution to Christian theology. It opens up an immense field of speculation, and creates a belief that the progress of psychology may have the result of placing stores of material hitherto unsuspected in the hands of the theologian. If this be true, there is all the more reason why the speculation should receive as careful an examination as possible.

It seems to be a cardinal principle in Dr Sanday's view of the subconscious that it is the better or nobler part of our mental constitution. Is this the case? The answer to this question must depend upon a careful examination of the evidence.

The main difficulty about the examination of the evidence is, that when elements from the subconscious enter consciousness, and so become open to our observation, they have, for all we can tell, changed their character. Every student of philosophy knows that the conscious mind is the greatest of magicians. It impresses a character upon everything which it apprehends. As the musician plays upon the organ and produces wonderful harmonies which come to him as revelations from another world, surprising him with their strange beauty, so, it may be, the conscious mind plays upon a mechanism which is as alien to it as sound is to organ-pipes, and produces results which astonish with their unexpected fulness and richness.

This consideration must ever be kept in view, but it does not dispose of the problem. It is certainly true that elements enter consciousness which seem to possess a spontaneity of their own, independently of the mind which knows them.

Let anyone observe what goes on in his own mind when the conscious directing activity of the ego is relaxed. He will become aware of a stream of images, feelings, impulses passing through his mind in a way which he inevitably represents to himself as somewhat below the surface.

These elements are always more or less chaotic, unorganised, and often silly. Sometimes there is a senseless repetition of a few vague impressions, a phrase, or a line of doggerel, or a popular tune. We all know that such things at times

obtain a strong hold upon the mind, and force themselves into consciousness whenever the relaxation of the will gives them an opportunity. Also, there are conditions in which these subconscious elements find expression by means of the organs of speech and motion, while the subject of them is wholly unaware of the fact. As an angry or self-absorbed man will talk aloud to himself, as we say, or walk about, and be wholly unconscious of his action.

Here, it is obvious, we have a mental activity which is closely related to dreaming. Yet it would appear that the images in dreams are at once more remote from the activities of the waking life and more organised than this subconscious stream which flows beneath our ordinary consciousness.

Now it is surely clear that a subconsciousness of the sort which has just been described is not a nobler or better form of life than the man's ordinary conscious activity. On the contrary, it is only so much raw material, some of it good and some of it bad, and it is worthless unless the conscious will take it in hand and completely subordinate it to the purposes of life. For this subconsciousness to gain the upper hand would be "midsummer madness." Indeed some forms of insanity seem to be nothing else than this. Sanity depends on the supremacy of the conscious will

It will, however, be said that we have evidence of subconscious activities far higher in their nature than those which have just been mentioned. And this is perfectly true. One of the best examples is the subconscious solution of problems. A mathematician has been at work upon some problem which has puzzled him. He has turned it over in his mind and examined it as thoroughly as his waking faculties permit. Then he lets it rest. He sleeps upon it, as the phrase goes. And when he returns to the consideration of it, he at once detects the solution. He finds it already solved-or so it seems. There is probably no mathematician or student of science who has not had this experience. The puzzle of the night vanishes in the morning. It has been, somehow or

other, disentangled secretly in the recesses of thought while the man slept.

Or, again, everyone knows that, after a period of hard work or constant practice at some pursuit demanding a high degree of skill, a period of rest will often be followed by a most extraordinary accession of technical ability. The pianist who has been struggling to master the difficulties of some great work, or the golf player who has been vainly trying to perfect his approach-shots, ceases the effort for a few days, and when, at the end of that time, he returns to his task, or his amusement, finds that a new skill seems to have entered his fingers, and that brain, eye, and hand are capable of working together with a certainty which before seemed impossible. The conscious effort needed apparently some subconscious process to complete it.

Such instances as these reveal a class of facts which cannot be disputed, and certainly point to subconscious operations which bring about a nice adjustment of the faculties which the waking conscious effort seems unable to attain. The evidence seems to show that these operations have a necessary part in the economy of man's mental and organic life.

But is there any reason to believe that they are higher in their nature than the conscious processes of reason and will? The evidence surely points the other way. Conscious will is the directing agency. These processes are but useful servants, which obey its dictates to the best of their power. Just as the processes of digestion, the action of the lungs, the circulation of the blood, the nervous system, subserve the life of the organism, so do these hidden mental processes subserve the conscious will. To call them higher because they are hidden, and accomplish results by processes which we do not understand, is surely a mistake. We might as well regard the heart or the stomach as higher than the man.

There are, however, experiences of a deeper kind. Most noteworthy of all are the inspirations of the prophet and the genius. It is these wonderful things which have given the impression that, hidden away in the depths of man's spiritual nature, are powers far higher than those which belong to his conscious life.

There are times when, even to the man who can make no claim to special power, there comes an unexpected and unexplained faculty of creative thought and expression. Such a man, having pondered as deeply as his ability and resources permit, desires to give permanent form to the ideas which have shaped themselves within him. But the fount of imagination seems dry. He feels himself unable to express what he wishes to say. Reluctantly he sits down, pen in hand. Then suddenly the impulse comes. A fresh spring of thought and utterance seems to have been opened within him. Or it is as if some power, far greater, wiser, and of more penetrating insight than himself, used his brain, and even directed the movements of his hand. As the work proceeds, thought springs from thought, imagination gains a new freedom and power, memory is quickened, and stores of material, hitherto unsuspected, are disclosed. Such experiences are well known to every worker in the art of letters, and indeed in every other art. Thus arose the poet's belief in the inspiring muse, and thus came the conviction of many a seer that the word which he spoke was not his own, but a word given him by some power greater and wiser than himself. In the case of the genius, it would seem that the creative artistic effort has the effect of making available resources vastly greater than those which the ordinary man can command.

These are the cases which most of all lend support to the opinion that there are faculties and capacities in the subconscious sphere higher in their nature than those which belong to the conscious life. But a more careful examination will reveal a confusion of thought in the argument. The contents and capacities of the subconscious are here judged from the results which accrue from the union and co-operation of the two departments of mental activity. It will be found that, in general, the aim or creative impulse is given by the conscious

will, and that the materials with which this creative impulse deals are, in the main, supplied from the stores of the subconscious. And it must also be considered that even these materials do not take their place in the whole of the result until they have been transformed by the magic, the unifying and co-ordinating faculty, of consciousness.

It seems, however, to be true that the creative impulse of the conscious will has a power which extends further than the sphere of consciousness. It seems to possess a penetrating quality which enables it to go down into the depths of the subconscious and bring up from thence materials which have been already selected and ordered, and so prepared to take their place in the complexity of the result. That is, the impulse given from consciousness extends further than consciousness itself, and uses processes which consciousness does not understand. Yet, as we have seen, there is here no reason for disputing the supremacy of the conscious. All these processes serve the conscious will. For it they exist. In large part they have been created by its past history. Nor must it be forgotten that the functions of mind and body which underlie our conscious life have come into being in the course of human and organic history, and must be traced to the past experiences of the race. The man of to-day uses with freedom capacities and aptitudes which his remote ancestors acquired by painful effort and close application. The conscious labours of the past created combinations and associations, calculating machines and mental short-cuts of all sorts, and stored them in the brain, in the sense in which music may be said to be stored in the organ, or in the sense in which a machine may be said to be a piece of crystallised intelligence, and the mind of the modern man uses, unconsciously or subconsciously, the methods which were won by the conscious efforts of the past. There is in all these considerations ample testimony to the supremacy of the conscious will.

Further, it will be found that certain phenomena which have come to light in the study of hypnotism and suggestion,

and which at first sight seem to make for a subordination of consciousness, are really an additional proof of its supremacy. When it is suggested to the subject in a hypnotic trance that he should, after a certain time and in certain circumstances, perform a certain action, it is a well-known fact that he will perform that action at the time and in the manner prescribed, although he be in his waking senses, and totally oblivious of what passed while he was under hypnotic influence. It is clear that in this case the suggestion operates subconsciously. Yet it produces its result in the conscious life. It thus affords an admirably conclusive instance of what have been termed "uprushes"—thoughts or impulses which enter the consciousness from beneath, as it were, and are not apparently due to the initiative of the conscious will. We saw above that the directing activity of the will has a power of penetration which enables it to control the processes of the subconscious, and organise them with a view to a result which finally emerges into the clear light of consciousness. The instances supplied by hypnotic experiments at once fall into line when this fact is considered. They simply prove that, in certain abnormal conditions, the direction given by the will of another may work in a similar fashion, subduing and controlling the subconscious processes. But here is only a further testimony to the supremacy of the conscious.

The pathological cases in which, as it seems, distinct and diverse personalities exist in the patient, and employ his nervous system, each of them in accordance with its own character, and as it gains its opportunity, yield no objection to the view just expressed. For each personality, during its period of supremacy, exerts itself as a conscious directing will, and so controls the mental and bodily processes for its own ends. That what is consciousness to one is unconsciousness to another of these personalities does not affect this conclusion.

It is therefore clear that the subconscious and bodily processes of a human being may become the medium through which another personality effects his purposes; but it is surely equally clear that this is not normal. It is, in truth, abnormal and pathological. The man is most truly himself when his conscious reason and will are in full control of his mental and bodily organisation.

There is a consideration which, as it seems to the writer, has been almost wholly ignored by those who have taken in hand to write on the subconscious. Yet it is a consideration of the most vital importance, and one which may have the effect, when its meaning is fully grasped, of overthrowing many of the elaborate structures which have been erected on the observations which form the foundation of the doctrine of the subconscious. The consideration is this: Mental facts of all kinds, feelings, thoughts, impulses, volitions, are not in space. They are in time only. The stream of consciousness, as we call it, has no place, no locus. If the subconscious be mental in its nature, how, then, does it exist?

It is startling to reflect that all the language which psychologists have allowed themselves to use in connection with this subject is daringly, almost outrageously, spatial and material. The same statement may be made of their account of normal psychical experiences. They speak of the *field* of consciousness, of the *centre* and of the *margin*. But there is no field, no centre, no margin in consciousness. These images are all spatial, and, in relation to consciousness, there is nothing so important about them as their utter unfitness to express the facts.

When we come to the subconscious we find this evil greatly aggravated. Myers' term "subliminal" is one of the best illustrations. It calls up at once a whole range of ideas which are essentially spatial. James wrote of "memories, thoughts, feelings which are extra-marginal" or "beyond the field" of consciousness. He tells us that the subconsciousness is a "region" which is "the abode of everything that is latent, and the reservoir of everything that passes unobserved and unrecorded." The statements certainly

¹ Varieties of Religious Experience, p. 233.

² *Ibid.*, p. 483.

correspond to a truth, but they are expressed in language which is essentially misleading. Theological writers carry this sort of imagery much further. Dr Sanday, as we have seen, writes of "zones" and "strata" in the subconscious; of mental states remaining "alive and active" in "subterranean regions"; of the human consciousness as a "narrow neck" with a porous material stretched across it; of the subconsciousness as the "seat or locus of all divine indwelling." It must be granted that it is extremely difficult to avoid language of this kind. It is impossible to purge our representative imagery altogether of spatial elements. But there is nothing so important in psychology as the constant recollection that these elements are the true source of all confusions. The more pictorial the psychologist becomes, the more certain is it that he is following a will-o'-the-wisp.

With this consideration must be coupled another, which is closely related and equally important. Professor Bergson points out—it is an essential part of the development of his doctrine of duration—that mental states permeate one another.¹ They interpenetrate. Things in space are mutually exclusive. No two things can fill the same space at the same time. Impenetrability is one of their essential qualities, or perhaps, more accurately, it is a logical necessity arising out of the very nature of space. To endeavour to get rid of it is to be involved in contradiction.²

States of consciousness are quite otherwise. It is only, as Bergson shows, because we represent them by spatial images that they seem to stand apart from one another. If this be true, it must follow that our consciousness possesses a complexity and a concreteness to which no material thing can offer any parallel. When we try to examine this complexity, our effort inevitably takes the form of disentangling one element after another from the whole, and setting it out

¹ Bergson, Essai sur les données immédiates de la conscience, ch. ii, English trans., Time and Free Will, by Pogson.

² See Bergson, op. cit., ch. ii.

in what seems to us to be a clear light. But this performance means simply the application to it of spatial symbols which completely alter its character. Further, there are elements which, either on account of their nature or their obscurity, cannot be dealt with in this way. The consequence is that, as distinct objects, they evade our grasp, and so seem less real than those which are more capable of symbolical representation.

It would seem, then, that the contents of consciousness are, in truth, inexhaustible. Every change in experience adds a new quality, and all past experiences have in some way contributed to the whole. Thus our conscious experience contains, in addition to elements which are clear and obvious. others which are extremely subtle and evasive, but which can, in fitting circumstances, become the means of wonderful constructions and reconstructions. Here is a clue to the processes of memory, and to its uncertainty. Here also is a consideration which must modify our view of the subconscious. Perhaps we may express it thus: The full concrete reality of man's mental life is his conscious will in operation. But within this are numberless subordinate elements and processes, some of which can be isolated and presented symbolically for inspection, and others which are incapable of such examination. Yet these latter may be, in their own way, as important as the former, and may, in certain circumstances, become the decisive factors. Such is the case in those experiences which are called "uprushes from the subconscious."

It is the symbolical representation of the self as a mathematical point or material atom occupying a central position in the midst of its experiences, instead of, as it truly is, the concrete synthesis of them all, and their containing principle, which has misled thought on this subject. Or, rather, it is this false view of the self, together with the whole range of symbolical spatial representations by means of which we are in the habit of examining our mental states. Professor Bergson has done excellent service to psychology and philosophy by his insistence on this latter point.

The whole tendency of these considerations is towards the establishment of the supremacy of the Conscious Will in the domain of mental fact. No mere element, whether conscious or subconscious, can truly contest this sovereignty. That, in certain abnormal states, other conscious wills can intrude and control certain mental processes, but adds an additional confirmation to this conclusion. And surely this is what every friend of religion should desire. Man is nearest God when he is most truly himself. When he most fully works out his own salvation, then, above all, can it be said that "it is God that worketh" in him.

The analogy of the relation of man to the material order will here, it seems, afford some light. Man deals with the world of force and matter, subordinating it to his own purposes. Yet in no instance does he violate the laws which constitute the order of that world. He gains his ends, accomplishing results which the material order apart from him could never produce, yet always in accordance with the nature of that order. The realisation of man's nature, that is, gives to the lower world a more perfect realisation. It is the mark of man's freedom, and of his transcendence of the material creation. So, we must believe, does God gain His higher ends in and through man, and, in doing so, give to man's nature and capacities their most perfect fulfilment. The more complete the realisation of man's freedom, the more perfectly is the work of God accomplished in him. Here is the rule of sanity for life and for theology.

There is nothing in this doctrine which should lead us to deny the reality of the Divine voice which spoke in the Dæmon of Socrates, or in the voices and dreams which have called saints to their lives of devotion and heroism. These things may be either the expression of the man's own deepest convictions, the outcome of his profoundest meditations and efforts, working through his subconsciousness, or they may be due to other influences entering his subconscious mind. But such cases, even if we do not call them abnormal, are exceptional. They are not, and ought not to be, the normal and expected means of decision.

Nothing in James' discussion of religious experience is more valuable than his bringing of the phenomena of sudden conversion into line with the slower conscious processes through which minds of another type pass from a lower life to a higher. The development which in one takes place by means of a subconscious incubation, and which reaches the conscious life by a sudden uprush, in other and more normal cases is effected by a conscious struggle and effort of will. And surely the latter is as truly divine as the former.

It does not seem, then, that Dr Sanday has gained much for theology by finding the "seat or locus" of the Divine in Christ, in His subconsciousness as distinguished from His conscious ego. As the latter is, and ever must be, in human beings the expression of the concrete whole of the personality, it is the true expression both of the Divinity and of the humanity.

CHARLES F. OSSORY.

KILKENNY.

LANGUAGE AND THE NEW PHILOSOPHY.

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I once overheard a philosophical discussion that came to a singular end. The disputants were two, a man and a woman, and their difference had resolved itself into the question whether there is a divine element indwelling in the human soul. The controversy grew more and more heated until finally the defender of the soul's divinity lost all control of her temper and, shaking her fist in her adversary's face, fairly shrieked out in a voice choking with angry emotion, "What! do you mean to deny that God is in me at this very moment?" It would be attributing to her far more humour than she had to say that the smile with which this outburst was greeted revealed to her the full force and clarity of the situation, but the confusion under which she immediately retreated showed that she had at least a glimmering sense that, somehow or other, the incident was closed.

I cannot help feeling that this trivial story contains a truth often forgotten by philosophers. What I have in mind is the fact that a philosophy, like a man, must practise what it preaches. Its method, in other words, must be an example of its doctrine. The woman's theory of her divine nature melted away before her all too human conduct. No other fate can await a philosophy, if the instrument with which it seeks

to grasp the truth, tried by the very test of what it grasps, be found unreal.¹ Only a real hook and line can catch real fishes.

I have made these remarks, not for their own sake, but because, in following the present conflict in the philosophical world between the defenders of a more or less deeply intrenched idealism and that growing band of empiricists, who, with such vigour of attack, are seeking to carry the metaphysical citadel, I have been struck by the recurrence of an objection to the new philosophy which rests in an alleged discrepancy of this very kind, a dissonance, that is, between its theory and its practice. The "intellectualists" have been the quicker to seize on this criticism, perhaps because, as they are aware, the reigning forms of idealistic philosophy are perfectly invulnerable at this point. Thought, these philosophers teach, is the essence of all things, and, with the strictest consistency, they spare neither logic nor the acutest distinctions of conceptual terminology in establishing the ultimate nature of the ideal. But the new philosophy, the idealists have not been slow to see, enjoys in this respect no such happy immunity, and they have turned on their opponents, therefore, with the most perplexing questions. "You are continually telling us," they say, for instance, "that life is larger than logic. If this be a truth of such moment, why, then, do you not stop arguing and begin to live? If reality is indeed deeper than words, how real, in that case, are your own books and essays? Why not cease writing and become philanthropists and politicians? If the flux of experience, as you contend, eludes the conceptual forms that seek to contain it, must it not, among other things, elude your own philosophy? What is this whole doctrine, in fact, but a roundabout way of proclaiming the bankruptcy of all philosophy? If this is a metaphysical suicide club you are forming, have candour enough to call it by its name." To these pertinent but puzzling

¹ For example: the statement "reality is concrete" refutes itself, for, if reality is concrete, the statement that reality is concrete is not real because it is not concrete. If this be logic-chopping, make the most of it!

questions there has come from the new school of thinkers, so far as I have heard, nothing resembling a clear and ringing answer, but merely a tendency to ignore them entirely or brush them briefly aside as so many more examples of that very casuistry which their own sounder method has been born to supersede. But this will never do. They are real questions. A real answer is demanded. To find such an answer concerns most vitally both the inner integrity and the worldly success of the new philosophy.

Now the truth is, I am convinced, that both the questions of the intellectualist and the failure of the empiricist to offer an adequate reply rest on a common and profound delusion, on the belief, namely, that language is primarily and essentially a conceptual instrument, that the main function of words is to express our thoughts. Were such a proposition not fallacy but fact, then, once for all, whatever the true philosophy might be, it could get itself uttered only in case it were some kind of idealism. All other beliefs would remain but the cries of men destined forever to emit no sound. Mankind, however, is certainly in no such melancholy plight; and to combat the notion that words are the mere vehicles of thought one need be no Talleyrand. Applied to the language of ordinary intercourse the inadequacy of such a conception is evident enough. lit up as that language is by the light of the eye, shot through with the dramatic colour of the occasion that calls it forth. energised in a hundred subtle ways by the character that utters it, expanded and etherealised by that most spiritual of all things, the human voice. All this will be as generally granted in the case of the spoken word as it is generally forgotten, or, if not forgotten, practically neglected, in the case of written language. It is not seen that one of the deepest distinctions between literature, on the one hand, and writing that is not literature, on the other, lies along this very line; that the art of written expression consists, in no small measure, in the miracle whereby dead symbols on the page take on something of that same vital quality which makes the Vol. IX.-No. 2.

spoken word the utterance, not of the intellectual faculty alone, but of the whole man. In the highest realms of literature, in the case of the world's supreme poets, no one, to be sure, is likely to forget this truth. We are uttering, as we know, not metaphor but sober fact, when we call Homer the great thunderer, when we describe Dante's language as a flame, or speak of the verse of Milton as a trumpet or the sea. But what we are not so apt to remember is that the same truth holds, in due degree, among writers of far humbler purpose and accomplishment. What, for instance, is the chief difference between a page of ordinary prose and a page of Burke or Carlyle, of Emerson or John Morley? The difference, someone will instantly reply, between prose that expresses few and trivial ideas and prose that expresses many great ones. However much truth it may contain, such an account of the matter is both shallow and misleading. Otherwise, we who can now so easily appropriate the ideas of Burke and Carlyle might be Carlyles and Burkes. Tennyson's poem about the little flower, which all can now raise because all have got the seed, was, perhaps, a pretty fancy, but, save in the most restricted sense, it never applied to any literature worth the reading. No; the chief difference between ordinary prose and prose of the masters is the difference between writing where the ideas are spread out, as it were, flat and opaque upon the page, and writing where the ideas are either held wholly in solution, or suspended, like particles of light, in a current of moral energy. It is the difference, to make a trivial comparison, between your friend's story of the play, which, to his astonishment and irritation, you receive with such unaccountable coldness, and the play itself; it is the difference between the battle itself, and the chart, which, long afterward, shows the historical student how the opposing forces were drawn up. Language, in other words, exercising its logical faculty is static; it can seize at one time but a single aspect of existence. But language performing what may be called, in a large sense, its poetic function, is dynamic; it can catch life's very interplay and movement.

An example or two will render this distinction plain; and if, in each instance, the second of the contrasted passages is taken from poetry rather than from literary prose, it is merely because, in the nature of the case, the illustrations must be brief and striking, and poetry often packs into a few lines what prose puts less forcibly in as many pages.

Opening my dictionary, I find the following definition of Stoicism: "The doctrine of Zeno, who taught that men should be free from passion, unmoved by joy or grief, and submit without complaint to the unavoidable necessity by which all things are governed." Now this, it is clear, or any similar definition, will give to the man who does not realise beforehand what Stoicism itself, the Stoic spirit, is, just about as vital a grasp on the thing in question as a description of the toothache will to him who has never known the grip of that arch-fiend, or a manual entitled "Swimming Taught in Seven Lessons" to the man who has never felt

"the cool silver shock Of the plunge in a pool's living water."

In each case, the definition, explanation, or what not, serves merely to mark off a certain portion of experience and give it, often, to be sure, with results of high convenience and utility, a name. In each case, too, for those who have no acquaintance with the underlying experience, the definition is literally less than nothing. But now let him who is disposed to think meanly of the power of words turn from the lexicographer to Shakespeare, from the definition of Stoicism just quoted to those mighty lines which Octavius addresses to his sister in the third act of *Antony and Cleopatra*:

"Cheer your heart;
Be you not troubled with the time, which drives
O'er your content these strong necessities;
But let determin'd things to destiny
Hold unbewail'd their way."

This is not a definition of Stoicism. This is the Stoic spirit itself. This is not the language of the understanding. This is the accent of the will. It is the current of moral energy as

potential with high accomplishment in its own spiritual realm as any form of mechanical energy in the physical world, as infinitely removed, too, from any equivalence with the definition or explanation that serves to identify it as is the bolt that splits "the unwedgeable and gnarled oak" from the paragraphs on electricity in the latest text-book on physics. If anyone fails to feel this, if for anyone Shakespeare's verse is unfortunately an unknown tongue, let him try a more modern instance of something, which, if not precisely Stoicism, is yet closely akin to it: that wonderful little poem *Invictus*, of William Ernest Henley, familiar perhaps, but never too familiar to quote once more:

"Out of the night that covers me, Black as the pit from pole to pole, I thank whatever gods may be For my unconquerable soul. In the fell clutch of circumstance I have not winced nor cried aloud. Under the bludgeonings of chance My head is bloody, but unbowed. Beyond this place of wrath and tears Looms but the horror of the shade. And yet the menace of the years Finds, and shall find me, unafraid. It matters not how strait the gate, How charged with punishments the scroll, I am the master of my fate; I am the captain of my soul."

Loftier spiritual attitudes than this there doubtless are, but to dwell on that fact rather than to respond to the superb motor quality of the poem is to stultify oneself morally and poetically. In these lines, again, the human will becomes articulate. Let a man but break down the insulation between them and his own soul, and an active principle enters his being of potency akin to that out of which the poem itself proceeded. Woe to him into whom that energy flows and who permits it to dissipate unutilised!

The distinction which is here suggested between what we may call intellectual, and vital, expression is obviously just

the distinction which often obtains between the language of theology and the language of religion:

"At the judgment-day mankind will be confronted with a perfect record of the deeds done in the body, so that even the sinner will be, as it were, his own judge, and as he goes away into eternal punishment may be said, in a sense, to have condemned himself."

That, compared with many theological utterances, is concrete and telling; yet, surely, if even such expression ever touched and moved the lives of men, it was because their imaginations had enabled them to supply from other sources the detail and colour of the picture of which this is the mere frame, the grip and intensity of a dramatic moment of which this is less than the most meagre setting. Contrasted with the varying flux, with the lights and shadows of even everyday life, such writing is but a seventh reflection of reality. Put beside it, however, another passage, whose intellectual content is identical, that terrific sonnet of Rossetti's, Lost Days:

> "The lost days of my life until to-day, What were they, could I see them on the street Lie as they fell? Would they be ears of wheat Sown once for food, but trodden into clay? Or golden coins squandered and still to pay? Or drops of blood dabbling the guilty feet? Or such spilt water as in dreams must cheat The undying throats of Hell, athirst alway?

I do not see them here; but after death God knows I know the faces I shall see, Each one a murdered self, with low last breath. 'I am thyself, -what hast thou done to me?' 'And I-and I-thyself' (lo! each one saith), 'And thou thyself to all eternity!'"

Here is language become, literally, a shrinking from a wrath to come! The interpretation of such a poem is less an act of the mind than a contraction of the muscles. If it is true that one cannot read it without a recoil of horror, it is even truer that without a recoil of horror one cannot read it. Against

the intense and concentrated reality of such writing, life itself, in its ordinary aspects, grows thin and impotent.

Nor is it otherwise if we pass to the opposite pole of the spiritual universe: "That which was fragmentary in the temporal order is fulfilled in the Eternal Order; that which was pain and sorrow in the world of appearance is transmuted by, and ceases to exist as such within, the Absolute." That is the language of idealistic philosophy. But here is the voice of religion: "And God shall wipe away all tears from their eyes; and there shall be no more death, neither sorrow, nor crying, neither shall there be any more pain; for the former things are passed away." Let him who believes that words are merely, or mainly, the vehicles of thought account, if he can, for the impassable gulf that sunders these two sentences.

And now, for a final illustration. Before restoring our textbooks and lexicons to their shelves, let us open one of the latter to the word agnosticism: "The doctrine," we read, "that the existence of anything beyond and behind material phenomena is unknown and (so far as can be judged) unknowable, and especially that a First Cause and an unseen world are subjects of which we know nothing." This, once more, is perfectly intelligible, but it is also perfectly ineffective. No one can dream for an instant that this doctrine, in its baldly conceptual form, could exert the slightest influence upon human life or conduct. Certainly if it has ever seemed to do so, it is because of some deeper and far richer storehouse of experience to which, by process of association, it has become a key. But from this nineteenth-century definition let us pass backward more than a thousand years to a famous passage in King Ælfred's version of Bede's Ecclesiastical History, the words of one of those councillors from whom King Edwin of Northumbria sought advice, when, in the presence of the Christian bishop, Paulinus, he debated the question of receiving the new religion. Even at the sacrifice of the Anglo-Saxon prose, the passage catches at least a faint reflection of its incomparable original:

"Thus seems to me, O King, this earthly life Beside that time which is unknown to us: As tho' thou, in the winter, with thy thanes, Were seated at a banquet, and the fire Were brightly kindled, and the room were warm; But rain and snow and tempest were without, And there should come a sparrow, and should flit Quickly across that hall-come in thro' one door, And pass out thro' the other. While within, He is not smitten by the winter's storm;-But that is but the twinkling of an eye, The least of instants. From the winter come, Into the winter he has flown again, . . . Even like this little moment's space, appears The life of man; for what has gone before, Or that which follows after, we know not."

Here is the real agnosticism! Here is the agnosticism which the honest man of every creed and condition must embrace-no product of the speculative intellect but the natural response of the common heart to the mystery within which human life is placed. Who, as he reads that passage, will undertake to trace to its source even one element of the moral and emotional temper it engenders? What long evenings of mirth and hospitality, what memories of old legends, what moods of sympathy, deep or fitful, with the strange pathos of animal life, what encounters with midnight and the storm, what countless other fleeting fragments of experience—unite their strands to weave the intricate web of a passage whose appeal rests at last on the stern and tragic contrast between the world's tenderest, most helpless things, and its darkest, most inexorable, and hostile powers! Nor is it the scattered memories of individual experience alone whose sudden focussing imparts vital character to the passage. Back of these is the genius and history of a race in whom contact with the inscrutable forces of nature gave birth, in singular intensity, to moods of reverence and awe. Centuries ago some Teutonic ancestor of ours, perhaps, battled through a long winter night in an attempt to rescue a lost comrade. He failed. But now, after many generations, as you and I pronounce the words (even such simple words as "storm"

and "winter") around which, by his fearlessness, that much more of human endeavour was crystallised, they become, under the poetic touch, magic formulæ, and the courage and endurance that then seemed wasted, is liberated, with all its high potentiality, in you and me. What wonder that the feeling of mystery which this passage evokes is of another order from that born of mere reverie or contemplation!

All this will sound to many like the idlest rhetorical flourish. Literally taken, it is, perhaps, little more. But in a larger sense the principle of association which it suggests will gain the instinctive assent of every man for whom the noblest utterances of his race are something more than records of its past, something more than so many sources of intellectual or emotional titillation. Do we not, in these considerations, indeed, come close to the real import of a remark of Wordsworth's, the very simplicity of which has wrongly helped to divert attention from its profound wisdom? The common words, says Wordsworth (in effect), in the preface to the Lyrical Ballads, are the most philosophic. For the man whose metaphysic is of a purely "intellectualist" cast, it remains possible to doubt the truth of that statement. For him the most clear-cut words are the most philosophic (as for the scientist they are properly the most scientific), those which, like algebraic symbols, are most free from complicating associations, whose total effect is most nearly equivalent to their "ideal" content. Hence the intellectualist's love of the last refinements of technical nomenclature. But the empiricist, unless his boasted reverence for experience be but the shamefullest pretence, is bound to another course. With Wordsworth he must turn from the clear-cut to the common words, from terms of the academic hot-house to words covered with the frost and dew of real life. Nor is the reference here merely to what the philologist would call the "connotation" of common words. That term is the product of a false psychology, suggesting, as it does, something incidental and not central, something passive and not active, a sort of

attendant halo or aroma, whose elusive nature, the scholar thinks, can best be got at by tracing, in seminar or library, the word's development—as if words were mere repositories of the mental habits and history of the race, dusty archives which can give up their secrets only to the trained student! (Where would the Bunyans and Burnses have been on such a theory?) No; such a conception is the very inversion of the truth. Into our verbal inheritance the hopes and deeds as well as the thoughts of our ancestors have entered, and the noblest of these seemingly lifeless symbols are the residences of the high aspiration of the race, of its heroism, its fortitude, its self-mastery. This it is that sinks the logical quality of common words into a mere aspect of their total vital worth, making them no longer mere vehicles of thought, but foci of light, centres of moral and spiritual force. In the intensity of that light and of that force the poetic potentiality of a word resides; and it is a happy fact that the sense and instinct for these things, as the gift for picturesque and vigorous expression in many a common man attests, is much more a matter of character than culture.

Now it is in the discovery and use of just these transcendental faculties of language that the hope of the new philosophy lies to make itself articulate. It is not true that a philosophy, by declaring life deeper than thought, condemns itself to be forever dumb. What it thereby commits itself to, rather, is a mode of utterance that is itself deeper than thought. I am in no sense accepting or defending the new philosophy. But if reality is, as that philosophy proclaims, an infinitely varied and complex thing, surely we shall be convinced of that fact, not by being told that it is so, but by active contact with some agency of expression that can expand the spirit into the distant reaches of experience. If, again, reality is a fluid, moving thing, we shall be persuaded of that, not through a medium of communication that is fixed and rigid, but by some organ with power to set up within us the very rhythm of life itself. And if reality, finally, is a

pulsing and dynamic thing, it will be by no idle naming of it as such that that truth will be brought home to you and me, but by the accent of a voice which has itself caught something of the sting and impact of that reality. There is a story of a prince who, on the eve of a great battle, retired to the nearest churchyard and gathered about him a host of ghosts and corpses. It must have been designed as a parable of those who in these days seek the overthrow of intellectualism with the weapons of a long-interred scholasticism or put trust in hollow conceptual formulæ for the utterance of their supposedly fresh volitional faith. Such procedure is futile. If, in an age of militant democracy, a virile and humane philosophy is to replace the neat outlines of long-current pseudoclassic creeds (whether of the "positive" or the "transcendental" tradition), it will gain its victory, not through any hollow proof of dialectical supremacy, but by convincing the whole man of its truth.

This (and much that has gone before) will sound to some like an attack on reason. You are asking philosophy, it will be said, to perform functions not pertaining to its nature. For my part I believe that the philosophies which have really counted in human history, have done so because they have satisfied, for the time being, something deeper than man's intellectual demands (which is by no means saying that they have not satisfied his intellect as well). We must beware lest we deftly insinuate into our definition of "philosophy" the characteristics and perhaps the limitations of our private metaphysical views, or accept some prevalent conception of its nature for the narrowness of which its currency is no excuse. It is not otherwise in the case of "reason." Whether what has been said is an attack on reason depends on what we mean by a term that is employed at present in the most diverse and contradictory senses. If we indicate thereby a mental agent above experience with powers of immediate divination in the realm of metaphysical truth, who should be censured for attacking it? But if we signify that organ that seeks, by

ordering the past, to make man master of the future, who dare be reckoned among its enemies? Who, especially in an age like ours, that needs clear judgment scarcely less than virtue, dare attack a faculty endowed with gifts of selection and measure and self-control, with power to rebuke and restrain the vagrancies of undisciplined desire, with authority to impose those bounds and limits that are the very condition of human progress? But a reason thus related to experience is at the farthest remove from a "reason" that is a mere law unto itself. And the loftiest reverence for the former austere power is perfectly compatible with relentless enmity toward that spurious form of cerebral activity which often masquerades under its name. Let us be on our guard, then, against a fatal confusion. But let us also, if we can, preserve, in the very face of that false rationalism that threatens to undo it, the integrity of the word "reason." It was a happy moment when criticism hit on its distinction between sentiment and sentimentality, between healthy feeling on the one hand and on the other that miasmic emotion which hangs suspended in the inane quite out of vital contact with the world of things whence the stimulus of every normal feeling comes, and equally cut off from the world of moral activity into which such feelings seek discharge. So effective has this classification proved that to-day to call a man a sentimentalist is held a deeper insult than calling him a knave. It will be a fortunate hour when an analogous distinction is clearly set up within the world of thought. Even though such a distinction has not yet been verbally embodied, the world has a hold on the difference itself as is evinced by the bad odour which words like "scholastic" and "academic" inevitably acquire. It now looks as if the term "intellectualism" were to be pressed into service in this matter. Pending its acceptance, it may be best, however, even at the risk of a confusion, to brand as intellectual sentimentality that type of mental activity which returns ever into itself in closed curves, shut off from the concrete world out of which healthy thought proceeds and affecting with no fresh impetus that other world within which are being worked out the political and religious destinies of mankind. Let him who imagines that an attack on this species of futility is an attack on reason, remember the Hellenic world. The Greek spirit has become almost a synonym for human reason; yet no nation, until those influences that ended in Alexandrianism began to make themselves felt, was ever less guilty of "intellectualism" than the Greeks.

But even if, on the basis of this distinction, the preceding pages be acquitted of being an attack on reason, there will remain those who will be disconcerted (or perhaps, rather, amused) by their exaltation of poetry, those to whom the mere mention of that word suggests the opening of the doors of rhapsody, and the closing of those of severe and scientific thinking. Such persons have yet to discover what poetry is. They confuse it, probably, with some form of loose impressionism even farther removed from the realm of poetry on the one hand than are the coldest and most abstract processes of thought on the other. They think that to turn one's face toward poetry is inevitably to turn one's face away from facts. The best answer to these objectors is the same warning as before—to remember the Hellenic world, to bear in mind that if the spirit of that world is well-nigh a synonym for reason, it is even more nearly a synonym for poetry. If the noblest creative literature of the Greeks constantly suggests the presence and restraint of high intelligence, it is no less true that their noblest metaphysical works are transfused with the imaginative spirit. It is this spirit that has imparted to a few fragments of Heraclitus a quality that bids fair to make them outlast the imposing edifices of many a modern system. It is this that will ensure the survival of Plato long after this or that school of Platonists, or Platonic critics, has passed away. Yet among the Greeks-and this is the point for the objector to observe—philosophy and poetry were not confused. Just how the reason and the imagination are related it may be vain to ask. It is enough, now, if we perceive that they

are allies, not enemies; enough, now, if we rediscover the truth that philosophy may borrow something of the force and illumination of poetry without thereby resigning a function that is, or usurping a function that is not, its own; that to express a profound thought simply, in other words, is not an easy act of condescension, whereby the philosopher graciously brings down the truth from some high heaven to ignorant humanity, but that it is an infinitely difficult act of creation, whereby what was inert and impotent receives the breath of life. In its moments of deepest inspiration and power the new philosophy, however unconsciously, has incarnated this truth, and there are signs abroad that philosophy in general is dimly awakening to the fact of its existence. Certainly if she does not discover it freely from within, the spirit of the time will force her, at the peril of her life, to discover it, as best she may, from without. English metaphysical thought, into whatever sands and morasses its stream may here and there have wandered, has, indeed, in Bacon and Hobbes, in Locke, Berkeley, and Hume, in Mill and Huxley, a tradition of noble sanity and simplicity. But it would be absurd to contend that the works of even these men constitute a "popular" philosophy. In the nature of the case, we may almost say they could not. Even in the days of Huxley and Mill, the sun of democracy was only rising. Now that it is full above the horizon, may it not be destined to transform, along with all other things, the spirit of philosophy? The fact is that the capacity of the popular mind for metaphysical truth has not been tested. We cannot foretell, were philosophy to learn the language of the people, with what "pure natural joy"

"the shock of mighty thoughts On simple minds"

might come; nor to what far-reaching spiritual changes it might give birth.

But let no one delude himself, it must be said in conclusion, into the notion that there is any royal road to the attainment

of that mode of expression which alone, in a democratic age, can render a dynamic philosophy articulate. It can issue from no study of words, nor be the reward of any imitation, however tireless or protracted, of "literary" models. These things, whatever their helpfulness incidentally, can be, in any large and ultimate sense, of as little avail to the philosopher as to the poet. "Sublimity," said Longinus, in a sentence that is one of the mountain peaks of criticism, "is the echo of a great soul." If reality be constituted as the new philosophers believe, then those souls alone that have become channels for its current can hope to tell others something of its surge and pressure. And so it may turn out in the end that the enemies of the new philosophy, without perceiving their own profundity, were right, when they urged its disciples to revert, in consistency, from philosophy to life. This is, indeed, the indispensable step. Only let it be remembered that when that step has been taken, the pentecostal miracle may follow. Literature is not lacking in analogous instances. There came in the life of Milton a moment when he had to choose between poetry and England. He gave himself to England and for twenty years plunged into the arena of political activity. When in old age, deprived of sight and surrounded by hostile powers, he turned again to poetry, the moral consecration and the deepened experience of those years found utterance in the accents of that voice "whose sound was like the sea." It is not otherwise with philosophy, as the lives of its supreme spirits, from Socrates to Spinoza, show. And the philosopher, therefore, like the poet, can never contemplate too seriously that austere sentence of the great Puritan: "And long it was not after, when I was confirmed in this opinion, that he who would not be frustrate of his hope to write well hereafter in laudable things ought himself to be a true poem."

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IDEALS AND FACTS.

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IDEALS are the things men judge to be good, and therefore worthy of pursuit. But this definition does not exhaust, it merely indicates, their significance. That depends on their power to evoke an impulse to pursue them. For then they do not hang idle in the sky; they exercise an attraction, and so become entangled and involved in the process of life. This impulse to the Ideal is an energy: I shall call it Will. It chooses, and it chooses what it holds to be Good; and is thus to be distinguished from other forces governing human action, from instinct and habit, which do not choose but fatally react or inertly continue, from desire which chooses, but not necessarily what is judged to be good. In the beginning, it would seem, in lower forms of life, all action is reflex or instinctive; there is no choice; and this, it may be held, is largely true of earlier phases of human history, and of much of the action of most men in all its phases. The structure we call Society seems to arise without deliberation; to be given like air and rain, or produced like nests and honeycomb; and afterwards, in many of its aspects, to be so perpetuated and sustained. And, again, when choice emerges, and conscious action, it is not always nor mainly choice of Good; it is choice of that which attracts, of pleasure, or power, or adventure, of merely the means of life. Expansion of numbers, and the consequent need for new sources of food, is a cause at the root of much of history. The wanderings, conflicts, conquests,

and subjugations which resulted thence were prompted by desire, but hardly by what I have called Will. The impulse to the Ideal emerges, hesitating and late, in and among these other tumultuous energies. It would be difficult, perhaps impossible, to trace its genesis, and to disentangle it from the stress in which it is involved. For only in the rarest men. if even in them, does it exist pure and uncontaminated. Normally, in societies and in individuals, it is in perpetual conflict, now dominating, now succumbing, now alert, now sinking to sleep; at one time harnessed to the car, then dumb and mute, pressing passively like a brake on the wheels of instinct and desire. Yet, though it be thus intricately involved with other energies, it is yet distinct from these, and sociologists labour in vain to reduce it to terms of them. The moment a judgment is made, "I desire this," there emerges something that is not instinct; the moment another judgment is made, "I choose this because it is good," there emerges something that is not desire. A new kind has come into existence,—none the less new because the stages of its growth are obscure and blurred.

Will, then, or the impulse to the Ideal, is in its essence unique. It is an energy; but one, as I have been insisting, which is entangled with others wholly or partly alien to it. I think always of ideals as sown into a soil of fact; external fact, of institutions and ways of life, which are again themselves the deposit of instinct and desire, and of will in some other phase; and internal fact, the actual needs, impulses, and habits of men. In that soil the seed must grow, if grow it can (for, as in the parable, it may fall on stony ground or among thorns, or the birds of the air may devour it), and growing must assimilate the material into which it is sown, suffer distortion from wind and shade and drought, and realise only imperfectly its original essence as conceived by the soul that east it forth. This is the tragedy Goethe saw and proposed to write, in the history of Mahomet and Mahometanism. It is the tragedy of all the great ideal conceptions of history. Look,

for example, at Christianity. How strangely different the fact from the ideal that was in the soul of Christ. For that ideal, becoming real, laid hold upon and in turn was invaded by all the natural instincts and desires of men, and by other ideal impulses incompatible with itself. As the tree grew up it bore the strangest fruits, fruits of war and competition, fruits of superstition and fraud, fruits of adventure, aggression, power and conquest, along with the fruits of faith, hope, and charity. So that when a Tolstoi arises, in these modern times, having in him the genuine spirit of Christ, he is repudiated by the whole world of Christianity because, in fact, though he be Christ-like, he is not Christian. It is a true and profound commentary on this part of our history which Dostoievsky has written in Les frères Kamarazov, where he makes the Grand Inquisitor apprehend as a heretic the Jesus Christ who reappears upon the earth. Christianity, rendering itself real, had moved away from Christ to the Tempter. It had learnt that, to win mankind, it must make stones into bread, it must conquer the kingdoms of the earth, it must east itself down from the Temple. Practical philanthropy, physical force, and miracles were its weapons. And so had grown up the mediæval fact; not the ideal of Christ, but a paganism fermented by that ideal; a product of that energy, but also of many others; a reality perverted from its essence by the act of becoming real.

I have instanced Christianity to illustrate my point, but I might as well have instanced Buddhism or Mahometanism, or Chivalry, or Monarchy, or Aristocracy. All the great products of civilisation are or have been prompted and supported by some ideal impulse; but that impulse did not create them out of nothing, nor can it perpetually sustain them. It is in constant stress of conflict with the elements it has partially subdued, and which have partially subdued it. More, it comes sooner or later into conflict with new ideals born from its failure to realise and maintain itself. For a time, when a phase of civilisation has established itself, the ideal is con-

servative; so, for example, in the Roman Republic in its best days, in the Aristocracy of Venice, in feudal Japan, and in China till our own days. The institutions existing are then judged to be good, and the great passions and actions rally to defend and perpetuate them. But this, the great conservatism, degenerates into habit and routine; it loses grip of the elements by holding which in subjection it exists; these, escaping, turn against the old and evoke a new ideal; then come the great periods of conflict, the revolutions and reactions, till the new ideal has mastered and been mastered by the new conditions, and there is place for a new conservatism.

Such, so far as we can interpret it, seems to be the rhythm of history. And it follows that ideals, thus entangled in fact, are not, so far as they evoke energies and enter into history, independent of time and place, and of the whole structure of the inner and outer world. Effective ideals are elicited by circumstance. But they are not created by it. It is a prejudice of modern science, a prejudice which sociology has taken over from biology, to try to explain the inner by the outer. But this is preposterous. No variation could be selected by environment unless it had arisen independently of environment; no ideal impulse could be evoked by a situation unless it were somehow there waiting to be evoked. A sociologist will say that the growth of population is the cause of changes in institutions; but, clearly, it is not its cause, it is its occasion. It gives the situation upon which inner factors, of need and desire, react. The inner life has a nature of its own, as Comte rightly saw, whether or no he rightly interpreted it. And part of that inner life is the will that chooses good. The direction of the choice is influenced by circumstances; but the act of choice belongs to the constitution of the inner life. In the Middle Ages the ideal of feudalism was possible, and not that of democracy. Yet no external conditions could have created the feudal ideal had it not been in the nature of men to conceive and practise it. The ideal of Democracy is

possible now; but not all the conditions of modern life would make it possible did it not lie in our nature to choose and pursue it. Ideals are relevant to conditions, but they are not creatures of conditions. And the process of history is a perpetual soliciting of the inner life to display in fact potentialities that are already there.

Because ideals are, in this sense, dependent on conditions, a given ideal may, at one time and place, either not emerge at all, or remain an otiose conception; while, at another, it may evoke an effective energy and determine action. Hence arises a distinction between Utopianism and a genuine operative Idealism. The Utopian is the desirable, towards the achievement of which no practical step can here and now be taken. To some minds, and especially to English minds, all ideals appear Utopian. This is the view of middle age, of people settled and ranged, of lawyers and shopkeepers, too often of teachers and professors. A relative of Shelley, we are told, afflicted by gout, would listen patiently to the declamations of the youthful poet, but remark at the end, "They may set up Plato's Republic in Horsham to-morrow if they like, but I would not lift my leg from this stool to hinder or to help it." This attitude is typical of a certain kind of temperament and experience. It is that of "all sensible men," and these are the permanent majority. They are, however, always wrong as well as always right. Their philosophy is that of settled times, of short views, of surfaces, and of epicycles. It ignores the planetary orbits and the deep currents of the world. And when these, in their steadfast motion, throw up in visible turmoil the bubbles and blazes we call revolutions, that view of man and his history is disconcerted. Human nature, assumed to be monotonous and fixed, begins to perform prodigies and wonders. Something gives before the steady pressure of hidden and subterrane an forces. There is a crash, a shift, what contemporaries call a catastrophe; then the surface re-forms at a new level', the normal consciousness closes over the gulf, the sleepless energy pent below is covered

in and forgotten, and once more the leg is on the stool in the little parlour at Horsham. Carlyle, it is said, sat listening once to the common talk about the ineffectiveness of ideas; then, when a pause came, remarked: "Gentlemen, there was once a man called Rousseau. He wrote a book which was nothing but ideas. People laughed at it. But the skins of those who laughed went to bind the second edition of the book."

Not all ideals, then, are Utopian, nor all impulses to pursue them idle. Yet many are; because, for the time being, or, it may be, for all time, the conditions are unfavourable. For instance, a life without a body might be desirable, or the life of a bird, or that of a chimæra. New senses, new physiology, the engendering of children by glances of the eye, intercourse without the medium of matter—these and the like might be held to be ideal; but they could hardly become objects of pursuit, and create energy, unless it were the energy of lunatics. And often, it may be urged, the ideals of social reformers are as Utopian as these. Thus, as a recent critic of socialism reminds us:—

"Fourier taught that Communism would alter not only man, but the physical world as well. Lions would be taught to draw waggons, as a symbol of the victory of man over nature. Human life would on an average last 144 years. The aurora borealis, which now rarely appears in northern regions, would become permanently visible, and be fixed at the Pole. It would give out not only light as at present, but also heat. It would decompose the sea water by the creation of citric boreal acid, and convert it into a kind of lemonade, which would dispense with the necessity of provisioning ships with fresh water. Oranges would grow in Siberia, and tame whales would pull becalmed sailing-ships. The full indulgence of human nature in all its passions would produce happiness and virtue. Society would harmoniously be organised in groups (phalanxes) of 1600 persons to inhabit a large palace called a phalanstery. If England would introduce these

phalanxes, her labour would become so productive that she could pay off her national debt in six months by the sale of hens' eggs."

This, it may be confessed, is a good example of Utopian imagination. Here and now such ideals could hardly lead to sane action. Yet, whether and how far they are altogether and permanently Utopian, we cannot wisely dogmatise. Things once seeming as strange have been accomplished, and the whole history of man is the achievement of the Impossible. A locomotive was once a dream; the aeroplane has but just ceased to be one. To a savage, talk of travel by rail or steamship will sound like talk of a journey to the moon. It is for this reason that I defined the Utopian, not as the permanently unrealisable, but as what we do not see our way to set about realising. To take an example:—Already at the beginning of the fourteenth century Marsiglio of Padua laid down a complete plan of democratic organisation for Church and State. The plan was Utopian, then and there, but not inherently impossible; the last century has been actually working it out, and it will now be generally admitted to be at least a reasonable ideal. Again, there are those now who urge universal peace, or a collectivist commonwealth. Are they Utopians or no? No one really knows. And they can only rightly be opposed on the ground that their schemes are undesirable, not on the ground that they are impracticable.

It follows that though we admit that ideals may be Utopian, we do not always know whether they are so or no, even for the time being, still less for all time. We have learnt so little of nature, and so little of human nature. Some possibilities, it is true, we may rule out without much hesitation. Always, it must be supposed, Man will have to reckon with physical facts—the stars in their courses, day and night, the seasons and the climates, land and sea, tempest and calm, drought and rains and cyclones. And in some occupations and ways of life, among sailors and farmers and hunters, these ultimate facts must perhaps be always so near and instant that the changes

and ameliorations wrought by man will seem contemptible in the comparison.

"They that go down to the sea in ships, and occupy their business in great waters, these men see the works of the Lord and His wonders in the deep. For at His word the stormy wind ariseth, which lifteth up the waves thereof. They are carried up to the heaven, and down again to the deep, their soul melteth away because of the trouble. They reel to and fro, and stagger like a drunken man, and are at their wits' end."

To men whose daily experience is of this kind, all idealism might well seem to be but a thin veneer laid over the surface of ineluctable fact. Yet even this region of fact has been invaded by the audacity of man. He has summoned rain to the dry land and water to the desert. He mocks at the tempest, he rides on the air, he makes the lightning his messenger. And the man would be rash who should attempt to set a final bound to this Promethean energy. Perhaps, some day, we shall indeed "command these stones to be bread"; perhaps we shall harness the tides, and warm ourselves at the central fire. Our science is young; and any day a new discovery may convert some Utopian dream into an actuality. Among things desirable, what may be possible is partly a problem for physical science. The social groupings and relations of men are largely determined by the character of their economic activities; and these, again, depend on the progress of exact knowledge. The substitution of electricity for steam might dissolve the factory system, and the use of oil instead of coal put an end to the problems of the pit. So that even in this region of physical fact we must beware of bridling our hopes too strictly; and still more is this warning in place when we consider not nature at large, but the nature of Man.

Here, too, no doubt, there is something final and fatal. We shall not grow wings, nor develop eyes in the back of our head, nor live upon air, nor procreate without conjunction. We shall not live for ever, though we may extend the period of life. We shall not add cubits to our stature,

nor convolutions to our brain. Nor, it is urged, shall we radically change our inner life. "Human nature," say the sage and the dunce, "is always the same." And modern science inclines to confirm this view. Our instincts, we are told, inherited from animal ancestors, persist unchanged. The mind of man, like his body, has a fixed structure; it is not a "blank sheet of paper," where environment and education may write what they choose. That may be so; but if "human nature" does not change, what is it that has changed between primitive and civilised man? Behaviour, at least, alters, if endowment persists. We may have the same instincts as the savage, but we do not practise the same conduct. Man in the long centuries has learnt by experience; he has acquired new modes of action, and these have constituted new habits. If he is hit, he does not automatically return the blow; if he is frightened, he does not fatally run away; if he desires, he does not instantly seize. Biology demonstrates, let us concede, a permanence of substance; but history demonstrates a change of modes. That change is the key to history. The law of change we may not have discovered, and it may not be discoverable, but at least we must recognise the fact. The spirit of Man is not frozen in ice, nor bound on a wheel of fire; rather it moves in a magic car through the forest of life, drawn by the team of instinct, habit, desire, and will; bound to the past, yet free of the future; proceeding from the brute, but tending to the god.

In this sense, then, human nature does change, and it perpetuates its changes by language, arts, laws, institutions. It thus creates a new environment, more important than the natural one, and, as some think, more important even than ancestral inheritance, This, at any rate, is the opinion of Professor M'Dougall.

"There is widely current a vague belief that the national characteristics of the people of any country are in the main innate characters. But there can be no serious question that

this popular assumption is erroneous, and that natural characteristics, at any rate all those that distinguish the peoples of the European countries, are in the main expressions of different traditions. There are innate differences of mental constitution between the races and subraces of men, and between the peoples of the European countries; and these innate peculiarities are very important, because they exert through long periods of time a constant bias or moulding influence upon the growth of national cultures and traditions. But, relatively to the national peculiarities acquired by each individual in virtue of his participation in the traditions of his country, the innate peculiarities are slight, and are almost completely obscured in each individual by these superimposed acquired characters. If the reader is inclined to doubt the truth of these statements, let him make an effort of imagination and suppose that throughout a period of half a century every child born to English parents was at once exchanged (by the power of a magician's wand) for an infant of the French or other European nation. Soon after the close of this period the English nation would be composed of individuals of French extraction, and the French nation of individuals of English extraction. It is, I think, clear that, in spite of this complete change of innate characters between the two nations, there would be but little immediate change of national characteristics. The French people would still speak French, and the English would speak English, with all the local diversities to which we are accustomed, and without perceptible change of pronunciation. The religion of the French would still be predominantly Roman Catholic, and the English people would still present the same diversity of Protestant creeds. The course of political institutions would have suffered no profound change, the customs and habits of the two peoples would exhibit only such changes as might be attributed to the lapse of time, though an acute observer might notice an appreciable approximation of the two peoples towards one another in all these respects. The inhabitant of France would still be a Frenchman and the inhabitant of England an Englishman to all outward seeming, save that the physical appearance of the two peoples would be transposed. And we may go even further, and assert that the same would hold good if a similar exchange of infants were effected between the English and any other less closely allied nation, say the Turks or the Japanese." 1

A statement so strong as this, I suppose, is disputable, and will be disputed. But it will serve to illustrate the importance of social environment; and that, at least, beyond dispute, is changeable, and always changing. Human nature, or, if you like, human behaviour, develops, embodies its development in social facts, and develops again in relation to these. There may be limits to this development, but no one is in a position to lay them down. The crude scepticism of the man in the street is here at least as much out of court as the faith of the most uncritical Utopian. Nor are the philosophers of history in a better case, for they import conclusions previously assumed into the whole course of their argument. When Comte, for instance, professes to prove, from the facts of human nature and the laws of its development, that the monogamic family is ultimate, that elective democracy is an aberration, that a priesthood is a necessity, and that the only place for Woman is the home, who is convinced that was not convinced before? What Socialist could reasonably be converted by Spencer's philosophy of Individualism? What Democrat by Hegel's apotheosis of the Prussian constitution? We know that change is possible; that progress has occurred; but we do not know its laws, its limits, or its end.

Thus all profitable discussion of Ideals is matter not for science but for literature—for the inspiration of the poet, the denunciation of the prophet, the doubts, denials, or questions of the plain man. To be serious, it must indeed be conducted with reference to the facts. It must avoid Utopianism; yet

¹ M'Dougall, Introduction to Social Psychology, p. 329.

still more it must avoid scepticism. It must take account of things as they are, and yet always be looking away from them to things as they may be. Above all, it must not pretend that it is achieving demonstration. For it works in an element largely indeterminate, where much is conjecture and speculation; and it deals with matters where controversy goes back to the roots of individual preference. In such a field of discourse personality must count for much, or most. A writer or speaker must declare what he has come to prefer; and the acceptance he meets with will be proportionate to the degree of his knowledge, the measure of his common-sense, and the profundity and scope of his intuition of Good. He must affirm; he cannot prove. But his statement of his own ideal will be a challenge to the reader to formulate his; and this will be the chief service he will render.

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WOMAN SUFFRAGE: A NEW SYNTHESIS.

G. W. MULLINS

I.

ALL who care that Philosophy should come to its own in the practical affairs of life must be grateful to the HIBBERT JOURNAL that, greatly daring, it has permitted a discussion upon this subject, and not less grateful to Principal Childs, Mrs Low, and Mr Harman for the spirit in which they have written. I say greatly daring, for the extremists and the caricaturists between them have made the subject almost an unhappy one; and yet surely it will be to the general discredit of our nation if we cannot find better ways in the difficulty than the extremists and the caricaturists suggest. It is the purpose of this present writing to suggest a better way, and the writer is anxious not to waste words in mere negative criticism of the ordinary views "pro" or "con." My point of departure is briefly this. At present the dialectic, upon either side, while able to destroy most of the opposite arguments, seems by no means able to offer a sufficient foundation for its own conclusions. Principal Childs' paper finishes with what is almost an "of two evils choose the lesser." He acquiesces "in some inconveniences rather than others"; he looks to "the happier contingency," but is hardly sure of it; he appeals to courage rather than conviction; and, in short, he seems rather to suffer his faith than to embrace it. Mrs Low, writing against woman suffrage, is so doubtful of the usual polemic against it, that she admits that it is the argument of her own side which usually compels her to examine her position again. Mr Harman, using (perhaps even over-working) a fair enough argument against, omits to notice that it may be turned into the most tremendous tu quoque, and that if we push it hard enough it may lead us to the conclusion that the three persons to whom we ought not to listen upon public affairs are Mr Balfour, Lord Kitchener, and Lord Milner!

Now all this of inadequate dialectic points, in my judgment, to the necessity of a radical change of our point of view. Which we shall proceed to make.

II.

In the first place we must get away from the current exaggeration of the importance of politics. Here Mrs Low is quite right and her instance is very apropos; but we men are just as prone to this error as the women, and we are all of us given to suppose that only by political action can we reach ends to which it is certain that there are other than political roads—even sometimes certain that these other roads are the only sure ones. Politics is the harness in which the nation works. It is a conditioning and limiting force, but the real national life is in the men and women and children who live within its forms. Their feeling and thinking and producing the workshop, the home, the school, the Church—the thousandand-one acts of economic and social exchange, these are the life of England; and, touching all these, politics can repress or can shape, but can hardly create. A full-blooded people makes politics, but no political activity alone ever made a people. Equally is it possible to exaggerate the value of the vote. vote is to assist in choosing a representative who shall join with others in the process of governing; it is, in doing this, to select the modes of government. But only among the men available can a representative be chosen, and none among them may be the heroic or the inspired person whom the situation needs. The right policy may not be among those submitted to the voter's choice, and real wisdom may be hidden from his

generation and himself. The suffrage cannot create political insight or command successful political study. Women who, impassioned for social service, desire the vote to express the will to do good to others, should remember that no power of voting can fill our councils with heroes and with wisdom, if to our days neither heroes or wisdom be vouchsafed.

Do not let us be misunderstood. Politics are important, and to vote is much; we should bring to each due seriousness and study. But we must get away from the strained earnestness which, in this discussion, has exaggerated the points at issue, and distorted the entire perspective. The mother training at her knee the children whose work shall make the world of to-morrow, the man upholding by his labour that productive system which sustains the world, the preacher who inspires, or the scientist who discovers: these and such as these know better where creative power—power open to every true worker and thinker—really rests.

III.

While I do not propose merely to criticise the ordinary discussion of the woman suffrage question, I feel that I cannot do better than develop my new synthesis against these ordinary views as a background. The first objection to "votes for women on the same terms as men" is, in my view, that it has not related itself to the facts of married and of family life. It asks for a vote for the woman who is householder or lodger, but not for the woman who is wife and mother. It means that when a woman enters what is (and what must remain) the higher realm of marriage, she is to lose the vote she had when a spinster, or retain it by her husband losing his. It means that at his death, with all the piteous loss which that means, she is to get—a vote! It means that the less useful (so, despite their admitted usefulness and value) unmarried women vote, and those who render the more precious service to the world are voteless. Mr Harman's note in the October HIBBERT points to the value of parentage in the training of the woman, and there is truth in his contention. Perhaps the emphasis should be as much upon wifehood as upon motherhood, and certainly we should admit that the great woman professions such as nursing or teaching are not to be deprecated as schools of character: nevertheless, we can never admit a scheme which is going to send the eldest daughter (lodger vote) off on her bicycle to the poll, while her mother, with thirty years of love and of self-sacrifice in her heart, stays at home. Such a conclusion offends every man's love for his wife; it breaks every canon of justice; and it cuts athwart the hero-worshipping instinct of the home-loving woman, since it puts upon a level with father or husband, not mother—but the lodger next door or the one-room spinster down the street.

This objection is fatal to the ordinary suffragette view, but it may indicate to us what is the right approach to the problem, which is, precisely, the inadequacy of the present male vote. A young man attains to the age of twentyone, and to the partial independence implied in the status lodger. At once he counts one in an election. A few years pass, manhood's experience and wisdom come, his social duties deepen, and anon marriage. Neither wisdom nor the fact that he now represents two in the commonwealth, appear to matter; he still counts but one. Years pass, and children come; his home is a school for the citizens of to-morrow: economic and social activities deepen and multiply; wisdom and experience increase, but nothing matters. He still counts one only; and at fifty, when he speaks for self and wife and children and years of learning, the State counts him no more than on the day he had ceased to be a boy. The position would be amusing were it not serious.

I say the State counts him no more than it had counted him just as he ceased to be a boy. This is not quite right. In an odd way—which is quite ineffective and which we habitually forget, and yet which is valuable as an admission of principle—the English constitution recognises a difference.

In all matters of franchise it is not only the vote, but its "weight," which counts. How much of a representative do you elect, a one-hundredth, or a ten-thousandth? Now, it has been our custom, in determining the number of representatives for a given place, to follow the numbers of population, and not of male voters. In practice, of course, it is much the same thing; and, moreover, population changes so rapidly and redistribution of seats gets undertaken so tardily, that the distinction does not matter; but in theory the difference is important. For it implies that a constituency of x voters and y population should get the same representation as another constituency whose voters numbered but one-half x if its population were also y. The male vote, that is to say, is partially a trust on behalf of the unvoting population; and its "weight," so to speak, depends upon the number of women and children. If we may digress for a moment, it is odd that this point has not been pressed into service during the recent discussions. What a weapon for the suffragists! "You deny women the vote, gentlemen, but a portion of the power of your own votes depends upon their existence and their numbers in the constituency." Or the delight of making play with such an argument as, "We seek only to exercise, in our proper persons, the political power which the State has given to men in trust for us." Or how the "Antis" might have triumphed over the "no representation, no law-abidingness" theories by showing how definitely the State had recognised the woman's position, and had left her to make it effective by her personal and private influence with her men people. Verily, the world has missed a bit of added humour in a situation which has never been wholly void of that article.

But it is quite clear that the method of mitigating the inadequacy of the male vote by building representation upon population is not effective, and that inadequacy remains, glaring and preposterous. It is to votes for women that I look as the means of rectifying this; but it must be votes for wives and mothers first. Do not start, my dear sir; does not your wife

already (and who so happy as you when she promised to undertake the job?) spend half your income, look after your meals, lend you her taste in music or books, train your children? Could she not, with you at her side, be trusted as one of the ten or twenty thousand who select one poor member of Parliament? I ask for votes for married women first, because, if women are to come to political consciousness (as I wish), I want that consciousness to grow up among and be trained by the men who have so far borne (with perhaps a not too great measure of failing) the burden of political power; I do not wish their entry into politics to be alone, in bitterness and opposition. I want votes not for a few girls or widows but for those (the great majority) who have assumed the full burden of womanly sacrifice and love. I want these votes to redress the inadequacy of the present system, so that the more stable element of the nation may speak with that fuller voice which is its right; I want them that the Home and the experience which has made it, and been made by it, may be rightly heard in the nation's counsels.

But it will be argued that such a step would lead to endless discussion in the home; as though discussion were not good, and as though home would not be more interesting for the introduction of a new and vital theme for study, conversation, and, probably, united action. Of course, discussions may lead to dissensions. Men and women are very fallible: they sometimes quarrel now; and, given a new and difficult problem, those who are inclined that way will just have another subject for dispute. But I cannot agree that we should limit our pursuit of good to those fields only where we are not likely to fail; no good comes of that cowardice. Everywhere I find love and good sense solving difficulties in homes; economic differences, differences in religion, varying ideas of culture and education, compose themselves in that mystic heart-laboratory where these subtle chemists preside. Shall we doubt the same would happen with politics? Is the average man so insincere a thinker, or is his political faith so

unworthy, that he should fear to bring either his thinking or his creed to the judgment of the woman who, for the most part, looks up to him with honest respect? Were it so, it would be indeed high time that we gave, but in how different a spirit, votes to women!

Votes for women householders would, of course, be included in the scheme I should propose; votes for women lodgers would follow in good time. But the first thing is votes for those, the wives and mothers, to whom, if we but stop to think, nature and our love and theirs have given a power and an influence so great that in comparison the vote is a small thing.

One other point should here be borne in mind. The householder and lodger qualifications, as every student knows, are attenuated forms of a property franchise. Now, to base the vote upon property, as such, is a mistake; it should rest upon one's status and function as citizen. (Of course the property franchise originally meant this; property was index to, and proof of, citizenship.) Now, in maintaining even these attenuated forms of a franchise resting upon mere possessions, we are wrong. A modern John Wesley, who should say "The world is my parish," and who should go about doing good from, as his only home, a furnished motor-car, would find himself disfranchised. Men and officers of our mercantile marine are frequently without votes, though who better earn them by service to the community I do not know.

Those who are urging votes for woman upon the ground that she is householder or lodger have failed to note that they are putting her claims upon a property qualification, not upon a personal qualification; I am sure they do not mean this.

IV.

The second big argument against "votes for women upon the same terms as men" rests in the conception of the sexes as complementary and not equivalent. Each, it is suggested, is Vot. IX.—No. 2. differentiated for its peculiar function; the truer life is in their mutual harmony,

"Not like in like, but like in difference."

Politics is essentially (the argument proceeds) a masculine business; woman is for the most part without political capacity. We must look at these positions.

First, it not seldom happens that this theory, when used to limit the woman's sphere, gains no small strength from a different strain of thought. The conception that woman is an irrational and perverse creature, a thing of whims and waywardnesses, is probably as old as is sex itself. Probably no man, however happy in his womankind, however conscious of his debt to them, but imagines, at some moments, that he has a quite unique and special experience of this inexplicable creature's inexplicable qualities! "You seek to give her the vote; Heaven forfend! Would not, perchance, the very colour of a candidate's necktie determine her?"—and the man. poor fellow, trembles at the prospect. Now, I don't propose to deal with the question whether woman is or is not perverse. I only want to point out that, even if she be, it is certain that different women will be differently perverse, and that therefore the waywardness of one would cancel that of another. So we will get this distortion of the complemental theory out of the way.

Another view of women's unsuitability for politics is not less beside the mark. Politics, it is said, are too tainted for a good woman to busy herself with them. There are bitternesses and rancours, party spirit, motive-mongering, insincerities, personal ambitions, dishonesties. We cannot but sympathise with Mrs Low in her objection to turning women into partisans; and this same fear was well expressed not so long ago by Mr A. D. Steel-Maitland, M.P. But surely what is unclean for woman is already unclean for man. If we cannot with equanimity see our women becoming mere partisans, can we not open our eyes and see how wrong it is, how

wasteful, that party spirit should rule as it now does in the male political world? What such an objection really seeks is a purification of politics—a lessening of the powers of the agent, the canvasser, and the bill-sticker. Perhaps if women shared our politics, we, who have cared not to protect our manhood against these debasements, would stay them for women's sake, and the whole nation would gain.

Another mistaken use of the complemental theory is the argument that, if women were inapt for politics, it is an inaptitude due to lack of training, which opportunity would remove. We permit men to learn their business as voters; why not permit women? This rather begs the question; the point at issue is that men may have a natural aptitude for politics which needs only training for its perfection; women may not possess this natural gift.

Let us turn, then, from the errors and distortions with which the complemental view of the sexes has been used in this discussion, and ask what is the truth of this theory, and how does it apply to our problem. In the first place, the difference between man and woman—the difference by reason of which each has its own functions, and a complementary theory can come into being-is not a difference due to sex only. It is due to the fact that life usually takes this original difference and develops it to full extent and beauty. Take a girl of fourteen and give her a masculine training; give her none of the secondary expressions of sex in dress or accomplishment, and deny her the possibility of wifehood and motherhood; give her no poor to visit, or sick to nurse, and give her, instead, the coldness and impersonality of man's pursuits; you will get a very unhappy woman, but you will get one who will be practically man's equal in man's own fields. The adult man and woman differ, because life took the one and flung him into external work, into productive energies, into the handling of affairs, and so trained him to foresight, wide grasp, perseverance, mastery; whereas life took the other and trained her to detailed cares and fine delicacies of thought and of act,

to gentleness, and to patience. I believe history will support me if I postulate that politics, broadly speaking, is a business which calls for the former masculine rather than the latter feminine qualities. It has been, and still is, largely a matter of peace and war; it involves the conditioning of, and supremacy over, vast productive energies; its large scale needs the big grasp and the sure command. If we say that women are unsuited to much of this, we but pay a compliment to the spirit of sacrifice with which they have accepted the special calls life had for them, and, specialising themselves for their own work, have, in so doing, become less competent for ours. And we must admit, too, the possibility of frequent exceptions to this general differentiation—here, women of brilliant intellect or of unusual experience, upon whom life has thrown (perhaps) masculine duties and trained to masculine qualities; and there, men, indolent, maybe, or unfortunate, trained in narrow fields, and restrained from any fair development of manhood's bigness.

That is the first point I want clear, that the difference between the sexes, while real, and while including generally a greater genius for politics upon the part of the man than of the woman, is a difference due not to sex only, but to sex plus life, and is subject to many exceptions. My next point is that the complemental theory of sex does not imply the nullity and voicelessness of either, even about those things which are primarily within the province of the other. It implies, on the contrary, that concerning every subject each sex may have its own point of view, its own inspiration, its own ideal; the truth will lie in mutual correction and the resultant harmony. It is not given to either to see all the truth; each can learn of the It is the interaction of two minds upon the one problem, even though one bring less to the solution than the other, which is the central truth of the complemental theory. And for politics this interaction is more necessary than we think. For withal, politics are mechanism. Now, the woman's life is above mechanism; she moves in a higher sphere.

hers to build the house, but to be its light and its beauty. Not hers to handle affairs, but to be and to create that nobler world for which affairs exist. Therefore in politics we need her voice that we may be told whether our affairs are well or ill managed—we need her judgment to know whether the State which our politics create is all it should be.

Looked at thus, the complemental theory becomes a support to the gift of votes to women, but not upon a mere mechanical "same terms as men."

V.

The third big objection to woman suffrage is somewhat apart from and somewhat connected with the question of feminine aptitude for politics which we have just been considering. It is an objection which is temporary in its antagonism to the usual demand; and yet, temporarily, and against that usual demand, absolutely fatal. It lies in the present lack of political education and training which to-day marks the great majority of our women.

Now, this is an important point. By far the greater half of the nation's womanhood has no political education and little political knowledge. At a moment when a Florence Nightingale lies but newly dead, and when a Beatrice Webb labours among us, this seems a hard saying, but I believe it to be profoundly true. Nor is it to woman's discredit that it is so; mostly, the fact is the measure of her specialisation upon her conventional functions, and the measure of our neglect (who vote partly as her trustees) to consult her and to teach. Nor can the position be turned by any of the usual platitudes. "Are men trained?" say the suffragettes; "are we less equipped than they? Or, rather, you never ask their equipment for political power: why ask ours?" To argue this is to forget that a representative system may stand a given volume of ignorance or unwisdom, but not double as much. It may be hard to be told that you may not be given a privilege already possessed by one no whit wiser than yourself; but if civic safety depends upon the illogicality, the State must continue illogical. Probably, judged by any even low standard of political competence, at least forty per cent. of male voters are too untrained for their function; but if we give votes to women, and mean thereby all women (as, finally, we must mean), we more than double the electorate, and probably some seventy-five per cent. of the addition are equally untrained. One sees at once what would be the proportions in the new electorate. Nor can we fall back on the argument which Macaulay used so happily: political competence is the product of political power, and to deny the vote until those who should receive it are capable of its exercise is as if one should say he would not enter the water until he knew how to swim: because we are dealing with a class whose natural and acquired qualities turn it somewhat away from politics, so that its learning may be slow and uncertain; and yet whose numbers are so large that they swamp the ordinary electorate and may bring its incompetence into fruition before it has had time to learn.

But this difficulty, so insuperable to the ordinary polemic, is by no means so vital in our new synthesis. We brought over from our last section the problem how to give to men, who are and will ordinarily be the more competent politicians, somewhat greater power than to women; and yet to give fair play to every woman and larger power to the exceptional ones. Can we combine these two problems for one solution, and meet the needs of the situation in respect to woman's present lack of political knowledge by the same device as meets her probably permanent lesser political aptitude? I think we can. The true problem, as I see it, is not one of sex at all, but one of securing to knowledge and ability a greater power in politics than is given to their opposites. To enfranchise wisdom more than ignorance, experience more than inexperience, is the point at issue.

Our fathers sought to do this in and by class representation, property representation, etc., etc.; and the story of their

failure is written in our histories. We, not less unwise, have given up wholly the ideal of a wisdom franchise. Time after time have we widened the franchise, and at no time have we sought to give more authority to knowledge or to capacity. As a voter your very Prime Minister counts but equal to his coachman, so far as personal (apart from property) qualification goes—a condition which obtains, be it observed, in no other business under the sun. And the result of all this widening of voting power and nullification of thought-power is—well, say the general election of last January, its halfpenny press and its posters.

To remedy all this, we need not restore obsolete or oligarchic franchises. There is a better way. All around us life, in a rough but not too ineffective fashion, sorts out the wiser from the less wise. Consider. If we should take all University students (men or women) who had obtained a degree of moderate value; add thereto the diplomaed members of the learned professions, doctors, clergy, lawyers, engineers, teachers, nurses, etc.; bring in all employers of labour who run their own businesses, managing directors, works managers, foremen of standing, principal clerks; include large shopkeepers and shop managers, and officers in army, navy and mercantile marine, who have attained a specified rank; add chiefs of the civil service, journalists, artists, authors; add again landlords who personally control large estates, head bailiffs of standing, and all the large farmers; include further every member of Parliament, or of a County, Town or District Council; add all magistrates, the head officers of every kind of municipal, etc., undertaking; include not less the heads of every important branch of every Trade Union, the leaders of the great Friendly Societies, the men and women who form our hospitals' committees or who direct our early morning schools; and, in a general kind of way, add also all men or women who, in the thousand-and-one social labours and organisations of the country, take or are elected to leadership:-get all these together, I say, and consider what a

magnificent constituency they will form. They will be persons trained by life itself to just those qualities which politics call for — foresight, width of vision and of grasp, qualities of daring, of perseverance, and of impersonal thought; persons, too, characterised by integrity and honour whom others shall readily trust. They will, from the nature of things, be mostly men; but women will not by reason of sex be excluded, and the best women of the day will naturally find inclusion in such a body. It will be no close corporation; no one will be kept out by fear or favour; and to gain place among its ranks will be a legitimate ambition. It will be a constituency continually renewing itself, and thus continually revitalised by new ideas. If we can get such a constituency and give it organisation and power, our problem is solved.

We have such men and women. Life itself selects them. It remains only to enroll them upon a list of wisdom voters; which, since their qualifications are and have to be patent to the world at large, any revising officer could easily do. Given such a roll of voters, we have to endow them with power. We are discussing the position and function of a second chamber,1 could we not base such a chamber upon just this wisdom franchise, and endow it with considerable powers both of suggestion and revision, with finally the right to refer to the electorate, by some approved form of referendum, problems upon which it disagreed with the Commons House? There are, of course, other ways in which we can bring such a wisdom electorate inside the limits of our ancient constitution; the precise form does not greatly matter, but what does matter is that we should see that here is this volume of practical wisdom and experience among us, and that to organise and to empower it is to solve half a dozen problems at once. Generally, it will be that endowment of knowledge with power which has been

¹ This was written before the failure of the Veto Conference was announced, and of course in ignorance of subsequent events. I believe it is precisely in the organisation of the wisdom franchise suggested that our best way to an ideal revising chamber lies.

the dream of Philosophy, and which was never more necessary than to-day. Specially, and as touching our present problem, it will, since most of the wisdom electors will be men, secure that masculine predominance in politics which, for reasons set forth, I believe to be proper; and yet many women will be among the wisdom voters, and it is not sex per se which will keep out or bring in. And it will also, by the extra strength and stability it can give to the State, permit a widening of the franchise which, without it, would, by reason of the ignorance of the new voters, be too risky an experiment.

VI.

But when we have put votes for women upon this new ground we have not removed all the objections. The vote implies a certain publicity, an open expression of, even emphasis upon, one's own views. Moreover, already the woman's vote in local matters is leading to her presence upon local governing bodies; it is likely enough that her vote in national affairs may lead to her presence in the national council-chamber. Now, all this, of public appearance and of public action, is, to many women, intolerably repellant. Consciously or unconsciously, these have founded their lives upon a theory which gives to the man power and to the woman influence; his is to be the public direction, hers the private inspiration, of the great national movements; or he is to determine the big things, and she, in secret and unobtrusive ways, will aid in doing them. Now, if we give votes to women without meeting the difficulty involved in this dislike of publicity and masterhood, one of two things will happen. We shall either silence the more retiring women, while permitting a voice to their more adventurous sisters, and so at once falsify the expression of opinion and rob the State of one factor of wisdom; or we shall place upon the quieter women a strain which, though small, is improper and cruel. That one of these eventualities—or more probably a measure of both—is likely, is indicated to us in the attitude of the quieter

men towards politics: whenever politics reach a certain point of stringency and vulgarity, they retire; the voice of the people is falsified by excess of the clamant note, and the collective wisdom is the poorer by the silence of those who, not seldom, possess the surer knowledge. American politics afford us the best instance of this danger.

It is easy, of course, to speak of woman's distaste for publicity as old-fashioned or conventional. So far as it is an insincere convention we may be content that it should cease; but it is with many not this at all. The quiet mind is good, even in modern days, and in man not less than in woman; too often both temperament and life drill it out of us, and we should be happy that our sisters cherish it more successfully. Nor is the modest and reticent character a synonym for nullity and powerlessness; the God of the prophet's vision was not in the earthquake, nor yet in the fire, but in the still, small voice. We want to recognise, I think, that there is more than one ideal of womanly character and of woman's relation to man. The ideal of the comrade-woman, awake, vigorous, ubiquitous, shrinking neither from publicity nor solitude, neither from authority nor lowliness, is good; may it grow and develop its best! But not less good is the ideal of the sheltered woman, cloistered at home, to be there the surer inspiration, wielding through husband or through sons a power the greater because she wears no crown and accepts no plaudits. I want each theory to accept its opposite. I want women recognised as truly womanly despite the fact that they share in the most public of social labours; I want them equally recognised as potent for good though they choose only the quiet services of the home and the unsung charities and influences of the daily round. Therefore, when the vote is given to women, I ask that each woman who so wishes shall be allowed to vote by proxy; so that, while all who care may vote as a man votes, those to whom the duty of personal reticence appeals may express themselves (as in so many other fields they do) through the men they trust. The

right to transfer a vote should be confined to the most elementary relationships, as wife and husband, sister and brother, mother and son. It should be necessary that the transfer be in writing, sufficiently witnessed, and special only to each occasion for its use—not a general transfer. The strongest punishments should await either undue influence or forgery.

It is probable that, as the world of politics grows purer, this transfer of a vote will be decreasingly used. But as things stand to-day, woman's genius for the quiet life is a great objection, in the minds of many of the best women, to her entry into the polling-booth. I claim that that objection should be fairly met, for the sake of much that is most precious in the characters of women.

VII.

Such then, put in briefest outline, is the new view of this problem for which I ask consideration. Of course there are many objections possible. Here is not space to discuss them, but I believe that I could so analyse most of them as to show even more conclusively the strength and sureness of the foundation I rest upon—which is, essentially, that in this matter there can be no real opposition between the interests of men and women, and that it is ours to live and to act together, husbands and wives, brothers and sisters, in public things as in private.

But there are two objections which I must consider.

The first is that which may be put forward, fairly enough, by those who have supported the movement of votes for women as it now stands. "We," they may say, "and those who have preceded us, have laboured for this cause for more than a generation; it has been hard enough; success we now think to be possible; why, now, do you ask us to burden ourselves with other reforms, even though they be good? Let us win our fight, and let our successors attempt the further problems."

Now, the answer to this is brief. I am not so sure that

success is near; personally, I think it farther away than ever by reason of recent events. But success is not the primal consideration. In this world what matters most is not that you win in your movement, but that your movement shall be developed up to its full measure of idealism, and pressed forward with clean and moderate methods. As I see life. half or more than half of the evils that afflict us have arisen because, in the past, good movements have not understood themselves, have not found out either their own true good, their own limitations, or the hidden good of what they opposed; and have been pushed on to what appeared success, but what has proved to be half-failure. To hasten slowly is good, not for slowness' sake, but that you may become clearer in your aims, wiser in your walk. And so I submit that, if woman suffrage is to do the good which its best supporters hope it will do, it can only be by it taking on its most ideal character and associating itself with every other reform which will help to bring out its true message.

The other objection is from the opposite side. Those who have not been attracted yet to the suffrage movement will say: "Well, after all, why should we go to all this trouble of reform unless votes for women are absolutely necessary; you have told us the best form such voting power should take, but—why give it at all?"

Here I am quite willing to admit that much has been said, as reason for giving votes to women, that is quite beside the mark. Principal Childs has saved us all trouble by his honesty in confessing that most of the arguments of his own side (though I don't know how they will like the confession) will not hold.

Perhaps we ought not to expect coherent reasons for its faith from the suffrage movement as it is with us to-day. For it is not a self-contained movement, inspired solely by political motives and making solely for political ends. It is at bottom but an aspect or division of a larger movement, feminism generally, which has been with us for some generations. Strangely compacted has that movement been. It has been

inspired by the justest of indignation against monstrous wrongs, and has breathed a spirit of pity and of help for uneducated girlhood and for neglected or ill-used womanhood. Upon the other hand it has also been inspired by hasty and mistaken philosophies, by misreadings of history, by the pressure of an economic system which is comparatively modern and which may ere long change to better things, and also (be it added) by something not unlike sheer selfishness and sheer neurasthenia. It has thrown up no big leader or philosopher, capable of sorting out its good from its evil, its temporary protests from its eternal rights, or able to state it in terms of constructive rather than of merely reactive thought.

If, then, the ordinary arguments pro do not convince us, where shall we turn? I am not convinced that Principal Childs' conclusion that Englishwomen are generally awaking to political consciousness is otherwise than an overstatement; the suffrage movement is much more intensive than extensive. His second point, that we must grant votes to women because in no other way can we quiet the present extreme agitation, raises a point which as practical men we cannot ignore; but it does not carry conviction. Any unhappy agitation must, in the interests of civic peace, receive the consideration necessary to arrive at honest conclusions and wise action concerning it, but it does not follow that it will be right to give the agitators all they ask.

Essentially the real reason why women should have the vote is the same as the reason why men should have it. Freedom is a necessity to personality; and by freedom we mean, in Kant's phrase, that a man should be his own end and not live merely to serve the ends of others. His own purposes must determine his action, and his own reason guide and determine his purposes. Since man lives in society and not alone, the reason which considers and the will which concludes are both subject to social inspiration and to social pressure: so far, liberty is partially limited by society. But it makes much difference, first, whether the social pressure is by mere force of

public opinion, to be ignored if one will, or works by means of a political system which can only be disobeyed at peril. Secondly, it makes much difference whether the social pressure is free to act in crude and brute forms; or is, by an over-ruling political system, confined to intellectual and spiritual influence and appeal. A political system, that is to say, has power to maintain the social pressures of society upon such a plane that they are instigations to the individual, but not brute limitations of his freedom; and thus it protects freedom: or it may permit, or itself may become the exponent of, such social pressure as positively hinders and enslaves. Because this is so, the political constitution is, as Green pointed out, a kind of Fate over the individual; it gives limits which he may not overstep, laws which he must obey, and either creates or permits (or both) a total scheme of things into which he must fit himself. Thus it is all-important that he himself be permitted to inspire, to make and to change that State which thus over-rules him. Given such power, he is a free man; his personality is not the mere servant of the community in which he lives, but can itself alter that community. Without such power, he is in measure enslaved, and this whatever may be the form of the community he lives not "in" but "under." And this power to affect one's own political constitution rests firstly upon freedom of speech, of writing, and of association, and secondly upon the vote.

Women are free personalities just as men are. They are entitled to just the same freedom. They are already, by somewhat unhappy economic conditions, combined with false views of marriage, frequently hindered in personal development and personal expression. Their votelessness adds to this state of tutelage. It is a fair claim, and precisely upon the broad human ground that I have set forth, that this votelessness should be removed. Other reasons there are for this reform, but here is the central one, and it alone is enough: the vote is necessary to freedom. With it, one is "of" and "in" society; without it one is "under."

VIII.

The writer of these words is not more than an observer and a student-just a mere man in the street, permitted for a few moments to become vocal and address his neighbours. has no right to ask that his words shall receive more attention than their inherent reasonableness may deserve. Accordingly he has felt that he ought, so far as it were possible, to discuss this matter as though it existed purely in vacuo. But he does not feel thus coldly. In common, as he imagines with the great majority of his fellow-citizens, he has not seldom felt pained, shamed even, at the excesses and the indifference which have marked the developments of the suffrage movement. But he feels that much of this may have an intellectual cause; we could not see through the problem, and so we raved or mocked or ignored. Seen in this new light, he believes this problem is not so intractable. And if he may close upon a note of appeal, he would ask that no facile judgment of "Utopian!" may prevent this new synthesis from receiving consideration. That word, turning one of the sweetest English dreams into a synonym for hopelessness, has too long disgraced our dictionary. No big ideals are necessarily impossible. We may make them so by our own smallness, by indolence, lack of imagination, prejudice, passion. In this matter we may, if we so choose, have generations of confused and murky strife, and ebb and flow of purposeless battle; or we may have the peace and the growth which comes of clear thought and daring ideal. looking round, we feel that there is not among us enough of moral fervour or of fine insight to make succeed such a scheme as I have suggested-well, it becomes one more reason why we should both work and pray for that upon which this reform (and every other reform worth anything) must rest-more religion and deeper, and a truer and more practical education.

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THE THEOLOGY OF LAUGHTER.

THE RIGHT REV. J. E. MERCER, D.D.,

Bishop of Tasmania,

In the July number of the Hibbert Journal appeared a stimulating article on the Comic. In it the writer shows how Plato "has placed comedy where, perhaps, no philosopher before or after him ever had the vision to place it—in the heaven of man's highest endeavour." It so happens that I have long reflected on the possible "divine affinities of comedy," and I am now emboldened to offer the results of my reflection as a sequel to the points so ably dealt with in the article.

My special problem in its simplest form is this: Have we any ground for attributing to the divine nature a mode of experience at all analogous to that which we know as a sense of humour? A perilous question! Some would say, an irreverent question! Well, I appeal to the facts of life, and I maintain that certain of them urge this problem on the philosophic mind. The multitudinous cross-purposes and maladjustments which arrest our attention at every turn are, many of them, not of our making. They have every appearance of being built into the nature of things, and, when not of too overwhelmingly serious import, of frequently possessing an element of the ludicrous in their own right. It seems to follow, therefore, that this element must be traced back to some ground in the being and attributes of the Creator.

Should there be certain minds which, in spite of the challenge thus thrown down by the facts of life, still shrink

from inquiry on such a subject, I confess to much sympathy with them. For it is immensely difficult to intellectualise our conviction that God can feel emotion of any kind. Witness the first Article of the Church of England's Thirty-nine, which lays down as a fundamental truth that God is not only without body or parts, but also without passions. And yet the Church Catechism teaches the child to believe that God is love, and is to be regarded as a Father. Here is an antinomy! But it does not trouble the average Christian, and even theologians are wont to accept it without much demur. Why, then, shrink from an inquiry into the theology of laughter? If it is argued that a sense of humour is not worthy of God, then I appeal to the Scriptures of that race which has been preeminent for reverence. What says the psalmist? "He that sitteth in the heavens shall laugh: the Lord shall have them in derision." This piece of vivid and dramatic anthropomorphism does not stand alone. And surely it arouses in us a train of thought parallel to that aroused by the facts of life. For if we think with any thoroughness, we are driven to ask how far the psalmist is justified in attributing to God this special form of emotion—a sense of incongruity blending with a feeling of triumph.

The issues involved in the problem are so vast and complex, and impinge upon so many questions of heated controversy, that the merest outlines of what promises to be a helpful course of speculation must suffice. And as a preliminary I will briefly define the limits within which I propose to move. I take the standpoint of a theist who has accepted in broad essentials the hypothesis of the evolutionists. Such a theist is free to think of God as a Person, and of the cosmic process as an unfolding manifestation of His will. In philosophy he may be an idealist; but he will not be able to manipulate the concept of an abstract and all-devouring Absolute; nor can he in any way consent to refine God to a transparency. He will hold that in whatever sense the universe is concrete, God is concrete, and that while we may

emphasise His transcendence we must emphasise no less His immanence.

Having provided a basis for discussion, I proceed to rule out two factors which bulk largely in human laughter, but are practically irrelevant to our present purpose. The first of these is the physiological aspect of laughter. We cannot ascribe to God in any direct fashion the intermittent expirations which constitute the most characteristic expression of the sense of the ludicrous, nor the neuro-muscular activities which cause (or accompany) the group of sensations associated with This physical side of laughter is not, indeed, wholly outside the scope of our inquiry. For if brought into living connection with the doctrine of immanence, these material phenomena are themselves spiritualised. To follow this track, however, would lead us too far afield. The second factor to be excluded is that of the unexpectedness which, as all psychologists agree, forms an important element in an analysis of the causes and nature of human laughter-the suddenness, we may almost say the disillusionment. This factor does not allow itself to be lightly transferred to an omniscient mind, though it is curiously provocative of well-known controversies. For does it not present a pale reflection of the still unsolved problem of the resolution of divine foreknowledge to creaturely free-will? Is it possible that an event to God may be at once expected and unexpected? I must leave this problem to the Pragmatists.

Having thus cleared the ground, I turn to examine the main theories as to the physical nature and function of laughter, with a view to discovering what significance they may have, individually or collectively, from the standpoint of the theistic evolutionist. The first to present itself is that which Plato clearly formulated in his *Philebus*. He there maintains that the pleasure of the ludicrous springs from the sight of another's misfortunes, the misfortune, however, being a kind of self-ignorance that is powerless to inflict hurt. Hobbes espoused this view, and expounded it with his usual

vigour and plainness of speech. He held that laughter is "a sudden glory arising from the sudden conception of some eminence in ourselves as compared with the infirmities of others." This theory implies not only a sense of superiority, but also at least a "spice" of malice. Nor is this sinister factor eliminated by the more subtle turn that Aristotle gives to the theory when he teaches, in the Poetics, that "the ludicrous is a defect of some sort, and an ugliness which is not painful or destructive."

If we bring this theory to the test of the evolutionary hypothesis, it at once receives and gives striking confirmation of development on these lines. The exulting of the primitive savage over his captive or fallen foe, the heartless vaunting of the Homeric hero in the hour of victory, the "inextinguishable laughter" at bodily defect that Homer pictures for us as breaking out in Olympus itself—these are predecessors of the average laugh among the cultured races of to-day. They are the outcome of man's struggle for existence. They relieve the tension, and express the joy, when an effort at self-preservation has proved successful; they are full-flavoured with Hobbes' "sudden glory"; they enable us to understand the psalmist's shout of confidence when Jehovah intervenes on his behalf.

So much for the theory. What is its theological bearing? We may at once eliminate one element in such manifestations of triumph—the element of malice. Even in the case of human development we can see how its scope and power are continuously reduced until, in the finest minds, it reaches vanishing point. In the perfect mind it could never exist. Perchance our first impulse would be to declare that when omnipotence is at work there can be no struggle, and that therefore the laugh of triumph, however sublimated, must likewise be confined to the sphere of the finite. Thus the psalmist's anthropomorphism must be treated as the mere expression of tense personal feeling wrought into poetic form. To disturb the logical limpidity of this conclusion there glide

into our minds the Bible accounts of the war in heaven, and all the wealth of human experience that went to their making. Taking this war as symbolical of something beyond our reach, we can at any rate ask if it covers a genuine struggle. If the answer is in the negative, the whole conception takes on an air of unreality. What, again, would be the final significance of the Agony in the garden, unless the foe there wrestled with had real power? We recall also John Stuart Mill's inference from the facts of existence, that God may be truly in need of our co-operation. There flash upon us, moreover, the strenuous arguments of modern Pluralists, especially those of Howison, for the recognition of an ultimate clash of wills. I am not now defending or arraigning such speculations, but only pointing out that, even where omnipotence is concerned, there may be irreducible antinomies which may render an experience of triumph not altogether inconceivable. In other words, the psalmist's bold and intuitive anthropomorphism may, after all, find some transcendental echo in the courts of heaven.

As an off-shoot of this first theory, we have the acute speculation of the Schoolmen, based on the Platonic ideals or patterns in the divine mind. These ideals are perfect, but are very imperfectly realised by finite individual beings, either in themselves or in their relations to each other. Hence in the finite world all manner of deficiencies manifest themselves some serious enough to move to disgust or indignation, some harmless enough to stimulate a perception of the ridiculous. Deficiency thus becomes the fundamentum reale of the subjective perception. All this is as easily comprehensible as it is acute, and seems to bring us nearer to ordinary ways of thinking. But it does not throw any additional light on our particular problem. True, it postulates God as the perfect Being; but it does not resolve the antinomies suggested by the further analysis of the concepts employed. No definitely new factor has emerged, and the relation of the deficiencies to the divine mind is left undetermined.

Let us pass on to other theories of the ludicrous-for other theories there must be. The one we have examined has accounted for the origin of the feeling of the ludicrous in the human race. And yet it might be argued almost a priori that so composite a feeling must have a composite explanation. And we have surely learnt by this time that the results of long processes of development are not to be judged by their origins, but by what they are. More especially in the case of mental and moral developments, there has been throughout a constant rain of varied accessories which have influenced and modified, sometimes beyond recognition, the original type. It is this transforming growth that has brought about the ever-increasing richness and fulness of human modes of experience. And this is true of laughter and the sense of the ludicrous. We can realise the truth of this contention even if we study the laughter of a child. For, though often suffused by a sense of "sudden glory," it is also often an outcome of the pure joy of living, or of appreciation of sheer fun. Preyer tells us that he observed "roguish" laughter towards the end of the second year. If a composite nature is revealed thus early, we may safely expect it in the mind of the adult.

Bergson has explored one of these less obvious elements in laughter by following up the trail of evolutionary process. He works his discovery out in detail in an exceedingly interesting little treatise entitled *Le Rire*. He holds that there is no ludicrous, properly so called, outside the sphere of the strictly human. Any other being, open to observation, which appears to have a ludicrous aspect, acquires it by some resemblance to human beings, due to some mark we put upon it, or to some use we make of it. I fear I must dissent from this view. But whether it be sound or not, it affects the sub-human only, and leaves a definite sphere for the manifestation of genuine incongruities and maladjustments.

After this preface, Bergson enters on a line of thought that runs singularly parallel to the main trend of his larger works.

Life, he contends, is able to adapt itself to its environment, and the more plastic and supple it is, the more speedy and perfect is the adaptation. To gain plasticity and suppleness, then, is a very definite advantage, and all that tends to increase these qualities will further the evolutionary process. Laughter is one of the spurs that tends to increase them, and so plays a practical part in making man master of his environment. A man stumbles and falls without seriously hurting himself; those around will find it difficult to repress at least a smile. Why? Because, says Bergson, he has displayed a lack of power of adjustment. Had he been more alert, he would have avoided the obstacle which occasioned his downfall. The mirth he arouses stimulates him to exercise, and so tends to sharpen his faculties. In short, laughter is seen to be an educative agency-unpleasant, indeed, at times, but effective. This idea is the heart of Bergson's treatise. He launches out from it on every side, showing the various subtle disguises it can assume, the strange metamorphoses it may undergo. It is drawn along in the creative processes of life, is protean in its manifestations, but always reveals to a penetrating analysis the secret of its origin and its vital function.

Such in briefest outline is Bergson's original and valuable theory. I am inclined to think he works it out too hard, but its substantial truth lies on the surface, and must at once appeal to all who have reflected on the uses and abuses of laughter. Our present concern is with its theological bearing, and this plunges us straightway into the vaster problem of the source and meaning and goal of the evolutionary process in its overwhelming totality. One central thought may save us from the swirling waters. Taking the theistic standpoint we may safely affirm that the cosmic process is a continuous unfolding of a supreme and personal purpose. Each detail of it is consciously willed. It follows that the sense of the ludicrous as an evolutionary agency is one of these details, and, as such, finds its source and ground in God. This carries us far. But it does not warrant the decision that God may

be the *subject* of such emotions as the sense of the ludicrous stirs in us. The utmost that is implied is that God may have willed this sense for our benefit, though Himself remaining outside its sphere. If we are to take the further step of attributing any analogue of human laughter to God, we must go beyond the bare phenomena of evolution, and discover some deeper element which shall involve mental and spiritual activities worthy of existing for their own sake. Is there such an element?

We turn, for answer, to those characteristics of laughter which may be deemed more distinctively and independently psychic. I have already noted that experience of suddenness and surprise cannot easily be attributed to omniscience. But this concession does not negative the possibility of ideational combinations which may have an analogy to such experience. I refer to the intellectual activities which lead to a sense of contrast or contradiction. Schopenhauer examines rather thoroughly this aspect of the ludicrous as paradox. He even puts a number of typical instances of the ludicrous into syllogistic shape, to show how, by the use of well-known reasoning processes, amusing incongruities may be analysed, and various species of them be distinguished. Now, given the possibility of such play of reason with itself, I have no very serious difficulty in ascribing such a form of mental activity to the divine Reason, and in finding here the ultimate ground, not only for Bergson's theory, but also for those imperfect correspondences and maladjustments which appear in human intercourse without man's conscious agency or intervention.

If it is argued, as against this, that the divine Reason must be perfect, and that, therefore, incongruities are impossible to it, I reply, first, that it is the keenest human intellects which are generally the most brilliant in creating and appreciating the ludicrous; and secondly, I repeat the contention that the facts of existence declare for the objectivity (in whatever sense of that term we may prefer) of the incongruous, no less than of the beautiful. To create and

perceive the incongruous does not necessitate self-deception or imperfection of mental power. It only implies a particular exercise of mental power, in the highest products of which there need be nothing derogatory to personal worth or dignity. Royce maintains that "the endless tension of the finite world is included in the contemplative consciousness of the repose and harmony of eternity." He views God as the Being "whose unity determines the very constitution, the lack, the tension, and relative disharmony of the finite world." He is expounding his solution of the problem of evil. I merely ask why such views should apply only to suffering and woe, and not also to the brighter sides of life? If there is a problem of the sad, there is no less a problem of the joyous. To shut one's eyes to this fact is surely to fail in any attempt to "see life steadily and see it whole."

My problem thus gives signs of yielding some kind of positive solution. Can we go deeper still? I think it may be possible if we distinguish wit and humour. Wit may be regarded as an accidental form of what we may broadly call the ludicrous, as is most plainly to be seen in plays upon words, and in chance combinations of incongruous ideas. But humour, properly so called, sounds a deeper note-I mean the humour of which Pater speaks, "The laughter which blends with tears, and even with the subleties of the imagination, and which in its most exquisite motives is one with pity." In humour of this nobler kind, the element of "sudden glory" may be transmuted into the gold of loving sympathy and tender insight. Hence, as was so strikingly emphasised in the article at first referred to, the close affinity between tragedy and comedy. Hence Aristotle's contention that one and the same man should write both. Hence (to take a particular instance) the poignancy of the daring conjunction of laughter and tears in the tragedy of Lear, where the sense of incongruity aroused by the weaknesses of a fine character is dissolved in the sense of the intrinsic worth and untold possibilities of a human soul. In short, when the humour is of

the noblest quality, the laugh of the body disappears; the subtleties of the intellect are subordinated to the finer emotions; there is the laugh of the soul. Such, though fraught with sadness, is the soul-laugh of Antigone—'Αλγοῦσα μὲν δῆτ' ἐι γελωτ' ἐν σοὶ γελω—" I laugh in sorrow if I laugh at thee." May not such soul-laughter, whether of joy or sorrow, come under the sway of Hegel's theory of reconciliation? For we see in it that division of spirit, that conflict of values, which constitute so large an element in tragedy. But tragic collision of wills and principles is not the only form such division and conflict may assume. There are an endless variety of tensions in the universe—a vast scale of degrees in their intensity; and there may be a corresponding variety in the modes of reconciliation. And thus a certain group of the perplexities of life may be relieved, not by the catastrophes of tragedy, but by the play of noble humour.

Here, then, is my conclusion. Reviewing the various thoughts above outlined, I maintain that if the Hebrew psalmist could attribute to God the laugh of conscious superiority, why should we hesitate to see in Him some analogue of the laugh of tender, loving insight? Mark the limitations I impose on my speculation. I avoid what I have called the accidents of laughter-the whole range of humanly conditioned forms it takes, from broad fun to finished literary product—the perversions to which it is subject, as experience, cynicism, pride, or malevolence. I have tried to penetrate to its essential features, and to show that these may have their root and ground in the "spiritual" sphere which culminates in God. Moreover, I recognise the anthropomorphic nature of our thoughts, and therefore speak not of laughter, but of its analogue. I lay stress upon the tension involved in genuine laughter, and on the relief it affords as a mode of reconciliation. Moving within these limits, I affirm that laughter has its theology strictly so-called.

Before the fall of the fatal blow, More moved his beard carefully from the block, and with a last flash of his quaint

and gentle irony, "than the bare axe more luminous and keen," muttered, "Pity that should be cut which has never committed treason." Disallow my contention, and this play of humour, unquenched in the very face of death, must be judged as a weakness, if not a folly. Allow my contention, and it gleams with pathetic significance and dignity. It proves that the spirit of the Christian scholar resolved the strange contradictions of his fate in the consciousness that he was a son of God.

J. E. TASMANIA.

HOBART, TASMANIA.

THE ROMAN CATHOLIC CHURCH IN ITALY AT THE PRESENT HOUR.¹

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To give in a few pages an exact and complete idea of the great religious drama which in our day is unfolding itself in the classical land of Papacy, is not an easy task. One has to deal with a movement leading little by little to a crisis impossible to foresee; what we can foresee is this, that it will be one of the most momentous crises recorded in history. The modern, open declaration of war against Papacy dates, in Italy, from the dawn of our national independence. Italy, which was awakening to a new life, could not forget that hers had been foreign chains, but chains that the Vatican had always blessed. And whilst many powerful attacks were being made against the Church from without, within the Church men of great mind and immaculate character, such as Rosmini, Gioberti, Lambruschini, were laying plans for a reform which was to bring back the Church to her former purity and spirituality. From the glorious days of our civil redemption to 1870, although few thought seriously of the religious question on account of the too many other anxious preoccupations which had arisen and had absorbed the whole attention of new Italy, still in the country which Garibaldi

¹ Compare with this the article by M. Paul Sabatier in the Hibbert Journal for October 1910, "De la situation religieuse de l'église catholique romaine, en France, à l'heure actuelle."—Editor.

and Victor Emanuel II. had politically emancipated, the great formula of Mazzini, "Dio e popolo," had not been forgotten, and the echo yet resounded of the cry, "Dio e patria," with which our martyrs, expiring in the galleys or on the scaffold, had greeted from afar the freedom of their country. In the year 1870, when, after the conquest of Rome and the fall of the temporal power of the Popes, the patriotic priests and the faithful among the laity found themselves at the cross-way, "either with the Church or with the country," the religious question entered a new phase, more critical than ever: the laity ended up by losing all interest in, and by tacitly severing itself from, the official Church; the clergy, especially the young part of it, began to prepare itself for that kind of ecclesiastical revolution which bears the name of Modernism.

The causes of this revolution are not difficult to discover if we consider for a moment the atmosphere and the conditions of Roman Catholicism in Italy. Here is what a group of priests write in a letter addressed to Pius X. and entitled, "Quel che vogliamo" (What we want): "Our society has now for many years entirely held aloof from the Church, which it considers as an ancient and inexorable foe. The old cathedrals, which the piety of free, believing peoples in the Middle Ages raised to the Virgin and to Patron Saints, are utterly deserted; men no longer care to draw from religion the strength and light necessary to the soul agitated by daily struggles; respect and veneration for all that has been held most sacred from the cradle, has vanished. And not only that, but the Church is considered an obstacle to the happiness of nations; the priest is insulted in public as a common, ignorant parasite; the Gospel and Christianity are regarded as expressions of a decayed civilisation, because they are entirely insufficient to answer to the ideals of freedom, justice, and science which are shaking the masses. . . . Few have remained faithful to their religious traditions, and even this minority shows symptoms of decay and lifelessness. For these few, religion, with its cold observance of formulas and traditional precepts, is no

longer a directing force in their life; church-going men are a small number; church-going women are slowly becoming rarer; and the young are growing up more than ever refractory to all religious education." In the Lettere Ghibelline (Ghibelline Letters), "Sibilla" (a pseudonym of someone who knows thoroughly the conditions of the Church) says: "To-day, an unbeliever desirous of entering the Roman Catholic Church seeks the living God, but finds a system of dogmatics, encircled by cast-iron formulas; a hierarchy which has all the majesty and strength of a Constantine organisation; the summus pontifex, who is, as he has been for centuries, a temporal prince, and still maintains the dignity of a throne and a court. All this, which was the natural result of a slow historical evolution, has given to Roman Catholicism great dignity and has rendered it organically more secure and more united, but has raised round the Holy City a mighty wall, which renders access difficult to outsiders, who find themselves confronted by too many obstacles when they endeavour to enter the Church of the Lord." Giuseppe Prezzolini, in his Cattolicismo rosso (Red Catholicism), says: "It is a painful fact: we have never found an Italian of the poorer classes praying to anyone but the Madonna, or perhaps some local saint. We find but few prayers addressed to our Saviour, and scarcely a trace of any to the Eternal Father. . . . And while the most ardent prayers to the Madonna are encouraged, we have not discovered a single instance in which the supplicant has been warned that, however good it may be to invoke the blessed Mother of our Lord, he must exercise extreme care that he does not allow these invocations to take the place of prayer to God himself. We can mention cases, and not among the most ignorant classes, in which the Madonna has been punished for not answering the prayers addressed to her, either by extinguishing the lamp in front of her image, or by turning the image with its face to the wall! And the clergy, as a rule, do not try to alter those sentiments. Amongst the priests all superstitious devotions find credence which

modern congregations, combining sentimentalism with the spirit of barter, have made the fashion. Moreover, they exercise no judgment upon what is handed down to them by those who have preceded them in their Churches, and appoint prayers and ceremonies to saints of old, claiming for them the value of ancient tradition, while in fact they do not date further back at most than the seventeenth century, and are the produce of small dealers in such wares; wares much in vogue at that period. But modern inventions of this nature are even more apparent in cases such as the 'snowball' system, for example: a formula of prayer to be recited for nine days, and then handed on to nine other devotees, who in their turn hand them on to nine more, and so on, naturally increasing the efficacy of the prayer! If these devotions resemble the way they pray in Thibet, there are others more harmful still, resembling (indeed almost identical with) the devotional practice of the Arabs, who swallow verses of the Koran: these devotions consist in swallowing small paper images of the Madonna and saints; a traditional practice, approved by the Holy Office under date 3rd August 1903."

Is it to be wondered at if in this atmosphere and under these conditions Modernism has raised its head? It has done so, because all is not dead in Roman Catholicism; it has done so, because the immense agglomeration of additions and superstitions has not yet quenched in its bosom the spark of Christ's Christianity; it has done so, as a protest against the mediæval ecclesiasticism of the Vatican. Modernism has permeated everywhere: seminaries, monasteries, town and country parishes through reviews, translations of foreign works, newspapers, pamphlets, secret circulars, it has carried everywhere the breath of new hopes, of new ideas, of new aspirations. I know many cells in different convents; I have entered the homes of many priests in the country and in town; I know well what the young think in more than one seminary; and am therefore in a position to state that of a hundred clerics from forty years of age onwards, no less than sixty keep most

jealously in their private desks the best products of the Modernist literature. The now suppressed reviews, such as La Rivista di Cultura, Il Rinnovamento, Nova et Vetera, Gli Studi Religiosi, La Rivista Storico-critica delle Scienze Teologiche, are secretly read over and over again by the young clergy. The Programme of the Modernists, the Letters of a Modernist Priest, the Battles of To-day (Le Battaglie d'oggi), a periodical which warmly discusses the most practical and delicate questions (compulsory celibacy, etc.), and the Democratic Action (L'azione Democratica), another periodical which keeps alive among the clergy the interest in the social question, circulate freely in the Church and fill with enthusiasm the young priesthood. Loisy, Houtin, Lagrange, Tyrrell, in their original tongue or in faithful translations, are the daily bread of these souls hungering after conceptions in harmony with modern conscience and mentality. And at every moment, vigorous circulars and pamphlets such as Unità e Libertà, La Vita della Chiesa, Che cosa vogliamo, Crisi d'anime nel Cattolicismo, Il Celibato, pass through the ranks of the clergy like sudden peals of thunder, and keep more than ever awake the expectant multitude.

What is really Modernism? It is a complex phenomenon. There are two things in Modernism: modernity, which is good, and exaggeration, which is bad. The one word, Modernism, which describes both, is most unfortunate, inasmuch as it only suggests reproof. It was invented by the Jesuit Fathers of Rome, and Pius X., who got it from them, has adopted it in his official documents, and uses it with free hand to condemn all the new disturbers of the Church. But all those who, though they have joined the new movement and desire modernity, dislike exaggeration, repudiate the name of Modernists; so that an inextricable confusion arises in the Roman camp, a confusion out of which it is possible to emerge only in one way: by accepting the word Modernism, because (failing a better) it is a convenient mode of describing the movement; but at the same time exercising great care in distinguishing

between what is good and what is bad in the fact described by it.

Modernism, I say, is a complex phenomenon, and therefore not susceptible of being defined by a formula. It is not a system. It is the synthesis of several new directions taken by theological and ecclesiastical thought in the Roman Church; directions which I shall endeavour to trace out as briefly and clearly as I can.

Here is, first, a group of noble souls who mourn to see popular piety attacked by the disease of an exaggerated and hysterical sentimentalism, and fossilised into a nerveless formalism. They are men such as Cardinal Alfonso Capecelatro, Archbishop of Capua, and Monsignor Geremia Bonomelli, Bishop of Cremona. Listen to Bishop Bonomelli, addressing the priests of his diocese: "I have seen altars dedicated to the Virgin and saints, hung with silk draperies, brilliantly illuminated, and great crowds prostrated before them, and I rejoiced; but then I saw the altar of the Holy Sacrament only modestly adorned, with but one poor lamp before it, and few, if any, worshippers. . . . Many times it has fallen to my lot to take part in processions in which the Sacrament, or some relic, or images of the Virgin or saints were carried, and I have observed with mingled wonder and regret that few people uncovered as the Sacrament passed, but many knelt as the relics or images passed, thus inverting the parts. . . . everything correct in this external worship? Is there nothing in it which offends the Christian sense? . . . " No one will deny the importance of these words. They are spoken by a man high up on the ladder of the hierarchy, and held in great esteem and consideration by the Church; but these men are sporadic; and besides, they point to the evil, but do not propose any remedy adequate to its gravity.

Secondly follows another group of more daring Modernists; so daring, that in their utterances they go to such a length as to be obliged to conceal their name under a pseudonym. For these venturesome men the question of the temporal

power of the Pope has been disposed of entirely. Here is what "Sibilla" says in the Lettere Ghibelline: "God conferred a blessing upon his Church, when, through the force of events, he liberated her from that earthly power which subjected the great lordship of the Church to the smaller interests of a kingdom. The Ultramontanes of Italy fight for a cause which is dead and buried." And further on: "In the Church, a reform is necessary to lead back the flock of Christ to the spirit of the Gospel." And in what is this reform to consist? "In the past," answers "Sibilla," "the reform called for was the improvement of conduct and of discipline; at the present day, the renovation required is of an intellectual kind; its aim is to see if the old interpretation of the Faith is adapted to our generation; if the primitive method of exegesis holds its own against the newer canons of historical criticism and research; if the mediæval concept of miracles should not be revised in the light of positive science; if it is sufficient to reply to new doubts, as formerly done, with the assertion of authority; if, in short, the human conception of Christianity should be the same for Jews converted in primitive times, for contemporaries of the scholastic period, and for the scientific believer of the twentieth century." And through whom must this renovation come? "It must come from above, in humble submission to the Pope; and by first passing through the hierarchy, must propagate itself in the lower ranks of the Roman Catholic family." What is now to be said of a renovation such as this, which is to be only intellectual? Giuseppe Prezzolini, in his Cattolicismo rosso, rightly says: "If you ask these Modernists where the disease of the Roman Church, which they say is sick, lies, they answer: In the head. And if you ask them again: What remedy do you propose for its cure? They reply: A library!" And what about this expectation of a reform from high places? Will ever any reform come from the Vatican as it is? And history, does it not say that reforms begun from above most frequently remain there and do not descend to transform the masses, unless Vol. IX.-No. 2.

something very deep stir the masses and awaken in them a longing for what is truly divine? Did the great and beneficent Franciscan movement begin in the upper classes? By no means. It began in the lower classes; and though it was finally recognised and accepted by the Church, much hostility had it first to overcome.

Thirdly come the hypercritical Modernists, whose views may be summarised as follows: Christ is not pre-existent, nor of miraculous birth, nor risen from the dead. Miracles are no longer historical facts, but fanciful veilings of moral teaching. The Synoptic Gospels abound in affirmations regarding the humanity of Christ, but are without a trace of any claim to divinity, affirmed by Christ himself. The Johannine Gospel is without historical foundation. None of the four evangelists ever meant to give us facts, but merely moral teaching. In the atmosphere of the primitive Church, it is not facts which created faith, but faith which created facts; or, in other words, the sacred writers did not first see, then believe, and then write, but they first believed, then imagined they saw, and then wrote. But with such a conception of Christ, and with a New Testament in which what is divine is spurious, what is grand is fantastic, and what is human is either not original or to be taken with a grain of salt, will a radical and lasting reform ever really be possible in the Church?

A fourth group of Modernists is that represented by the Christian Democracy, led by Romolo Murri. This movement does not concern itself either with Biblical criticism or dogma; it has arisen in connection with the social question; it desires to see men less unhappy than they are; longs to hasten the time when oppression of the weak and the poor will cease, when riches will be made better use of, when the bonds of human brotherhood will be more closely woven by the awakened conscience of a great Christian solidarity, and when justice will be established on earth; it seeks to remind Christians that the Kingdom of God is not only of heaven, but of the earth, and that Christ's Christianity does not aim

at making egoistically happy individuals, but saves the individuals in order that they may serve as means to save the masses. The Papacy has recognised that in our times it would not do to stamp as heretical aspirations such as these; and its policy has been limited, from the very beginning of the movement, to direct, moderate, discipline it, and above all to keep it well secured within the boundaries of the Church. But, just at this point, dissension has arisen between the Vatican and this social phase of Modernism. The movement, according to the Vatican, in order to be legitimate, ought to be subject to religious authority; the director of every social effort in the parish should be the priest; in the diocese, the bishop; in the Church, the Pope. According to the Modernists, instead, the movement ought to be free in all its action, autonomous, genuinely democratic, altogether independent of religious authority. The dissension has ended up in a complete rupture.

Finally, we have to mention the Practical Modernists, who say: Let us lead the people back to the true source of spiritual life; let us place again their conscience in immediate contact with the Christ of the Gospels, and the spiritualising of worship, the restoration of dogmatic formula, will certainly follow. To embody this idea, on the 27th of April 1902 a Society was formed, called "The Pious Society of St Gerome for the Spreading of the Holy Gospels," which immediately prepared and widely distributed a new translation of the Four Gospels and the Acts of the Apostles. It seemed as if the Society could not have commenced its work under better auspices. More than two hundred bishops had signed their approval of it, and many had promised their assistance. The Pope had granted an indulgence of three hundred days to the faithful who read the Gospels for at least a quarter of an hour once a day. After three years the Society had circulated 300,000 copies of the book. In 1907 the 880th thousand of the small volume was issued from the Vatican printing-press, and in 1908 the number had not

fallen far short of a million, while it was known that the Society was working with alacrity at the preparation of the rest of the New Testament. But the little volume, in its general aspect, with its index of passages from the Old Testament quoted in the New, with its little concordance and synoptic tables, its underlined verses, its illustrations, and its cheap price, savoured too much of Protestantism not to be unpalatable to some; and the Society was soon denounced as one whose object was "a new kind of dangerous propaganda." It was not enough that the unfortunate Society should be presided over by a Cardinal, nor that its meetings should be held in the Vatican; the Curia, as soon as it perceived that the fortunes of the Society were very different from what it had expected, became diffident and nervous; by amending, touching up, and correcting in its own way the general Introduction and the notes, it sought to render the work of the Society more innocuous, but at the same time dug its grave and kept it ready. The last information I have from a trustworthy source shows how far things have gone: "The Society has not been dissolved by any express official act, but it has nevertheless been dissolved. The sale still continues, but in a more languid fashion. The Curia has not killed the Society directly, but has so managed that it should expire gradually, slowly, of itself." This of the Practical Modernists, therefore, has been a dream, a beautiful dreambut nothing more than a dream.

What shall we then say? That Modernism has no future in Italy? That the Syllabus of Pius X., his Encyclicals of 1907 and 1909, and his *Motu proprio* 1 of Sept. 1910 have

¹ The difference between an Encyclica and a Motu proprio is this: the Encyclica deals only with doctrine; the Motu proprio deals with discipline and practical matters. The only new part of this document (all the rest is a repetition of previous papal utterances) is the oath of orthodoxy and of fidelity to the Roman Catholic doctrine and discipline. This oath is to be taken by every professor before resuming his annual course, by every priest of an inferior order before his promotion, by all new confessors, parish priests, canons, and by every one who holds a special office in the Church.

been more than sufficient to kill it? That no other hope remains of the Church ever reforming herself? No. If it has to come, the reform will come not from any of the directions we have already mentioned, but from another one: from the direction of the young priesthood. The young clergy that lives in contact not only with ideas but with facts, and is called every day and every hour to answer to the needs of the modern conscience, is roused. An abyss lies between the Vatican and these men; the words which come to them from the Vatican are for them no longer words of authority and power. This young clergy is grieved to see the formalism, the paganism, the superstition into which the Church has fallen; it no longer has any confidence in a Curia that seems to have lost nearly all sense of the things that are of God, and is moved to action only for the welfare of its beloved Church. This great Church, with its episcopal ritual, its strong ecclesiastical organisation, its glorious traditions, with its majestic cathedrals erected to God by the piety of former generations, is the Church which seems to this young clergy best to respond to the genius and temperament of the Latin races. These men desire to see over this historical Church a Primate exercising not a juridical and tyrannical, but a spiritual and human authority; they desire to supply the void now felt in that episcopal form by filling it with something genuinely Christian; they desire to be themselves reinspired with the Spirit of Christ; they desire to see God worshipped in the cathedrals, "in spirit and in truth." From time to time we hear of earnest men who, having lost faith in these ideals, not to trifle with their own conscience, cross the boundary and find shelter in the Protestant camp; but, for the one or two who cross the line, hundreds, thousands, remain in the fold, and, remaining, grieve, but believe and hope. One of them writes me: "If you could see what is happening in our midst, you would scarcely believe the testimony of your own eyes." In their Open Letter to Pius X. they say: "We are not rebels, but

sincere Catholics; and as such, we desire to stand up for the salvation of Christianity."

I know the objection made to all this: "You have no right to criticise the Curia; the Curia is logical, consistent; the illogical and inconsistent are the rebels. Pius X., in all his written and verbal utterances, expresses faithfully the official views of the Church. The clergy, which has received Holy Orders in and for the Church, has a choice of but two ways-it must either accept those views or go. The third way, chosen by those who, while not accepting those views, remain and conspire, is the way of rebellion, and the Pope is perfectly right in inflicting upon them all the disciplinary punishment of which he disposes." "He is perfectly right," you say; but listen to their answer: "Is it then no longer true that in times of political or moral bondage there remains to man, as God made him, the sacred right of rebellion? Is it no longer true that right is not always on the side of the strong, but much more often on that of the weak? No longer true that when majorities rule unjustly, there remains to minorities who aspire to truth and justice the right to hope and prepare for their emancipation? It is not for us to go; it is for them, considering that they are no longer the true Church; we are the true Church, and on the day in which our minority will have become majority they will have to go." It is quite true that the Vatican is logical and consistent. The Syllabus of Pius IX. condemns "whoever says that the Roman Pontiff may and must reconcile himself, and come to an understanding with progress, liberalism, and modern culture," and the Vatican, accordingly, concentrates all its activity on trying to keep alive ecclesiastical mediævalism in the midst of our modern society, and on checking every utterance of modern mentality with the ipse dixit of mediæval scholasticism. But to attempt to stop human thought, human conscience, human culture in their glorious evolution—is it really a sane and safe undertaking?

Such are the present conditions of the Roman Catholic

Church in Italy. What will be the outcome of all this? No man can say. I venture to prophesy that Modernism in Italy will not miss its mark, if it knows how to keep itself on the granitic basis of Christ's Christianity; if it is able to organise itself; if it succeeds in rousing in the laity an interest for the movement.

1. Will it know how to keep itself on the granitic basis of Christ's Christianity? That Modernism should recognise all rights of a criticism loving truth more than novelty, that it should try to aim at a less tyrannical and more rational conception of dogma, that it should revise the formulas of its Catechism, that it should insist on the necessity of a clear and sharp distinction between religion and theology, and that it should correct the notion of authority it has inherited from past centuries, is right, is good, is salutary; but if it allows itself to be carried away by the flood of hypercriticism, it will be hurled into the sea of unbelief and thus be lost. Already too many Italian Modernists have made shipwreck of themselves in that way; but, if I am not mistaken, their example seems to me destined to become the salvation of the rest. In the Commento (October 1910), a Modernist review, Romolo Murri, who is the editor of it and a leader of the movement, thus answers Professor Salvatore Minocchi, who, a short time ago, was also a priest and editor of the now suppressed Studi Religiosi: "No; I will not shut myself up in a sterile, unfruitful negation, as you have done. I believe in Christianity. . . . I find it necessary to have faith in what man has said and meant to say by formulas such as the following: Divine personality, individual immortality; working of God in history; absolute worth of the spiritual realities which shine in the historical life of Christ. And I count to have a right to declare myself a Catholic; meaning by this very declaration to affirm that the Pontiff (as he is at the present day) and his men have forfeited the right to speak and act in the name and authority of the Church; and I claim for myself the right to handle freely, with subjection to nobody,

all matters pertaining to historical Christianity. I declare myself a Catholic, I say, because I think that, as there is a living doctrine, there is also a living tradition handed down to us by Western, Latin, Italian culture and life; and from that tradition I do not want to sever myself." At the present hour this is the position of the large majority in the Modernist camp.

- 2. Will Modernism be able to organise itself? The young modernist clergy is, with regard to the Vatican, in much the same position as that of our patriots during the wretched time of our political slavery. A year ago I wrote: "Sometimes I dream of the members of this clergy as organising themselves into conventicles, and forming a great and powerful spiritual Carboneria; dividing themselves, as the Giovane Italia did. into so many committees, depending from a central committee, from which would issue the secret journal that would feed the flame; enclosing the whole peninsula within its net; hastening with words and writings the hour of freedom." And a few weeks ago, in one of the largest Italian papers, we read with warm interest the following words from a member of the Roman clergy, not in low position: "The Vatican has in its possession hundreds of documents proving that in the Roman Catholic Church there exists at present a secret Modernist organisation, and that a sort of freemasonry has been formed in order to foster and spread Modernism. The Vatican has succeeded in finding out that a clandestine Modernist correspondence is kept up between some churches, and even between various seminaries. We know, for instance, that from some seminaries circulars and writings are periodically issued in favour of Modernism. Whoever thinks that Modernism is dead or about to die is grossly mistaken." Would one not be inclined to think that my dream was on the point of becoming a reality?
- 3. Will Modernism succeed in rousing in the laity an interest for the movement? There is little ground for hope in a renovation of the Church to be brought about only by the

clergy; a true and lasting renovation must be first of all longed for by the laity and then brought about by the clergy in co-operation with the laity. Up to the present, Modernism has been a concern of the clergy only; the laity, for several reasons, has not yet taken to heart the movement. As I already said at the beginning of my article, for a long time the laity has begun to lose all interest in the official Church, and to sever itself from her; is it therefore to be wondered at if it is now reluctant to believe that an earnest movement of reform may be possible within the Church through the medium of the priesthood? Only those who know thoroughly the Italian mind and soul are in a position to rightly estimate the profound sense of distrust of the laity for the clergy; and no little time will have to pass before the Italian laity feel ready to believe in, to sympathise with, and to give the right hand of fellowship to Modernism. And vet signs are not wanting which give evidence of the fact that the laity begins to take some interest in the great question. Our most important political dailies have special "Vatican correspondents," who keep the public at large well informed of all that is possible to be known of what happens in ecclesiastical circles; the Modernist movement, which at the beginning was treated by the press with unmasked suspicion, begins now to be dealt with regularly and with open sympathy; Modernist publications are scattered about in all directions; foreign works treating with competency and liberal spirit the great ecclesiastical questions are put in circulation in excellent translations by our best editorial firms; and by all these means laical thought is interested in the subject, developed, matured, and slowly prepared to give the necessary support to the clergy in its arduous undertaking. There is, it is true, a large portion of the general public which, absorbed as it is by all its particular preoccupations, takes little notice of home and foreign Modernist literature; but this portion of the public remains in its turn most effectually struck by certain facts, which happen now and then, and produce a deeper impression than any writing could do. The following is the latest of these facts I am alluding to:-On the 20th September, the historical date of the fall of Papal temporal power, the Mayor of Rome, surrounded by an immense crowd, laid, as usual, at Porta Pia, a wreath on the spot where the breach was opened by our soldiers in 1870. The Mayor, a noble-minded man and a great patriot, made a speech which was an eloquent eulogy of civil and religious liberty, and at the same time a bold denunciation of Papacy, depicted by him as a system of moral oppression and of spiritual tyranny. The Pope answered the speech of the Mayor with a protest which was considered by our press as a kind of "poor and dull lamentation"; and whilst from all parts of Italy letters and telegrams expressing sympathy and solidarity were coming either to the Capitol or to the Vatican, a written message was sent to the Mayor of Rome which was at once made public throughout Italy, and which everywhere roused approval, sympathy, enthusiasm. It was a message from a large group of priests, representing the Here are some quotations from it:-Modernist movement. "On the 20th September you knew how to find in the tradition of the Eternal City the human and universal words of liberty, dignity, right to live, which the Vatican no longer knows how to be the herald of, and you spoke to Italy and to the world in a Roman way. Whilst modern society treats with indifference not only a religion which every day loses more and more of its divine substance, but also the heroic attempts of self-denying men who do their best to save, for the benefit of humanity, the treasures of the sinking ship, you, Mayor of Rome, have not been indifferent to the agonising cry which the Italian clergy has raised around you. . . . The Vatican has uplifted its voice in the name of the Church against your assertions; but the Vatican, inasmuch as it has always hindered the progress of Christianity, has no right to speak in the name of the Church. The best part of the Church, in Italy, does not want to be an accomplice of the Vatican in the fatal programme of open war against the unity of the country,

against evolution of thought and liberty of conscience. . . . Still, a great hope lives in our hearts: the hope that the Church, which finds herself in the dilemma by which humanity exacts from her either to be a means of life or to die, may yet find again new ways to become, as the Gospel says, 'light of the world' and 'salt of the earth.' In the name of all those who are longing for freedom and truth, of all those who are seeking in Christianity not an archaic form of intellectualism and a new kind of slavery, but a source of true life, we rejoice in the opportunity we have to-day of expressing to you our gratitude and sympathy."

A few more events such as this one will suffice to rouse the interest of the laity in Modernism; then, Modernism, inspired by Christ's Christianity, strongly organised and supported by the laity, will only need a leader; and the providential Moses will certainly not fail to appear to summon all to arms, to give to the slaves the signal of revolt, to lead the Church out of the land of the Pharaohs to the Canaan of freedom and life.

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CHRISTIAN ETHICS AND ECONOMIC COMPETITION.

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THERE seem to be three sorts of moral grounds upon which the prevailing mode of distribution of wealth conceivably may be, and actually has been, criticised. That distribution has been condemned on the ground that it fails to realise the greatest possible well-being of the greatest possible number; or again, on the ground that it is confiscatory, taking from some men that which is theirs of right to give to others that which they have never morally made their own; or again, on the ground that it is competitive. Each of these criticisms springs from a distinctive way of thinking about the moral aspect of social institutions: the first, from the ethics of benevolent eudæmonism; the second, from some form of the ethics of natural rights; the third, from what is most characteristic in the ethics of Christianity. To each of the three corresponds a certain mode of argument for Socialism. When those who are content to judge of social institutions by their total concrete results in terms of human welfare become Socialists. they do so because Socialism appears to them to promise a higher level and a wider diffusion of welfare than is possible under existing institutions. This seems to be, in the main, the line of approach to Socialism characteristic of the English Fabians; vaguely understood, it is also the source of much current socialism of the "unscientific" sort, the yearning for

a time when, through State action, slums shall be abolished, when all men shall be well fed, well housed, well educated, and all shall have a margin of leisure for the enjoyment of wholesome pleasures and the cultivation of their higher faculties and finer susceptibilities. The militant socialist of the Marxian tradition, however, in so far as he condescends to recognise that ethics has any relevancy to the matter at all, rests his case chiefly, not upon the mere intrinsic desirability of the proposed regime of collectivism, but upon the violation of distributive justice which he finds characteristic of the present order. Capitalistic production, he contends, is an arrangement by which wealth is taken from those who produce it and given to those who contribute, of themselves, nothing to the producing of it; our present system is, in the literal sense, he holds, a scheme of expropriation.

The argument especially destructive of the Christian Socialist is different from either of these. He may, indeed, make use of both the other arguments; but he adds a further consideration which seems to him decisive, in itself, for all who accept the ethical teachings of Christianity. The competitive industrial system, even though its outward results were not so bad as they are, and even though the question of intrinsic justice be shelved, would still be open to condemnation simply because it is competitive. For economic competition, it is maintained, is a sort of war-a fight, not indeed for life (except in a relatively small number of extreme cases), but certainly for the means of maintaining and enjoying life. And as such it is incompatible with the Christian law of love. As Mr Rauschenbusch¹ is fond of saying, the moral ideal of Christianity is a completely fraternal social life; and the present economic system makes such life literally impossible for most men, except at the cost of economic suicide. It does not simply tempt men into attitudes and modes of conduct towards their fellows which, from a Christian point of view, must be regarded as immoral; it makes such immorality

¹ Christianity and the Social Crisis.

virtually compulsory. It says to men, You must fight your brethren, if you would live outside of the almshouse; and if you would live largely and give the good things of life to your children, you must fight hard and persistently. You may, it is true, be generous to the vanquished; you are permitted moments of truce when you may apply salves to the wounds you have yourselves dealt; but even to be generous you must first fight for the means of generosity—and for the production of a class of vanquished who may afford objects for that generosity. A system, then, the Christian Socialist commonly urges, which puts men into such a situation is one which must be condemned by Christianity, for the simple and sufficient reason that it makes the practice of Christianity impossible. "If," in the words of a clergyman of the Church of England,1 "the doctrine of the Brotherhood of Man is to be worked out in the economic sphere, we must substitute a co-operative basis for the existing basis of society. There is no middle path between the acceptance of Socialism and a declaration that Christianity cannot be applied to economics." Even religious writers not favourable to Socialism have gone so far as to say that (the words are those of Professor Shailer Mathews) "in a competitive system a business man is, by the very force of circumstances, a warrior; and war, in the very nature of the case, is an enemy of love and a thoroughly Christian society."

The issues, both philosophical and economic, raised by the Christian Socialist's short and easy method with the present social order, are both more various and more complicated than many contributors to the controversy seem to have realised. It is only with a single topic in so large and involved an argument that I wish in this paper to deal. I desire to inquire, namely, in what respects, in what sense, and in what degree our present mode of distribution is competitive. The question will probably appear to some too simple to be worth asking. Yet, as a matter of fact, most of the serious replies to the ethical contentions of Christian

¹ The Rev. W. Temple in The Economic Review, 1908, p. 198.

Socialism have attempted, upon one ground or another, to show that what economists call competition is not by any means identical with an immoral conflict of wills and antagonism of interests; that in reality it proves, when analysed, not to be competition at all, in any ethically pertinent sense. Competition in business and industry, it has been argued, may be unaccompanied by hostility of feeling; and it tends indirectly and in the long run to the greater fulfilment of the desires of each competitor. Some apologists for the prevailing machinery of distribution have even professed to show that competition is simply a sort of measuring rod for meting out to each all the goods that he ought to desire to possess, since the amount so determined is precisely what in justice belongs to him. I shall therefore deal with the question proposed, by examining several of the arguments advanced in favour of the view that economic competition is morally unexceptionable because in the last analysis it is, so to say, not really competitive.

Before proceeding to this examination, one or two definitions are needful. By "competition" in the most general sense, I shall hereafter mean any endeavour on the part of one person or group to secure any (real or supposed) good which can be possessed, or which, when possessed, will be valued, only upon the condition that some or all other persons are ipso facto deprived of that good, or of some more than equivalent other good. Competition, in short, is the attempt to get or keep any valuable thing either to the exclusion of others or in greater measure than others. By "economic competition" I mean this endeavour when directed towards the attainment either of tangible goods having a market value, or of desirable positions or modes of employment. This definition of the term departs in a significant respect from the usual, though not invariable, usage of economists. For the most part, economic writers have meant by competition the rivalry between persons discharging the same types of function or standing on the same side of the market, the rivalry

between seller and seller, or buyer and buyer - and, in particular, that between sellers of more or less similar things. the struggle of manufacturer with manufacturer, of labourer with labourer, of shopkeeper with shopkeeper. It has not been customary with economists to denote by the word "competition" the process of direct or indirect bargainingthe struggle between the buyer and the seller of goods or labour, between the producer and consumer, in which each seeks to increase his own share in the total real wealth of the community at the expense of the other's share. The reasons for this restricted use of the term lie deep in the history of economic theory: but they need not now detain us. The term ought not, at any rate, to be employed in this narrowed sense in the discussion of the ethical arguments of the Christian Socialists. The situation to which those arguments pertain consists in the apportionment of shares in the collective annual income by means of a general tug-of-war, not only within economic classes, but also between economic classes. The morally significant struggle is, indeed, far less that which goes on among the representatives of the same economic function, than that which arises between the representatives of distinct economic functions; and it appears in its most serious form in the opposition between the buyer and the seller of labour. As will appear more fully in the sequel, the controversy concerning the "morality of competition" has hitherto largely been a debate in which the two parties have been talking about essentially different issues. The defenders of the "competitive system" have ordinarily used the word in the economists' sense, and have failed to observe that they were justifying something by no means identical with that feature of our existing economic order to which the criticisms of the Christian Socialists are chiefly pertinent. Much, we shall presently see, may be said in moral justification of the endeavour of men engaged in analogous tasks to surpass one another in the effective performance of those tasks—or even to gain superior prizes thereby—which cannot at all plausibly

be said of the endeavour of men on opposite sides of a market transaction to give as little to one another as possible and to get as much as possible.

I.

It has sometimes been urged that commercial and industrial rivalry may exist without causing any inimical feelings on the part of the competitors. Men's immediate aims may be opposed and yet their personal attitudes remain kindly. "So long," observes Professor Cooley,1 "as I see in my opponent a man like myself, acting from motives which I recognise as worthy, I cannot feel anger towards him, no matter what he may do to me. The conditions of the open market do not, in fairly reasonable men, generate personal hostility." It may even "be maintained that competition, when not unjust or destructive, promotes a broader social feeling. The free and open play of energy and purpose is calculated to arouse precisely that knowledge of others and of the limitations which their life imposes upon ours, out of which a wholesome sympathy and sense of justice must spring." This cheerful picture of a reign of competition wholly without ill-will, so far as it is faithful at all, manifestly represents only competition in the narrower of the two senses of the term. Such friendly. personal relations are, no doubt, possible enough between competitors engaged in the same economic activity—between lawyer and lawyer, labourer and labourer, even shopkeeper and shopkeeper,—so long at least as the struggle is not so ruthless as to be absolutely destructive of the losers. Certain rules of the game have in these activities been conventionally agreed upon; and all who conform to them may have friendly and even affectionate sentiments towards one another, while the competition is at its briskest. But Professor Cooley's picture does not correspond to the attitudes now commonly characteristic of persons representing different economic factors—the attitude of labourer to capitalist, of tenant to landowner, of

¹ Personal Competition, 1899, pp. 148-9.

middleman to producer, of consumer to both middleman and producer. These persons are not only conscious of the fact that they are in competition, but also now exhibit highly suspicious and exasperated states of feeling towards one another. Strikes, lock-outs, boycotts, projects of legislation having the avowed purpose of taking from the rich to give to the poor, cries of "confiscation" from the rich when such projects are broached: these things can hardly be considered the outward and visible signs of a "wholesome sympathy" between social classes. And the reason why, in the case of these economic relations, competition does engender inner hostility and constant outbreaks of overt economic warfare, is obvious enough. There are, in this competition between the representatives of distinct economic functions or classes, no "rules of the game" that are as yet generally agreed upon; there is not even agreement that we should go on playing just this sort of game. And there cannot be expected to be, unless reasons sufficient to satisfy all fair-minded men can be presented for regarding the results of distribution by competition (of the prevailing sort) as just and beneficent. For the degree of antagonism which men feel in competing must vary with the degree of their moral approval of the distribution resulting from the competition.

II.

It may, however, plausibly be suggested that the present hostility between social classes may be due, not to economic competition as such, not even to the competition between "labour and capital" for the greater share of the proceeds of their joint productivity, but merely to some unfairness in the rules or conditions of the contest, to the existence of a suspicion on the part of the majority of the players that the game had been so arranged as to assure to a minority the possession of loaded dice. If this unfairness were corrected, we might conceivably—it may be argued—without abolishing competition, have between employer and employed, between buyer

and seller, a rivalry as friendly as that now often found between two lawyers practising in the same courts, or two prosperous manufacturers of the same kind of goods. By some more or less "socialistic" legislation that should still come short of thorough-going collectivism, the conditions of economic competition might be so modified that all the contestants would become convinced that they had a fair chance, and that the game itself, just as a wholesome competition, was interesting enough to be worth playing.

Those who reflect duly upon the distinction between competition within an economic class and competition between economic classes, will say that, at best, this transformation of the spirit of competition could hardly be realised without decidedly radical social changes. So long as anything approaching the present difference of strategic position in bargaining prevails between the capitalist and the labourer, it would be unreasonable to expect that the temper of the competition between these two should be like that which commonly characterises the rivalry of men engaged in parallel activities. For the situation in the one type of competition bears no true analogy to that in the other. The two lawyers or the two manufacturers are competing to determine which of the two can perform, with the greater skill or the greater energy, the same set of skilful acts under the accepted rules; they are racing side by side upon a common path towards an identical goal. In such contests it is quite true that the more successful, through their experience of the difficulties of the process, may acquire a genuine fellow-feeling for the less successful whom those difficulties have overcome; while the losers will often feel constrained to a sympathetic admiration for the winners, in whom they see realised the powers and excellences after which they have aspired for themselves. But the competition between buyer and seller, and especially between the buyer and the seller of labour, is far more remotely comparable to the friendly competitions of sport. The capitalist and the labourer are not, in any practically significant sense, simply striving to see which of the two can perform the same process the more skilfully or effectively. The labourer who receives from a man living in luxury wages which compel him and his family to live miserably or shabbily, is extremely unlikely to feel for his employer merely a generous admiration, as for one who has shown the better performance in a fair race, in which both had an even start and were confronted by similar obstacles. Yet there is a way in which, even without abolishing this relation of capitalist and employee, the competition of the two might be made to assume the form of a friendly and generous rivalry. If, namely, all capital were plainly and unmistakably the product of exceptional skill or energy in labour or of exceptional self-denial in saving, on the part of the individual possessors of it, the distinction between the two sorts of economic competition would partly disappear. All men would then start upon the commercial or industrial race from the same point, with equal opportunities and similar obstacles before them, and the man who at any time had surplus capital wherewith to employ the labour of others, would be a man who had once been in a position similar to theirs, but had emerged from it by applying superior abilities to socially useful work and under conditions generally agreed upon as fair. This, while conserving in some degree even the competition between buyers and sellers of labour, would reduce all competition to a form in which it has been found to be stimulating to men's energies and not incompatible with paternal social relations. But it must be added that the legislative reforms requisite in order to bring about such a genuine and generally acknowledged equalisation of opportunities, though they would fall short, could hardly fall very far short, of a thorough-going scheme of nationalised industry. For they would involve, among other things, an extremely drastic system of death duties; and the immense volume of capital thus falling into the hands of the State would necessarily be employed largely in State industrial enterprises.

Would a competition thus rendered amicable and agreeable by being equalised, satisfy all those who base their views of social reform primarily upon the ethics of Christianity—and who therefore regard opposition of wills and antagonism of interests as evils in themselves? There may be some who, adopting an extreme interpretation of the Christian principle of non-opposition, hold that all conscious competition, even though unaccompanied by hostile feeling, is immoral. Those who take this view would necessarily condemn also the playing of competitive games; indeed, as I have suggested, economic competition itself, when fairly carried on under rules which all the competitors have freely enacted, might be regarded as a gigantic manifestation of those impulses in human nature which lead men into the friendly rivalries of sport. But our more extreme sort of Christian moralist would look upon these very impulses as sinful. True, the games give to all concerned pleasure which they would otherwise lack, and even promote social sympathy and good understanding; but they, after all, put one will into the posture of negation toward another, compel A to desire that which he knows he can get only upon condition of B's losing it; and therefore the intransigeant sort of Christian Socialist would exclude them from his ideal order of things. To many men, however, and I daresay to most who avow themselves Christian Socialists, this view will seem, as it seems to me, a strained and sickly use of casuistry. And it may therefore appear that, in the eyes of these more moderate interpreters of the moral temper of Christianity, the evil of our "competitive" economic system could be cured, not by the abolition of competition, but merely by the restriction of its intensity and the equalisation of its conditions.

Yet even such a scheme must, I think, appear unsatisfactory from the point of view of the Christian ethics, so long as there continues not only competition among the representatives of similar economic functions, but also our second sort of competition between the representatives of different economic

functions: so long, in other words, as the rewards of the contest are in any degree determined by the process of trading or bargaining between buyers and sellers. It may not be-it assuredly is not-inadmissible that men should strive to outdo one another in useful service; it may not be inadmissible, at least as a concession to the present imperfection of human nature, that men should agree with one another that certain special outward advantages should accrue to those who best perform such services. But it can hardly be regarded as consistent with any version of the moral teaching of Christianity that a competition in sheer disservice should go on. And in the relation of buyer and seller, as distinguished from that between fellow-producers, we have a rivalry of this sort. It is not a mere rivalry in achievement, or for prizes which society has voluntarily determined to attach to superior achievement; it is really a competition in cupidity as such. The man who, in this special form of economic competition, gets the best price for any goods, any part of the market for which he exclusively commands, is the man mean enough to hold his fellows off from the enjoyment of the surplus which he has produced, until he has extracted from them the last penny with which they can be made to part in exchange. The labourer, whether with mind or body, who secures the highest payment for his services, is he who is not too ready to render those services. The moral nature of the bargaining process is admirably illustrated by the methods used-and, under existing conditions, necessarily used-by trade unions in securing higher wages. Protected against the competition of one another as sellers by the system of collective bargaining, they face the purchasers of labour-power as a unit; and their sole ultimate device for securing an advantageous bargain is the strike, or the continual vague menace of a strike. In other words, success in bargaining for the sale of labour is absolutely conditioned upon the presence of a disposition and an ability on the part of labourers, as an organised group, to refuse to labour. And this is no special peculiarity of the labour-bargain

to hold back, to be not too eager, to be grudging in giving to the buyer what he needs or desires—these, more or less disguised, are the first principles of success in that "higgling of the market-place," by which prices are fixed, and by which, therefore, the distribution of wealth is largely determined. Those occupations in which men work for the joy of the working, and bestow for the pleasure of sharing, are, as a rule, occupations not highly rewarded in other ways. Yet it would seem to be to such workers that society should give its material prizes; these are they who seek first the great ends of human living and social fellowship, and all other things should be added unto them.

Thus distribution by bargaining places a premium upon an anti-social attitude. The rivalry between exercisers of the same economic function is, on the whole, a competition in serviceableness; he succeeds who produces most with the greatest economy of means, who does best some task which some third party desires to have done. But the competition between the two parties to a bargain is a competition in unserviceableness. For any person or group of persons having anything to sell, the way to success now lies through the establishment of some approach to monopoly conditions—in a small market or a large—and then the creation of a judicious degree of scarcity in the supply of the commodity sold. The material interest of all classes collectively demands an increase of production and an intensification of productive activity; but in our system of distribution—and this is the very essence of any system based upon rivalry between the several factors in production—the separate interest of each factor demands a large measure of abstention from productive activity-or, at the least, the constant reiteration of a more or less insincere intention to abstain. To a limited, yet often to a very great degree, one man grows rich by adopting an attitude which tends to make society poorer; and, by the ethics of our current economic philosophy, every man is bidden to adopt this attitude to the utmost of his power.

though he is at the same time warned that forces are at work (namely, the competition of his rivals in the same activity) which will prevent the average man from succeeding either in greatly enriching himself or in impoverishing society.

It cannot, I think, be denied that in this feature of the present mode of distribution lies the real gravamen of the Christian Socialist's indictment of the existing order. The competition which now goes on within and between the several groups in the economic system is, in fact, a competition for social usefulness paradoxically combined with a competition for social uselessness. And it has the latter character by virtue of the fact that goods or services are exchanged at ratios called market-prices; that market-prices are in the last analysis determined by the process of direct or indirect bargaining; and that the first principle of bargaining is withholding. It is to this "antagonism of utility and distribution" that the Christian Socialist may effectively point as a morally pernicious instance of an opposition of interests and of wills which is not to be eliminated save by the elimination of the bargaining-process from its present place in the machinery of distribution.

III.

The issue thus resolves itself into the question of the moral defensibility of those interpersonal attitudes that necessarily accompany the higgling by which, in overt or concealed ways, market prices are now determined. The classical economics has, of course, its own familiar arguments for proving the beneficence of this process in its complex total results, and therefore its ethical propriety. Before passing to the consideration of these, it is necessary to note one other argument on behalf of competition which, though frequently put forward, is essentially irrelevant to the issue as now defined. The term "competition" has sometimes been used to signify merely the process of industrial selection, whereby in modern societies the incompetent are in the long run eliminated, and

the man best fitted for each function in our complicated social life is (at least sometimes) discovered and given that function to discharge. The antithesis to competition, in this sense, is the assignment of functions by status, without comparison and selection. Now, this shuffling of men about until the right man is found in the right place, is unquestionably advantageous in the highest degree to society at large. And the inference seems to have been drawn or implied by some critics of Socialism that all economic competition is therefore, in its final consequences, advantageous. Sir Leslie Stephen seems to have attached great importance to this line of argument: "If," he wrote,

every profession shall be open to every man; success in it shall depend upon his abilities and his merits; and, further, every child in the country shall have the opportunity of acquiring the necessary qualifications; what is that but to accept and to stimulate the spirit of competition? What is the alternative? Should people be appointed by interest? Or is nobody to be anxious for professional or literary or commercial success, but only to develop his powers from a sense of duty, and wait till some infallible observer comes round and says, "Friend, take this position, which you deserve"? Somehow I do not think that last scheme practicable at present. But even in that case, I do not see how the merits of any man are to be tested without enabling him to prove by experiment that he is the most meritorious person; and if that be admitted, is not every step in promoting education, in equalising, therefore, the position from which men start for the race, a direct encouragement to competition? 1

Professor Cooley devotes his little treatise chiefly to the elaboration of the same view. The function of competition, he writes,

is to assign each individual his place in the social system. It is eligibility to perform some social function that makes a man a competitor.²

These observations, which are entirely just, would be pertinent as a reply to those Christian Socialists (if there be such) who aspire to abolish competition altogether, in all its

¹ "The Morality of Competition," in Social Rights and Duties, 1896, ii pp. 140-141.

² Personal Competition, pp. 79-80. It is not clear how far Professor Cooley intends this as an argument against Socialism. Sir Leslie Stephen's essay makes the application explicitly.

senses and in all its forms. But the Christian Socialist of the more critical sort, as we have seen, may be supposed to confine his disapproval to one particular aspect of economic competition -which is not at all the aspect that Stephen and Cooley have extolled. There is a form of competition which he may reasonably wish to perpetuate. But the considerations by which this type of competition may be justified are clearly not applicable to the justification of that very different sort of competition which goes on between the representatives of different factors in the economic process, and least of all to the justification of the fixing of exchange-values by bargaining. The competition between the labourer and the owner of capital, between the producer and the consumer, between the tenant and the landlord, cannot be said to be nicely calculated to bring about the selection of superior aptitudes. When six labourers compete for employment at the hands of a farmer who needs only three, the best three will probably be chosen. But there is nothing in the process which shows that, as between the farmer and all six of the labourers, it is the farmer who has the best natural endowments for the efficient management of land, or for the productive use of the profits of that activity. It is true, as has already been pointed out, that much might be done to equalise opportunities, and thus, by reducing all the modes of competition approximately to a single, free-for-all race, to render the process throughout more truly selective. necessity for some such equalisation of initial positions, before his argument could have much relevancy to the real social situation, seems to have been recognised by Stephen. as we have seen, the measures indispensable before any adequate equalisation of opportunities could be brought about, would of themselves take us a long way towards Socialism. And meanwhile there would still require to be resolved the final scruples of the Christian Socialist about the moral attitudes incident to the process of distribution through bargaining.

IV.

We come at last to the familiar piece of reasoning by which economic theory has long sought to demonstrate the ultimately beneficent, the really non-competitive, character of economic competition. All but one of the arguments thus far considered have been concerned with competition in the narrower sense-competition within an economic class, rivalry between sellers or between buyers. The present argument takes some account of the existence of the other sort of competition, that between buyer and seller, consumer and producer, capitalist and labourer. It is to the effect that the competition between these classes (or between individuals belonging to them) becomes transfigured into a veritable harmony of interests, so soon as we duly consider the fact that there is at the same time taking place a compensatory competition within each class. If the individual labourer had to struggle merely with the individual owner of capital, there would, indeed, be a real and unrelieved conflict. But the capitalist is not only competing with the labourer for a share of the profits, he is also competing with other capitalists for the labourer's services. The latter competition tends to bring wages up-and thus to serve the labourer's interestas much as the former tends to bring them down; while the constant rivalry of capital with capital for profitable investment tends steadily both to increase of production and to lowering of prices, and thus in the long run advances the interests of all. The bearing of this familiar economic principle upon the ethical question at issue has never, perhaps, been more lucidly expressed than by an American economist in a recent text-book:

It is not true that the rivalries of competition are necessarily or commonly hostile conflicts of interest, in which the well-being of one is set over against the success and prosperity of his neighbours. True, each is trying to undersell the others—to get the trade, to gain the market and to control it—at the expense or even to the ruin of his rivals. This, however, proves, not that competition is a rivalry between each member of society and society as a whole, but only that it is a rivalry between competing producers. It is a co-operation

between each competitor and society. When one producer or seller prospers as against another, it is by offering society the better product or the lower price. Viewed, therefore, from the point of view of society, competition is a rivalry in offering most for least—a contest in the rendering of largest service, a war in well-doing—where success is declared to the largest benefactor.¹

It would be an austere Christian Socialist indeed who should find more than a venial sin in a war in well-doing. But there seem to be three serious reasons for doubting whether such a description can be applied without great qualification to economic competition in all its forms. the first place, there is nothing whatever to show that the distribution actually resulting, now or at any given time, from such a system of universal but counterbalancing competitions will be a good distribution, or one accompanied by social harmony and a general reign of brotherhood. For the outcome of the competition will in practice depend upon changing conditions of population, of supply and demand, of the comparative strategic advantages of the positions occupied by the several competitors in their dealings with one another. For example, it is no doubt true that the labourer, in his capacity as consumer, gets the chief benefit of that continuous beating down of prices which competition causes; but it is also true that, where neither laws nor trade-unions interfere with the free play of competition, money-wages are beaten down by the same process, and it depends upon the varying states of each local market whether the gain offsets the loss. Meanwhile, it is apparent as a fact of history that -even with the maximum demand for labour and the maximum lowering of prices—the real wages of labour have never long remained so high as to produce any close approach to equality in the lot of the average labourer's family and that of the average capitalist's or merchant's or landlord's.

In the second place, the economist's traditional apologia for competition seems curiously mal à propos at a time when precisely that competition within each economic class—which,

¹ Davenport, Outlines of Elementary Economics, 1908, pp. 186-7.

when generalised, has been supposed to be the saving feature of the situation—is conspicuously tending to disappear, and is doing so with, perhaps, results on the whole advantageous. In many trades, labourer no longer freely competes with labourer for employment; and in the most advanced branches of modern business, producer no longer competes with producer for the larger sales to the consumer. Organisation and consolidation of interests in each class tend to be the rule; so that the competition which remains stands out all the more nakedly as a competition between economic classes as units. And, finally, to this latter sort of competition the usual argument of the economists is not in the least applicable. That argument never really faced the issue respecting interclass competition as such; it merely pointed out that rivalry within a class was to the interest of those outside this class, and that each class, therefore, in so far as it was engaged merely in this internal competition, was benefiting all others. But no class ever was engaged merely in that competition; it always has at the same time been endeavouring to increase the share in the national dividend apportioned as the reward of the function which it performs, and to decrease correspondingly the share going to the representatives of other functions. And it has always done this by maintaining the posture of the bargainer-by endeavouring to sell in the dearest and buy in the cheapest market; in other words, by getting from others the most possible, and by giving them in return the least possible. This attitude has never been very accurately describable as "a contest in the rendering of largest service." Indeed, most men, not habituated to commercial life, when compelled to engage in direct higgling over prices with other persons—and especially with persons more needy than themselves—are likely at times to feel that there is in the part which they are thus compelled to play at least something vulgar and unseemly. It is to the relation of buyer and seller, of consumer and producer, that the caustic saying of Mr Howells' "Traveller from Altruria" is most evidently applicable: "As we look back at the old competitive conditions we do not see how any man could be a gentleman in them, since a gentleman must think first of others, and these conditions compelled a man to think first of himself."

After this review of the principal arguments in the case, it seems legitimate to attempt a judicial summing-up of the question under controversy between the Christian Socialist and the apologist of economic competition. The verdict cannot be unqualifiedly for either side. Socialist writers, on the one hand, have condemned competition in an unduly promiscuous and uncritical way. For, as we have seen, competition and hostility are not necessarily synonymous; there are kinds of competition which could hardly be abolished, even under collectivism, without thereby leaving all human life the poorer; and obviously any Socialist who proposes that, in a reorganised society, men shall be given differential rewards for unequal services, ipso facto commits himself to the perpetuation even of purely economic competition. But, on the other hand, there is one aspect of our present "competitive system" which Christian ethics may, and must in consistency, condemn. It is a kind of competition to which economists have not ordinarily applied the name; but it is, as we have seen, in reality the extreme example of competition for economic goods, an absolute and unrelieved antagonism, a brute pitting of will against will, and of the interest of one against the interest of all. It consists in the fixing of prices. and thereby indirectly of incomes, by the process of overt or concealed bargaining. This process is of the essence of the present method of distribution; it would be eliminated (in its present form) by collectivism; and it can apparently be eliminated only by collectivism. For if virtually the entire machinery of production and distribution were in the hands of the State, the relation of buyer and seller would be reduced to a negligible minimum; practically all incomes would have the form of salaries for services rendered the community by

the individual; and the differing amounts of those salaries would be determined by the collective judgment of the community, expressing itself through its organs of legislation and administration. Those who then had the egoistic desire for greater salaries could realise it only by increasing the measure of their service—not, as now, by threatening to withhold service. In view of these considerations, there undeniably appears to be, even when all necessary concessions and qualifications have been made, a profound inner incongruity between at least one phase of economic competition and the spirit of the Christian ethics-and a natural affinity between that spirit and the ideals of socialism.

Yet, alas! one great difficulty remains. If any inequality of rewards is to be retained, by means of what formula is society to apportion those rewards? By what criterion will the Socialist State determine the relative value of different social functions-since all will be equally necessary? Clearly the matter will require to be settled in some way; and as clearly-unless in the meantime some philosopher is able to reduce the principles of rightful distribution to something like an exact science—there will be no established standard by which to settle it. Differences of opinion-to say nothing of conflicts of interest-will then inevitably arise. There will perhaps be those who hold that practitioners of the uninteresting, if also unintellectual, art of bricklaying deserve better of the Republic than those assigned to the duties of university professors; the latter, it may be suspected, will regard this view with scepticism. And the partisans of differing opinions of this sort will, if sincere, begin political agitation for reforms in the laws of distribution. Thus competition between the representatives of different economic activities, having been expelled by the door, will come in again by the window. I do not think one can fairly predict that it will be a case of the return of seven other devils worse than the first. For, in the first place, under no conceivable scheme of distribution by legislative enactment in a democracy could the inequalities

of material condition be so monstrous as they are now. Moreover, the struggle, being transferred to the domain of politics. would not involve a direct opposition between utility and distribution within the process of industrial activity itself. And finally, such inequalities as existed would, after all, express the judgment of the majority, formed after deliberation and discussion. Yet it remains true that that judgment would, in these matters, have only rough empiric impressions to guide it. The general formula, no doubt, might readily be arrived at: a "distribution according to needs," meaning thereby, in Mr Hobson's phrase, "those needs which society, taking an enlightened view of social interests, confirms and endorses." Yet I hardly think that such a formula would be found in practice greatly to simplify the problem. Society, therefore, in dealing with the matter of distribution, could only slowly and with abundant friction arrive at the unanimity of opinion which would be the condition precedent to harmony of feeling and concord of wills.

The truth is that Christianity's yearning for such a harmony could find full realisation in a concrete economic order only through a scheme of complete equality in distribution. Those who regard such a scheme as impracticable or undesirable should recognise that they have thereby given up all simple, clear-cut, ready-made formulas for distribution. They can therefore look forward only to a gradual approximation to harmony, in proportion as men, through debate and experiment and the gradual increase of reciprocal understanding, work out a plan for allotting functions and privileges and possessions which seems to the general reason fairly satisfactory. Yet the Christian Socialist is assuredly right in deeming it, in itself, a morally desirable consummation that the issue should be appealed to the general reason, and not be left to the blind antagonisms of individual desire.

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WHITHERWARD?—A QUESTION FOR THE HIGHER CRITICISM.

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THE time has come when it seems necessary deliberately to raise the question whether the story which we have in the Four Gospels of the birth, life, death, resurrection, and ascension of their central figure was designed by their authors to be taken as literal history. The Higher Criticism, indeed. is forcing this question to the front, and the time does not seem far distant when all sections of the Church will have to face it. The Higher Criticism may be described as a virtual, though not intentional, attack on the historicity of the Bible. It did not, indeed, begin in that way. That was not its avowed purpose; it called itself historical criticism. and aimed at judging the various parts of Scripture in the light of the actual circumstances in which they were produced. But the result has been to show in almost, if not every, part of Scripture that what we have is not history proper—that the author's purpose was not to write history, but to edify, to teach some religious truth which he regarded as all-important. There is all the difference in the world between the point of view of the modern historian and that of the Biblical writers: the aim of the former is to give the facts as far as he can discover what they were; that of the latter was to inculcate some doctrine of religion, to teach some religious truth to the world. The former must keep to the facts; his whole work is done when he has faithfully set Vol. IX .-- No. 2.

these down: the latter was not obliged to do this, for his object was beyond that; he would use the facts when they served his purpose, but he would have no hesitation in subordinating the facts to his purpose. The Higher Criticism has made it abundantly clear that this is exactly what the Biblical writers did. The prophets of the ninth and eighth centuries B.C. tell the story of their nation's history from their special point of view in the books of Samuel and Kings; and the same story is told from the priestly standpoint in the books of Chronicles, Nehemiah, and Ezra; the dominating motive of both being not history, but edification—the inculcation of what the writers regarded as important religious truth. It is not necessary to say that there is no history in what they relate: what is important is that what of history there is is used for an ulterior purpose.

As a result of the work of the Higher Criticism the Four Gospels are a complete wreck as historical records. It is long since the Fourth Gospel was relegated to the realm of spiritual imagination; it cannot be depended on in any one particular as authority for a historic Jesus. It is regarded, even among conservative theologians, as an ideal presentation of the life of the Master, the story of his life told in the light of the philosophy of Alexandria. It is claimed, indeed, that there is a nucleus of fact embedded in the structure of the Gospel, but what this is no one can tell: it is impossible to separate it from the philosophical speculations and spiritual teachings of the author. It is a pure assumption to suppose that there was any such nucleus of fact: a more reasonable assumption would be that the author deliberately adopted the biographical form to set forth his message, which he regarded as all-important. In either case, the author's object is not history, but religion. It would be quite in harmony with his purpose to suppose that the historical incidents he records never took place in the sphere of outward fact, but are wholly inward and spiritual, all the more true because not historically true. It can never be proved that a historic person called Jesus uttered the great

teachings of this Gospel, or that the wonder stories with which it abounds were performed by him; but the author may never have imagined that such an idea would be entertained of his work; it may have seemed to him that its spiritual character would be sufficiently manifest, and it may be that it is the hard, unspiritual, unimaginative, theologising spirit of the West that has turned this pure spiritual Gospel into history. It is only by some such supposition that it can be restored to the world, and it is only by treating it as a spiritual treatise dealing with great religious principles that even the most literal and orthodox can draw from it any nutriment for the soul.

The same is substantially true of the Synoptics. As authorities for a life of Jesus they are hopelessly shattered by the assaults of the Higher Criticism. How little they tell us of an historic Jesus! And that little full of contradictions and discrepancies, of impossible incidents and errors. It would almost seem as if these were placed there on purpose, as a warning to people not to worship the letter but to seek the spirit of the teaching within the so-called historical forms. It does not require much skill to detect these discrepancies and contradictions. They are upon the surface. It would explain much in these Gospels if we granted that the writers were not anxious to be historically accurate, that they cared nothing about history as such, that they were writing spiritual drama, and that it mattered little if they outwardly contradicted each other or crowded their pages with seeming miracles. So-called facts of history are, after all, very trivial matters. What can it interest the people of to-day to know what took place in Palestine two thousand years ago? But what is eternally true is a matter of vital importance to people of all ages. Suppose that the writers of the Gospels were deeply spiritual men, that they were inspired from within to teach the world spiritual truths of the greatest importance. They would thus only be in harmony with the spiritual men of all times, who have cared little for history, but have cared much for the truths of the inner life. This would account for the perennial power excited by their writings upon the men of all ages and lands. They speak from the soul to the soul: they stir the depths of the heart: they move the inner emotions as no mere facts of the outer life can do.

The Higher Criticism has forced the Christian world to interpret spiritually, and not literally, much that these Gospels tell us of Jesus. Who reads the story of the Virgin Birth recorded in Matthew and Luke as a statement of historic fact? Only the most ignorant or the most prejudiced, but the spiritual benefit which even they draw from it does not come from it as mere history, but as spiritual allegory. As a miracle that occurred only once in the history of the world it is of no consequence to anyone, but as a symbol of a universal truth its importance is great and world-wide. As history the Higher Criticism has destroyed it: it is only as a spiritual truth that it can find a place in the religious teaching of the future. The same is true of almost every so-called incident in the Synoptic Gospels. It is impossible to regard as historical the Temptation, the Transfiguration, the cleansing of the Temple, and the numerous miracle incidents with which they are filled; and if there is no other way of reading them than as historical facts, then they must go on the rubbish-heap of the world. But the world refuses thus to throw them away; by an inner instinct it still clings to them because they are felt to be more than history, and to belong to that "literature of power" which is perennial and everlasting. So long as the Higher Criticism confined itself to these incidents little concern was felt, but now it is beginning to lay its hands on matters which are regarded as essential, such as the Trial and Death and Resurrection and Ascension of Jesus, and to point out the impossibility of reconciling these with history. It seems as if it will not stop until it has pronounced all the leading features of the Gospel story incredible; and when this is done, where will be the evidence for the historicity of Jesus? It would seem as if the real result of the Higher Criticism is to be something the Higher Critics themselves did not contemplate—that there is only one way in which Christianity can survive, and that is by the surrender of its claim of being a historical religion, and the placing it on a purely spiritual foundation. Let anyone read such books as Schweitzer's Quest of the Historical Jesus or any of the popular Lives of Jesus, with their endless discussions of history that is dead, buried, and done with, and he will feel how empty they are of the real content of religion, simply because they are the record of incessant efforts to make a false theory fit the Gospel statements. It would seem almost as if the last attempt was being made in such books to explain the Gospels by the historical theory. Schweitzer shows how, in the past, one theory after another has proved quite unsatisfactory. He then presents a theory of his own which will satisfy neither the orthodox nor the liberal—that Jesus was a Jewish fanatic bent on forcing on his own death in order to precipitate the coming of the promised Kingdom of Heaven. What comes out clearly is that the historical theory never did, and never can, fit the Gospels: it leaves them in a state of chaos. The time has come, therefore, to look in some other direction for the secret of the Gospels' power. Why not listen to the mystic who tells us that it is nothing less than idolatry to fix our thought and worship on a historical Jesus who is supposed to have lived in Palestine two thousand years ago, that a fleshand-blood Christ is a contradiction in terms, and that what the Gospel writers intended to give the world was not history or biography, but spiritual allegory or drama? If this theory fits the facts as the historical theory does not, this will be the proof of its truth.

A presumption is established in favour of this view of the Four Gospels by the way in which we have learned to read the Old Testament, especially the early chapters of Genesis, on the literal interpretation of which the Christian Church has based its scheme of redemption. The idea of a historical Saviour who was to come at some future time is based on a historical "Fall," which happened at some definite time in

the past. Fifty or sixty years ago a doubt of the historicity of the third chapter of Genesis would have been regarded with the same feelings as the average Churchman of to-day regards the denial of the historicity of the Gospel story. But no one to-day reads the third chapter of Genesis as history; all are content to read it as allegory or drama. The Eden in which man was said to be placed was no garden of earth: it was of the soul. It symbolises animal contentment and peace, and the "Fall" represents the passage from this status into the stage of struggle and discontent. The voice that told him to eat of the forbidden fruit came from no serpent or devil, but was the voice of his own expanding soul-God's voice within him—and marked the birth of intuition and reason: and the death it threatened was not physical dissolution, but the end of animal innocence and sensuous satisfaction. He who was to bruise the serpent's head was no future deliverer who would appear at the end of four thousand years, but the "Living Christ" who was to rise within man himself, or, in other words, be the development within him of that same intuition and reason which had been the undoing of his animal contentment and peace. What a blunder to make both Fall and Redemption outward, historical events and a Paradise lost and a Paradise regained, when they are both inward, spiritual facts, happening not once in the long course of history, but re-enacted in every human soul! But here is the point: it is not possible to make the Fall allegorical and the Redemption historical. If one be spiritual, so must the other be. If the "Devil" who lured man to his "death" be the partial development within him of reason and intuition, the "Christ" who is to be his Saviour must be their full development. Man's Saviour is not historical, as St Paul is never tired of reiterating. "The Christ" that saved him was the Son of God revealed in him. His great desire for his converts was that "the Christ" might be formed within them. "The Christ" with Paul was one who lived in him and in those who were his, and the race's hope

of glory was a "Christ" who dwelt in the heart of the race. The idea that man is saved by a historical Saviour who lived at a definite time in human history—a Saviour external to himself-is the great error of the Christian Church: it is the great apostasy, the idolatrous materialisation of the truth. Man is saved when the "Christ" is born within him. And what we have in the Four Gospels is not the biography of an individual-it is impossible to read them as such without landing ourselves in contradiction and confusion—but a spiritual drama or allegory in which, in the form of biography, the experiences through which the Son of God in man, the Christ within, must pass are faithfully set forth. It is not necessary to this view to deny that a Jesus ever existed. No one can possibly know enough to make such a statement. It is impossible to prove the universal negative. But what is to be insisted upon is that the experiences attributed to him in the Gospels, of birth and life and death and resurrection and ascension, must be reproduced in the individual soul. "The Christ" must be born within us, must grow in consciousness and power, must receive divine illumination, must die to the lower self, must rise into newness of life and power; otherwise the story will avail us nothing, and may as well not have been.

Thus interpreted the word "Christ" becomes a symbol of the soul in its spiritual aspect, or the Son of God, as Plato long ago explained the term. With this hint it is easy to understand how in the Gospels Jesus always appears as a Divine, not as a purely human, being. The late Father Tyrrell in his last impressive message to the world was right—Christianity, especially Liberal Christianity, is at the "crossroads." It has come to the parting of the ways. It must take one of two roads; it cannot walk on both. After over a century's efforts to find the realistic, historical human figure of Jesus in the Gospels, the testimony comes from many quarters that he cannot be found. The Abbé Loisy in France, in his L'évangile et l'église, as against Harnack's Das Wesen des Christentums, and Dr James Denny in Scotland, in his Jesus

and the Gospel, as against the claim of Liberal Christianity generally, both show that an idea of the Christ as a Divine Personality and not a human Jesus pervades the whole of the Christian literature from the very first, and is the centre of both Gospel and Epistle. Professor Otto Pfleiderer in Germany, after a lifetime spent in strenuous defence of Liberal Christianity, confessed before his death to the doubt whether it was possible to reach "the simple human grandeur of the Founder of our religion, the ideal of a lofty and noble religious hero, worthy of the veneration of the mind and the heart of the modern world." "All that can be determined with certainty from these writings (Gospels and Epistles) is only that conception of Christ which was the object of the faith of the early Christian communities; Christ as the Son of God, as Conqueror of Satan, as a wonder-worker, as Conqueror of Death and the Life-giver, and as King of Kings and Lord of Lords." Last, but not least, comes A. Schweitzer, also of Germany, who shows in his Quest of the Historical Jesus that the result of the attempts made during a little over a century to write the life of Jesus is the atter failure to find the Jesus of Liberal Christianity in the New Testament. Liberal Christianity, the writer contends, "is in essence only the degenerate offspring of rationalism with a tincture of history; its portrait of a professedly historical Jesus is feeble and small, and has little or no truth in it, and if it would meet the needs of the coming day it must get rid of its rationalistic bias and its pride in its historical character." It is perfectly evident that no human person could have been intended to be designated by the central figure in the Gospels, for the simple reason that no single human person could have passed through the experiences described. It is only by the method of the Higher Criticism-of sweeping away or ignoring all that is marvellous in the Gospels-that it can make up an imaginary figure of a man to suit an age that has lost its faith in the miraculous. But to drag the symbol "Christ" down to mean a human being in this way is nothing

less than a profanation of the message of the Eternal contained in the Gospels. The word "Christ" is the richest in our language. It contains more meaning than any other term ever used by man. Suppose we say that it means the Higher Self-the soul-in every individual man, instead of one who lived in the first century, and apply that conception to the interpretation of the Gospels, and see what is the result. The appeal then will be to experience rather than to history. Instead of selecting what we judge by our modern canons of criticism to be reasonable features in the story, and then assuming their objective and historical truth, suppose we frankly accept the Gospel story as mystical and see in the central figure a mighty idea, a profound reality, something grander and far greater than any historical personality, and under every experience through which he passes a truth hidden applicable to the spiritual nature of every child of man. This would not degrade the Gospels, but elevate them to a position they have never yet occupied.

In what seems a piece of genuine autobiography we are told by an early Christian whom some place in the first century and make a contemporary of the Jesus of the Gospels, and others place in the second century, what becoming a Christian meant to him. It is not at all what we would have expected. We would have expected that it would have meant becoming acquainted with the life and ministry of Jesus through the disciples Peter and James and John, who were Christians before him. But it does not mean this. On the contrary, he spends two chapters in showing that he did not get his Gospel from those who were apostles before him. His Gospel is not of man, neither by man. "I certify you, brethren, that the gospel which was preached by me is not after man. For I neither received it of man, neither was I taught it, but by the revelation of Jesus Christ" (Gal. i. 11-12). While he was a Jew, zealous in the Jews' religion, it pleased God "to reveal his Son in me" (Gal. i. 16). This is his brief account of the matter. He did not, as one might expect, immediately confer with the disciples, neither did he go to Jerusalem to them who were apostles before him. He makes it quite clear that he got nothing from them. It would be perfectly natural that Peter and James and John should put forth claims of precedence if the Gospel story be veritable history. According to that assumption they were not only Christians before this man: they had known Jesus, had listened to his teaching, they had seen him perform his wonderful deeds. But he gave place by subjection, no, not for an hour. Not only did Peter and James and John add nothing to him—they acknowledged him as equal to themselves, and gave him the right hand of fellowship.

This piece of autobiography is interesting because it tells us what becoming a Christian really meant to one at least of the earliest Christians. It was the revelation of the Son of God within him. To reveal is to unveil. The Son of God was within him before this took place, only he was unconscious of the fact. He became conscious of the Divine within him. His oft-repeated assertion that the apostles before him imparted nothing to him means that he was instructed by this consciousness of the Divine within him, and that his conversion did not mean that he assented to some statements made by others about a person called Jesus of Nazareth. The phrase "of Nazareth" never occurs in this man's writings. His conversion meant that he became conscious that the Son of God dwelt within him. By the Son of God, therefore, this man did not mean a historical Jesus of Nazareth: he meant the Divine that dwelt within him, of which up to the time of his conversion he was unconscious, but which from that moment became the dominant fact and factor of his life. Hence the writings of this man say little about the historical Jesus, and quote nothing of his teachings, a fact which must seem curious to the modern Christian who cares so much for them. All this does not fit in with the hypothesis that the Gospels are historical. The term "Christ" is this man's name for the consciousness of the Divine within him. His

writings cannot be understood unless one keeps this fact in mind. If one supposes that by the term "Christ," which is found in almost every page of his Epistles, he means Jesus of Nazareth, the actual historic person whom some suppose was his contemporary, his language will seem enigmatical; but if one remembers that by the word "Christ" he means the Son of God within him, a wondrous light will be cast upon his words, and many a saying that seems a puzzle will shine with new meaning and power.

Now, this Christ is potential in every individual of the race. He is first a germ, then he is born and grows in consciousness and power. It is this process of spiritual birth and growth which, according to the hypothesis of this article, we have in the Gospels: its conflict with the lower nature, its gradual mastery of all lower forces, and its final triumph and glorification. It is a favourite idea of the writer referred to above that the individual must live through and experience personally the life of the Christ. The process is a universal law, not a mere event in the past, just as the unborn child recapitulates the whole process of physical evolution. Men in all ages have been conscious of the existence within them of more than one self. Various names have been given to these, but the names are not important. What is important is the fact to which universal experience bears witness. There is the personal, phenomenal, empirical self, which exists, so to speak, on the surface of consciousness and which constitutes the stream of our ever-changing life. This personal self is never long the same, and it may be said to be made up of several selves, no one of which is permanent. The Latin word persona means a mask, such as was worn by the Greek actor on the stage, that through which sound came, and the soul or self in man speaks through many a mask in the course of even a brief lifetime. The personal self is always a mask, which reveals, indeed, the existence of a higher self, but which, at the same time, hides it. Knowledge of the personal self is not true knowledge. The personal self is

but a mask which we must wear upon this stage of life, and when true self-knowledge is attained the illusory character of the personal self is realised. The personal self is something to be overcome and mastered, and he that overcometh "shall be given to eat of the fruit of the tree of life, which is in the midst of the paradise of God." Who is there that does not understand Paul's seventh chapter of Romans, where he describes the conflict of the higher and lower selves? Who is there that does not echo his cry, "Oh, wretched man that I am!"? And who is there that has experienced the joy and freedom, the sense of victory and of peace, that come when the soul recognises the Divine Son of God within, and that this true self is one with God, that does not join in his burst of thanksgiving and praise? This is the day of days for the soul—the great day in the feast of life—when this consciousness or realisation comes. This is the supreme affirmation of spiritual experience. This, indeed, is the whole of religion, the attainment of Christ-consciousness, the realisation of God within oneself. The Christ within is the spiritual self of every man, and is identical with the Divine Son of God ever living in the bosom of the Father. There is only one Son of God, but this Son of God is in every soul, and constitutes the real being of every soul. This is the light which every man brings with him into the world, the light which shines in the darkness that does not comprehend it. The Real Self is thus a ray of the Divine Light, a spark of the Divine Fire. It contains within itself all potentialities. It is encased, so to speak, in sheath after sheath, which prevents its full expression. The great end of life's discipline is that this Inner Light may shine through the enveloping medium of the personal selves, that the consciousness of the Son of God may pass from lower planes to higher, and that the true self may be brought into realisation. True religion is the soul's increasing desire to realise the highest unity with its source, aspiration in every direction towards that sublime end. And the height of spiritual experience is to know and feel the real and true and perfect

in every realm of existence. It is to enter the inner sanctuary, the sacred chamber of the soul, the beautiful world of peace and joy, the inner realm where all is well, that secret place where dwells the soul serene. It is the fulfilment of all the hopes of human life, the attainment of the peace that passeth all understanding, the joy unspeakable and full of glory. It is the attainment of Christhood, the finding of the universal self, which is our real self.

Now, what we have in the Gospel story is, under the symbol of Jesus, the repeated acts of the soul, or Higher Self, its recognition and realisation of its oneness with the Divinethe whole story, indeed, of the soul's redemption. It is significant that to the mystics of all ages facts of history have appealed but little, for in the outer life nothing is found to stir the depths of the soul. The deepest religious teachers have always passed from history to the facts of the inner life when they have sought to move the religious emotions of men. It is presumed that the supreme motive of the Gospel writers was religion, not history. The birth of Jesus must have its analogue in the experience of the individual. And whether Jesus was born in Bethlehem or Nazareth, this was the truth vital to the Gospel writers. And the Virgin Birth they speak of was no blunder of theirs: their concern was not to relate a fact of history, which could only make men open their eyes in wonder, but to teach the universal truth that the Christ is always born of a pure virgin in the soul of man, the virgin being the purified lower nature which arrives at that state when it is fit to bear and bring forth the infant Redeemer, being made ready for the Christ, or Son of God, to be revealed within it. The Higher Criticism would have us give up the beautiful stories of the Nativity recorded in the First and Third Gospels; but, once we are delivered from the glamour of the historical as being the object of the writers, how true these stories are! How accurately they describe the birth of the Christ within the soul, the attainment of the message of "glory to God in the highest, on earth peace and good-will

to men"! These are not words spoken at the birth of one individual; they are the language of heaven spoken to the soul whenever the Christ is born within it. Who does not see that it is only when we cease to read these stories as local happenings in the "little town of Bethlehem," and make them spiritual experiences into which it is the privilege of every soul to enter, that their full and real significance is seen? When the lower nature is so purified that the Christ can be born within it, the angel vision breaks upon the soul, the heavens are opened, the harmonies of the spiritual realm are heard. Christhood always brings the same message and produces the same experiences; and unless they become history within the soul, not merely history upon the physical plane, they might as well not have been.

And what is said of these birth stories is true of the whole. The Christ-soul must pass into the arena of conflict. It must meet the devil of the not-self, and must feel the insecurity of the soul, ere the Divine has become a living factor in the life. It must meet and resist the temptation to refuse spiritual truths hard to assimilate, and to look to the easier outward knowledge only. It must learn that man cannot live by intellect only, but needs spiritual truth for the soul's sustenance. It must learn to cease looking without for help, and rely instead upon the spirit within. It must learn never to use the increased powers of the soul for selfish ends. The lower things cannot tempt him who is united with the self. The path which the soul who has awakened to Christ-consciousness-in whom the Christ has been born-must take, is the path of self-sacrifice, of self-denial and self-consecration to the will of the Highest. The soul must be purged of selfishness, every sphere must be made pure, every sense must become a channel through which the Christ-life must flow. It must sacrifice every earthly interest, every private end, to the universal good. It must continue to walk in this path even though it has to walk alone, and is drawn further and further from the ways of men until its feet press the Via Dolorosa and ascend the Hill of Calvary.

Suppose it were proved that Jesus never died on a cross? What then? The true Crucifixion is not something that happened once in the history of the world-a mere Palestinian affair: it is an eternal happening that most intimately concerns every man in his inward nature, and the story of the Crucifixion in the Gospels is but the shadow of that. The Crucifixion is something that is to be worked out in every man, and it is this mystic but most real Crucifixion that is the reality, though all others should be proved unhistorical. It is not the historical that is the foundation of the spiritual; it is the spiritual that is the foundation of the historical. Facts are nothing in themselves until they become symbols of spiritual truths. The Crucifixion of Jesus would remain merely a brutal murder without further significance if we regard it merely as a historical fact. Even with those with whom it is a historical fact it must become a symbol of spiritual truth before it can be an inspiration for the soul: both the idea of Jesus and the idea of crucifixion must cease to be looked upon as merely historical and become the outward manifestation of an inward experience. When the soul caught up in an ecstasy of devotion cries out-

"Hallelujah! 'tis done,
I believe on the Son,
I am saved by the Cross
Of the Crucified One!"—

it is recording something far more profoundly true than any mere historical fact can be. The Crucifixion has become a figure and a counterpart of the soul's experience, a symbol of spiritual law. The fourfold meaning of the Cross—the crucifixion of the Christ by the world, the crucifixion within man of the lower nature, the offering of the Christ for the redemption of the world, the crucifixion of Deity in and for the creature—are eternal spiritual facts whatever the Higher Criticism may compel us to believe concerning the historical crucifixion of Jesus.

The spiritual experience symbolised in the Gospel story

does not end with the Crucifixion. There is the Resurrection from the dead, and the Ascension into heaven, and the Exaltation to the right hand of the Majesty on high. What are we to make of these? The Higher Criticism tells us that they are unhistorical. Must we, therefore, throw them away? Were the Gospel story to end with the darkness and death of crucifixion it would not be true to spiritual experience. The Christ-soul is to be liberated from the spiritually dead matter of the lower nature and enter into the Kingdom of Heaven, or full consciousness of God. And as spiritual truth is eternal. having no relation to time, the triumph of the Resurrection and Ascension does not merely follow the defeat of the Cross, but is simultaneous with it. As the Christ in the Fourth Gospel is made to say, "I have overcome the world," so there is a sense in which the story of the agony and death of the Son of God is only typically true. Looking only on one side of the picture, we do not see the full truth. The Christ-soulthe soul who has attained full emancipation and has entered into full consciousness of oneness with the Eternal-sees both sides at once. The Christ-soul beholds the vision of unity and can hold all opposites in one. In our imperfect consciousness we are like the tapestry-weavers who work upon the wrong side of their task:

"Above their head the pattern hangs, they study it with care;
The while their fingers deftly weave, their eyes are fastened there:
They tell this curious thing besides of the patient, plodding weaver,
He works on the wrong side evermore, but works on the right side ever."

Looking on one side of the living web of the Gospel story, we see a man defeated. Could we see the pattern we would see a man triumphing; but the pattern is on the other side, yet it exists simultaneously with the under-side. Have we not glimpses of the truth sometimes that the suffering, the crosses and confusions of life are but the under-side of a pattern we cannot see, but which we would know, did we see it, was the perfect work woven by Divine fingers on the great loom of Time? It is not without reason that Emerson speaks of "The

Perfect Whole." The only thing the imperfect consciousness can see is the crossing of threads, the knots, sometimes a perfect medley of confusion. What the perfect consciousness sees is the perfect pattern. Instead of a man bending under a heavy cross which he is carrying up a steep hill, on which he is to be nailed when he reaches the top, the perfect soul sees one crowned with many crowns, radiant with eternal light, the symbols of power in his hands and the word of authority issuing from his lips. It is, therefore, the truest instinct that makes the resurrection and ascension and exaltation of Jesus follow the shameful death, for in the consciousness of Christhood there is involved the certainty of overcoming the world, of victory over all its obstacles and temptations. The last picture the New Testament gives us of Jesus is as the Conqueror of Death and the Giver of Life, King of Kings and Lord of Lords. How could this sublime truth be revealed save by means of vision and symbol? What if it be unhistorical, as the Higher Criticism assures us? How could it be revealed by means of history? How better could it be expressed than in the New Testament stories of resurrection and ascension and exaltation to God's right hand? What if these be Vorstellungen? The Christ within, our better, diviner self, must pass through the toil and struggle of earth and by its own consecration and effort grow towards its own heights of glory and power. It carries up and incorporates into character and life untold depths of experience during its passage through the lower planes of existence. Its destiny is to live an infinite life and step from the range of evanescent illusions into that of eternal truth. The great illusion of all is the sense of separateness; the great deliverance of redemption, that which frees the soul from all illusion, is the realisation of oneness with the Divine Life, which lives and moves in all. Deep within us is the Infinite Self; and when we come into touch with it by and through a deeper and fuller consciousness, we recognise it as our true self, more real than our surface, personal self, which masks the higher self upon this Vol. IX.-No. 2.

stage of life. The finite which "toils and suffers" is to pass beyond the consciousness of its own finite nature into that of the Infinite, which ever "lies stretched in smiling repose."

After the Higher Criticism has done its work, taking away everything from the Gospel story that does not stand the test of historical analysis, the real task of interpreting the Gospels remains to be done. It is folly to deplore its work as destructive, for it was a necessary step towards the true spiritual view of the Gospels. The interminable disputes of the critics over what items of supposed history are to be accepted and what rejected ought to suggest the question whether the much-vaunted "historic sense" has anything to do with the interpretation of Scripture. The marks of imagination are so plain in all parts of the Bible that it is a wonder how any thoughtful person could mistake Scripture for history. Suppose we take the pictures of the Gospel story as the spiritual artists of the New Testament drew them, and try to learn the lessons they would teach by them. Suppose they meant to present in the picture as a whole a symbol of human life, not of the natural man, but the spiritual man, the man regenerate, the Christ, the Son of God who proceeds from the Absolute Fatherhood and comes into the world of manifestation to animate all things, the Potent Soul, who explains the mystery of the Archetypal Man out of which come in diversity all the qualities of souls, bad and good, wanting completion and perfection — the goal of endeavour. It is both ideal and hope, both that which ought to be and may be. And the beginnings of it are in all of us. If this be the purpose, how else could it be presented but in picture and parable? How could a perfect man live in an imperfect world? The Higher Criticism admits that the historic Jesus it speaks of had not the learning of all time, only the learning of his age; but it seeks to attribute to him perfect conduct which is dependent on knowledge. A perfect person such as the historic Jesus is held to be could not exist in the imperfect

society of to-day, far less in the Græco-Roman world of the first century. A perfect individual implies a perfect environment. He would be utterly out of gear with the social and national structure of the world as it is. He could not eat while others are starving; he could not wear a shirt at which a seamstress had worked her fingers to the bone: he could not wear a suit of clothes made in one of our sweating-shops. A perfect being in an imperfect society is an unthinkable contradiction, and if such a thing is to be set before the world it must be in vision and in picture.

The people love Jesus, not because they have proved him to be a veritable historical character, but because he embodies for them universal idealism, universal beneficence. This is done in defiance of all history, and severed from all history the symbol will retain its hold on mankind. Let the records be proved unhistorical, as the Higher Criticism has proved them: Jesus will still be, for the people, such a religious symbol for the reason that he is essentially that in the intention and purpose of the Gospel writers themselves. This is not the first time that the instinct of the people has been found a truer guide than the learning of the critic. Unsophisticated Christian people always treat the Gospel story as an allegory. Let a popular preacher take as his text any Gospel incident, and instinctively it becomes in his hands more than history—a door into an inner spiritual realm, and this altogether independent of the fact whether the preacher be orthodox or heterodox. The historical theory is not the theory of the masses, but only of scholars and theologians. A striking testimony to this fact is found in the words of Professor Percy Gardner in his Exploratio Evangelica (p. 471): "When thus read, the Scripture is really translated from the past tense into the present. The reader sees a record not of a distant state of society, but of that in which he lives. The foes of the Israelites become the foes of his higher life with whom he does daily battle. The land of Judæa is an ideal realm lying on all sides of us. The temptations, the doubts, the heroic

resolves of Biblical heroes become transformed and take the lines of the present day."

Christianity—especially Liberal Christianity—has come to the "cross-roads," because it has tied itself up with certain so-called historical happenings. It has involved itself in obscure and uncertain issues of historical fact. The "way out" is to follow the instinct of the masses, not the lead of learned critics, and make the central figure of the Gospels denote not a historical person, or a supernatural visitant from a far-away heaven, but a present Reality, the Inner Self of all, the Eternal Divine Son that is in the deep background of every human soul waiting for development and growth. The Gospels are inspired from within the soul and are meant for the soul. Their value is not in their history, but in the spiritual truth they enshrine. They are full of such truth for one who is delivered from the clamour of the historical.

When this view is frankly accepted it will be found that it is not a novelty, but the ancient and Scriptural view. The historical view of Scripture and the founding of religions upon history are nothing but the unwarrantable assumptions of ecclesiastics against the plain evidence of Scripture itself, and against also the pure instinct of the human soul.

K. C. ANDERSON.

DUNDEE.

THE CLERGY, CONSCIENCE, AND FREE INQUIRY.

THE REV. CANON DANKS.

Some thirty-five years ago Lord Morley published an essay on Compromise. Probably it does not accurately express his present views, for a mind so sincere, so lucid, and so penetrating ranges far and reconsiders much in five-and-thirty years. There are, in fact, indications in his later work of some changes of position. Still, the book is on the shelves of our public libraries, is read, and has influence; nowhere is more clearly or cogently stated the case for No Compromise in matters of religious belief; not many title-pages bear a more justly honoured name. It therefore may form a not unsuitable starting-point for some consideration of the subject of this paper.

Lord Morley's essay, like all his writings, is full of wise reflections, apt quotations, and suggestive instances; and, in dealing with the ethics of Compromise or Accommodation, is an indictment of his generation, and perhaps especially of the clergy, for disloyalty to truth. I find in the list of contents the following headings: Influence of a State Church; The pernicious influence of its priests; Modern Latitudinarianism; The case of an unbelieving priest. In the work itself are the following remarks: "Far the most penetrating of all the in fluences that are impairing the moral and intellectual nerve of our generation remain to be stated. . . All this hesitancy this tampering with conviction for fear of its consequences,

this want of faithful dealing in the highest matters, is being intensified, aggravated, driven inwards like a fatal disorder towards the vital parts, by the existence of a State Church. While thought stirs and knowledge extends, she remains fast moored by ancient formularies. While the spirit of man expands in new search after new light, and feels energetically for new truth, the spirit of the Church is eternally entombed within the four corners of Acts of Parliament. Her ministers vow almost before they have crossed the threshold of manhood that they will search no more. They virtually swear that they will to the end of their days believe what they believe then, before they have had time either to think or to know the thoughts of others. They take oath, in other words, to lead mutilated lives. . . . Consider the waste of intelligence, and, what is assuredly not less grave, the positive deadweight and thick obstruction by which an official hierarchy, so organised, must paralyse mental independence in a community."

Dealing with the difficult case of a clergyman who has lost his faith, and who, nevertheless, dares not honestly proclaim his unbelief for fear of losing the means of subsistence for himself and his family, Lord Morley concludes: "These cases only show the essential and profound immorality of the priestly profession, which makes a man's living depend on his abstaining from using his mind, or concealing the conclusions to which the use of his mind has brought him. The time will come when society will look back on the doctrine that they who serve the altar shall live by the altar as a doctrine of barbarism and degradation."

These are words of very serious import to men who have entered or who wish to enter the ministry of the National, or indeed of any other Christian, Church. They express the thought which, more than any other cause, deters able candidates for ordination. Nor has their force been lessened by the lapse of time, for the gap between the critics and the popular theology is wider now than thirty-five years ago; or, to speak more accurately, there is a far larger body of advanced or liberal

opinion in all the Churches than is easily reconciled with their formularies or trust-deeds. There is a greater gulf between the theological student and the untaught believer or unbeliever than ever before.

But will Lord Morley's statement of the situation bear examination? "Eternally entombed within the four corners of Acts of Parliament." Surely Acts of Parliament are not an eternal tomb for anything. They are repealed or amended every session, and embody or reflect, more or less, the growing experience and wisdom of the nation. We are learning at the present time that not even the constitution of Parliament is entirely immune to change. It would seem that a trustdeed has more of the eternal prison about it than the legislative enactment. Not to Acts of Parliament must we chiefly look for the power of the dead hand, for, a generation back, such an Act relaxed the terms of subscription to the Articles. Nor to the judgments of the Law Courts, which have nearly all been on the side of liberty. Nor to those Reformation formularies which have lent themselves so generously to the free interpretations of the Courts. Then, as for "the positive deadweight and obstruction by which an official hierarchy, so organised, must paralyse mental independence in a community," -how does this compare with the actual record? Were Hooker and Butler emissaries of intellectual darkness, slaves themselves and enslaving others? Were Thirlwall, Lightfoot, Westcott, Creighton, Robertson of Brighton, Maurice, Kingsley, Stanley, Jowett-were all these obscurantists, stunting the mental growth of their time? On the contrary, they were among the most alert, profound, and free intelligences of their time, teaching and emancipating their own and succeeding generations. Nor is there, as far as I know, any reason to suppose that they were in the least conscious of thinking in fetters, or of acting a part.

In the advanced guard of free inquiry to-day, in history, philosophy, and theology, many and honoured are the names of men who hold ministerial office, both in the National and in the Free Churches. We have only to look through the list of contributors to Hastings' Bible Dictionary, or to the Encyclopædia Biblica, to realise that from the ranks of these bondslaves to Articles and trust-deeds comes the main body of pioneers in inquiry and criticism. The slaves of Lord Morley's imaginary world are the free men of our actual world.

It is as important in theology as in politics not to be led astray from the conditions of the actual world by brilliant pictures of a world imaginary.

There is an imaginary world in which the chief duty of man is the pursuit of intellectual truth, and the chief preoccupation of the ordination candidate is the question how far his own opinions and the standards of his Church square with each other, and with the verdicts of Scripture, philosophy, and history. The actual world is not in the least like this. The pursuit of truth is indeed one of its noblest ambitions, and the martyrs of truth should be held in everlasting remembrance. But the real chief duty of man is rightness not of opinion, but of conduct, of spirit, of life; and the chief preoccupation of the ordination candidate is not speculative at all, but devotional, spiritual, practical; not the teaching of men's minds so much as the saving of their souls or characters, and the attainment of that social ideal which Christ called the Kingdom of God. Nine men out of ten are neither equipped nor inclined for the search after speculative truth. They ask their Church or their leaders for a reasonable rule of faith, for the assurance of divine guidance, for sacramental communion with the unseen, and for the opportunity of setting forth a Gospel which is the eternal need of humanity. They are not merely permitted but bidden to read widely and to think sincerely, according to Bishop Creighton's dictum that "the position of the Church of England rests on an appeal to sound learning"; they are the inheritors of the courage and enlightenment of the Fathers of the Reformation: men brought up under the shadow of the great and imposing mediæval Church, who could nevertheless boldly arrive at and sturdily stand by the declaration that

"Holy Scripture containeth all things necessary to salvation, so that whatsoever is not read therein nor may be proved thereby is not to be required of any man that it should be believed as an Article of the Faith, nor be thought requisite or necessary to salvation."

Observe that this is not the imposition but the abolition of a test, and involves the right and duty of free inquiry. From men of their time and tradition it is equivalent to a proclamation in one breath of the freedom of Biblical criticism and of the simplicity of Christ's religion.

The clergy, then, are not men in bonds or blinkers, but men accorded a large liberty of thought and action, who find in the ministry an opportunity of service which is chiefly practical, spiritual, personal, and social.

Before we leave this part of our subject, it should be remarked that in the imaginary world of No Compromise it would be impossible for either Church or State to exist. For no body of men can unite to pursue either spiritual or civil ends without organisation; and organisation involves authority, method, limits, and personal concessions. It is not only by a true, but by an absolutely necessary instinct that both Church and State impose upon their members, and especially upon their officers, conditions and restraints, and furnish them with a framework for their activity. Some minimum of creed and formulary is as essential to the life of the Church as some minimum of allegiance and obedience is essential to the life of the State. The Republican living under a monarchy, the Socialist living in a capitalist community, may work for his ideal, and yet be a loyal subject; but only by the exercise of restraint, patience, and compromise. The clergyman who desires a further relaxation of his Church's formularies may be a loyal Churchman on the same conditions. The layman or the cleric whose conscience exacts an absolute and constant correspondence between his own convictions and the laws and administration of the community to which he belongs is not suited to the actual world. His right place is in an imaginary

world which will oscillate between slavery and chaos according as the community or the individual prevails.

Now, let us embody these considerations in a concrete form. We will suppose the case of a thoughtful clergyman who finds a few years after ordination that the Creeds present to him intellectual difficulties. We will further suppose that he is a man of religious mind, happy, apart from his difficulties, in his ministerial work—a lover of the Lord Jesus Christ in sincerity. But he cannot accept the usual interpretation of every article in the Creeds, or of every phrase in the Prayerbook. Is he to retire from the ministry?

His first thought will be that he is not infallible; that he may be wrong and the Creeds and the Prayer-book right. No educated man, with some share of the humility which education brings, will lightly cast aside the forms or thoughts which have been evolved from centuries of human thought and experience. And this humility or diffidence will save him from hasty or precipitate revolt, and give him time to reconsider. If he that believeth shall not make haste, neither shall he who doubts.

"'Old things need not be therefore true';
O brother man, nor yet the new;
Ah! still awhile the old thought retain,
And yet consider it again!

The souls of now two thousand years Have laid up here their toils and fears, And all the earnings of their pain; Ah! yet consider it again."

His second thought may be that since his views have undergone a process of change, and cannot possibly have reached finality, a further change may remove his difficulties; and that a man who cannot hold his judgments in suspense, and has less toleration for his Church than his Church has for him, will probably betake himself to every Church in turn, and finish by belonging to none, having cast overboard on his journey the opportunities and happiness of a lifetime.

His third thought may be that whatever differences may

exist on speculative matters, there is an immense body of agreement common to all Christian people; and that a ministry is useful, inspiring, and effectual in proportion as it bases itself on this fundamental Gospel and appeals to the eternal needs and instincts of the human heart.

His fourth thought may be that Churches, like men, have their changes, developments, and restatements. The whole of Christendom has changed its views since primitive times on the imminence of the Second Advent. The English Church at the Reformation developed a change of view about the Sacraments and the relative importance of Scripture, tradition, and obedience to Rome. In our own day great changes have come about in the accepted views of Scripture inspiration, the theory of the Atonement, everlasting punishment, the Mosaic cosmogony, the relative importance of intellectual assent and the inward life of faith and love.

And so our thinker will be led to the greatest and most fruitful conception of all. Recent science has made it a commonplace that human society and national life are not mere mechanical arrangements but living organisms. They grow, like a tree or a character, of an inward vital principle dealing with an outward environment. A society, a nation, a race is alive as a man is alive; and, like a man, has its childhood, its adolescence, its maturity, its old age and decay in order to be reborn to a new and higher form of life. If this is true of the secular side of the community, is it not more assuredly true of the religious side? of Churches and their framework of dogma and organisation? It is the greatness, the universality, the vital power of Christianity, that it can reclothe itself in the intellectual forms of successive ages, of various races and civilisations. As it baptized into its service Jewish prophecy, Greek philosophy, Roman organisation, Asiatic mysticism, Italian art, German music, English poetry, giving to each some of its divine and inward spirit, borrowing from each some added power of persuasion, education, or appeal, so it is now, however slowly, adopting and adapting

the methods and discoveries of modern science and criticism, pouring its life into the chill theory of evolution, and learning from it new and nobler interpretations of old doctrines and Scriptures.

A man who thus regards the Christian Church at large will not think of his own branch of it as a society artificially constructed, fenced off by tests and rules from the progress of human intelligence, fossilised in the mental strata of the third, the sixth, or the sixteenth century. He will think of it rather as a living and growing organism, absorbing and assimilating the wisdom of the ages, and pouring along the intellectual channels of every age the spiritual power of God's eternal message to the souls of men. He will not ask with troubled conscience, Is this or that formulary or article exactly to my mind? He will ask, Am I in accord with the spirit of the Church which framed these formularies and articles amid conditions which no longer exist, and in a stage of human knowledge less advanced than ours? Did the Church of the Reformation, does the Church of to-day, stand on the whole for freedom of inquiry, for the spiritual side of sacraments and worship, for the direct access of the soul to God, for the Gospel message as it came from Christ, and as it is set forth in the New Testament? If so, then I can give my general assent to the articles and formularies of such a Church, and have no need to retract it.

Those who are so ready to say, If you cannot swallow every article in the Thirty-nine without qualification, you have no right to a place in the Church's ministry, are speaking from a lower level of thought, as men who have read no history, or, reading, have not understood. They belong to the company who believe in the verbal inspiration and in the historical and scientific infallibility of Scripture—which is to say they belong to the past, to an intellectually extinct order. I can scarcely imagine a greater misfortune to religion than that men of alert mind, alive to the issues of current thought, should be deterred from the ministry or, having entered it, should be made to

regret having done so. Knowledge driven from the sanctuary is prone to regard it as a hostile fortress, garrisoned by the enemies of human progress. The sanctuary forsaken by knowledge tends to superstition and reaction, and ceases to be a home for the leaders of mankind. Both these calamities have befallen the countries of the Roman obedience, to the infinite loss of Europe and of Christianity.

It may be that discouragement, opposition, and injustice have not been, and will not be, wanting in the lot of those in Anglican orders who combine the open mind with the Gospel But the future belongs to them as surely as it belonged to John Wycliffe in the fourteenth, or to the Reformers in the sixteenth century. They are the morning stars of the New Reformation, whatever eclipse of faith may obscure its dawn. They need an immense patience with the Church in her slow and difficult adjustment to new conditions. They need an immense love, as of Christ, for the multitudes to whom knowledge is a very secondary thing, and with whom the head counts-and rightly-for so much less than the heart. They need a constant watchfulness lest mental activities involve some atrophy of "the human heart by which we live." But to them belong the hope and promise of the future of religion.

One word more. We are not to be afraid of compromise, since no organised society in Church or State can exist without it. Yet one region there is in which compromise must have no place, and that is in our own inward life. If we think for ourselves at all, if we seek for the ground of the faith that is in us, there must be no compromise in the thought or in the search. The whole truth we shall in this world never know; but if not the whole truth, it must be the truth and nothing but the truth for which we seek.

Carlyle's favourite virtue of veracity was not mere honesty of statement; it was the resolve to see things as they really are, and not otherwise. When Dr Johnson said: "Clear your mind of cant," he meant the same thing. When Bishop

Butler said: "Things are what they are, and their consequences will be what they will be; why then should we seek to deceive ourselves?" he threw the same admonition into another form; and Clough summed it up in his noble lines:

"It fortifies my soul to know
That though I perish, truth is so."

Let us be forbearing, sympathetic, humble, in the presence of the traditions and convictions by which good men have lived. But let us be true, and let us not be afraid. Truth can never harm religion. Religion is a primary and fundamental element in the life of man, and therefore indestructible. Every increase of human wisdom has rendered religion more fair and free, has stript off some disfigurement, or loosened some bond. So it will always be.

"Her open eyes desire the truth.

The wisdom of a thousand years
Is in them. May perpetual youth
Keep dry their light from tears,
That her fair form may stand and shine,
Make bright our days, and light our dreams."

WILLIAM DANKS.

THE PRECINCTS, CANTERBURY.

WHAT IS SCHISM?

THE REV. J. M. LLOYD THOMAS.

It is a common observation that men are divided far more deeply by temperament than by opinion. The truth of this is nowhere more plain than in our attitude towards ecclesiastical organisations. What is vaguely called taste has much to do with our decision to remain in or to pass out of some particular religious fellowship. In many instances taste is far more operative than any rational conviction.

I believe this difference in temperament accounts largely for the persistence of orthodox dissent. It is not an entire caricature of it to say that it is not distinguished by any very glowing emotion of Churchmanship. It lays no stress on the solemnity of special seasons, places, or traditionary symbolisms of worship. It does not deeply feel the sanctity of the meaning or function of the corporate religious life. It is therefore unable to withstand the cheapening and disintegrating forces of the secular world. Popular science and enthusiasm for social reform have withdrawn numbers of working men from all regular religious associations. But this drift of democracy has proved more debilitating to dissent than to those communions where sacerdotal ties of Churchmanship are still powerful. Middle-class elements may cling yet awhile to the Nonconformist bodies, but even these are being more rapidly detached by liberal theology than is officially or publicly admitted. The better type of workman has already been drawn to adult schools, brotherhoods, guilds, Sunday morning institutes, and other religious free-and-easies. Having put in appearance there, he goes for a walk or devotes himself to his allotment or garden, and only rarely goes to These vigorous unsectarian groups of earnest and intelligent artisans are the best symptoms of the pronounced anti-ecclesiastical tendency of our time. Yet in them we shall soon recognise the beginning of the end of the dissenting influence over the masses. Denominational loyalty cannot be an attractive or cohesive power except where the Church-idea finds worthy expression that has in it more than a faint touch of poetry and romance. The mystical idealism of Churchmanship which sees Humanity as a consummated and sacred society, a divine fellowship, the blessed company of faithful people, a confraternity of charity, can still fascinate the imagination of men. No wonder then that a countermovement against a utilitarian secularism is already becoming apparent in other than High Church circles. Rationalism is working itself out into an agnosticism which is by no means irreligious, but rather a vague kind of mystical and æsthetic Even the hard-shelled sceptics are beginning to look wistfully for some spiritual solidarity and long for that peace which they suspect may still be burning quietly like a sanctuary lamp within the hush and dimness of the Church. Having rebelled like self-willed children greedy for experience, they are at last disillusioned or nauseated with satiety of doubt, and in the last act of their melodrama they turn again with tears to kiss their waiting Mother and be reconciled.

This modern appeal of the Church-idea is not to be explained wholly as a climatic twentieth-century change from an individualistic into a socialistic consciousness. That is, indeed, a powerful element in it, but the Church continues to woo mankind with those immemorial charms she has never lost. To these have been added new seductions. Souls who have wantoned irresponsibly among the cults and starved on the husks of intellectualism arise and penitently wend a homeward way. Self-confident moralists are shaken by the spectacle of

the break-up of old sanctions and restraints. Superficial optimists and free-lances are disturbed and sobered by the open advocacy of licentious theories of sexual ethics. Sincere and robust secularism is agitated even to panic as it contemplates the insolent and cynical mammonism of current politics. Men who used to strut and pose as "advanced" begin to ask whether, in the fight against Nietzsche's ideas and the baser materialistic sort of eugenics, they must not resort to the armoury of the wise old Church and frankly seek the aid of her venerable antiquity and authority. Modern life provides many terrible exposures of our moral impotence, our humiliating incapacity for great self-sacrifice, not to say heroic martyrdom. The crisis in Christianity which will later on challenge into existence a new monasticism seems at present rather to provoke a headlong abandonment to voluptuousness. Unable as vet to attack with a charging onrush the forces of evil, Christians wait for their baptism of courage and defiance.

Meanwhile we all need the spiritual support and moral stimulus of the past. We find the best experience of the centuries gathered in the reservoir of the Church. We drink of her waters, for the wells of individual inspiration are deep, perhaps dry, and in any case we have little or nothing to draw with. It is only by the sense of an environing and interpenetrating fellowship that we are sustained at our higher levels. We feel too not only the moral strength but the æsthetic attractiveness of Church-life. It has a certain satisfying completeness and an infinite vista and beauty. inevitably runs into poetry and art and music and the fine language of liturgy. It adorns itself with colour and rich raiment and precious stones. By a kindly process of elimination and selection the mind visualises even the historic Church in its ideal aspects. It forgets her cruelties and devilries and rests in the peace of her more perfect episodes.

The Church thus becomes to the transfiguring heart something that can satisfy the inextinguishable passion for social mysticism. It is the conservator of the world's best religious

experience, the school and the home of saints, the divine fellowship and human brotherhood working against a hateful and satanic anarchy, the holy league of crusading comrades and auxiliars to whom heart and mind and soul owe a loyalty more lovely and strong than that of chivalry. Hence every thoughtful and sensitive Christian shrinks from separation, and in that sense from schism, as from a crime. To break away from the main column of tradition and history seems an unpardonable freak of self-will, a presumptuous indulgence in a love of singularity. Dissent, whatever may have been its historical justification in the past, is now shorn of some of its best arguments. In the stress of the modern crisis it appears almost an obsolete and frivolous anomaly. To divide on mere matters of Church government, when men are asking whether there is to remain a Church to be governed at all, seems a reckless and obstinate perversity. To separate on forms and creeds when both Conformists and Nonconformists have so much common orthodoxy in peril is a wilful waste of fighting To preserve within evangelical dissent the trivial distinctions of Methodist, Presbyterian, Congregationalist, and Baptist is, to a detached outsider, an utterly indefensible gratification of sectarian pride. There is, indeed, a movement toward federation and reunion, but it is neither rapid nor vigorous enough for the emergency, and such movement as exists in orthodox dissent is on wrong lines and wilfully blindfolds itself to the meaning and the power of yet another movement.

This may be called the movement for a deeper and freer catholicism and against dogma. By dogma ought always to be understood not doctrine or any group or body of doctrines, but a doctrinal system compulsorily imposed by the official authority of a church as a condition of ministry or membership. It is the element of ecclesiastical compulsion and authority that carries doctrine over into dogma. Now, whatever we may think about the possibility in the future of a brand-new Church based on a brand-new dogma, we shall all probably

agree there is now felt an increasing difficulty among honest men about accepting the existing dogmas of existing orthodoxy. So deep-seated is this difficulty that young idealists refrain from seeking orders. The point of honour involved constitutes for many clergymen and ministers a genuine life-tragedy. The Sidgwick-Rashdall controversy is by no means closed. For the moment there may be a tacit agreement that it is a little indelicate to reopen it, but compromise on a question so pregnant with moral issues is not really possible. Here is the rock on which the Broad Church has split in the past, and on which I am convinced it will split in the future. Here too is the dilemma of Modernism. "The only infallible guardian of Truth is the spirit of truthfulness." Yes, but that carries us far and deep, and, I fear, removes and even isolates many of us from our intellectual comrades. Veracity is still a virtue and demands, like every other virtue, its own sacrifices. It demands all the sacrifices of an unsophisticated effort to secure not only truth of matter but truth of form. not only truth of spirit but truth of statement and expression, and where that is impossible, as it often is, then, at least, the elimination of scandalous untruth of statement and offensive inadequacy (positive and negative) of form. In saving this I know that I am walking over volcanic fires and that there is only a thin crust of convention between them and eruption. I mention it here not to embark on an argument in casuistry but in order to indicate one of the most serious difficulties in connection with the subject of schism. To put the case concretely, let me give an illustration. A is a high-minded Unitarian. B and C are Anglican clergymen. B is an easy-going Liberal and recites the Athanasian Creed because, though he disbelieves in it, he considers the whole thing almost beneath notice. He would like to see it dropped, and this would probably be a real relief to his conscience, but in the meantime there it is and he shrugs his shoulders. If he cannot get a choir together to sing it for him "with a triumphant voice" he will himself rattle it through as rapidly and indistinctly as possible. But C recites the Athanasian Creed because he believes in it and honestly thinks he is pronouncing the veritable perdition of A the Unitarian. Now it is clear that in the sphere of morals A is infinitely nearer to C than to B. In the Invisible Church of sincere men, militant for Truth, the Unitarian and the man who damns him are really one. If C is an ignorant but honest priest, A will say, even as he is being burnt, "O sancta simplicitas!" But to B, the easy-going Liberal, eager to tolerate and to welcome him, A will apply the language of the Book of Revelation concerning the Church in Laodicea.

There is, of course, another type of Liberal Anglican who is not indifferent or easy-going but earnest and active for the reform of his Church. He feels the same poignant dilemma that some of us outside his communion feel.

Loyalty to Truth and loyalty to the visible Church do not always present themselves as identical. When they do not, we have to make a stern moral decision. That decision may be subjectively right when objectively wrong. In other words, it may be sincere and honest without being ethically sound. Sincerely and honestly Canon Rashdall decides one way, sincerely and honestly Henry Sidgwick decided another way.

And this brings us to the painful heart of the tragedy. It is constituted by the recognised distinction between the Church Visible and the Church Invisible. Let it be granted that incorporation in Church-life is essential to salvation; essential in the same way that incorporation in society is essential to the sanity and citizenship of an individual. But it is an authorised if not authoritative doctrine even of Romanism that this is true primarily of the Invisible Church and only in a subordinate manner of the Visible Church, which is but the sacrament and organ of the Invisible. If it is difficult to define the Visible Church, it is impossible to define and hard even to describe the Church Invisible. It is, at any rate, more than the democracy of the dead as depicted in history,

more than our Christian forerunners now deemed immortally alive. It is even more than these cleansed and purified in some higher mode of being. It includes some now physically alive-the just, the true, the pure of all kindreds and tribes on earth. It must further include, in idea, those who are to be, who will in the future belong to it. It thus embraces within its mystic fold past, present, and future. Beyond this Church we cannot go. In it we find what is, for us, the final authority and the ultimate joy of God. To be sincere in the presence of it is our first and last loyalty. Is there any visible organisation or tribunal which can tell us whether we are thus sincere or not? Is there any external power which can possibly excommunicate from that holy fellowship those who are not in their essential interior spirit already excommunicated? We either are or are not in some degree in the communion of saints; and do not the degree and the quality of our communion depend on the intensity and quality of our hidden life? A man may be near the centre or on the indefinitely far circumference of the awful Rose of Heaven, but if he is human at all, if he has one faint spark of love, if he is not already spiritually dead, can he be really outside?

It is this Church Invisible that commands our final obedience. The man who is most docile to the Visible may, by reason of the moral meaninglessness of his docility, be a rebel and a schismatic against the Invisible Church. It is of this spiritual order that it must still be said—He that is not for us is against us, and he that gathereth not scattereth. We hear much of the moral evils of secession; but it is a secession that can never be absolute, and it is secession from the Church Invisible that we must first and finally fear. Father Tyrrell, in his essay on *Idealism: its Use and Abuse*, says that "it is the weak man who gives way to violence in speech and action, whose first impulse is revolution, rebellion, secession: it is the strong man who keeps silence and waits and hopes and obeys." True, and for that very reason some of us are strong only in the strength of the Invisible. "Secession," he

resumes, "when it is not a work of malice, is the child of crude thought and moral cowardice. It is to fly from temptation which it is our duty to face and to conquer, the temptation of scandal, of seeing ourselves deprived of the support of public example and edification and left in comparative isolation as idealists and dreamers. It is the act of a soldier who deserts lest he should be involved in the defeat of his regiment which he foresees, or share the suspicion of having failed in his duty. Or is it the act of a son who denies and disowns the mother that bore him lest he should be partaker in her disgrace?" That is nobly put, but the mother that really claims the very soul of us is the Jerusalem that is above, which is free and the mother of us all. What we ought to dread most of all is that treachery to the Church Invisible which may be loyalty to the Church Visible. What we must never shrink from is that rebellion to the Visible which may be the highest obedience to the Invisible Church. Such rebellion, by virtue of its heroism and fidelity, may only more deeply incorporate us into the Invisible Church. If this means earthly isolation, so be it; but it means also the closest intimacy of heavenly communion which the heart can feel, and therefore we may each strive to be that strong man who keeps silence and waits and hopes and obeys. We have meat to eat and a sacrament to receive which many members of the Visible Church know not of.

This must not be understood to mean that incorporation in the Church Visible is a matter of small moment, but only that at best it is not of supreme moment. It is perhaps in the disproportionate importance attached to it that we may see the cloven hoof of real schism. The man who for ever cries "Church, Church," may be its worst enemy, the most flagrant example of moral and spiritual secession. If one may be a heretic in the Truth, much more may he be a schismatic in his very insistence on Catholic Churchmanship. In fighting against schism his clumsy sword may cut that coat which was without seam, woven from the top throughout. The anti-schismatic temper may thus become the acutest

schism, because the cruellest cleavage of that fraterna caritas which is the most essential note of the Church of Christ. It is this virulent truculence that still needs our Lord's rebuke—He that is not against us is for us.

Schism, then, in so far as it means a separation from the true Church, occasioned by sincere diversity of theological opinions, is an illusion and an unreality, the hallucination of panic-stricken theologians who, spite of all their dogmatic rhetoric, do not really believe in the invincible catholicity of the Church. Just as it is men who do not believe deeply in God who are most afraid of atheism, so it is men who do not believe in the Holy Catholic Church who are afraid of schism. Theologians have exhausted all the metaphors of Church-life. It was an army, a travelling pilgrimage to eternity, a company of the faithful, a body of believers in promulgated dogma, They have been driven from one untenable conception to another. It is a sign of grace that they would now make loyalty to the Person of Christ the distinguishing note of Churchmanship. But this again, for the purposes of test and exclusion, is as little efficacious as any other. Loyalty to Christ depends for its value and validity on what we mean by the terms. Is it not precisely this loyalty that commands many of us-the love of Christ which constrains us-to become "heretics and schismatics" in His name? May we not do the Will of God, and even cry "Lord, Lord," unless we first accept Dr Forsyth's judgment of heresy on the Papacy or the Papacy's judgment of heresy on Dr Forsyth? In our warfare with the Philistine we have been too long encumbered and embarrassed by Saul's armour, and must now trust in the sling and the stone of simplicity and naturalness. It is high time to lift our denominational controversies to a higher altitude. It is neither fanciful nor fanatical to say that theology, like any other science, must trust for its vindication and triumph to the selfconvincing power of Truth. There is no hope of changing men's inner convictions by inducing them to repeat together and often a creed which they do not believe. The lesson of

the history of political no less than of ecclesiastical thought is that the Church must rely for the preservation of her integrity, for her vitality and purity and progress, on the grace of God, the intercession of the saints, and the inner resources of her own moral and religious life. She is, and will be, subjected to attack, but she has no other effective weapon of defence than the persuasive energy of her own appeal and the majestic authority of her own spirit. In technical theology the Church Triumphant is in Heaven alone. We love to nourish our idealism upon that mystical contemplation, and to dream of it with longing as an actual state of perfection symbolised by the music of great masters and the art of childlike lovers and believers like Fra Angelico. But in some form, however qualified and modified, we all believe in a Church Triumphant on earth. It is what gives meaning to progress. We must believe in it if we believe at all in any high destiny for the human race on this terrestrial sphere. We believe in it in the same way and to the same degree in which we believe in the victoriousness of Justice and Truth and Love among mankind. It is those who believe most ardently in the Divine Life of the Church who fear least and trust most, and are ever ready for the supreme venture of faith. The Free Catholic Church may be driven out of material temples, she may lose prestige and endowments, her sacrament may be a communion of the dust, she may have to wander as an itinerant preacher among the lanes and lakes and villages of Galilee; but if we believe in the supremacy and the ultimate victory of Christ as her essential spirit, we shall also believe that she, like Him, will have the heroic daring to set her face at last toward Jerusalem. She will run the risks not only of betrayal by Judas and denial by Peter, but of crucifixion by priests and politicians. She will not quail before the utter committal of her spirit into the hands of God.

J. M. LLOYD THOMAS.

NOTTINGHAM.

PRAYER.

CHARLES STEWART.

I sincerely feel the temerity of applying the critical spirit to a mental exercise, a habit and attitude of mind so essential for mankind as prayer undoubtedly is, and this paper would not have been written if it were calculated to discourage devotional exercises of that character, and if the hope and endeavour for their amendment, to some extent in substance, but mainly in form, were vain and impious. The suggestion for modifying supplication and beseeching into some form of self-submission to the divine will and of humble resolution does not seem to require, etymologically or otherwise, the disuse of the word prayer, which may surely be used, not only as applied to supplications for special favours, or for treatment more advantageous to the petitioner than is dealt out to his fellow-creatures, but with equal fitness to cognate devotional exercises for self-improvement.

Apart from Bible records (which will be briefly considered hereafter), is it rational to suppose that there can be actual direct and specific communication between man and God? We must recognise that it is in the power of God to make any communication to mankind generally, or to any individual man, that He may think fit, and that either directly or indirectly; but no evidence seems to be forthcoming that He has ever exercised this power in the form of communication of actual words. The conversations reported in detail in several books of the Old Testament between God and man (Moses, Joshua, Job, etc. etc.) or between God

and Satan, and the speeches of God reported by the prophets Isaiah, Jeremiah, etc. etc., must no doubt be regarded as legendary and imaginary, as the prophets' methods of conveying to the people their ideas of God's acts and intentions, not as words actually spoken or messages actually conveyed from Him to man. The addresses of man to God are commonly conveyed in the form of prayer; but can it rationally be supposed that the prayers, made daily and hourly by hundreds of millions of human beings of one religion and another, addressed to their deity, true or false, asking for all manner of things, wise and unwise, selfish and unselfish, can reach the ears of God, or that they deserve to do so, a very large proportion of them being merely formal, perfunctory, insincere, or misdirected? Considering the incalculable amount of weighing and sifting which these petitions must require, the wide and constant knowledge and observation of the bodily circumstances and mental conditions of each suppliant which must be presupposed in God if the petitions are to be dealt with judicially and fairly (and any other idea is incompatible with divine justice), can it be conceived that God can give serious ear and individual consideration to each and all of them? If we consider the matter with any calmness of judgment, we must have difficulty in retaining such an opinion, and must accept the probability that the personal, careful, and individual attention and consideration which the Deity is supposed to give to each suppliant in listening to and dealing with the subject of the petition is an archaic theory, perhaps necessary in the early stages of faith and education, but now neither needful nor credible. May we not rest content and be well satisfied with the belief that all prayers (so far as they have any effect other than merely subjective on those from whom they emanate) are dealt with, not individually and particularly, but according to the general laws affecting God's intervention in the affairs of His creatures?

The longing that one's desires, important or unimportant, should be known personally to God is perhaps natural. We

have been educated and trained from childhood to put up such petitions; and if any calamity or danger should befall us, we should probably from force of habit and education fall on our knees and cry out to God to interpose and help us, though our better reason might tell us that such ejaculations are not really likely to reach His ear, and—a further and more important consideration—that such petitions imply want of trust in God's judgment and benevolence. Is it conceivable that God should witness the impending danger or the calamity, and reflect, "I can avert this blow and the affliction that it will cause, but I will not avert it unless I am asked to do so"? Does not greater piety consist in leaving to God the disposal of our fate, to be dealt with in His supreme wisdom, or to follow His immutable laws?

We need not ask for the power to resist evil; this has been given to us at the creation of man and at our birth, and it seems to be merely paltering with God's precious gift to persist in begging for it over and over again, when we undoubtedly possess the power already.

The mental attitude of humility and the sense of dependence on God, that leads men to prayer, is eminently wholesome and indeed essential to overcome the certain consequences of allowing pride and selfishness to have their sway. The objection is to the *form* of its expression, to petitioning, at large or specifically, for this or that, instead of recognising that God is the best judge of what is good for us to have or not to have, and that we may safely act on the power of judging between right and wrong which He has given to us, and may continuously trust in Him.

The wholesomeness of prayer, or rather of the prayerful spirit, is undeniable, but those who have given thought to the matter generally recognise that the benefit is *subjective* only—in other words, that it promotes and stimulates humility and the sense of general dependence on God, and that it conduces to repentance and resolution, the direct and only road to amendment.

Is it not possible to devise some substituted formula that will satisfy devout persons and retain the beneficial subjective effects of petition and beseeching, while discarding its unreality, an unreality widely felt, though very many are unwilling to express their dissatisfaction with mere supplication and with the want of trust in God which it implies?

What we want to express, or ought to wish to express, is—Gratitude for gifts and potentialities bestowed on us.

Submission to the will of God.

Recognition that He has given us the power to do good and to resist evil.

Resolution that we will exercise this power; not beseeching for it.

Aspiration towards the elevation of our motives, and towards better and nobler conduct.

We hold this same resolve in regard to obedience to the civil laws of our country, and recognition of the authority of the King, of the law courts and magistrates. We are not in the habit of reciting these obligations daily or weekly in the market-place or in our chamber; though possibly the thought-less among us might feel the obligation stronger if we did so. In regard to our religious duties it is no doubt wise to recognise that some daily or weekly recital or declaration of, and exhortation to, the higher obligations for which there is no human and visible and legal sanction such as fine or imprisonment, and of our duty of observance of them, is useful in enforcing them on the minds of the careless and unthinking; in other words, that periodical and regular services of Religion are expedient and helpful.

What, then, should this form of service be? The Churches and the clergy are ready made for it, if they should approve it and be willing to adopt it.

The New Testament teaching, the practice commanded or urged by Jesus Christ and His apostles, and consequently by all the Christian Churches since His time, has been in favour of Supplicatory Prayer; but may not this simply have originated in the adoption by these early teachers, perhaps wisely, and in reliance on attachment to old customs, of established habits of worship, such as in early times were addressed to the pagan gods? May it not also be right to recognise that these teachers were men, not necessarily in advance of their age, and with no further knowledge and enlightenment as to the ways of God towards man than were possessed by the centuries preceding them, and only progressing slowly, as we ourselves are, towards greater knowledge and understanding?

It is almost impossible to overestimate the force and power of established custom, of habit, of conservatism, especially in matters of religious creed and worship. The clergy-perhaps nothing else can fairly be expected of them-are painfully averse from any revision of established formulas, and still more so, from the critical examination of supposed rudimentary truths. Christ Himself, our highest authority, the Founder of our Religion, our Leader and Guide, was essentially, except in His powerful condemnation of evil and in His effective advocacy of virtue and right conduct, a Man of his Age, without pretension to fore-knowledge of the future of the world; and it may well have been, even if He had more than human knowledge of the exact relations between God and man, that He, while perhaps recognising its mere subjectivity, the advantages of its reflex action, thought it beneficial and expedient to advocate Supplicatory Prayer-as indeed He Himself practised it in the Garden at Gethsemane in His human suffering on the eve of His trial and execution-an exhibition of human weakness which has endeared Him for ever to mankind. If, therefore, the teaching and practice of Christ and His disciples, as they reach us through the writings of the apostles, is to be considered as precluding all further inquiry into the relations and communication between man and God, the need of Supplicatory Prayer by man for what he chances to want is firmly established; but to assert that all inquiry on the subject is foreclosed would be inconsistent with the belief that progress in human and

divine knowledge accords with man's duty and with the law of the universe.

The suggestion here made for further inquiry and consideration of the subject is founded on the belief or supposition—

- 1. That a large proportion of the prayers now offered to God¹ are either improperly selfish petitions for special favour, for treatment in some way better than other people, for an alteration in our own favour of the laws of Nature and of moral cause and effect; supplications to secure for ourselves or our friends, otherwise than by our own or their own exertions, something that we should not otherwise obtain; or for powers or grace which have already been conferred by God on each human being at his or her birth; and that the habit of beseeching for such gifts, and of depending for their use and cultivation on some one else, and even on God, tends to weaken resolution and personal endeavour.
- 2. That the effect of prayer is *subjective* only, and that if it reaches the ears of God, it is not only undesirable but inconceivable that He should really be influenced by our feeble and ignorant appeals to Him to divert in our favour the action of His divine and everlasting laws.
- 3. That Supplicatory Prayer is mainly a matter of long tradition, habit, and education, but that there is no deep-seated or reasonable belief among Christians generally in its being heard, seriously considered, and complied with by God.
- 4. That only a slight change in the present formula, a change from the form of supplication to the form of aspiration, subjection to God's will, and resolution, is necessary; and that such a change, being more in consonance with the facts of Nature, the laws of the universe, and with rational belief, would probably lead to the improvement of mankind and of the world.

CHARLES STEWART.

ATHENÆUM CLUB.

¹ "The imperfect offices of Prayer and Praise," as Wordsworth describes them.

THE ECCLESIASTICAL SITUATION IN SCOTLAND.

THE REV. DONALD MACMILLAN, D.D.

It is exactly forty years since the late Dr Robert Wallace, at that time Professor of Church History in the University of Edinburgh, contributed to a volume of Recess Studies, edited by Sir Alexander Grant, a long and important article on "Church Tendencies in Scotland." It may at once be said that nothing of equal value has since appeared. Dr Wallace's article, as those who afterwards knew him in the House of Commons, where he sat as representative for East Edinburgh, would naturally expect, is thoroughly well-informed, calmly reasoned, absolutely fair, and ever and again is lit up by that pawky humour which was altogether his own. His contribution covers the whole field of religious thought and Church politics of the time, and indicates the tendencies which were at work and the results that might be reasonably expected to follow. The writer's forecasts have not become true in every instance, but many of them have long since been realised and have passed into the life of Scotland. The period of forty years that has elapsed since the article was written may seem a very brief one in the history of a Church or of a nation, and yet within it, as in the present case, changes may occur of farreaching consequence.

In the Established Church, the one to which Dr Wallace himself belonged, what really amounted to a revolution in its constitution took place in 1874—just four years after his article

was published. In that year the Government of Mr Disraeli passed an Act abolishing patronage in the Church. It is not too much to say that the grievance which the people of Scotland had against the exercise of lay patronage was responsible, if not for all, certainly for nearly all the secessions from it, and it was the chief reason for the Disruption of 1843. Act of the Government was, of course, the result of representations from the Church itself. The abolition of patronage was, as everyone now admits, a wise act, although the motive of those who engineered it was doubted. Their aim, it was alleged, was to gain an advantage over the Free Kirk, which had left the Establishment on this very question. Dr Wallace and Dr Story, who represented the Liberal party in the Church, did not sympathise with this motive, and their support was only half-hearted. They held that the logical sequence of such an Act was to give the right of electing ministers to all the parishioners, irrespective of their particular Church connection. This right has since been granted. When a vacancy occurs in a parish, any adult can make application to the kirk-session, and, if his claim is allowed, he is put on the voting roll as an elector. It was also maintained that another result should follow. Not only should the parishioners have a right to vote, but the ministers of the Free Church should also have the right of being elected. This too has been conceded. The late Principal Cunningham of St Andrews got the Assembly of the Church of Scotland to agree to open the door of the Church to the ministers of all the Presbyterian Churches of Great Britain, Ireland, and the Colonies (1886), and many have taken advantage of the privilege thus granted and are now ministers of the Church.

Even the creed of the Church has, during the period under consideration, changed, if not in form, at least in spirit. The first movement was in the direction of a tightening of confessional bonds. In 1897 a young minister of the Church, the Rev. Mr Robinson of Kilmun, was deposed for heresy. He had, two years previously, published a book called *The*

Saviour in the Newer Light. It dealt largely with a criticism of the New Testament records, and questioned, if it did not deny, the usual conception of certain Christian doctrines, particularly the Resurrection of Jesus Christ. His deposition is felt to have been a mistake. He had never introduced any critical discussion into the pulpit; his own congregation never doubted his orthodoxy, and he himself was an influence for good; and yet the Church ousted him from his charge and stripped him of his orders. The second event is of a much later date, and is in the direction of a loosening of confessional bonds. At the General Assembly of last year a new formula of subscription for ministers and professors of Divinity was adopted by the Church, and what it practically binds them to is a belief in the "fundamentals" of the faith. Such are some of the changes that have taken place in the Church since Dr Wallace wrote his article.

Nor have what were at the time the two chief dissenting Churches - the Free and the United Presbyterian - been stagnant. Indeed, they have been subjected to greater upheavals and revolutions than the Church of Scotland itself The Robertson Smith case in the Free Church is now a matter of ecclesiastical history. Professor Robertson Smith led the way, in this country, in bringing to bear upon Old Testament documents the light of the most recent research and the most advanced scholarship. The ground of the attacks that were made upon him was an article on Deuteronomy which he contributed to the Encyclopædia Britannica, and a further article on the Bible which raised the whole question of the historicity, authenticity, and inspiration of the Old Testament. The Assembly of the Free Church deprived him of the professorship which he held in its theological college in Aberdeen. But a reaction took place not unlike that which has just been referred to as having happened in the Church of Scotland. When, at a later date, two professors, Bruce and George Adam Smith, and one minister, Dr Marcus Dods. were brought before the bar of the Free Kirk Assembly for Vol. IX.-No. 2. 26

denying the inerrancy of Scripture, the charges against them were dismissed. Indeed, the liberal seed which had been sown by those who were martyrs to what they held to be the truth began to bear fruit, and the Church, desiring to free itself from some of its confessional bonds, passed a Declaratory Act giving a more liberal interpretation of certain of its doctrines. It paid, however, for its courage, because a secession took place, and thus was formed the Free Presbyterian Church. The great event, however, was the union in 1900 of the Free and United Presbyterian Churches. The majority of the Free Church entered into the union, but a minority remained, who laid claim not only to the name, but also to the status and the property of the Church, and the famous decision of the House of Lords in 1905 vindicated their contention. An Act of Parliament had to be passed to apportion the property and to reinvest the dispossessed Church in a share of its original possessions. The union was thus in its main object abortive. Although the two Churches united and thus formed the present United Free Church, two still remained, the other being the original, or what is now known as the legal, Free Church.

The United Presbyterian Church, some ten years before the union, had also to settle a case of heresy. The culprit was the Rev. David Macrae of Gourock, afterwards so well known as an independent minister in Dundee. He denied the truth of the Church's teaching on the subject of eternal punishment, and the Church replied by deposing him. The only change of any importance that has taken place in the Scottish Episcopal Church during the period under review is the creation of a Consultative Council on Church legislation. This body is composed of an equal number of clergy and laity. It took its present shape in 1905. The Roman Catholic Church took a step forward in 1878, when it restored its Hierarchy. The Congregational Churches in the country formed themselves into a Union; the Reformed Presbyterian Church joined the Free Church, but left a remnant of eleven congregations

behind; but the other Churches—such as the Wesleyan-Methodists, the Original Seceders, the Baptists, and the Unitarians—have practically remained unchanged. They certainly have not increased in membership, and would seem to be content to minister quietly to those who support them and to leave other Churches alone.

We do not pretend to have mentioned all the different Christian bodies that exist at the present time in Scotland. It is said that in Glasgow alone there are thirty-four and in Edinburgh twenty-five religious societies. But the chief denominations have been specified; indeed, so far as their influence upon the main trend of religious thought and ecclesiastical politics is concerned, the majority, even of those mentioned, might be put aside. Some of them, it is true, can, like the Congregationalists, boast of distinguished preachers, and the others have qualities which ought to be cordially recognised. But so far as a lead is to be given to Church life in Scotland, attention must be fixed upon three of the Churches, namely, the Church of Scotland, the United Free Church, and the Scottish Episcopal. The Roman Catholic Church, which claims a tenth of the population, is practically foreign to Scottish soil. With the exception of certain districts in the north, which were never really reformed, its membership is almost entirely drawn from the Irish population of the great industrial centres. The religious future of Scotland lies in the hands of the three Churches referred to; and if the number were to be still further reduced, it might be said that the future will be determined by the teaching and policy of the Church of Scotland and the United Free Church.

One has only to refer to the numerical strength of these two Churches to see this. According to the latest returns the membership of the Church of Scotland is 711,211, and that of the United Free Church is 507,408. It will thus be seen that between them they embrace something like three-fourths of the possible membership of the whole population, which is expected to reach at the forthcoming census 5,000,000, the

remaining fourth being divided between the various denominations mentioned; a considerable allowance, of course, being made for those who have no Church connection at all. It might be thought that the Scottish Episcopal Church ought to be left out of account because of its small membership, for it only lays claim, at the very most, to two and a half per cent. of the population. But it ought to be remembered that it was at one time the National Church of Scotland, that its history is deeply rooted in the past, that it inherits dearly cherished traditions, and has, in its membership, most of the aristocracy and many of the gentry of Scotland. It possesses a strong social influence, and its power is far out of proportion to its numbers. In order, accordingly, to arrive at some clear understanding of the religious situation in Scotland and to forecast if possible the movements that will determine its future, it is necessary to examine the principles which are guiding the leading Churches, so far as they can be seen from their own more recent doings and the policy in creed and conduct which they may at the moment be adumbrating.

In referring more particularly to the Established and United Free Churches it may seem that what practically amounts to a doctrinal revolution in them was somewhat easily and speedily won. On the contrary, however, the battle for progress was both long and hard fought. The Church of Scotland began the movement more than fifty vears ago. Its champion at that time was Dr Robert Lee. He had successors in Dr Norman MacLeod, Principal Tulloch, Principal Caird, Dr Robert Wallace, and Principal Story. Others whose names are not so well known did yeoman service. The Free Church also had its champions and both Churches These leaders were undoubtedly greatly their martyrs. influenced by German thought and scholarship. If one may make a difference, it can be said that the Church of Scotland was chiefly affected by the philosophers and theologians whose writing bore more directly upon dogma and doctrine, and the Free Church by the scholars who took the lead in what is

known as the Higher Criticism. Indeed, if the writings of the chief authors in both Churches be studied, the truth of this distinction will be readily admitted. Tulloch, Caird, Matheson, and Flint were theologians. Robertson Smith, Bruce, Dods, and Davidson were critics. It will thus be seen that, unconsciously as it were, each Church has contributed its own share to the development of religious thought in Scotland during the last half-century. They thus formed the two sides of the shield, and can claim equal credit for the work accomplished.

Nor should the honour be entirely given to these men only, for others who are fortunately still in the fighting line have contributed their share. This can be seen from a series of remarkable contributions by leading clergymen of the Scottish Church to the Glasgow Herald when under the editorship of Dr William Wallace, and published in book form three years ago. They appeared under the general title of Creed Revision in Scotland. It may be of some interest to give one or two sentences from a view of these articles. "It is not," says Dr James Moffatt, "that the Churches have outlived the Gospel, but that the Gospel has outlived the Creed." "Not long ago," remarks Professor Menzies, "the Churches were vying with each other for the reputation of orthodoxy, each pointing with an air of virtue at the heretical tendencies appearing in a sister Church. Now they have found out, all at once as it were, that the Confession of Faith which they recently upheld as a strong rock of true religion and inviolable standard of the faith is, as the creed of a living Church of the present day, impossible." "With regard also to much which has hitherto been accepted as historical in the New Testament," adds Dr John Hunter, "the conviction is spreading and deepening that knowledge is out of the question. To affirm or to deny dogmatically the historical verity of the story of the virgin birth, the reanimation of the dead body of Jesus and his visible reappearance after death, is to speak with certainty where certainty is simply impossible." Such

sentences as these by three men, who in this matter may be said to be representative of the United Free Church, the Church of Scotland, and the Congregational Church respectively, are surely significant, and the fact of their being allowed to pass without any adverse comment shows the advance which has within recent years been made in religious thought.

Surprise may be expressed, in view of all these facts, at the reluctance of the Scottish Church to make a new Confession of Faith. A sufficient answer might perhaps be found in the difficulty of such an undertaking. Thought is not sufficiently ripe, the age is too restless, the Churches themselves may not be quite convinced. The truth, however, seems to be that there is a fear lest making a new creed, however short and simple - even though it were as brief as the one which Professor Denney recommends when he suggests that the symbol of the Church's unity might be expressed thus: "I believe in God through Jesus Christ His only Son our Saviour"-might endanger the freedom which is at present enjoyed. This is very well expressed by Professor Ernest Scott in his contribution to the series of articles that appeared in the Glasgow Herald: "The very reluctance to abandon the Westminster Confession arises in large measure from the half-conscious feeling that the days of creed-making are over. A new Confession, framed in however generous a spirit, would impose definite obligations to which few would care to submit themselves, and it seems better on the whole to leave things as they are." The truth would seem to be that the desire of the Scottish Church is to recreate in its members, if possible, the faith of the primitive Church, to go back in thought to the time before heresy was ever heard of, or intellectual discussions arose concerning the verities of the Christian religion. A spiritual apprehension of the truth is believed to be of far more vital importance than a mere intellectual assent to it. This is undoubtedly the tendency in Scottish religious thought at the present time, and it is one that is full of hope for the future.

All this has not taken place without influencing Church life in Scotland. A sign of the times is the greater freedom of Sunday observance on the part of all classes of the people. If a new conception of the Bible which questions its authenticity or inerrancy be sanctioned by the Churches, then the Mosaic regulations as to the Sabbath must cease to be binding on the Christian conscience. In any case, it would seem that the members of the Church are acting on this understanding. Things are now done on Sunday in Scotland that would have horrified our forefathers; even a generation ago they would not have been tolerated. Motoring, cycling, excursions by train and steamboat, and even golfing are more or less common on the Lord's Day. A marked transformation is also perceptible in the social habits of the people. They patronise forms of amusement which in days not so very far distant would have been prohibited, and they indulge in them to a far greater extent. Life on the whole-both religious and social—is less fettered; a spirit of freedom would seem to be abroad, and Scottish character is accordingly losing much of the sober restraint and even dulness which, whether truly or not, were commonly attributed to it.

Additional evidence of the influence of the movements in thought referred to is seen in the marked change which has taken place in the worship of the Church. Up to recent years, owing to the attitude which was adopted towards the Bible, it was believed that nothing should be allowed in religious service which was not sanctioned by Holy Writ. It was pointed out that the Sacred Scriptures do not pretend to supply forms of worship, but somehow this argument had little or no effect. The Psalms of David in the metrical version, and at a later date the paraphrases, were all that was permitted in the praise of the Church, and long extemporary prayers, with a longer sermon, completed the service. All this has altered. In certain of the Presbyterian Churches, especially in some of those belonging to the Church of Scotland, say St Giles', Edinburgh, or Glasgow Cathedral, the

worship is as rich and varied as in the Episcopal Church, and the best organs and the most beautiful music are also to be found in them. Many of the clergy read their prayers, a valuable service book has been prepared for their use by the General Assembly of the Church of Scotland, and congregations that a few years ago persecuted their ministers for daring to introduce the slightest innovation now accept quite gladly the changes and improvements that have been made.

Following upon this change has come another, or rather both grew up simultaneously. While the devotional element in the Church has assumed its right relation towards the service as a whole, the sermon has altered in character and shortened in length. With the assaults that have been made upon the doctrinal standards of the Church and the revolt against hard and fast conceptions of infinite truth, fresh in mind, preaching has become less theological and more spiritual and practical. The modern sermon in the Scottish Church is, as a rule, simple, sincere and direct. There is heart as well as head in it, and its leading note may be said to be neither evangelicalism nor morality, but spirituality. If the old doctrines are not so often brought forward, their essence, which is far more vital, is seldom or never absent.

A similar change springing from the same source is seen in ecclesiastical architecture. Many of the churches built within the last thirty years are fine specimens—chiefly of the Gothic type. Previous to that date, except in a few instances where pre-Reformation churches still remained, the buildings not only lacked beauty of form but were often ugly and repellent. Their interiors were in keeping with their exteriors, and nothing could be more miserable for an Englishman than to worship in one of those "barns."

The general tendency may also be seen in the increased interest that is being taken in social questions. Once the mind ceased turning in upon itself and analysing its theological opinions it began to look outside of itself and to see the need there was for some practical effort to leaven the large mass

of unreclaimed humanity that is to be found chiefly in the large towns and cities. The Church of Scotland has never been forgetful of the poor; indeed, from the Reformation until sixty years ago it was their sole almoner. The passing of the Poor Law Act took the duty in a sense out of its hands, but it has never failed to insist upon its right and its privilege in this matter, and quite lately it has renewed its efforts to cope with the great social problem. In this movement we see it putting itself once more in direct relation to the source of all helpful work. The Church of Scotland is active in this cause, and it now spends something like £10,000 a year on Labour Homes, Farm Colonies, Shelters for Men and Women, and Institutions for Lads and Girls. The United Free Church is following suit; but if the action of its late General Assembly be an indication of its policy, it is undertaking a dangerous experiment in trying to solve economic questions by practically allying itself with the Labour party. It would be a mistake for it to affiliate itself with Socialism. It is possible that too much may be made of the social work of the Churches. All that they can accomplish is but as a drop in the ocean, and without the power of discipline in their hand their labour is often love's labour lost. Hundreds are found ready to take advantage of their charity without benefiting much in the end; being free agents they can come and go as they please. All the same, this effort is a noble one. It shows that the Church is leaving the sphere of abstract and doubtful problems for the tackling of one that is surely palpable enough, and if it cannot solve it, it can at any rate agitate and stir up the nation, inspire it with a sense of its duty and fan those ideas which ought to act as beacons in the social darkness.

But the greatest of all the changes is the one that has taken place in the relation of the Churches to each other. For eight years, from 1877 to 1885, the country rang with the cry for the disestablishment of the Church of Scotland. The agitation was started by the Free Church on the initiation of its leader, Principal Rainy, and the real cause of the movement

was the soreness which he and his friends felt at the abolition of patronage. The ground, however, which he took up was that the existence of an Established Church was an injustice to the other Churches, and that only by its disestablishment and its disendowment could union take place. He was joined in the agitation by Principal Cairns, the leader of the United Presbyterian Church, and they both went up and down the country addressing public meetings in furtherance of their cause. The Church of Scotland entered into a strong defence, and the nation was thoroughly roused to the seriousness and the apparent imminence of the issue. Dr Rainy and his party depended upon Mr Gladstone to accomplish their ends. They thought that they had secured his support, but he threw them over in 1885 in a speech which he delivered in the Assembly Hall of the Free Church itself. The agitation for disestablishment has never recovered the shock then given to it, and it has practically passed out of Scottish ecclesiastical politics.

Various reasons may be given for the lack of interest now manifested in any attack that is made on the Established Church. That Church embraces in its membership about onehalf of the Protestant population of the country. It has pursued its work quietly and steadily, and its services are freely at the disposal of the whole community. Its members have never found its relation to the State to be a hindrance to its own freedom or to their religious well-being. Besides, its endowments are, in these days when dependence upon voluntary support is seen to be very uncertain, a source of great strength. Thoughtful men, even in the dissenting Churches, admit the growing need for a permanent endowment of religion. In addition, the best minds of all the Churches have been directing themselves lately to other and higher interests-to the scholarly interpretation of Divine truth and the critical elucidation of the sacred records. If the Churches are to cope with the religious and social problems that now face them it is felt that the very last thing that should be thought of is to throw away the Church's own possessions. So, on all

hands, the cry now is rather for establishment than disestablishment; sectarian bitterness has given way in face of the nation's needs.

Another element must be taken account of in the changed situation. The union of the Free and United Presbyterian Churches and the results of the famous law-suit that followed have rendered hopeless any fresh attempt at disestablishment. The two Churches emerged from the troubles of that period strengthened in one way, but very much weakened in another, and it is strange that the Nemesis which dogged their steps was the Highlands, in which up till this time the Free Church found, numerically at least, its strength. It was partly to please the Highlanders, to prevent them seceding from the Free Church, that Robertson Smith was sacrificed. The union that was being negotiated in 1873 between the two Churches that afterwards became one was thwarted by the Highlands. The congregations of the Free Church in the north and west of Scotland were thoroughly constitutional, and one of their leading principles was Establishment. Well, when Dr Rainy found that the agitation against the Established Church was practically dead he responded to an invitation from the United Presbyterian Church to enter into a union. That was accomplished in 1900; but in the terms of union the Voluntary principle of the United Presbyterian section swallowed up the Establishmentarian principle of the Free Church section, and on that ground and on others chiefly doctrinal—such as the toning down of the Confession's teaching on foreordination and universal redemption-a considerable proportion of the Free Church, chiefly in the Highlands, appealed to the civil courts and in the end secured a judgment in the House of Lords to the effect, that the section of the Free Church which joined with the United Presbyterians had, in their terms of agreement, broken the contract upon which their property depended, and that that property belonged to what is now known as the legal Free Church. The United Free Church, it must be said, came through the crisis with marvellous success, but as a fighting machine it was considerably weakened, and has ever since been fully occupied in putting its own house in order. The Church of Scotland, in the face of all this, has pursued an even and ever-advancing course, striving to live at peace with its neighbours, and to widen its constitution and its creed so that it may embrace within its folds the whole nation. Its policy would seem to be meeting with success, for while last year the net increase in the membership of the United Free Church was only 897, that of the Church of Scotland was 5395.

At this point there emerges the proposal on the part of the Church of Scotland towards a conference with the United Free Church on the subject of union, and it is this proposal which at the moment occupies the ecclesiastical field. It must be said that this is the subject which looms largest in the public mind so far as Church matters are concerned. The genesis of the proposal is of a somewhat doubtful nature. It was sprung upon the General Assembly of the Church of Scotland in 1907 by the late Dr Scott. It assumed a new shape in the Assembly of 1908, and in 1909 it took its present form of an "unrestricted conference" with the United Free Church to discover what may be the obstacles in the way of union. It was suggested at the time that one of the first acts of the Radical party, who had just gone into power, might be a Bill to disestablish the Church of Scotland; hence Dr Scott's hasty action. It was said again that the United Free Church, weary of contention and strife and sorely crippled financially, was not unwilling to make peace with its big neighbour and share its endowments. These, of course, were not the reasons given by the leaders in the movement. They declared that union was urgent in the interests of the country, that through the unnecessary multiplying of Churches there was a reprehensible waste of men and money, that people were leaving the Churches because of their divisions. Let them unite, and then with a solid front they would attack the social and moral evils of the time and redeem the country.

It has been said, however, in reply to such arguments, that history does not show that one large Church in a country is a stronger moral and religious force than ten or twenty. Otherwise, what of the Roman Catholic Church before the Reformation, or of the Church of England before the Wesleyan secession, or of the Church of Scotland before the Disruption? Did they serve the purpose for which a Church exists better than the various Churches are serving it now? As for the scandal of division, there is no scandal in division. An outward union may contain within it more real differences than those which exist between two sister Churches that are one in Christ. As a matter of fact, there are more envy and uncharitableness between the different United Free congregations in a small town than between them and the Parish Church. As to the deplorable state of the country which this great United Church is to transform, it is not so deplorable as they try to make out. Indeed, the people of Scotland never were such enlightened Christians as they are at the present day, nor was there ever a greater proportion of them in connection with the Church. One has only to read the statements of Dr Chalmers as to the religious condition of Glasgow, when he was minister of the Tron Church, to see this. The fact that churchgoers do not attend so regularly as usual is no proof to the contrary. It is true that there is a great mass of non-churchgoers, but no greater than there used to be. The exceptional greatness of it is manufactured for special purposes. All the same, this mass is to a very considerable extent mentally, morally, and physically defective. It is composed of miserable creatures whose case has been put before the public by the Royal Commission on the Poor Laws. Their condition is the concern of the nation as much as that of the Churches.

In the conference that is taking place between the joint-committee, two points will have to be settled, and the first of these is the demand on the part of the United Free Church for what it calls spiritual independence. In plain language,

this means the right and power to do as it likes with its Confession, its constitution, and its property. Any action will depend upon and be justified by a majority in the Assembly, and against such a majority the minority is to have no appeal. Will the State ever allow contracts to be broken in this way? It said "No" when the House of Lords gave its judgment in the Union case. The Church of Scotland claims to be already in possession of spiritual independence inasmuch as its rights and property are safeguarded through its contract with the State. Within its sphere it is absolutely free. The next point that will have to be settled is the fact of establishment or the recognition of national religion through a State Church. Both Churches are agreed in their desire for national religion. The United Free Church wants it without having any connection with the State. Is that possible? Hitherto the Church of Scotland has said "No," and the process by which a different answer may be given will be watched with interest.

It must be admitted that the case of the United Free Church is weak; it has no grounds in history or in fact, or in its own experience for pressing its claims. There never was a Church spiritually independent in the sense that it desires, nor was there ever national religion that was not established by the State. And then recent events in the experience of the United Free Church itself, the decision of the House of Lords for example, stripping it of its property because it carried its idea of spiritual independence beyond the law, and the subsequent reinvestment of it in a share of its property, show the thing to be impossible. Further, as to State connection, it does not object to receive national money for the education of schoolmasters and for the teaching of religion in schools; and quite recently it has permitted—indeed encouraged—its own ministers to be appointed by the State to Navy and to Army chaplaincies and to receive salaries from the nation.

It is perfectly clear that if there is to be any union there must be concessions, and if there be concessions there will be

fresh disruptions. The debate in the United Free Church at last Assembly clearly showed this, and the silence of the Church of Scotland is not to be accepted as a blind yielding to any course that may be followed. The leaders in this movement ought not to allow themselves to be deceived. Should there be any concession of principle on the part of the Church of Scotland's representatives, there will be a violent upheaval and the religious condition of the country will be worse than ever.

Nor are the men who are unfriendly to this movement "impossible." They object to it because it is to a large extent meaningless. Their imagination is not captivated by the idea of a "large" Church any more than by that of a "large" house or elephant. They do not think that a huge organisation which is created by artificial means and works mechanically is a genuine organism or possesses true unity. For the sake of this big Church, the religious and moral effect of which they do not believe will be at all as great as that of the different Churches which are at present actively engaged in Christian service, they are not prepared to sacrifice their own principles or to ask other people to sacrifice theirs. Their position, besides, is far from being negative. The thoughtful men among them are now bringing forward for the acceptance of the different Churches what they believe to be a scheme of true unity, one which while recognising the value to each Church and to the Christian Republic, of its own special constitution, also insists upon loyalty to Jesus Christ as their common Head. These ideas are finding expression at various hands. The Bishop of Carlisle, for instance, in the HIBBERT JOURNAL of January 1908, says: "Meanwhile the functions of the various members of the whole body of Christ will continue diverse and manifold. Some will be national, others congregational, some episcopal, others presbyteral, some with ancient customs, others with customs more modern, yet the national cannot say to the congregational, 'I have no need of thee,' or the episcopal to the presbyteral, 'I have no need of thee '-the

only need for all alike will be life flowing down from the Universal Head and love flowing back from every member to the Universal Heart. This, then, I take to be the distinguishing note, the fundamental characteristic of the Catholic Church, the all-resounding note—love to God and man."

Those who are putting forward this idea of union between the Churches are going back, like those (and they are practically the same thoughtful men) who seek for a common basis of Christian faith, to the Apostolic and Primitive Church where they find among the different congregations that then existed the conception of union which they favour. There they see Churches that were largely autonomous living in union with other Churches because of their common union with Christ. This is brought out in a remarkable book on Church Reform (1910), by the late Rev. J. C. Barry of Dumbarton. Much regret is felt at the untimely death of the author, and so highly does Professor Denney of the United Free Church College, Glasgow, think of the book that he has written for it a striking introduction. "The cry of union," says Dr Denney, "is raised and echoed in many quarters as if it contained the solution of all our perplexities, yet many of those who are caught by it have no distinct idea of the advantages it is supposed to bring, or of the principles on which it is to be carried through. What we hear most about is the sinfulness of schism, of Churches standing apart from each other while they are practically indistinguishable in doctrine, worship, government and discipline, and by union seems to be meant the bringing into one larger corporation two or more practically indistinguishable bodies. . . . What we want for practical efficiency is not the legal incorporation of all who adhere to the same doctrine, worship and discipline, but the moral integration of all who call Jesus Lord. The two things are not the same, nor is there any necessary connection between them. It is a plausible, but at reflection a transparent mistake to suppose that if all the Presbyterians (let us say) in Scotland were united in the legal sense of the term, the problem of Christian unity would

have been solved so far as they are concerned. Even with them the true problem is local rather than national, and the Christians who are not Presbyterian would remain. It is one of the dangers incident to the current Romish idea of unity, that it leads men to forget that liberty no less than unity is essential in Christian life. It is not a mark of the weakness of Christianity, but of its immense power to stimulate human nature on all sides and to adapt itself to all varieties of circumstance, that it has produced such distinct types of teaching as we see even in the New Testament, and such varieties of organisation as diversify the history of the Church from the earliest times to our own. We have no call to shed tears over such phenomena or to beat our breasts in public and talk about the sin of schism. There is no reason why the unity of the Church should not be conspicuous through all the varieties of doctrinal type and legal organisation."

There would thus seem to be a growing revolt against the Roman idea of unity which is not unlike the rebellion against the older conception of the Bible. Both are a protest for freedom, the one in government and the other in belief. Unity. it is contended, among different Christians and Churches is truer and deeper if it depends, not so much upon outward authority, as upon the inward spirit which should animate every believer who is in union with Christ. Those who plead for this larger Christian brotherhood point to the fact, that the external uniformity of ecclesiastical organisation, desired by those who are negotiating the union between the Established and United Free Churches, came into existence only after the fall of the Roman Empire. It was then that the Church appropriated the secular framework of imperial rule, and grafted upon it the ecclesiastical system which spread over Christendom until it was shattered by the Reformation. They have no desire for a revival of the Roman system among the Protestant Churches, and they believe that salvation lies in going farther back and reviving the spirit that animated the Apostolic and Early Church. Vol. IX.—No. 2.

It accordingly seems quite clear that before Scotland can gather together under one external organisation its ancient Presbyterianism, not to speak of the Scottish Episcopal Church and other Protestant bodies in the land which ought to find shelter in a reconstructed ecclesiastical institution, the difficulty just raised, and the others discussed or referred to, must first receive solution. No one, not even the most sanguine, can expect that the present conference will result in anything tangible. Should an attempt be made to force the pace and bring about a union that would be purely mechanical and artificial, the ecclesiastical peace of the country would at once be broken, and contention and strife would continue for many a long day. One good thing, and perhaps the only good thing, that can follow from the conferences that are taking place is an agreement on the part of the two Churches to go back, each to its own work, in a more friendly and generous spirit; to think out more fully the differences which divide them, and to see if, after all, the truer way towards a higher reconciliation and a deeper unity may be found, not in one outward organisation, nor even in a common intellectual belief, but in that inward unity of spirit which is the bond of peace.

DONALD MACMILLAN, D.D.

THE AGENDA CLUB.

FRANCIS BICKLEY.

Burne-Jones, humaner than the proverb-maker, declared that Heaven was paved with a mosaic of good intentions and good deeds, but one supposes that not even he deemed the two equivalent. The embryo has the potentialities but not the actual worth of the accomplished growth, and good intentions are but good deeds in embryo. Certainly the former are the commoner phenomena. The discrepancy implies much misdirected effort, futility and despair.

Nowhere does the gulf between deed and desire yawn wider than in the field of social reform. What Mr John Galsworthy has called the social conscience is alive and busy enough, but that in itself is a sign that something which needs doing is undone or misdone. If all were right with society, the social conscience would be asleep from ennui.

What has long been needed is an organisation of effort and object, and quite recently such an organisation has come to birth in a scheme which stands at once on a high plane of idealism and on a lower plane of realism than such schemes usually deign to descend to. The realistic side of the venture—the outward and visible sign—is embodied in the stern practicality of the Agenda Club. The inward and spiritual grace was expounded in *An Open Letter to English Gentlemen* which, over the modest pseudonym "Pars Minima," occupied the place of honour in the Hibbert Journal for last July.

The direction of this epistle was in itself arresting, and by

no means unprovocative of criticism. With a large class of social reformers the "gentleman" does not stand high in credit. "What have the privileged classes done for England?" "Down with the gentry!" shouts the asks the democrat. Even the most responsible of Liberal democratomaniac. journals considered "Pars Minima's" appeal a piece of mistaken mediævalism. The mistake lay with the critic. He had misapprehended the fundamental idea. No one-least of all so clear and unbiassed a thinker as "Pars Minima"—expects the landed gentry to rise up in unison and by one coherent effort to allay for ever the sufferings of the less fortunate. But it is as obviously absurd to maintain or imply that there are none among the well-born who have not bowed the knee to the Baal of selfishness and complacence, as it would be to assert that every horny or labour-stained hand is the hand of a hero. "Pars Minima" made his appeal not to a class, but to a type -"that still extant but not increasing type-the well-bred Englishman—to men of gentle birth, of an inherited courtesy and courage, 'good sportsmen,' incapable of dishonesty, lying with difficulty, unassuming, undemonstrative, plain, blunt, loyal." If, for the moment, he had nothing to say to the "men who have the essential stuff of the gentleman in them" but are not in fact gentle by birth, he turned his back more permanently on those who have inherited merely the accidentals of their order, "an ample fortune, an honoured name, a more or less perfunctory code fulfilled in the letter rather than in the spirit." Obviously a beginning must be made somewhere, and it could hardly be more aptly made than with those whose obligations—if there be any truth at all in the law of compensation—are undoubtedly greatest. The nature of the letter will ensure its reaching only those for whom it is intended. It is common knowledge among missionaries and advertisers that to catch the few one must address the many.

The real need is for men—such men, distinguished not by class but by mental attitude, as are prepared to give themselves to the service of an idea, to devote themselves to the work which has got to be done unless England is to fall on evil days and still more evil. The Open Letter was an appeal to the true patriot, the man who puts country before party and before class, the man of ideals and ideas but not of isms. impossible to damn the scheme with any ism but idealism. Socialism it is not, for the work is to be done by the few. The dream is of a picked body of fifteen to thirty thousand. Individualism it is not, for self is to be sacrificed. It is neither Conservative nor Liberal, for the great questions of parliamentary controversy are outside its sphere. Though free from narrowness, it is not incompatible with nationalism; nor, on the other hand, does it seek to pick a quarrel with sane imperialism. One of the most friendly and at the same time most perspicacious notices of the Open Letter appeared in the Spectator. The article voiced the two points of doubt which are the most likely to be urged against it.

Firstly, there is the difficulty of keeping such an undertaking as this clear of party. However lofty, clear-sighted and disinterested the patriotism of the workers may be, the difficulty is real enough, and will need much careful steering, tact and forbearance to circumnavigate. But the fact remains that there are many reforms to be carried through, as to the desirability of which every one is agreed and with which Toryism and Whiggery have nothing to do. And it is a happy fact that dislike for party methods and party catchwords is on the increase. Possibly the day is not so far off when such men as go to form the Agenda Club shall have their influence on national politics.

The Spectator's second criticism was of the vagueness of the scheme which the Open Letter adumbrated. But, as already hinted, the Open Letter was only an adumbration. The substance is not lacking. But to define a policy before getting the men to carry it out would be to place the cart before the horse. The members of the Agenda Club will decide their own policy. They are to be responsible agents, not machines. Though a certain sacrifice of self is required,

the subordination is rather of aim than of personality. Personalities are needed, to build up such a composite personality as may carry on effective and comprehensive work. Also, it must be understood that half-knowledge, easy amateurism, is not wanted. The work of the Agenda Club is to be expert, thorough. Action must wait on thought and study. The instrument must not only be forged but tempered before it can be used for its appointed task.

Since the writing of the Open Letter much has been done. Men renowned in many paths of intellectual activity have put the scheme to severe scrutiny and have approved it. Those who are sufficiently interested to know all there is to know of the Agenda Club and its ways will receive full particulars on applying to the proper source. A book is at this moment in course of preparation which will set forth the details of the scheme and show how careful has been the planning of a structure apparently so simple in its perfected form. A brief sketch of main characteristics, however, may here be given.

"To organise the moderate men" is the avowed desire of the inceptors of the Club. The brilliant eccentrics are not asked to join. They work best alone, and would do little to help the progress of a confederacy. But there is a vast amount of intellect that needs organising; a world of dreams that needs solidifying; much earnest desire that is perishing for lack of direction. The essence of the Agenda Club is its practicality. It is to be run on purely business lines, which emphatically does not mean that there is money to be made out of it, but that it is to be elaborately and carefully organised, purged of sentimentality, and that full use will be made of the modern science or art of publicity. One of its characteristics is the fraternity it offers to such societies as are already doing good work and care to make use of its organised means for furthering the ends of reform. In a phrase, the organisation of idealism is its purpose. "To find the highest common factor of practical idealism," is the way the inceptors themselves put it.

The actual constitution of the Agenda Club is as follows. In the first place there is a Council, who are not members of the Club, but are all men eminent in their own walks of life. They are at once a guarantee to the world at large and a check on the activities of the Club itself. Very extensive power is in their hands: firstly, right of veto over any agendum; secondly, control of foundation funds; thirdly and ultimately, power to dissolve the Club, through this same control, if it seem to them to have departed from its original profession. Every endeavour will be made to preserve on this Council, the members whereof are elected for life, a nice balance alike of political and of religious opinion.

Subject to the authority of the Council as just stated, the government of the Club is in the hands of a Board of Control, consisting of nine members, three of whom shall be elected every year by a democratic suffrage. This board controls the executive, and may, if it think fit, submit specific agenda to the approval of the Club. It may here be pointed out that while the names of the Councillors as guarantors of bona fides are to be published, the Board of Control shall remain anonymous. The names of the latter are, however, to be supplied to the newspaper offices on condition that no improper use be made of them. This policy, it is thought, is the best to avoid the reproaches and dangers of self-advertisement on the one hand and the suspicion and dangers attaching to secrecy on the other. It is perhaps needless to add that the Finance Committee will not be anonymous; and that while the names of donors will not be announced, the representatives of the press and members of political societies will always be at liberty to inspect the books of the Club on cause shown.

The Club consists of associates and members. The Associates of the Board are those who have pledged themselves to do some definite piece of work. This, in many cases, is of an expert kind. To quote a recent leaflet, "medical men will be ready to submit advice on many matters where the professional skill and experience of the doctor are invaluable;

architects and builders will be available for suggestions and ideas when such subjects as town-planning and housing of the poor are under consideration; journalists and men of letters will assist to present a case on paper with that degree of lucidity and force which is seldom found except in those versed in the art of writing; the able men whom the profession of advertising has of recent years attracted to its ranks will be approached when the accomplishment of any object appears to require the skilful use of the various instruments of publicity; business men will give shrewd advice on the investment of funds and finance generally." This is not a dream: these services have been actually organised, and the idea makes a very strong appeal. It is plain, however, that men of the professions above alluded to can usually spare but little time for voluntary philanthropic work; but if, say, a journalist will undertake to write but one letter in the year to the correspondence columns of one of the great dailies according to the organised Agenda plan, it is a definite and valuable service. So is it if a rich man will lend his motor car for one day in the year and no more. One of the Club's golden rules is, not to ask too much. The members will be even more lightly taxed than the associates. All they are pledged to do is to buy the four moderately-priced books which are to be issued yearly, and to further, as far as in them lies, the success of the agenda decided on by the Club as a whole

Time will disclose the work that this simple but carefully planned organism is capable of doing. Its endeavours, at first at any rate, will be confined to small things. Its founders think that by concentrating on some small but important matter they will do more service in the world than if they wandered ineffectually among large aspirations. Moreover, it is uncontrovertibly true that one thing done makes the second easier.

Hand in hand with the getting of things done goes the dissemination of knowledge. This will be effected in various ways. The publication of books on various subjects of social

interest and of bibliographies prepared with the authority of men of intellectual renown are to be undertaken. An organised occupation of the correspondence columns of the great dailies should achieve much.

The dream, the thought, and the deed: these are the three stages of man's perfection. But the passage from the first to the second is hard, and from the second to the last harder still, if anything but vanity is to come of it. Unless a man have his dreams, the harvest of his life will be barren. No great thing has been said or done that was not born of a dream. But to achieve itself the dream must become thought. Those who try to leap from dream to deed leap but into the black abyss of chaos. But thought, for the dreamer, is hard, dealing with ugly things, leading through labyrinths to contradictions. And then, which road of the many that thought opens up will lead to the effective deed? The bones at the crossways are countless.

Than the Agenda Club, it may be asserted, few better instruments for man's fulfilment have been designed or forged. For the dreamless one, the misbegotten child of a material generation, it has no use. But to the weak dreamer, wandering vaguely among nebulæ, it gives a definition of ideal, offers a knightly quest, while to him who has already seen his ideal it holds out the hope of achievement. Along the paths of thought it places sign-posts. Membership implies serious study. The literary aspects of the Club have already been mentioned. Moreover, it affords opportunities of stimulating companionship and counsel, whereby fresh intellect and mature may give and receive mutual benefit. Then the deed, the realisation of the dreams that thought has clarified and co-ordinated. "Organisation, business system, is the keynote of the method," wrote the Inception Committee of the Club in the correspondence columns of the Spectator. "We think that if anything like the same forethought, courage, persistence, ingenuity in presentation (anglice, advertising) were devoted to idealistic effort as are

daily consecrated to the sale of soaps, salves, tobaccos, drugs and drinks, we should have a happier England." Faced thus with a brutal comparison, the dreamer involuntarily shudders. Let him think twice, and the offence will disappear. The means matter little, if the end be reached and the starting-point be not lost sight of. One must use the weapons of his time.

Obviously it is the young men who are wanted, whose dreams are so often only dreams, whose thought wastes itself among sterile philosophies. Them alone, with their enthusiasm and their sureness, can the Agenda Club use and serve. For its service will be great to its members. It is a life-class, where they will learn to see truth naked. It is a trainingground for the statesman, the economist, the business man. It will bring young men into contact with realities and teach them to be unashamed of their enthusiasms. No father could do better for his son than give him, for a couple of years, a fulltime membership of the Agenda Club. It has been one of the dreams of the inceptors to make of it a sort of postgraduate university, where men may study for the degree of Doctor of Life. And thus, at any rate, the scheme appeals to the writer, who has certainly no predilection for the methods of modern materialism. For it must be understood that this is no authorised exposition of the Agenda thesis, but merely the impressions of one who has seen, as in a vision, the fineness and the possibilities of the thing.

It is hardly too bold to assert that the venture cannot fail. The interest and enthusiasm it has excited have been far greater than the inceptors ever dared hope. The thing is so practicable and so finely conceived. Double in its nature—idealist and realist—it is also double in its appeal. It has its meaning for egoist as well as altruist, those equal combatants who make our youth their battle-ground. Mainly, perhaps, it appeals to the man with the "social conscience," he who desires to do good to his fellows for their own sake, who is heart-rent by the squalor and poverty around him and in-

dignant at its preventable causes. But he who wishes, for his own sake—that his taste may be satisfied, his senses not offended—to see a fairer world than that on which he now looks, will find here a means of realising his vision. His ideal is also a worthy one, implying pride and joy and love of the "good life." To such an one, besides-unless he be mere hedonist—the idea of dedication will be far from repulsive. The Agenda Club has already evoked comparison with the Samurai of Japan. It does not, indeed, like the Proposals for a Voluntary Nobility issued by the Samurai Club which was founded some years ago in this country, demand any bodily discipline, any actual asceticism, in its members. But it is obvious that the work which it does demand of them requires a certain self-culture, the formation, at least, of habits of some mental and physical clarity and austerity. Whencesoever the Club draws its members, it will probably send them thither again gentler, nobler, with more of that quality which the Greeks called apiotos.

But, after all, such advantages are only by the way; and, should they lead (as they so easily might) to snobbery or priggishness, they are not advantages at all, but pernicious snares. The Agenda Club is formed to do its share of the work of the world, not for the salvation of the souls of the elect. According as it does its work well or ill, it is to be judged. The inceptors have no illusions. They realise that age stales both men and institutions, and they are so disposing of their funds that after twenty-five years or so the Club shall automatically come to an end. It will then be time, they think, to start a new association. A generation with new ideas will have arisen, anxious and with the right to oust the old. But if the Agenda Club has done its work well, its voluntary suicide will be but the handing on of the torch. Meanwhile, the work is to do, and men are needed to do it.

FRANCIS BICKLEY.

LONDON.

DISCUSSIONS

N.B.—The contributions under this heading refer to matters previously treated in the "Hibbert Journal." Reviews of books are not open to discussion. Criticism of any article will, as a rule, be limited to a single issue of the *Journal*. The discussion ends with a reply from the original writer.—Ed.

DR AMBROSE VERNON ON THE PRESENT CRISIS OF THE CHRISTIAN RELIGION.

(Hibbert Journal, October 1910, p. 57.)

I.

Ir is impossible to pass without a protest Dr Ambrose Vernon's attempt to brand Professor Herrmann with the mark of the unhappy Naumann. "The teaching of Jesus," Dr Ambrose says, "is attacked to-day by those who revile him on moral grounds"—Nietzsche has been his example here—"by those who are forced reluctantly to separate from his company"—Naumann is one of these shining lights—"and by those who still walk humbly after the glory of his person." And among these last he would have us include Professor Herrmann.

Herrmann, then, attacks the teaching of Jesus. But to say this of such a teacher as Herrmann is to assume a Tolstoyan idea of the Gospels, and that is also a Roman Catholic notion of morality. It is to plant your flag on the very rock over which Naumann stumbles: it is to call the Gospel a programme rather than an inspiration. Naumann thought the Gospel was a programme, discovered that it had no directions as to the limitations of armaments, so he—very sincerely at least—gave it up. Professor Herrmann also discovers that the Gospel does not direct us about the German Navy, and he therefore gives up the idea that it is a programme.

Some little time ago, before the appearance of Dr Vernon's article, my brother (the translator of the revised edition of the Communion with God) wrote me a letter dealing chiefly with the contrast which these two men present. I quote here what he says about Herrmann's attitude to the State. "He says the State is not Christian, any more than eating or breathing or arithmetic is Christian. It is a form of natural life. It has to be controlled and used so as to make Christian life possible. You must first decide, on grounds of expediency, between a State and an ideal Kantian anarchy: if you decide for a state, then that means a state with

police, fleets, etc. But to admit that the Gospel gives no precise rules about trade, or fleets, or clothes, or wallpaper is not to say that these things are alien to the kingdom of God, or that the principles of the Gospel are inadequate to guide life. The Gospel does not need to teach arithmetic, but it has much to say about embezzlement; the least convincing verse in the New Testament is perhaps that dealing with hairdressing, but we accept its general views as to modesty."

It is easy to misunderstand Herrmann's position if we do not remember that his whole attitude to the teaching of Jesus Christ is built upon the knowledge that, as he himself puts it, "a man is truly alive and spiritually united to God, only when he acts from his own free conviction, that is to say, when he is true, and does not act a part." "Our God," he says again ("Römische und evangelische Sittlichkeit," trans. as "The Moral Law," in Faith and Morals), "Our God does not give us His orders like a policeman, but as the Father and Lord of spirits. For that reason His command does not present itself to us as something strange and foreign. It is so given to us as to constrain us in our inmost being. But it does so only if we ourselves understand the truth of it; that is to say, if our own sense of perception compels us to prescribe it to ourselves. So long as we fancy that when we are confronted by ordinances of God we may have, and may assert, a certain independence, we have before us, not the omnipotent God, but an idol. . . . Jesus wished to lead His disciples out from the service of unintelligible rules, and to set them on their own feet. . . . To the servant of rules, who thinks he has fulfilled all God's commands, He says that he can become perfect only by a determination prescribed to him in no rule (Luke xviii. 18-23). . . . The perfection of a man, according to Jesus' teaching, consists in the simple fulfilment of the command of morality (cf. Matt. v. 48). The view of Jesus, then, is that a man does not fulfil the moral command of God till he imposes upon himself something which he does not find written in any rules."

I turn now to the confused, vague, and disappointed letters of Friedrich Naumann. This is the man whose only sincerity seems to be the avowal that he is afraid to be sincere. He sees no truth, so he proclaims as truth the fact that he is in doubt. Surely in coupling such a man with Wilhelm Herrmann, Dr Vernon has made a strange pair.

EDITH A. STEWART.

CLAREWOOD, LIMPSFIELD.

II.

Will you allow me, as a layman, and as one of Dr Vernon's "most religious readers," to say how the attitude adopted by him strikes me.

His article in your October issue gives an excellent exposition of the present unparalleled crisis in the Church. But to my mind Dr Vernon is weakest just where he ought to be strongest. His diagnosis is careful and clear, his remedy vague and ineffective. His "way out" is ambiguous and misleading.

The sketch given of the criticisms and renunciations of to-day is graphic and even pathetic. His classification of them under three heads, too, is helpful. But what really is his own "way out"?

In spite of his repeated assertion that Jesus is best understood when we place him in the category of the poets—that poetry, in short, is the only adequate vehicle of eternal truth—he himself concludes with the old demand for a religion of authority, "a standard objective to himself, and a message independent of his own attainments."

This objective standard he finds in "the spirit of Jesus," but he immediately confirms his own misgiving that there may be "some inherent difficulty with his method" by adding on a number of phrases that, so far as words are concerned, mean just what each man chooses to make them mean. Thus, "calling Jesus Lord is the essence of Christianity," "No one can call Jesus Lord but by the Holy Ghost," "The Lord is the spirit, not the flesh" and finally, "The spirit of God and the spirit of Jesus are identical terms."

When a reverent and loyal soul endeavours thus for others' sake to unburden himself of what he feels to be his own inner faith, an equally reverent sympathy bespeaks silence.

All the same, these heartfelt phrases leave us very much where we were, and send us back to the situation itself which led up to them. I am safe, I believe, in saying that even the educated layman's reluctant conclusion in regard to the avalanche of modern criticism of which Dr Vernon here discourses is that it is all at its best unavoidable scavengering, and his one demand is to ascertain what it is that is really left after all the litter of it has been cleared away. If "what Jesus took for granted" cannot be defended, and much of "what he taught" is open to equal objection, it is evident that the Christian record is being steadily put in its proper though still lofty place as the richest embodiment of religious experience and aspiration the world has yet seen.

Such a conclusion, however, can only mean that the final "authority" for this religious life and aspiration is neither in documents nor in individual men, but in that alone of which every religion has been its own age's and race's best apprehension and expression—the response of the human soul to the Eternal Spirit in whom we live and move and have our being, who is nearer to each of us than we are to one another or to ourselves, who is speaking to us in every thought of our own or of another's spirit, in every act of our own or of our neighbour-in all nature, in short, which not merely metaphorically but literally is, as Berkeley called it. "God's ceaseless conversation with His creatures." The glory of our human nature is our inherent capacity for this response to, and communion with, the Eternal Spirit. There is the true and only Real Presence, and we ourselves are each of us the Bush that burns perpetually in that holy flame, with all the brightness and ardour of which our individual capacity admits, and yet are not only not consumed, but, on the contrary, fired with all holy energy, and graced with much fair achievement.

Are we then to be driven to mere individualism? Is each man to be a law and an authority to himself? Is this what "the way of the mystic," as Dr Vernon calls it, comes to? The truth in individualism is obvious. Each man is to himself the centre of the universe. But the truth in universality is deeper still. The universe is not a mere bundle of "individuals." In Him we live and move and have our being.

In the converging and concurrent response of humanity to the Eternal Spirit, whose word or expression it is, lies the only "religion of authority,"

the only "message independent of our own attainments."

Here I anticipate at once the natural criticism of anyone occupying Dr Vernon's point of view. Can such a religion "be made powerful unto seeking and confused souls"? Without hesitation I say it can. I know it to be so from the bottom of my heart. I am often amazed at the timidity

of the appeal that is made to it.

The demand for an objective standard and authority is to a large portion of the human race practically irresistible. They feel as if they could not "live the life" without it. And so long as, and so far as, this is their vision of truth, it is their duty to adhere to it and to profit by it. But there is a still larger duty lying at their door. In the very nature of things, the Eternal is Subject as well as Object, and if we are to grow in our vision and apprehension of the Eternal, we must sooner or later lay hold of Him, not under the merely provisional form of an "objective" individual, but as a Spirit. We must worship Him in spirit. To have this deep and fundamental capacity of our spirit cultivated is the clamant need of our day, and especially in our hard, individualistic Western world. This passion for the Eternal, which it is our highest privilege to share, "will yet become the basis of another and far vaster knowledge" of spiritual things than we yet possess. The whole trend of the best thought of our time is assuredly towards this passion. Can we conceive any passion of the human spirit which will more infallibly find its rich reward than this? The time for intermediaries and tentative methods is past. The veil of the temple is long since rent in twain, and lo! the holy of holies is found to be in man's own spirit.

The truth is, we lack the native courage of our Christian faith, refusing to throw ourselves on so daring a thought as our absolute kinship with God, and our consequent power and privilege of direct access into that Eternal Presence. The spirit of Jesus is the spirit that discerns this Presence, and that lives in the light of it and by the strength that flows from it.

Dr Vernon, in spite of his slight cynicism in describing it, has evidently a strong natural leaning towards this "way out," and frankly admits that "doubtless many of my most religious readers follow it." Let him look more carefully along that way, let him throw himself more trustfully on the unbidden instincts of his own heart, and greater light will assuredly break forth on him.

A. S. MORIES.

PRINCIPAL CHILDS ON WOMAN SUFFRAGE.

(Hibbert Journal, October 1910, p. 189.)

I.

Dr Harman's letter on Woman Suffrage, on p. 189 of the October number of the *Hibbert Journal*, calls for reply—not in the interests of the suffrage, but in the interest of the race.

Is it possible that any spiritual man or woman can read that letter without feeling human dignity offended? Can we really permit it to be said without protest that the deepest revelation of life is inseparably connected with some physical condition? Is there not an army of celibate men and celibate women ready to rise in protest?

Dr Harman's letter is too precise to make it possible to believe that it is the spiritual side of maternity which he has in mind when he makes of maternity the condition to a woman's vote. Were such his view, his letter might pass without protest for the compassionate and protective quality which distinguishes this maternity—is, indeed, a mark of that maturity of spirit which we may well desire in our electors, in men as well as women. But not all married women possess this quality though many times mothers. And many single women do possess it, and do exercise it, though that physical side of life is unknown to them, not always from compulsion, but in many cases from choice.

That Dr Harman's remarks may apply to some men and women we would not question; but surely the dignity of the race requires us to protest on hearing it proclaimed as a generality that celibate men are "embittered," and celibate women subject to "neurotic restiveness." Such types exist, we admit; but alongside of them we have men possessed of the Franciscan spirit inside and outside the order—we have women like the late Miss Florence Nightingale, to whom the term "neurotic" could scarcely with fittingness be applied.

When we speak of the "natural life," let us always remember that human nature is twofold, and that it is as natural for some human beings to live in the spirit as it is for others to live in the flesh; that for spiritual natures celibacy represents no over-strain and no morbidity, but rather, perhaps, that peaceful freedom of heart and mind in which human service can most easily be performed.

Let us keep our gates open, desiring that the best of our race shall lead us, be they men or women, married or single. And with that respect for the variety of the human spirit which history should teach us, if our own hearts fail to do so, let us avoid any error so fundamental as the limiting of human excellence to any one external condition.

LUCY RE-BARTLETT.

ROME.

II.

THE opinion of a medical man on this subject is worthy of consideration, but that expressed by Dr Bishop Harman in the October issue of this Journal seems, from a woman's point of view, to require modification. He is, undoubtedly, right in considering that a position of economic independence is unnatural to a woman, and that the majority of women attaining that position are spinsters; it is also only too true that as such they suffer a serious disability in being cut off from one of the great humanising influences of a woman's life. But maternity is only one of the humanising influences; there are others. A woman's mission is not only motherhood, but womanhood; from days of old she was designed to be "an helpmeet for man." Is it not probable that the majority of spinsters are sadly conscious of their loss? And that they are learning to look at it gravely and steadfastly? And that in this way they may also be learning a little of what life is, what it means, and what it leads to? Is there a more humanising influence than suffering? Because the years of Hannah-like prayers of a woman have remained unanswered, is she of necessity embittered and her judgment warped? Is there nothing else in the life of a spinster which will give a broad outlook? There is education, experience, life-work; and the very fact that they are conscious of being but onlookers gives them a clearer view than that of those who are physically taking a more active part.

Would the lady mentioned by Dr Bishop Harman have learnt in no other way to "have a more kindly feeling towards the men part of the community"? She was, presumably, only in the twenties when she married; antagonism is not uncommon at that age. The writer is a woman in the forties, a spinster; her university attainments are doubtless much lower than those of the lady in question, but she ventures to assert, with all the energy of which her being is capable, that it is not only wifehood and motherhood that give the more kindly outlook, and that the average spinster is not antagonistic to men, and does not hate men as a sex. Why should she? She may be awkward and constrained and not at her best in their society, but she does realise that many men are doing their best for the good of all, of men and of women. At the same time, she is wishful to do her part also; and she is not yet convinced that the right to vote would not be for the greater good, but she is open to conviction. She does not want the suffrage if it is not to be for the good of all-of men, of women, and of little children. The majority of women are teachable, and if it can be shown that our citizenship is as complete and influential without the vote as with it, we should rest content. The demand for a fuller recognition as citizens will not in that case have been idle, for it has aroused the lotus-eaters among men to a sense of their responsibility, and has made the workers question whether they have done their utmost. Whatever be the outcome of the agitation, for years to come men will feel that women are intelligently watching the trend of

affairs and their efforts towards betterment, or regarding with shocked

surprise their callous apathy.

The writer is far from contending that the vote, if given, should be given to unmarried women only; but she deplores that any man of education should consider that, while spinsterhood deprives a woman of the highest earthly joys and of one of the highest means of education, it should also deprive her of rights as a citizen; and that any such man should also consider that, because a childless woman has what he calls "no real stake in the future of the nation," she is unworthy of trust. We cannot give physical offspring to our nation; but let a man pause before he thinks we have no other stake, and can give no other offspring. If a woman has no child of her own to inherit the earth, it is possible for her so to care for the well-being of others to whom she is bound by no physical tie as to devote to it her life-energy and life-thought, considering herself as a unit—it may be a very small unit—in the factors that go to make up the sum of human life and progress.

Unmarried women are grateful to men for their appreciation of the dignity of motherhood, and for their sympathy with those who are denied its joy; they are grateful for, and appreciative also of, the efforts men make to broaden the outlook on life of such women. It is, however, just as a nation calls for the best in a woman, and just as a man calls for her best,

and expects it, that she will arise and give it.

A WOMAN TEACHER.

REVIEWS

The Alchemy of Thought.—By L. P. Jacks, M.A., Dean of Manchester College, Oxford, and Editor of the Hibbert Journal.—London: Williams & Norgate, 1910.—Pp. viii+349.

This volume contains fifteen Essays which form a connected whole, and which are mainly devoted to a statement and defence of certain fundamental principles or *Grundbegriffe* in the spheres of General Philosophy and Ethics. These principles in themselves cannot be called new; but, in view of the present condition of philosophic thought in the English-speaking world, new emphasis needs to be laid upon them; and this has been done by Mr Jacks in this volume, with marked freshness and force, in a manner likely to attract the attention of readers who would be repelled by a merely technical discussion of the same themes.

The author's fundamental position is thus summarily stated by himself: "To say that the Universe is a Rational Whole appears to me true; but to treat this as an adequate account of Reality appears to me false. I am equally averse to regarding the rationality of the Universe as the fundamental or all-inclusive or even the dominant form of its self-expression. ... 'Pluralism' has lost much of the strength it would otherwise have by denying, or seeming to deny, that the Universe does express itself as a Rational Whole. This denial, however, is by no means involved in the affirmation that Reality expresses itself in many ways other than those which fit into the forms of conceptual logic" (Preface, pp. v, vi). From this follows a point of view defended in several parts of the book, and especially in the essay on "Art and Experience": experience is not to be regarded merely as "a problem-to-be-solved,"-merely as a subject of discussion, We find ourselves asking more of experience than that it shall satisfy us of its rationality: "We are seeking a response which can only be given in terms of feeling, action, love, and never in terms of rationality alone" (p. 39). For the artistic consciousness and for the moral consciousness the world is not a "problem" in the sense in which this term is understood in any particular kind of scientific discussion.

At the same time, in two consecutive Essays on "The Alchemy of Thought" and "The Universe as Philosopher," both of which are expressed in a striking and original way, the author does full justice to the claims of logical system. The argument of these Essays appears to rest on the all-important principle that a thing is what it does (the phrase is not

the author's). A theory of the universe is itself part of, and is produced by, the universe; and the theory must be able to explain-or at least must not be irreconcilable with-its own presence in the world, "Such extremely clever matter," said Martineau in a famous address, "matter that is up to everything, even to writing Hamlet, and finding out its own evolution, and substituting a molecular plebiscite for a divine monarchy of the world, may fairly be regarded as a little too modest in its disclaimer of the attributes of mind."1 The principle—as Mr Jacks forcibly suggests -is of very wide and fundamental import. He develops it in a specially interesting way in reference to the mutually "contradictory" character of philosophic systems. "The very conception of philosophy involves a variety of progressive but divergent forms, for the same reason that morality involves a variety of conflicting desires not on the same level; philosophy is an organic whole, the logical prius of all the philosophies; its history is the evolution of a continuously developing life; this life in each and all of its diverse manifestations is the expression of one and the same ultimate principle; the full expression of this principle is the goal of the whole process, never attained under finite conditions; and no system is unnecessary which another system can use as the point of departure for a fuller expression" (p. 124). It seems to me, however, that these conclusions cannot be sustained without the principle of Degrees of Truth, to which the author does not make explicit reference.

At the risk of using modes of expression which Mr Jacks may not accept, I should like to bring his position, as I understand it, into comparison with that of Hegel. I take it that, for Hegel, man, as intelligence, has an infinite as well as a finite side; the infinite side is the ultimate reality, so that the universe thinks itself in him. Thus, thought is absolute, i.e. is conditioned by its own nature and structure alone, not by anything beyond and apart from thought. Thus, again, thought itself becomes the object of philosophy; the business of philosophy is the explication of the distinctions which belong to the nature of thought, and this is otherwise definable for Hegel as the explication of God.

Mr Jacks does not reject Hegel's view of thought, but supplements it. If I have not misunderstood him, his position is one with which I am in entire sympathy, and which seems to me to be fundamentally sound. Man is infinite as well as finite not only in thought but in feeling and will,—or rather in his whole nature, of which these are equivalent though inseparable expressions. Instead of maintaining the "identity" of thought and being, he maintains their necessary relation, in the sense that while thought is not the whole of being, the whole of being is rational. By saying that "the whole of being is rational," it is meant that thought will in the end be capable of comprehending the whole of being in its own way, by following out its own laws as thought. But while thought is "absolute" in the sense of having a structure and laws of its own, it is necessarily related to all the main tendencies of our nature, and is not to be separated from them, nor

¹ Essays, Reviews, and Addresses, vol. iv. p. 175.

they from it. No one pretends that we could be conscious of degrees of worth in art and in social conduct apart from the co-operation of intelligence in forming these ideals, any more than that we could be conscious of degrees of worth and knowledge, *i.e.* degrees of truth, apart from intelligence. At the same time, Art and Morality are other than forms of truth or knowledge. Both Art and Morality aim at the construction of a Whole; but the Whole cannot be described as that of a logically self-cohering system.

The full justice done by the author to the demands of the intellectual consciousness is seen also in the Essay on "Self-defeating Theories," where the significance of the fact that "thought cannot go behind its own principles" is effectively brought out, and the fundamental assumptions are shown, which are made in the very act of choosing to regard the world as "a Problem-to-be-solved." And in connection with his own central contention, that this is only one out of many possible different and valid ways of regarding the world, the author makes some suggestive comments on Spinoza's much-neglected hypothesis "of those 'infinite and eternal attributes' of Reality, other than Extension and Thought, of which, after a bare introduction, we hear so little and desire to hear so much" (p. 46).

I am sorry that the author retains a sentence over which some readers stumbled badly when the Essay on "The Alchemy of Thought" first appeared in the *Hibbert Journal*: "The total life which is rich enough to require the tiger as well as the Good Samaritan for its full manifestation, requires also Nietzsche as well as St John, the Pragmatist as well as the Kantian, and Thomas à Kempis as well as James Mill" (p. 119). The "plain man"—for whom Mr Jacks holds a strong brief in his first Essay—might be excused if he supposed that the author here identified the "unity in difference" of a whole which is a logically self-cohering system, with that of a whole which is a work of art, and with that of a whole which is constructed by moral effort. Such identification would seem to be entirely contrary to the author's fundamental principles.

contrary to the author's fundamental principles.

In "The Bitter Cry of the Plain Man"—a criticism of the literary style and method of exposition characteristic of too much of the prevalent work in philosophy—it must be admitted that many of the thrusts go well home. Still, one must point out that the work of the able philosophic thinkers in France, England, and America (can we add, in Germany?), who are also brilliant writers, seems to give ground for hope of better things. And, on the other hand, the "plain man's" aversion to philosophy is sometimes merely an unwillingness to think a little harder and more fundamentally than he is accustomed to do; or an aversion to going through a little preliminary mental drill (no more than is required to grasp the elementary facts of chemistry, for instance) before he demands "results"; or an objection to break down a few of the "water-tight compartments" of his mind.

I have left myself but little space in which to refer to the group of Essays dealing with some aspects of moral experience which are prominent and important at the present time. In dealing with the question "Is there a Science of Man?" and with the alleged possibility of a "Manipulation of Man," perhaps we may assume that the author has in view (at least in part) the more extreme positions adopted by some advocates of "Eugenics" and of "Race-cultivation." His general position is, I think, entirely sound. Here, as elsewhere, he makes a suggestive use of the analogy of Art. "Whatever is produced by mere obedience to rules imposed from without lacks everything that Art demands. Art lives in a free creativeness, which for ever makes new rules for itself, and rejects every formula which defines its business or shackles its free movement towards a freely-chosen end" (p. 221). In the same way "Life overflows all formulæ, breaks through all theory, goes beyond all knowledge" (p. 220). From this point of view the author approaches the current controversies concerning "The Manipulation of Man," "The Quest for a Safe-conduct in Morality," and "Moral Education," In some passages he comes near, I think, to a dangerous overstatement of his case. For example, it does not follow, because the alleged "Science of Man" is an utter impossibility, that therefore educational psychology is impossible, or that the "mind-cure movement"-in which the most progressive thinkers and workers in the medical profession are becoming more and more practically interestedis an illusion. Moreover, "to employ men for a purpose which is yours and not theirs," and "to manage 'crowds' or 'masses," and "to 'keep' one's brother" (p. 231)—these things are not only not impossible, but are actually and constantly done-mainly because (as William James said) men are "walking bundles of habits," and therefore there is a working "knowledge of human nature" which can be gleaned even from ordinary unreflective experience. I do not say that Mr Jacks denies all or any of these things; only one misses a certain amount of qualification and limitation which appear to be needed in some of the statements in this group of brilliant Essays.

"Believing, as we do," says the author, "that Conduct is essentially a Fine Art, is it too much to claim that no one can live the good life without a touch of genius?" (p. 266). Among other consequences of adopting this point of view, appears the argument that "complete scientific knowledge of what has been done up to date will never enable us to answer the question, 'What ought to be next?'" (p. 260). True; but is there, then, no truth in T. H. Green's view that, while we cannot say that man's end is anything else than to realise the faculties of his conscious being, and we cannot know what these faculties are apart from their realisation, yet from reflection upon that realisation, as far as it has gone, we can in a measure estimate both what the faculty is, and what is the direction in which it may be further developed?

I must resist the temptation to comment further on particular portions of these stimulating discussions. The two Essays with which the volume concludes have appeared in this Journal. One is a powerful statement of the meaning of Religion as Loyalty to the Highest—a loyalty such as is

interpreted, in one of its forms, by the late Frederick W. H. Myers in his Saint Paul. The remaining essay, "Is the Moral Supremacy of Christendom in Danger?" was written at the close of the Russo-Japanese War. The question to which it relates has lost none of its importance in the interval.

S. H. MELLONE.

EDINBURGH.

The Master as I saw Him, being Pages from the Life of the Swami Vivekananda.—By his Disciple Nivedita, of Ramakrishna-Vivekananda, Author of The Web of Indian Life, Cradle Tales of Hinduism, etc.—Calcutta (Udbodhan Office). London: Longman & Co., 1910.

THE writer of this book is an English lady who, early in 1898, went out to Bengal to help the Swami Vivekananda in his efforts for the good of Indian women. In the education of women, thought the Swami, lay the key to India's future, and his later life was a fusion of two ideals, that of the apostle of Hinduism and that of the practical worker for India. Those who simply listened to him in the West only knew him as the former; it was the prize of a more intimate acquaintance to learn that he was also a fervent lover of India, and that he had elastic and far-reaching plans for its benefit. As a lecturer he discharged a duty which he conceived that he owed to all who were walking in ignorance, or who had not realised the truths which they theoretically knew, whether in India or in the West. He was not under the delusion that he could convey truth by standing up on a platform and talking about doctrines. Religion, to him, was not an intellectual theory, but the realisation of truth. For this, spirituality was an indispensable prerequisite, and such a rare quality needed cultivation. Still, Western and Eastern ideas being so different, it was necessary to expound the latter, i.e. the ideas characteristic of orthodox Hinduism, not as mere ideas, but as life-giving truths. Three volumes of lectures remain, delivered partly in England, partly in America, partly in India, besides the address before the Parliament of Religions at Chicago in 1893, and scattered separate lectures, especially that called "My Master," an account of the Swami's Guru, the saintly, God-intoxicated Ramakrishna, and a lecture on the Vedantic philosophy, given at Harvard University. All these are helpful, not only for a clearer insight into Indian thought, but for a somewhat tantalising glimpse of Vivekananda's personality. The present work, however, by Miss Noble, who in India became his disciple, gives a much more satisfying view of the Master. It is not a biography, but what our German friends would call a Charakterbild, and as such it may be placed among the choicest religious classics, below the various Scriptures, but on the same shelf with the Confessions of St Augustine and Sabatier's Life of St Francis.

This, in fact, is why I notice the book here. Some readers may like to find out what manner of man is produced by a combination of Eastern and Western elements such as Vivekananda represents. Professor Höffding says that the religions which have come to us from Asia are irreconcilable with science. I am sure that Vivekananda, not less than the author of Buddhist Essays, would have protested against this. There is ample room, he thought, in the Vedantic religious philosophy for the theories which have received the assent of Western scientists; indeed, according to him, they have even been anticipated in some sense by the Indian sages. And that being the case, he was convinced that Indian thought was wanted by us Westerns to enable our religious consciousness to stand the shocks which it receives from science.

It may seem strange, considering the central Indian doctrine of Impermanence, that Vivekananda should have been so keenly interested in works of beneficence. Certain it is that the regeneration of India was prominent in his thoughts and aspirations. And the motive on which he rested all service was derived from the most startling of all Vedantic doctrinesthe divinity of man. "Compassion," he said, "was that which served others with the idea that they were jivas, souls; love, on the contrary, regarded them as the Atman; the very Self-Love, therefore, was worship, and this worship the vision of God." "For the Advaitin, therefore, the ONLY motive is love." There was no privilege to be compared with the trust of a great service (p. 371). This was one of Vivekananda's most original points. The infusion of a definitely practical spirit into Indian sainthood would surely do more than anything else to prove that Hinduism had still a great mission to India. And it is the combination of the old and the new. Eastern elements and Western, which makes Vivekananda such a fascinating figure.

It was not without cost to himself that this unworldly man-so free from personal ambition and the desire to make an impression-plunged into the varied details of schemes of usefulness. "I have become entangled," he said simply, to one who protested that to his mind the wandering Sadhu of earlier years, who had scattered his knowledge and changed his name as he went, had been greater than the Abbot of Belur, burdened with much work and many cares,-"I have become entangled." And I remember the story (Nivedita is the speaker) told by an American woman, who said she could not bear to remember his face at that moment when her husband explained to this strange guest that he must make his way from their home to Chicago with money that would be paid gladly to hear him speak of religion. "It was," she said, "as if something had just broken within him that could never again be made whole" (pp. 61, 62). For this entanglement, whether real or imagined, there was but one remedy-the reattachment of himself to the Unseen. If this world had begun again to bind its roots about the inner man, there must be a fresh rending of the bonds. This was effected by those absences which he allowed himself from the monastery which he had founded, after each of

which he returned with the radiant look of one who had made a discovery or received a revelation. It is the principle of Catholic "retreats."

It is comforting to find so much that is human in the Swami. The pain of a favourite sister's death never left him. One remembers how "Jesus wept." We know, too, that his Master, Ramakrishna, recognised a "film of ignorance" placed by his "Mother" on the mind of his disciple for high reasons (p. 71). Hence arose a strange sort of eagerness in Vivekananda's practical work, however restrained this might be by the constant practice of meditation; indeed, the very idea of the extinction of his work had power to hurt him. And hence, too, there was a touching simplicity in his everyday piety. His grand object might be to realise the impersonal Brahman, but he knew what it meant to see the same indwelling God through the mists of sense as personal. He was aware that the majority of men would lean to the conception of God as the Preserver (Vishnu), and the problem for him was how to deepen in the ordinary man the knowledge of the connection between this and the highest philosophy. His own inclination, however, was rather to the adoration of Siva, who, strictly speaking, is the Destroyer and Rebuilder, but to refined imaginations is "the Divine accessible within, and purified of all externals," imaged by the great Himalayan snow-mountains where He dwells (p. 161). But still more constant was his sense of the presence and activity of the consort of Siva, the "great Mother" Kali. Primarily due to the influence of his Master (see the wonderful account, pp. 466-8), it was also the outcome of his deep sympathy with his country; Kaliworship is prevalent in Bengal. Certainly he thought this worship of the highest importance for strengthening Indian character. But how the different realisations could be mutually adjusted was a question to Vivekananda himself. His reply was: "Is it not the multitude of cells in the body that make up the personality; the many brain-centres, not the one, that produce consciousness? Unity is complexity! Just so! And why should it be different with Brahman?" (p. 216). One involuntarily thinks of our Christological problems,

Vivekananda seems to be the first of a new line of Hindu saints. In some very important points he does but repeat the character and spiritual endowments of his wonderful Master. In particular, the doctrine of the truth that resides in all religions, which Ramakrishna worked out practically in such a remarkable way, was welcomed and made the guiding star of his studies and observations by the disciple. But the inclusion of leadership in national reform and the better performance of civic duty among the functions of a Swami was new. The idea of making Hinduism aggressive, and of sending a missionary to England and America to preach the spiritual life—that was also new. He had a good knowledge both of English and of Sanskrit literature. He knew the trend of Western thought, and had a first-hand knowledge of his own Scriptures. He had also seen the doctrines of Hinduism summed up in a single wonderful life. But he must also have had practical gifts, though what our nation most

believes in, the Swami greatly dreaded—organisation. Probably what he meant was that forms and methods should be genuinely Indian, and that hints should be taken, wherever possible, from old Indian experience. Certainly he knew many parts of his India well from his lonely wanderings, and the result was that he unified in his thoughts all the different populations of India, and excluded no form of Indian religion from Hinduism. It is interesting to know that he had a special sympathy with the great organiser of Sikhism, Guru Govinda Singh, and of course Buddha. The Punjab was indeed his own country.

But what would Francis of Assisi and what would Vivekananda have effected without their brethren? Both of them were "breakers of bondage," and emancipation requires many workers. The mission of Vivekananda's Order of Ramakrishna was that of realising and exchanging the highest ideals of the East and of the West. The founder understood this mission in all its fulness on his return from the West. Practical work among the poor and the sick had from the first been natural to him and his brethren. But now the brothers learned to regard their various works from a larger point of view. The range of their operations, too, became wider, and the founder himself "was consumed with a desire for the education of Indian women, and for the scientific and technical education of the country." Nothing was too great or too small for his mind to work upon. "He would throw a world of enthusiasm into a long course of experiments on such problems as the sinking of a well, or the making of brown bread." In the last year of his life he "spoke of his desire that the Hindu Lent should be celebrated henceforth by special courses of athletic exercises" (pp. 56-58).

This new and exacting doctrine, that those who would help India must combine Western practical skill with Eastern spirituality, is the key to the last five and a half years of Vivekananda's life. It was no descent from the old Indian religious ideal, but its completion. And if it was exacting, and required a constant revival of spirituality under penalty of their becoming dry and materialistic, the brothers of this unique man were not left to themselves. Intercourse with him was felt to be what we Christians call a means of grace. It is claimed for Ramakrishna that he could by his touch give spiritual insight; and Vivekananda says, "Spirituality can be communicated just as really as I give you a flower." All can at any rate grant that the company one keeps has a subtle influence on the mind, and that it would certainly be good for any of us to be in the presence of an extraordinary man like the Swami Vivekananda. By ways that we cannot understand, the spirit of Vivekananda is working like a leaven in India. Is it permissible to add that, there being no sectarianism in sainthood, and no end to the influence of great thoughts, the essence of his teaching (which was his life) may penetrate even to those who are as loyal to Christianity as Vivekananda was to Hinduism?

There are many other important ideas which might easily be quoted from this remarkable volume. The possibility of finding all religions true, and yet be loyal adherents of one of them, has been already referred to, but requires further development. Vivekananda's devotion to Jesus Christ was hardly less than his love of Buddha, and was not diminished by intellectual doubt as to the historical contents of the Gospels. Such doubt as he had appears to have been connected with a strange vision granted to him, which turned his thoughts into a new channel (pp. 350-3). "Higher criticism" he had had no opportunity of studying. And a "higher critic" would probably think that, though the comment on the visions in Luke xxiv. given in the closing chapters by Vivekananda's disciple helps greatly to understand how that priceless narrative may have arisen, it does not prove that the setting of the visions is a matter of fact. That would be his misfortune. He would admit that those who brought the narrative into being might have had the consciousness of spiritual meetings between themselves and some lost friend; but whether, when Jesus died, those men, or any men, expressed what Sister Nivedita thinks they experienced, would remain for him most doubtful. The Sister and her companions, however, were impelled irresistibly to believe, as she most touchingly describes, "because, in all its elusiveness, a like revelation, at a like time, had made itself evident to us also." And who are meant by "us"? It is most interesting to know that the "we" are brethren of Vivekananda, who, according to their custom, showed their reverence for Jesus at Christmastide somewhat in the spirit of the early Franciscans. They read the story of the Nativity (one of the monks holding a crook), and were then led to continue their reading of St Luke to the very end. Their Master had died-had laid aside the garment of the body-on July 4 of that same year (1902). But of his presence death had not had power to rob them. Can even a critic help believing this? Such evidence is unimpeachable.

T. K. CHEYNE.

OXFORD.

The Christian Certainty and the Modern Perplexity.—By A. E. Garvie.
—London: Hodder & Stoughton.—480 pp. 1910.

DR GARVIE has done well to collect and publish these essays and addresses, which contain a very complete exposition of his views on most of the religious and theological questions of the day. He divides the book into two parts, "Constructive" and "Critical." Under the former head we have "The Restatement of the Gospel," "Conscience and Creed," "The Religious-historical Method," "The Development of the Conception of God," "Sin, Sacrifice, and Atonement," "The Personal Equation in Theology," "Authority in Religion," "The Influence of the Ritschlian School," "Divine Immanence," "Personality in God, Christ, and Man," and "The Fellowship of the Living Christ." Under the latter he gives us "The Value-judgments of Religion," "Modernism," "The Foundations of the Christian Faith," and "Recent Christology."

Dr Garvie is known as an able champion of orthodox Protestantism and as a careful student of German theology, especially of the Ritschlian school. He is fair-minded as well as learned, liberal as well as orthodox. The book contains many wise and timely sayings, such as the reminder that "many have inherited the Christian ethos, without having passed through the Christian experience"-hence their inability to understand the power of the Cross (p. 8); the protest against confounding Hindus. Turks, and Chinamen under the name "Orientals": the effect of humaner manners on eschatology—"it has become impossible to enthrone tyranny in heaven" (p. 137); and the observation that "Christian experience does not distinguish between Christ and the Spirit as Christian doctrine has tried to do" (p. 179). In the later chapters he gives us a very penetrating estimate of Roman Catholic Modernism, and an exhortation to Dr Sanday not to let a dubious psychology of the sub-conscious self mar his forthcoming work on the life and person of Christ. On this subject he says rather wittily that it is only those who "put God in the cellar" who can talk about "divine forces stored below."

At the same time, Dr Garvie has his prejudices, and they are strong As a historian of Ritschlianism he dislikes hearing that school criticised, though he has himself abandoned Ritschl on several crucial points. He does not hold that value-judgments are independent of existential judgments; he holds fast to the objective truth of historical dogmas, including the virgin birth; and, above all, he is quite willing to accept and lay great stress on the Pauline doctrine of the unio mystica, provided always that it is called by any other name. Mysticism is a red rag to Dr Garvie. He is so delighted at Herrmann's denunciation of mysticism as "Catholic piety" that he will not see that Herrmann is arguing against that very doctrine of communion with the living Christ which Dr Garvie rightly regards as essential for Christianity. "Herrmann," he says (p. 223), "has been unjustly blamed with a denial of our fellowship with the living Christ." Now, since Herrmann, in the third chapter of his Communion of the Christian with God, says, "We cannot speak of a communion with the exalted Christ, nor do we find such a communion spoken of in the New Testament (!): the risen Christ is hidden from us," it is not easy to see where the "injustice" comes in. If words mean anything, Herrmann is denying the doctrine which Dr Garvie, like everyone else, finds in St Paul. Kaftan, of course, frankly deserts the Ritschlian position on this fundamental question.

The unhappy "mystics" are not allowed to claim their own property. "To call the union with the Saviour mystical is to substitute vagueness for definiteness, subjective fancy for objective fact," and so on. Why? Only because for Dr Garvie the mystic is essentially a vague, fanciful, and generally contemptible person.

Dr Garvie has another bugbear—metaphysics. He seems quite unable to realise that there are some persons for whom the intellectual effort to understand the universe is a principal way of experiencing the

Deity. Even "apostolic metaphysics" are destitute of the "authority" which belongs to "apostolic faith." "Philosophy," he says, "has not the material or the method for forming a valid conception of the world as an intelligible whole." Its province is "the observation and explanation of the world in its parts" (p. 232). After this curious confusion between philosophy and science, we are not surprised to find metaphysics warned not to trespass on the domain of "faith."

These prejudices are a source of weakness in Dr Garvie's work. He thinks poorly of those who still value Greek theology; and then when he is himself drawn unawares on to the field of speculative dogmatics he gives us such startling utterances as that "the kenosis of God is the eternal Word or Son." The Greeks would have taught him better than that.

These, however, are comparatively slight defects in a book full of strong and independent thought, which should certainly be read and pondered over.

W. R. INGE.

CAMBRIDGE.

Ritschlianism. By John Kenneth Mozley, M.A.—London: Nisbet, 1909.
—Pp. 274.

Faith and Fact: A Study of Ritschlianism. By Ernest A. Edghill, M.A.
—London: Macmillan & Co., 1910.—Pp. 272.

The Norrisian Prize for 1908 was divided between the authors of these two volumes, both of which fully deserve this recognition. Both are well-informed, well-expressed, and well-arranged. But as regards their standpoint they differ greatly. Mr Mozley writes as one who fully realises the present theological distress, and who warmly appreciates the endeavours of Ritschlianism to offer some relief. The question he seeks to answer is, How far will this movement bring men influenced by modern thought nearer to the evangelical faith? Mr Edghill writes from the standpoint of a self-satisfied Anglican orthodoxy. He does not realise the intellectual difficulties the Catholic tradition presents to inquiring minds to-day, and so he judges "Catholic theology vastly superior to Ritschlianism." While Mr Mozley continues the spirit of sympathy in which I have endeavoured to present this theology to English readers, Mr Edghill follows in the footsteps of Dr Orr and others, who have not, in my judgment, given the movement "fair play."

I do not wish to abuse the hospitality of the columns of this journal in defending myself against Mr Edghill's frequent attacks; but I may be excused if, in as few words as possible, I define my own position in relation to his criticisms. He describes me as a Ritschlian, whereas I have disclaimed any discipleship, and my criticism of the leading features of the theology of the school gives ample proof that I do not commit myself to any of the positions common to the members of the school. Again and again phrases are used that suggest that my criticisms are unwilling con-

cessions, and may therefore be regarded as all the more damaging. defence of Ritschl against what seem to me unjustified attacks is discounted as much as possible without an answer being given to my arguments. There is one statement to which I must crave indulgence if I call special attention, as it seems to impugn either my sincerity or my competence as a theologian. On page 181 Mr Edghill writes: "Ritschl finds a strong supporter in Dr Garvie, who states with apparent seriousness that the ecclesiastical dogma of Christ's Divinity seems to sacrifice on the one hand the unity of the Godhead; and on the other the unity of Christ's Person. It might have been considered obvious to any one who had studied the historical origin of the Christological dogma that these were exactly the two truths which the formula of the two natures in one person was expressly intended to safeguard." As the problem of Christology has been engaging my attention for nearly thirty years, and as I have taken the trouble to study very thoroughly the whole history of the doctrine in its minute details, I cannot plead guilty to either a want of seriousness or a lack of study. What is "obvious" to me is that whatever were the intentions of the formula originally, and on that point I have no dispute with Mr Edghill, yet the results of the formula in general Christian thought have been just what I have described. On the one hand we have what comes perilously near tritheism; on the other the historical personality of Jesus becomes a duality, the divine and the human natures functioning alternately. Mr Edghill seems blessedly oblivious of the insuperable difficulties many Christian scholars and thinkers feel in regard to this ecclesiastical dogma. It is his contentment with Church tradition which makes him incapable of appreciating both what Ritschl has attempted and has effected,

An outline of each volume may be given before a few special points are briefly referred to. Mr Edghill prepares the way for Ritschl by a brief account of Kant, Lange, and Lotze, as his philosophical, and Schleiermacher and the Romantic School as his theological precursors. A sketch of Ritschl, his age and his school, follows. Three chapters are devoted to the Ritschlian theory of knowledge and judgments of value, and four chapters to the Ritschlian dogmatics, dealing with the Christian Idea of God, the Kingdom of God, the doctrine of the Trinity, the Person and Work of Christ, and Sin and Salvation. With an estimate of the Ritschlian theology, in which some points of the teaching of the school are generously praised, but which on the whole is very severely unfavourable, the volume ends. To Ritschlianism is applied the apostolic warning, "Not thus have you learned the Christ."

Mr Mozley has also an introductory chapter, but his subsequent arrangement shows his different standpoint. It is inevitable that he should first discuss the Ritschlian attitude to Philosophy; but he deals with Religion and the Idea of God, and Ritschlianism and Revelation, before he touches on the value-judgments. Without assigning such importance to the theory as determinative of the Ritschlian theology as has been done usually, he finds in it a revival, in opposition to orthodoxy

and rationalism, of the true conception of faith, and with this the next chapter deals. He also insists that the theory must be considered in the light of the Ritschlian historical positivism, its doctrine of Revelation, with which his previous chapter has been concerned, as "value-judging is not found apart from given facts." The influence of Herrmann, to whom the volume is dedicated, is shown in the giving of a whole chapter to "the Ritschlian conception of man's communion with God." Only two chapters deal with the Ritschlian systematic theology, the doctrines of God and Man, as the writer properly recognises that the contribution of Ritschlian theology lies more in the region of what the Germans call "Vorfragen" ("previous questions"). The volume concludes with appreciation as well as criticism. How different his standpoint is from the other writer's is shown in his closing sentences. "He feels that a school which is alive to the needs of the time, and, with whatever failures, tries to supply them, should be looked upon with friendliness by all who realise the same need, and would gladly do something to meet it. No one can pretend that the Ritschlian solution of the problems of theology is other than very imperfect; but towards all whose aim is to make more manifest the grace and truth which came into the world with Jesus Christ, our hearts may go out with the sympathy of those who, with them, are disciples and servants of the One Master" (pp. 263-4). I need not say that these words have my hearty endorsement. It is in the spirit of Mr Mozley, and not Mr Edghill, that I at least have learned the Christ. The one illustrates the desirable theological cosmopolitanism; the other the regrettable ecclesiastical insularity.

Mr Mozley is in so close agreement for the most part with my own representation of the Ritschlian theology that it is not necessary for me to discuss his book in any detail. Only two points may be noted. Mr Mozley dissents from my judgment that Ritschl tries to get beyond an ideal pre-existence of Christ (p. 186); but in his argument against this judgment he does not adequately recognise that I have myself pronounced this attempt as unsuccessful. He thinks that in my criticism of Ritschl's doctrine of dominion over the world, "dormitat Homerus" (p. 229), but I must still hold that the prominence Ritschl gives to the idea, however defined, is a shifting of the centre of gravity of religion. These are minor matters, and I can give this volume my most cordial commendation.

The points on which Mr Edghill criticises me are so many that most of them must be passed over. I select only a few that seem of such importance for a right judgment of Ritschlianism as to demand mention. As regards Ritschl's theory of knowledge, Mr Edghill maintains that it is subjective idealism; as in so doing he finds himself following Stählin, Favre, Pfleiderer, and Orr, he opines that "it needed considerable courage for Dr Garvie to maintain that all these scholars were labouring under an entire misapprehension" (p. 83). It would require more space than I can here claim to restate my very full and searching argument to prove that Ritschl wavers between vulgar realism and critical idealism. What

Ritschl in the sentence quoted by Mr Edghill in italics calls "a purely formal conception without all content" is not the thing in its total reality but "the isolated thing," divorced from "all its peculiar qualities." What he is contending against is the abstraction of a substance without qualities or a subject without any attributes or operations. Regarding the statements on which Mr Edghill and the critics he follows rely, Mr Mozley well says: "Even those statements do not go beyond an insistence, even an extreme insistence, on the unknowableness of the soul apart from its activities. They do not assert the non-existence of the soul apart from its manifestations" (pp. 22, 23).

Mr Edghill is to be commended for the very full account he gives of the teaching of the school on the judgments of value, but his own statement in these two chapters does not warrant his criticism of the Ritschlian theory of knowledge in the sentence, "It is impossible to hold with religious knowledge as true that which the theoretic reason pronounces false" (p. 248). If in the earlier statements of the theory there was a slight justification for such a charge, on Mr Edghill's own showing it has been removed by the later. On page 188 Ritschl's view on miracles is entirely misrepresented in the sentence, "They must on no account be regarded as contraventions of the established order of nature." What Ritschl does say is that the believer may hold his belief without concerning himself at all as to the theory of the relation of miracles to the order of nature. On page 124 Mr Edghill quotes a sentence from my book (page 83), and dismisses it with the criticism, "This, however, is only an epigrammatic way of stating, not of solving, the difficulty." The previous sentence shows the injustice of the criticism. As regards my argument concerning Ritschl's Christology, Mr Edghill is content with dismissing it with the epithet "strained defence" (p. 203), without dealing adequately with the mass of evidence there collected in opposition to Dr Denney's sweeping condemnation, which he endorses. While there is a great deal that is valuable in Mr Edghill's book, and it is one that should not be neglected by any student of Ritschlianism, because it does mark a distinct advance towards greater justice to the school from the standpoint of its opponents, vet it must not be taken as an impartial judgment. The two books should be read together, as each is complementary to the other.

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L'Évolution des Dogmes.—By Charles Guignebert, chargé du cours d'Histoire du Christianisme à la Sorbonne.—E. Flammarion, éditeur.—Paris.

This work, which is the latest production of the brilliant French theologian whose name it bears, is bound to arrest attention. It has an

interest alike for the theologian and for the public, in that it shows what way thought is progressing in the world of Biblical criticism and whither lead the tendencies of that learned and original band of religious thinkers which is represented by M. Guignebert.

The theme of the work is a living one. And the effort of the author to prove that the laws of scientific evolution have been uniformly operative in the history of Dogma has succeeded in a remarkable degree. If we accept his premises we find it difficult to escape from his conclusions. His reasoning is clear and forcible, and he holds his reader's attention from first to last. Such a theme, indeed, is bound to prove of interest in an age in which the scientific world has pledged itself to the evolutionary hypothesis, and the modern theologian is fully prepared to recognise the operation of natural law in the spiritual world. We take up the work with something of a predisposition to accept its conclusions. M. Guignebert, therefore, may well assume that he has no need to conciliate the prejudices of his audience; he speaks to men who already have his sympathy.

It is fortunate that the lectures which compose this attractive little volume are of a popular nature. The veriest tyro in theology would have no difficulty in following the argument to its close, or in understanding the historical and critical references with which the lectures abound. M. Guignebert writes with all the fluency of a Frenchman and an orator, he is a scholar of no mean order, and he has his subject at his finger-tips. At the first perusal of his work we are almost swept away by the rush of his rhetoric. We find ourselves carried with ease through the intricate channels of Church History, and we are delighted when the author enables us to breathe the atmosphere of the early Christians or to view the great Master Himself in an altogether new aspect. We plunge into parallels of all kinds, drawn from the Coran, the Zend-Avestas, the philosophy of early Greece, the religion of Imperial Rome, and the creeds of the Buddhist. We are enabled to watch the varying forms of belief and the gradual promotion of the creeds through the long history of the Papacy, nor are we allowed to pause until we have estimated the work of the Reformers and the aims of the Modernist. And when we come to the close of M. Guignebert's work, we frankly admit that he has done all that scholar and theologian could do to establish the thesis he is concerned to maintain.

But we lay the work aside—if we have been brought up in the evangelical tradition—with a sense of dissatisfaction. It is not that we doubt the scholarship of so eminent an authority upon the history of the early Church. M. Guignebert is a thinker so brilliant that the Sorbonne can only gain in prestige by having such a theologian upon its professorial staff. But while we can go a long way with M. Guignebert and can heartily approve the main argument of his thesis, we feel that he has gone too far—so far, indeed, that he has almost broken with that early Christianity which he professes to rediscover. He cannot be vindicated from the charge of

immoderate liberalism which has sometimes been made against the modern theologians of the Sorbonne. Indeed, the feeling that some of the members of the Faculty of Theology have transgressed the limits of loyalty to the Christian faith found clear expression in the Synod of the Eglise Reformée when, only last year, during its session in the erstwhile Protestant town of Grenoble, it declined the honour of appointing one of its own ministers as a representative on the Board of the Faculty. The alumni of Montauban did not thereby depreciate the courtesy or the broad-mindedness of the Sorbonne in offering official recognition to the historic Huguenot Church of France; but they were unanimous in declining to assume a joint-responsibility for teaching which ran counter to all their traditions. They expressed the belief, which is assuredly gaining ground to-day, that a man can be a scholar and a thinker without transgressing the limits of evangelicalism or playing into the hands of a heartless rationalism. We do not, of course, know whether the Synod had M. Guignebert in its mind -and his Evolution des Dogmes was not in the press at that time-but as we lay down the suggestive work under our consideration we shrewdly suspect that it was so. His book must be read and answered, not only because it is a remarkable contribution to a line of thought which has impressed the modern theological world, but because it is so remorselessly destructive of evangelical faith.

In its fearless application of the evolutionary hypothesis to the articles of the faith M. Guignebert's work is abreast of modern thought and in sympathy with the temper of the modern mind. It keenly appreciates the difficulties which stand in the way of the intelligent student of Christianity, and it faces every problem in the true spirit of the "Modernist." Yet similar attempts have been made, and quite as boldly, by men who are as soundly evangelical as Professor James Orr in his Progress of Dogma; and M. Guignebert is unique merely in applying his method with a mind so broad as to leave Renan and Loisy altogether in the shade, and with a recklessness that breaks in toto with the historic creeds of the Church, both Catholic and Protestant.

We are, indeed, not wholly convinced that M. Guignebert is warranted in applying the term "evolution," in the scientific sense, to that progress of dogmatic belief which he has attempted to sketch; and we feel that at every point he has been obliged to treat his facts in a somewhat unhistoric and uncritical way in order to make them support his thesis. For instance, he habitually errs in assuming that the dogma which he seeks to discuss has no basis whatever in the facts of Christianity or in the teaching of Christ. And when he writes of Jesus of Nazareth he leaves the impression that he is a critic from without, rather than within, the circle of those who really know Christ. He treats Christianity too much in the spirit of the botanist who deals exclusively with dried specimens. It would seem as though he had never smelt the rose and the violet, or drunk in the beauty of the landscape clothed in spring flowers. We recall the lines of Wordsworth:

"One impulse from a vernal wood May teach you more of man, Of moral evil, and of good, Than all the sages can."

And we imagine that M. Guignebert has spent his time among the sages rather than out amid the natural beauty of Christian experience.

We readily concede that M. Guignebert is on the right lines in the main evolutionary idea of his work. It is in his method of treating individual doctrines that we part company with him. Before all else we take a view of the Christ of the New Testament which is diametrically opposed to his. When he deals with the historic Christ there are two things which characterise all he says—a vast wealth of scholarship and an absolute lack of spiritual insight. In M. Guignebert's estimate of Jesus we seem to find a remarkable illustration of the prophet's words, "When we shall see him, there is no beauty that we should desire him."

From the volume before us we have no difficulty in assigning M. Guignebert's place in the religious world. He would, we presume, describe himself as a "Liberal Protestant," and the designation is accurate, if it be assumed that by "Protestant" we mean "non-Catholic," and by "liberal" we denote an entire freedom from allegiance to all that evangelical orthodoxy holds dear. M. Guignebert is a "Higher Critic" of the most advanced school and a biblical interpreter of the most rationalistic tendencies. Yet his honesty is so transparent and his argument so clear that he affords a worthy antagonist to anyone who would champion that hallowed faith in the Christ of the Gospels which has proved the most revolutionary force in individual lives that the world has ever known.

When we speak of M. Guignebert as a "Higher Critic" we do not, although we confess to our evangelical bias, imply that he is necessarily an object of suspicion for "orthodox" believers. A man may be devoutly "orthodox" and at the same time an intelligent "Higher Critic." And there are not a few among the most ardent leaders of modern evangelical Christianity who owe to the newer criticism of the Bible more than words can tell. A reverent criticism is infinitely to be preferred to the unquestioning acceptance of ideas which stand solely on external authority. The currents of Higher Criticism have not only swept away the sands which, drifting before the ignorance and prejudice of centuries, had gathered deep around the bed-rock of the Faith, till its strength and beauty had been largely obscured; but they have revealed much of priceless value as they have opened up new strata of truth concerning the methods of God in His self-revelation. But this is not the school of criticism to which M. Guignebert belongs. Most men have certain scruples about dealing recklessly with sacred themes. M. Guignebert has no such scruples in dealing with these writings which have been revered in the intelligent faith of centuries of Christians. Others may think that the scribes and Massoretes and the founders of the early Christian Church

have some claim to be regarded as honest, rational men. M. Guignebert would probably class them all as what our American cousins call "sacred idiots." They were, he seems to think, not merely dupes, but deceivers so apt and plagiarists so bold as to be scarcely better than romancers. There is a critical school that once went mad over a certain theory according to which the whole of the Hexateuch and the superincumbent Old Testament polity and doctrine could not only be explained, but explained away, by the ingenious insertion of the mystic word "Jerahmeel." And these critics, more faithful to their theory than to their facts, found the word "Jerahmeel" almost everywhere that they wanted it. But M. Guignebert goes farther than any "Jerahmeelite." His method is an easy one, as well as instructive, and it shows us to what extents the Higher Criticism can carry a man when he lacks spiritual insight and reasoned faith. It enables him to reject almost everything in the New Testament in such a way that the average observer discerns more zeal for the theory than for the "Word." And the day of a living and regenerating Christianity will have passed its zenith in very truth if we are in for a period of Guignebertian Biblical interpretation.

Still it is in the treatment of the contents of Christian belief that he is most ruthless. He is a disciple of Baur and an ally of Harnack. He firmly believes in the irreconcilable oppositions of a Petrine and a Pauline party in the early Church. The Petrine Christians he holds to be the original Jewish Christians who alone knew Jesus in the flesh. He takes it for granted that the Twelve and the whole body of Jewish Christians would have risen in hot indignation against anyone who believed in the divinity of Christ; and he attributes that essential Christian belief to the inevitable tendency towards "majoration" in dealing with the Hero of the Faith, together with the unwarrantable Hellenising of

Christianity.

M. Guignebert lavishes his benedictions upon the Jewish Christians, although he does not regard them in the same light as does the Book of Acts, for to him the New Testament represents ideas much later than those of the Apostolic age. He considers that all the early Christians were Unitarians; and he treats as absolutely unwarranted additions the Pauline conceptions of the nature, the person, and the work of Christ and the meaning of the Supper, which are unfolded in the epistles. His description of the "majoration" of Christ is most interesting and ingenious. It would even be plausible, were it not based upon such a truncated edition of the New Testament that he everywhere lays himself open to the charge of begging the question. Thus, for instance, it seems to us that M. Guignebert treats the great doctrines of the Trinity, the divinity of Christ, the Atonement, the Resurrection, as mere obsolete superstitions deserving of a historic consideration and calling for an indulgent pity.

When, then, we endeavour to estimate this contribution to the literature of Christian theology, we must confess to a keen disappointment. If

M. Guignebert's contentions are wholly correct, then we must regard it as a fatal mistake that Jesus Christ ever came into the world, for His work was not only a needless piece of folly but His influence has been more prolific of strife and bigotry than of aught else.

But evangelical faith has an answer to the negative conclusions of such a work as this. It is able not only to vindicate the historic accuracy of the facts of Christianity, but by its irrefutable appeal to the Christ of experience it can meet the hostility of an unbelieving opposition. We may well hazard the prophecy that the words of St Paul, in spite of his being what our author calls a "mystic," and what we call an "experimental Christian," will be a power for the salvation of men long after Guignebertism has been relegated to the sphere of theological curiosities. Indeed, we cannot call to mind a single modern theologian who is so ready to belittle Christ without a cause or to interpret the Gospels without spiritual insight. And when a theologian lacks spiritual perception, no amount of scholar-ship can atone for the defect.

W. HARVEY-JELLIE.

CHELTENHAM.

Light from the Ancient East: The New Testament Illustrated by Recently Discovered Texts of the Graco-Roman World.—By Adolf Deissmann, D. Theol. (Marburg), D.D. (Aberdeen), Professor of New Testament Exegesis in the University of Berlin. Translated by Lionel R. M. Strachan, M.A., English Lecturer in the University of Heidelberg; formerly Scholar of St John's College, Oxford. With sixty-eight Illustrations.—London: Hodder & Stoughton, 1910.—Pp. xl+514.

This is not the first time that Professor Deissmann's work has been introduced to the English public by Mr Strachan, and as before, so now, the translation is admirably done. If I may venture on one small criticism, it is on a point to which the translator himself draws particular attention. He finds fault with earlier translators of the Greek texts for being too modern in the language of their renderings, and has himself "tried to render the Greek literally in language as far as possible resembling that of the Authorised Version and the Revised Version." No endeavour could be worthier, and on the whole he has succeeded in bringing out the remarkable likeness which often exists between these texts and the New Testament. The specimen which he himself selects for comparison with the rendering of Grenfell and Hunt is this, from the second Logia fragment from Oxyrhynchus:- "Jesus saith: Let him that seeketh not cease ... until he findeth, and when he findeth he shall be amazed, and having been amazed he shall reign, and having reigned he shall rest." The obvious comment on this is that, despite its archaic flavour, it misses the subjunctive which the English Bible employs. The nearest parallel is of

course in Luke xv., "What man of you having an hundred sheep, if he lose one of them, doth not leave the ninety and nine in the wilderness, and go after that which is lost, until he find it? And when he hath found it . . . " etc. It is curious that, taking this passage as his model, Mr Strachan should have written "until he findeth."

The translation is made "from the second edition (curiously called 'second and third') of the German work (Tubingen, 1909)." The delay is compensated for by our now having the book "in its revised and enlarged form, including nine illustrations that were not in the first edition." Among these are some of the most interesting in the whole volume. From the modest account in the Translator's Preface it is evident that the English version is a considerable improvement on the German original; in particular, the elaborate indices have been made more readily available. For all this laborious achievement Mr Strachan deserves our warmest thanks. He is to be congratulated also on the discovery of the singularly appropriate colophon which closes this bulky and handsome volume.

When we come to Professor Deissmann's own work two things about it strike us at once. The first is its actuality. Here is no mere product of the secluded study, the workroom of a man who shuts himself off from his fellow creatures to make learning the business of his life. Too many theological books have no contact with the busy world which lies around, and some of them appear to a plain man to have no other justification for their being than the author's desire to justify his own professorial existence by the promulgation of a theory which requires all the resources of abstruse scholarship and subtle reasoning to render it even tolerably presentable. Professor Deissmann goes out into the open. He has himself twice journeyed to the East, and here he presents to us a selection of the spoils which he has gathered. But not only himself. He knows how to ransack libraries, museums, and collections public and private, in order to lay the choicest of their contents before his readers. And these contents take us to the market, the army, the village, the real daily life of the world in which Christianity rose and developed. Our most sacred religious documents are brought into juxtaposition with the common people, and over and over again I find myself reminded of Wordsworth's theory that poetry ought to be written in a selection of the ordinary language used by ordinary men and women in their everyday life. According to our author this is pretty much what we have in the New Testament. Generally speaking, there is no special Biblical or technical language. What we find is simply the Kowń, the common Greek of international intercourse round the shores of the Mediterranean.

The second thing which strikes us is that already there is a singular familiarity about the author's arguments and even about some of the details. This is due to the fact (to his credit be it said) that instead of hoarding up his treasures in order to make a great show all at once, he has already admitted us to many preliminary peeps, and in lectures, articles,

and books has displayed his stores. In other words, we have already benefited by many gleams of the light from the Ancient East. Some points which are raised here have already found their way into standard books.

The main object of Professor Deissmann's work is to prove that Christianity is a religion, and the New Testament a book, of the people. Again and again he returns to this point, driving it home by argument and illustration, even, too, by denunciation of the methods of earlier scholars. Those lexicographers are unsparingly condemned who labelled certain words and ideas as exclusively biblical or ecclesiastical. "The book which has most strongly insisted on the supposed novelty of countless 'ideas' and 'meanings' in the New Testament—I mean Cremer's Lexicon—is by reason of this dogmatic tendency one of the greatest hindrances to an historical grasp of the real expansive force of Primitive Christianity" (p. 392). But, one may ask, how could these new facts be known before the discovery and publication of the non-literary records of the past? If a word was unknown save in the Septuagint or New Testament, how can a dictionary-maker be blamed for saying so? And is it really necessary to insist so emphatically and so often on the popular character of early Christianity? If we have not given it as much attention as it deserved, we have all read the passage (referred to more than once in the book before us) in which St Paul states that "Not many wise men after the flesh, not many mighty, not many noble, are called: but God chose the foolish things of the world, that he might put to shame them that are wise" (1 Cor. i. 26, 27). This remark is abundantly proved to be true out of the stores of learning which Professor Deissmann has at his command. But I cannot help thinking that he pushes his argument too far. If I read the Acts and Epistles rightly, St Paul was not the "artisan missionary" who is here depicted. That the apostle was a maker of tent-cloth everyone knows, but surely his trade, or at least the exercise of it, was an accident of his missionary career, not his life's occupation. Unless our whole conception of the apostle is wrong, he was not a man of the people, as was Martin Luther; he was a gentleman, and (according to the ideas of his race and age) a scholar. It was by the force of his natural genius, quickened by the grace of God, that he "became all things to all men." And when commentators have represented the Johannine style as "particularly Semitic" a good deal more went to that judgment than "its preference for paratactic constructions" (pp. 127, 128). Westcott says: "The vocabulary, the structure of the sentences, the symmetry and numerical symbolism of the structure of the sentences, the symmetry and numerical symbolism of the composition, the expression and the arrangement of the thoughts, are essentially Hebrew. . . . The words are Greek words, but the spirit by which they live is Hebrew." In spite of these minor criticisms, there can be no doubt that the Heidelberg Professor (now of Berlin) has established his position, showing incidentally that "even Thayer is now out of date" (p. 417), and that there is great need of a new lexicon. This need will be 1 Commentary on St John i. 12.

met, it is to be hoped, by the Lexicon of Patristic Greek now in

preparation in England (xviii.).

The materials drawn upon are: (a) Inscriptions on stone, metal, etc.; (b) texts on papyrus; (c) texts on potsherds. Their value lies in the fact that they are non-literary, and so admit us to view their writers in their ordinary life and using their ordinary speech. They belong to "the period which led up to and witnessed the rise and early development of Christianity, the period, let us say, from Alexander to Diocletian or Constantine" (p. 4); and many of the originals are presented to us in remarkably beautiful photographic facsimiles. One who is not an expert must frequently wonder at the success of the author and other scholars in deciphering the, at times, barely visible letters. It ought to be said that in these pages no notice is taken of any but Greek and Latin texts, and that all the texts are provided with translations. Some are of extraordinary interest. Here (figs. 14 and 15) is the oldest Greek letter yet discovered, a leaden tablet of the fourth century B.C., now in the Berlin Museum; and here is the oldest Christian letter extant in the original, "papyrus written at Rome between 264 (265) and 282 (281) A.D." (fig. 31). The latter has been previously published by Grenfell and Hunt.

Among miscellaneous points may be mentioned the assumption "that at least Colossians, Philemon, and the 'Epistle to the Ephesians' (Laodiceans) were written during an imprisonment at Ephesus" (p. 229); that "the so-called monogram of Christ had been in use long before the time of Christ" (p. 251, n. 3); that δεισιδαιμονεστέρους, Acts xvii. 22, is translated "extremely religious" (p. 285); and that "no one in the Mediterranean world in the first century A.D. would have thought of finding in the word διαθήκη the idea of 'covenant'; it means 'a unilateral enactment,' in particular 'a will or testament'" (p. 341). These must serve as specimens of valuable matter far too copious to be noted here, though attention must be drawn to the light shed on the religious and political use of the title "Lord." Dating in the West from the time of Domitian, i.e. later than St Paul, it is found in the East much earlier, having been taken over from the native courts.

G. E. FFRENCH.

WEST CAMEL.

Walter Headlam: Life and Poems.—By Cecil Headlam.— Duckworth, 1910.

CAMBRIDGE has had to mourn in the last few years the loss of three of her most distinguished Greek scholars, Adam, Archer-Hind, and Headlam, each by a lamentably early death. The loss of Headlam will be particularly felt in the study of Greek poetry, to which he had devoted many

laborious years. The regret of his friends and admirers will be all the keener in that he did not live to crown his researches by some comprehensive work which might have won for him a wider fame. In this most interesting biography, a labour of love excellently performed, Mr Cecil Headlam shows us that he strongly shares this feeling, and thinks that such a result might confidently have been expected of Walter Headlam's later years. He had gathered great stores of learning, his judgment had matured and his sympathies widened, and his reputation had never stood so high as it did at the time of his death.

Headlam was a member of a distinguished scholarly family, in the past as well as in the present, for he could boast descent from the great Richard Bentley. He was a man with an intense enthusiasm for Greek poetry. And the really astonishing measure of his familiarity with it, alike in form and spirit, is shown in the masterly ease of his renderings from and into Greek in his Book of Greek Verse. But the greater part of his work was devoted to a minute study of points of scholarship. He was tireless in his labours to elucidate even the smallest points of reading or interpretation. It is the penalty of such devotion that the result achieved can rarely represent any but a small part of the labour and learning that went to make it; and perhaps also, even in the case of the greatest scholars, that when the weight of all literature is brought to bear on a single word, it not seldom strikes us as just failing to break the butterfly on the wheel. And Headlam, though never pedantic, was apt on some subjects to be one-viewed and terribly sure of what must remain open to doubt. But for all that he did work which won him recognition both at home and on the Continent, and he had the satisfaction of having his opinion sought and valued by scholars working on the same lines as himself. "The divine gifts of judgment and inspiration, these qualities Walter Headlam possessed to a degree excelled by no classical scholar since Bentley. And to the force and penetrating originality of Bentley, he added the exquisite ear of Porson." So claims his biographer, with an enthusiasm no one would wish to blame. Perhaps it is claiming rather too much. But, if not one of the greatest scholars, he was a very fine scholar, and of the stuff of which great scholars are made; as we should judge both from the work he did and from the impressions he made on the discerning circle of his intimate friends.

The life of a scholar and a college-tutor does not give scope for a sensational or eventful record, and Mr Cecil Headlam does not try to make more of his subject than it allows. But he makes us genuinely interested in Walter Headlam, in his life at college and the Olympian carelessness of his holiday arrangements. There are several charming letters to friends, indicative of his eager and lively nature. With this went some morbidity of mind, which made him a depressed and a somewhat "nervy" person at times. In particular, it led him to suffer sometimes from the not uncommon delusion that he was doomed to death by a mysterious disease. But he was not, as his biographer tells us, incapable

of extracting some amusement from this, as when he told his friends that he must put aside the classics and read Shakespeare while there was yet time. "Shakespeare was one of the things they were likely to set."

A collection of his poems is included in this volume, and Mr Cecil Headlam is of the opinion that a great lyric poet was lost in the scholar. Again we may feel this is claiming rather too much. The poems are indeed of great merit. They show, as do his Greek renderings, a fine feeling for style, and for beauty and order of words. But, as is natural enough with a man whose instincts were mainly scholarly, too scrupulous an attention seems to be given to form and expression, and there is some lack of warmth and poetical fervour. Still, they show real feeling, though it may not always express itself fully. Two verses may be quoted from the poem entitled "Anniversary" (of the death of J. K. Stephen). They are, it may be suggested, pleasantly reminiscent of the author of "Thyrsis."

"Oh, easy creed
That our beloved ones are not lost indeed,
But, somewhere far and fainter live secure,
While yet they plead
With voices heard in visions live and pure,
With touch upon the hand, that they endure,
Only withdrawn! Even I, as in a dream
Wherein at once we seem
To suffer joys or terrors, and are sure
They are but things we deem,
So, when at first my tears were shed,
Though sorrowing for his death, could scarce believe him dead."

"A marvel rare
Beyond the range of human hearts it were,
If to that saving trust they should not cleave,
That no despair
Need gloom for loss no morrow may retrieve,
Because Death cannot endlessly bereave,
But they shall meet upon some further shore,
Not to be parted more:—
Whatever utmost fancies Hope may weave
Of what Death has in store,
None ever yet so dear she wove
As lost ones to be loved hereafter and to love."

LAWRENCE SOLOMON.

University College, London.

English Philosophy: A Study of its Method and General Development.— By Thomas M. Forsyth, M.A., D. Phil., Assistant Lecturer in Logic and Metaphysics in the University of St Andrews.—London: Adam & Charles Black, 1910.—Pp. xii+228.

DR FORSYTH has made a valuable contribution to the study of English Philosophy. The book is an expansion of his thesis for the Doctorate in Philosophy at Edinburgh. When one thinks of the amount of time and energy which candidates for degrees often spend in writing dissertations which are barren and disappointing mainly because the chief literature on the subjects dealt with is written in a language with which they are but imperfectly, or not at all, acquainted, it seems most regrettable that Dr Forsyth's example is not followed more often. In choosing some aspect of English philosophy for his thesis the student has the obvious advantage of having the main literature on the subject accessible in his mother tongue, instead of having to rely on translations, mostly imperfect, of only some of the principal works on the subject. And this is no small gain when dealing with problems of philosophy, where the terminology is so subtle and elusive, and where even apparently slight differences of meaning are so important. Nor need this very palpable advantage entail any real sacrifice of interest or importance. English philosophy is interesting enough and important enough in all conscience. German candidates for degrees have no difficulty in finding in English philosophy abundant materials for their dissertations, which are not infrequently quite interesting. And the volume now under review shows how fruitful such researches may be. Not that one would wish to be a Little Englander in matters of philosophy. Far from it. Students who possess a sufficient mastery of foreign languages may well be encouraged to take up some special problems of Continental philosophy. But it is hardly profitable to let those do so who must rely solely on incomplete and imperfect translations. It is therefore to be hoped that the very interesting results of Dr Forsyth's studies may help to make problems of English philosophy more popular among candidates for the higher degrees.

Dr Forsyth's book, as the sub-title suggests, does not profess to be a History of English Philosophy. For such a history we are still looking, patiently and with keen interest, to Professor Stout. The present volume only treats of certain aspects of English philosophy, though these aspects are treated in the light of their historical development. The mode of treatment is not unlike that with which Windelband's History of Philosophy has made us familiar. It would be idle to attempt a summary outline of the book. It is too condensed for that; and professes, in fact, to be itself only an outline requiring to be filled in to an indefinite extent. But the following list of the headings of the chapters will convey an idea of the contents of the volume:—The Significance of Method; The Unity and Differentiation of Knowledge; The Twofold Aspect of Method; Experience

the Basis of Knowledge; The Implications of Experience; Knowledge as Significant of Reality; Experience the Material of Reality; Knowledge as Relative to Practice; Experience as Appreciation of Reality; The Character of the Philosophy of Experience. It will be seen from these chapter-headings that the three principal problems which Dr Forsyth discusses are:—(1) The Method of Philosophy; (2) The Relation of Experience and Reality; and (3) The Relation of Knowledge to Life or Practice. In his treatment of these three problems the author follows very largely, and acknowledges his indebtedness to, the views of Dr Shadworth Hodgson (who has, and deservedly has, a whole chapter to himself), Mr Bradley, and Professor Stout. Needless to say, the three problems are not really ultimately distinct problems, but rather so many aspects of the same ultimate problem. In fact, Dr Forsyth's whole treatise, as the sub-title already suggests, might well be described as "an historical and critical account of the experiential method in philosophy, and its implications." Recent volumes of the Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society contain abundant evidence of the "liveliness" which the problem of the experiential method in philosophy has at present. Dr Forsyth's contribution thus appears at a very opportune moment; and a welcome contribution it is.

The main trend of Dr Forsyth's account may be briefly (but very inadequately) indicated as follows. English philosophy, it is clearly shown, has always insisted on the experiential method as the right method in philosophy as in science; and the author fully concurs in the accuracy of this view. But it is by no means obvious what exactly the character of this method is. Its nature must obviously have been conceived in very different ways to have led to such different results as are found in the various systems of English philosophy, all of which are professedly based upon the experiential method. And so it was. The different phases of English philosophy result from different conceptions of the nature of experience. But one may trace the gradual correction of one-sided conceptions of experience. The main line of advance has been from more abstract to more concrete views of experience. Thus fact and idea, sense and thought, intellect and will, have each, in more or less explicit antithesis to one another, constituted the distinctive basis of the procedure and conclusions at different stages of the development of English philosophy; and the general line of progress has been in the direction of their adjustment and correlation. The advance towards a fuller or more concrete conception of experience was accompanied by a progressive integration of experience and reality, the difference between experience and reality being gradually reduced to the contrast between actual and possible experience. This result, Dr Forsyth thinks, was inevitable; it was, from the first, a latent implication of the experiential method of philosophy. For the true import of the principle of experience (so our author feels convinced) is not simply that reality can be known only through the medium of experience, but that reality is experience. And the significance of this result lies not

in any mere apprehension of its truth as a general principle of interpretation, but in what it means for the development of experience itself. For while reality consists in experience, and not only in existence that must be apprehended by way of experience, this involves that it can be realised in or for our consciousness only by way of a progressive appreciation which actively or livingly participates in it. Thus experience is at once the starting-point, the pathway, and the goal in the search for reality. And the experiential philosophy is ultimately inseparable from the life of entrance into the being and nature of the infinite reality.

One may not agree with Dr Forsyth's final conclusions; one may even disagree from him on certain details; one certainly wishes that the volume were much fuller in contents and less condensed in style, so as to enable one to feel more sure about one's agreements and differences; but there is no doubt that Dr Forsyth has written a very able book on English

philosophy.

A. WOLF.

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Modern Religious Problems.—Edited by Dr Ambrose W. Vernon.— Boston and New York: Houghton Mifflin Company.—Cambridge: The Riverside Press, 1909–10.

Under this title, Dr A. W. Vernon, of Brookline, U.S.A., has begun to issue a series of small volumes corresponding practically in size and scope to the well-known Religionsgeschichtliche Volksbücher which have been so successful in Germany. Four years ago I hoped for such a series (cp. Hibbert Journal, vol. iv. p. 468). Now, one is glad to welcome it. The general aim of the series is defined in its prospectus as an attempt "to lay before the great body of intelligent people in the English-speaking world the precise results" of modern scholarship, as that has modified the traditional conceptions of the Christian religion, "so that men both within and without the churches may be able to understand the conception of the Christian religion (and of its Sacred Books) which obtains among its leading scholars to-day, and that they may intelligently co-operate in the great practical problems with which the churches are now confronted." To this large and educative programme Dr Vernon has set his hand. None of the three Old Testament volumes has yet appeared, but four of the seven promised upon the New Testament are now published, viz. Professor F. C. Burkitt's on "The Earliest Sources of the Life of Jesus"; Professor B. W. Bacon's upon "The Founding of the Church"; Professor E. F. Scott's upon "The Historical and Religious Value of the Fourth Gospel," and one by the present writer upon "Paul and Paulinism." Five monographs are announced upon the Fundamental Christian Conceptions; two of these may now be procured—one by Professor G. W. Knox upon "The Gospel of Jesus," which contains a general introduction to the series.

and another by Dr W. de W. Hyde upon "Sin and its Forgiveness." One has only to read the former and the volumes by Professors Burkitt and Scott to see how admirably this work is done. Dr Hyde's booklet, a trenchant little study, really leads up to the topics covered by the fourth division of the series, viz. Practical Church Problems. In this division Mr Charles Stelzle has published a characteristic essay on "The Church and Labour," which is to be followed by four other monographs, all written by American scholars. Readers of the Hibbert Journal will do well to keep their eyes upon this series. The volumes are cheap; each costs two shillings. They are competently edited, clearly printed, and attractively got up; but their main title to notice consists in their attempt to convey a living re-statement of the Christian religion for the work of the present day. Each writer, as in the German series, has been left free to handle his subject as he pleases. But the general spirit of the series may perhaps be represented not unfairly in the following sentences from two of the volumes:-"To serve society; to rebuke the sins which hurt society and our fellow men, and, through hurting them, offend God; to love all men, even those who do wrong; to live the better life of love in the complex relations and close contacts of practical affairs; to keep these spiritual distinctions clear, and the impulse of love warm, and the readiness to forgive, even at high personal cost, alert—these are the great functions for which the Church, the community of those who have the loving and forgiving spirit, exists. . . . No man who is not daily aware of his own shortcomings, and profoundly penitent for the unprofitableness of his service, no man who does not find occasion for constant forgiveness of others every day of his life, has learned so much as the first rudiments of Christ's gospel, and all theologies, old or new, will remain to him sealed books," So far Dr Hyde. Professor Bacon, towards the close of his bright and fresh volume, sums up the result of his investigations as follows:-"If anything has been made clear by our study, it is that nothing went to the building of the Church which was not placed there in loyal perpetuation of the teaching and example of Jesus. Its faith, its principle of order, its institutions, its work, were all from him." It will be evident from these sentences, taken almost at random, that the series is at once frank and reverent, positive as well as critical, eschewing alike technical irrelevancies and pious rhetoric. Canon Driver is the only British scholar who has yet to contribute to Modern Religious Problems; but the series, although published in America, is of international range, and I take this opportunity of directing the attention of British readers especially to an enterprise which is so timely and which has begun under such excellent auspices.

JAMES MOFFATT.

BROUGHTY FERRY, N.B.

- I. Monasticism in Staffordshire.—By F. A. Hibbert, M.A., Headmaster of Denstone.—Stafford: Mort, 1909.
- II. The Dissolution of the Monasteries in Staffordshire.—Same Author.—Pitman, 1910.

OF the two books before us, the earlier is certainly the more valuable, though we heartily welcome both. The time is hardly ripe for a complete and impartial survey of English monasticism; we must first have a period of piecemeal monographs or honest advocacy. Mr Hibbert's natural prepossessions are those of a Woodard-School Headmaster; but he has tried hard to see the facts for himself, and has made a very valuable contribution to the history of his subject. Staffordshire is a small county, but the author is probably right in taking it as fairly typical, except when we come to the Dissolution—at which point, curiously enough, he most definitely makes this claim (ii. 8). The Bishop of Lichfield, Roland Lee, acted throughout as a friend and collaborator of Cromwell; and, among other natural differences, this very likely accounts for the apparent silence of Cromwell's visitors against the morals of the Staffordshire houses. These men (to whose unsupported word we ourselves should attach no more weight than Mr Hibbert does) were doubtless sometimes tempted to force the hand of unwilling monks by random or deliberately false accusations; they might therefore spare themselves this trouble in cases where the bishop's influence seemed already likely to secure a surrender. But it must not be forgotten that the very injustices of Henry VIII. and his visitors owed much of their point to the fact that public opinion had long set in the same direction. Mr Hibbert evidently fails fully to realise the evil repute of the monasteries during the three centuries preceding the Reformation, or he could not have written that "there had been no definite charges of moral delinquency brought by authority against the monastic system" before 1535 (ii. 73). However strictly we may emphasise these two words authority and system, the sentence could hardly have been written by anyone who had studied the proposals for Church reform presented to Henry V. in 1414 by the anti-Wycliffite University of Oxford. But if, on this and other important points, Mr Hibbert sometimes lacks breadth of view, he must yet be congratulated upon the diligence and honesty with which he has studied the facts which have come in his way. He points out that much of the work done by Parliament from 1530 to 1534 "was not much more than giving statutory enactment-often with brutal frankness-to what had long existed in fact. The royal authority had always been what the royal power had been able to make it: little under weak or indifferent kings, strong under masterful ones. The novelties of the period which is called 'the Reformation' were in reality much slighter than is generally supposed" (ii. 48). With regard to the monasteries, again, he writes, frankly: "Much of the story of the decline and degeneration of the religious houses has been to me a great disillusioning. Face to face with the accumulated evidence

which I have given, one is driven to confess that the suppression of the monasteries was quite inevitable; the wonder is that they lasted as long as they did" (i. 5; cf. 80, 91-100). Finally, he agrees substantially with Professor Savine of Moscow (whose exhaustive study of the Valor Ecclesiasticus we reviewed in the April number of this Journal) in deciding that "the social effects of the dissolution were probably not great" (ii. 210). In the 8th, 9th, and 10th chapters of his earlier book, he goes into the official records of Staffordshire monasteries in the Middle Ages; and his examination contrasts strongly with the dilettante spirit of many similar reviews in the Victoria County Histories. Even so, however, he seems hardly to have realised the significance of the references to apostate monks and nuns in the fourteenth century registers of Bishops Norbury and Stretton; nor has he brought out the evidence as to the luxurious table which was officially organised for the Burton monks as early as 1197-1222. A careful analysis of the documents published in Salt's Staffordshire and in the Burton Chronicle (R.S.) would go far to explain why the orthodox Gower and the vet more orthodox Gascoigne spoke of monastic luxury as a matter of common notoriety.

Mr Hibbert's account of the Dissolution seems to us distinctly weaker. In his later book (which itself is scarcely more than an amplified second edition of the chapters which conclude his first) he spends too much energy in repeating familiar facts and flogging dead horses. He is not fair to Cromwell, whom he again accuses of condemning the monks to a seclusion "not merely intolerable but impossible" (ii. 136); yet in fact this seclusion was an original and most emphatic precept of the Benedictine Rule. Hibbert has earned our gratitude by frankly facing the facts before 1530. If, from that time onward, he had equally boldly faced the real problem that confronted Henry VIII., and tried to explain to us how the monasteries could have been suppressed by strictly legal means, amid a society in which injustice and commercial immorality were ingrained by the habits of centuries, we should have been still more grateful. Modern society is rightly intolerant of any plea for injustice; and we are all heartily ashamed of the frequent crimes which stained the Reformation, as every other revolution in history. Is it not, therefore, the historian's real task, at this point, to distinguish on every count between real injustice and those illegalities which may be not only pardonable, but actually inevitable in a confessedly corrupt society?

G. G. COULTON.

EASTBOURNE.

Life and Habit.—By Samuel Butler.—London: A. C. Fifield, 1910.—Pp. x+310.

This is practically a re-issue of the first and most important of Butler's writings on evolution, with a few small additions in the shape of appendices taken from unpublished MS. Mr Streatfield writes a short preface,

quoting Professor Bateson's remark in *Darwin and Modern Science* (the Darwin Centenary Essays), that Butler was "the most brilliant and by far the most interesting of Darwin's opponents, whose works are at length

emerging from oblivion."

But his controversial part is less interesting than his metaphysics. In Unconscious Memory (reprint reviewed in Hibbert Journal, October 1910) he argues that, as automatic expertness in piano-playing proves previous practice, so also does the immediate expertness in pecking, of a newly-hatched chick, To the question: How can a newly-hatched chick have had any practice in pecking? Butler replies that the essentials of the chick once lived in its parents' bodies, and that it remembers what they did (or what it did in them), and can therefore do it again. This brings up the whole question of personal identity; and Butler deals with it in Life and Habit. We say that an octogenarian is the same "person" as he was when an infant: yet there is no identity of matter. Nor does personality depend upon any consciousness or sense of such personality; it is not likely that the moth remembers having been a caterpillar, any more than we remember having been children of a day old. And if the octogenarian is the infant of eighty years ago, he is also the fœtus of a few months before, and—chasing him still further back—he is identical with his parents. This "involves the probable unity of all animal and vegetable life, as being, in reality, nothing but one single creature, of which the component members are but, as it were, blood corpuscles or individual cells," which would fit in rather well with the similar argumentation of Fechner.

It is characteristic of Butler's whimsical genius that he should confess (p. 306) that he did not at first believe in his own theory! But he was undoubtedly serious enough, later on; and though, after *Erewhon*, the reader is always on the watch for satiric leg-pulling, it will not now be denied that Butler is a real and earnest teacher, suggestive and stimulating even when he is wrong. And his literary style places him among the very best of nineteenth-century prose writers.

J. ARTHUR HILL.

BRADFORD.

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PHILOSOPHY AND RELIGION.

THE LATE LEO TOLSTOY.

Translated by L. AND A. MAUDE.

Amongst the learned who study philosophy one meets some individuals who study it—not, as most of them do, merely professionally—but for the sake of their own souls.

It is difficult for these learned men to free themselves from the scientific superstitions in which they have grown up and matured, and by the service of which conspicuous worldly success is so often obtained. But some of them, possessing live, sincere, and moral natures, unceasingly strive to liberate themselves. Realising in their inner experience all the narrowness—or, to put it plainly, the stupidity—of the materialist view of life, which is incompatible with any moral teaching, they are inevitably drawn to the acknowledgment of a spiritual principle as the basis of everything, and to the question of man's relation to that spiritual principle; that is to say, they are drawn to questions of ethics, to which more and more attention has been paid of late.

What it comes to at bottom is, that by a long and intricate road of scientific philosophy they are brought to the simple position accepted by every Russian peasant—even by those who are illiterate—that one must live for one's soul,

and that, in order so to live, one must know what to do and what not to do for that purpose.

The relation of these learned men to the matter is, I consider, perfectly correct; but unfortunately they for the most part cannot manage to free themselves from the scientific ballast they have assimilated as something necessary and valuable and that has to be utilised, but which really, by obstructing reason, prevents its free play. Sharing with all scientific men the superstition that philosophy is a science which establishes the foundations of all other truths, they, in order to establish these truths, unceasingly construct one theory after another, without ever reaching any definite result. Great erudition and even greater flexibility and ingenuity of mind often encourage them in this; but the chief reason that their labour fails to yield results, is the false (as I hold) conviction accepted among them, that religion is nothing else than faith: faith, in the sense of credulity—the acceptance of statements certain people have made; and that, consequently, faith or religion can have no significance for philosophy; and that philosophy, if not antagonistic to religion, must at least be entirely independent of it. They, with all the scientific philosophers, overlook the fact that religion (faith), besides the meaning now attributed to it—that is to say, besides dogmas and the establishment of blind belief in certain Scriptureshas another meaning. This real meaning is the acknowledgment and clear expression of the indefinable elements (the soul and God) felt by everybody. And so it is that all the questions with which scientific philosophers are so zealously occupied, and to solve which an endless number of mutually contradictory and often stupid theories are constructed, were solved centuries ago by religion, and solved in such a way that there is, and can be, no need and no possibility of re-solving them.

These men, like all their fellow-philosophers, do not perceive that religion—not the perversion to which religion has everywhere been and still is subjected—but religion in the sense of the acknowledgment and expression of indefinable

but ever-realised elements (the soul and God), is the inevitable condition of any reasonable, clear, and fruitful teaching of life—of teaching from which alone firm principles of morality can be deduced—and that therefore religion, in its true sense, cannot be opposed to philosophy; and more than that, that philosophy cannot be a science unless it accepts the data established by religion for its basis.

Strange as it may seem to those who are used to consider religion as something inexact, "unscientific," fantastic, and inconstant, and science as something firm, exact, and incontrovertible—in philosophic matters the very reverse is the case.

The religious conception of life says: "Before all things, and most indubitably, there exists something indefinable, and that is our soul and God." But just because we know this before everything else, and more indubitably than anything else, we can in no way define it; yet we believe it exists, and is the basis of everything, and on that belief we build all our further teaching. From all that is knowable to man, religious perception selects the thing which does not admit of definition, and says of it, "I don't know." And that attitude toward what it is not given to man to know is the first and most essential condition of true knowledge. The teachings of Zoroaster, the Brahmins, Buddha, Lao-Tsze, Confucius, and Christ are of that kind. The philosophic view of life, on the other hand, seeing no difference, or shutting its eves to the difference between knowledge of external phenomena and knowledge of the soul and of God, regards a chemical combination and man's consciousness of his own ego, astronomical observations or calculations and the acknowledgment of the Origin of all life, as alike open to rational and verbal definition: and—confusing the definable and the undefinable, the knowable and the unknowable-unceasingly constructs fantastic and mutually contradictory theories one on the top of another, in attempting to define the undefinable. Such are the teachings of life of the Aristotles, Platos, Leibnitzes, Lockes, Hegels, Spencers, and of many others—their name is legion. In reality,

all these teachings consist: (1) of idle reasonings about what is not subject to reason, reasonings which might be called philosophistics, but not philosophies: the love of philosophising, but not the love of wisdom; and (2) of poor repetitions of what, in relation to this moral law, has been much better expressed in the religious teachings.

Yes, strange as it may seem to those who have never thought about it, the understanding of life of any pagan who in his religion acknowledges an inexplicable origin of all things, personified by him in any kind of idol—unreasonable as his conception of that inexplicable origin may be-has yet an understanding of life incomparably higher than that of a philosopher who does not acknowledge the undefinable basis of all knowledge. The religious pagan acknowledges something undefinable, and believes that it exists and is the origin of all things; and on this undefinable something he builds, well or ill, his understanding of life, and he submits to that undefinable Origin and is guided by it in all his actions; while the philosopher-endeavouring to define that which defines everything else, and can therefore not be defined—has no firm foundation on which to build his conception of life or to use as a guide for his actions.

It could not be otherwise, for all knowledge consists in establishing relations between causes and effects. And the chain of causes is endless, and evidently the study of certain series of causes in that endless chain cannot form the basis of a world-conception.

A few days ago a learned professor explained to me that all the faculties of the soul have now been traced back to mechanical causes; "only consciousness is not yet quite explained," said he with striking naïveté. "We already understand the whole machine, only we don't quite know by what and how it is set in motion." This is amazing! Only consciousness (the "only" is delightful) is not yet explained by a mechanical process! "Not yet explained," but the professor is evidently convinced that any day the news may

arrive that some Professor Schmidt of Berlin, or Oxenberg of Frankfort, has discovered the mechanical cause of consciousness, that is, of God within the soul of man. Is it not plain that an old woman believing in the Kazán Queen of Heaven is not only morally but mentally incomparably superior to that learned professor?

What's to be done? Where are we to get the foundation of our world-conception, since reasoning—the activity of the mind—supplies no such foundation? Has man, then, no other knowledge than that obtained by reasoning? The reply is obvious: each man within himself is conscious of a knowledge quite distinct from reasoned knowledge, and independent of the endless chain of cause and effect. This knowledge is his consciousness of his spiritual ego.

When man discovers this consciousness directly for himself, he calls it "consciousness"; but when he finds this consciousness, which is common to all mankind, in religious teachings, in distinction from reasoned knowledge, he calls it "faith." Such were all the faiths, from the most ancient to the newest. The essence of them all lies in the fact that, despite the often absurd forms they have taken in their perversions, they yet give to him who accepts them, such bases of knowledge, independent of the chain of cause and effect, as alone render a reasonable conception of life possible.

So that the learned philosopher confined within the endless chain of cause and effect, who does not acknowledge a religious basis, is inevitably forced to seek for an imaginary and impossible cause of all causes; while the religious man recognises this cause of all causes, and has *faith* in it; and consequently, in contrast to the scientific philosopher, possesses a firm understanding of life and a sound guidance for his actions.

¹ A celebrated wonder-working icon.

CAN THEOLOGY BECOME SCIENTIFIC?

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In his article in The Hibbert Journal Supplement for 1909, Canon Scott Holland said of the Docetæ: "They approached Him from the side of speculative reason, looking for primal ideas and first principles. Now, from the side of reason, facts are but the symbols of ideas—the phenomenal and temporary illustration of principles. Reason pushes them aside, in order to pass through to the intellectual reality which they suggest and veil and disguise. Facts drop off, as the husks. They belong to the external, material presentation, which is but an unreal appearance." To this method of inquiry the writer of the article opposes the method which he says was used by the early Church. "They approached God from the point of view of the will, not of the reason. . . . God was revealed by what He did, . . . And, if so, then facts are everything. They are not the symbol of an idea, which can be dropped when once the idea is apprehended. They are the real material in which the thing was done." According to Canon Scott Holland, the Church conquered because it insisted that the doctrine led directly to the facts, because it held to the facts as the primal realities, and used theories as instruments for co-ordinating the facts.

Unproductive intellectualism was the temptation which the early Church resisted successfully; the temptation to regard facts as materials for the manufacture of definitions, to treat objective experiences as unreal appearances, and logical definitions as valuable realities. The Church escaped by using the pragmatic method of seeking truth, by adopting "the attitude of looking away from first things, principles, 'categories,' supposed necessities; and of looking towards last things, fruits, consequences, facts." 1

The object of this article is to put a question to theologians. Are they willing to consider the advisability of returning to the method which one of themselves assures us was used by the early Church in its pursuit of truth? Are they willing to regard religious facts as the primal realities wherewith they are concerned, and theological theories as instruments for acquiring rationalised knowledge of these facts, not as "answers to enigmas, in which we can rest"? Are they willing to measure the truthfulness of theological ideas by their values as aids to religious life, and by their relations to other truths which also must be preserved by men? Theologians speak of theology as a science; are they willing to advance their science by using the scientific method?

What is the scientific method, and what would be some of the results of using it in theology?

In his sermon to members of the British Association at Sheffield, in September last, the Archbishop of York used these words: "You cannot understand what something is except by seeing what it comes to be." To be always inquiring what things are coming to be is the habit of the natural sciences. To help investigators to see what things are coming to be, scientific method uses hypotheses and theories; it uses these as means for bringing intellectual order into certain facts selected from the vast heap of experiences which nature pours out before the observer. Scientific hypotheses and theories are thought-paths which enable investigators to get about among facts easily and expeditiously, lead directly and quickly into unexplored regions of sensible realities, and, by helping to make clear the relations of the new facts to

¹ William James, Pragmatism, pp. 54, 55.

those which were known before, are of immense service in the building up of a body of objective truths. The ideas, principles, theories of a natural science are conceptual instruments for searching into perceptual realities. Like the sensible realities with which they deal, they lie wholly inside human In every branch of natural science there is a constant, animated intercourse between conceptual and perceptual experiences. Without the facts, theories have not even a shred of reality. Without the order-bringing theory, the facts lie "confusedly insubordinate." The theory helps the investigator to make selections from the heap of facts; it helps him to spot the likely facts, and to test their usefulness for his purpose, which is to find intellectual orderliness in the multifarious data of sensible experience. In their turn the facts become touchstones of the truth of the theory. Sometimes a well-established theory will dominate certain fractious facts and quell their complainings by assuring them that they have not quite made good their claim to be preserved as undoubted realities. Sometimes a single indomitable fact suffices to dethrone a theory and to nominate a more worthy successor. The truth of a scientific theory is a certain relatedness between the theory and the facts which it is said to explain. A true theory brings the investigator into close, warm contact with sensible realities; arranges these in orderly sequences; suggests which sequences are the more important, that is, quickly lead to a reconciling acquaintance with facts that for a time seemed to be inconsistent with those already known; opens new lines of inquiry; brings satisfaction to the intellectual passion for mobile orderliness; and supplies occasions for the exercise of disciplined imagination.

A true theory allows itself to be modified, on definite lines, by contact with fresh experiences; but a loose, flabby theory is of little use, and is therefore not very true in science. To say of a scientific theory that it is absolutely true is to talk nonsense. You do not know what a scientific theory is except

by seeing what it comes to be. It never completely is; there is always an element of becoming.

Inasmuch as scientific theories are constantly being widened or narrowed, strengthened or weakened, made more true or less true, as investigation of sensible experiences proceeds, it cannot be said that they have the same kind of reality as belongs to their perceptual equivalents, which are objective facts. Scientific reason never "pushes aside facts . . . in order to pass through to the intellectual reality." And yet, for scientific reason, facts are not everything.

Take a special scientific theory, the molecular and atomic theory of the structure of matter. I have found it asserted by absolutist philosophers that atoms and molecules are as real to the physicist as the substances which he handles in the laboratory; that he discovers these, his ultimate realities, to be self-contradictory; and that then he is driven to the Absolute. When the chemist or the physicist is in his workshop, the things that are vitally real to him are the sense-impressions made on him by his experiments. Afterwards, in his study, he substitutes a scheme of intellectual concepts for the sequences of objective facts which he has realised, and inquires whether the intellectual scheme preserves and finds places for the newly discovered facts, and in what directions the concepts which are guiding him indicate that experiments should be made.

I suppose that almost all workers in chemical physics at the present time think habitually in atoms and molecules, and some of them, sometimes, in electrons. But it is only as the translation of their thought into sensible experiences proceeds that the meaning of the thought clarifies. While they are using the theory, it is vividly realised; realised, not in the same way as the objective facts are handled and measured in the laboratory, but as an instrument for arranging these facts in orderly sequences. When the theory leads to inferences which emphatically contradict thoroughly established sensible realities, or to inferences the sensible equivalents of which

refuse to appear, it is the theory which is either mended or ended; the objective facts remain, and take part in moulding a new theory or a new version of the old theory.

The wonder of wonders is that it is possible to substitute so crude and simple a mechanical device as the atom and the molecule, even when it is helped by the elusive electron, for the inexpressible fineness and complicatedness of physical and chemical occurrences—and the physical and chemical parts of any natural occurrence are only a portion of the whole event,—and by this substitution to make it easy to move about in the delicate network of phenomena, to feel at home among them, to construct a cosmos from the chaos which nature puts before the observer. The fact that this substitution works extraordinarily well is probably enough to lead careless reasoners to give to the mechanical device the same kind of objective reality as they and others assign to the sensible experiences which that device helps to arrange in interrelated sequences.

The thoroughly well-established facts of the natural sciences remain unchanged. The instruments, called hypotheses, by the use of which these facts are fitted into suitable places in intellectual schemes, are constantly being polished, altered, made more suited to their work. The intellectual schemes, called theories, are never quite complete; they are always becoming. Hence, it is a grievous error to assign, at any time, the same kind and degree of reality to the theories, as belong to the facts of a science.

To judge from popular writings on science, and from the arguments which some philosophers base on what they allege to be the procedure of the sciences, there must be many who regard a scientific theory as a collection of intellectualistic definitions, each of which negates all that is not included in it. The coldness and barrenness, the detachment of such definitions are not unlike the coldness and rigidity of detached facts before they are warmed and made mobile by seminal ideas. It is not to be wondered at that those who love definitions should assign to them the same kind and degree of objective

reality as they give to single facts, should speak of them as ultimate realities. The intellectualistic philosopher makes for himself rigid definitions, and substitutes these for the lifebringing theories of the sciences. He easily shows that the definitions lead to contradictions. Then he asserts that the definitions he is arguing about are the ultimate realities of science. At this point two courses are open to him. Sometimes he pours contempt on science, and finds repose in the Absolute. Sometimes he asserts that (what he calls) the ultimate realities of science are as self-contradictory, as unthinkable by logical minds, as any philosophical abstractions, as any theological dogmas; and that, because we are obligedhe says-to accept the definitions of science as ultimate realities, we are, therefore, compelled by the rules of scientific procedure not to refuse assent to philosophical doctrines and theological dogmas, on the ground that they appear to be selfcontradictory. The answer to all this is to show the fundamental untruthfulness of the description of scientific method which is given by the intellectualistic philosopher.

I have tried to exhibit what I take to be the main features of the scientific method of seeking truths.

Let us suppose, for a moment, that theology were to adopt and use this method. Theology would then be a systematic attempt to co-ordinate the facts of man's religious life; to express the points of agreement between groups of these facts by means of general formulas, in other words, to find the laws of religious experiences; to try the hypotheses which have been made for the purpose of bringing order into sections of religious facts, by inquiring how these hypotheses have worked; to test the truth of the theories which have claimed, and of those which now claim, to explain the facts of religious experience, by inquiring into their fruitfulness, their vivifying influence, their power of bringing the realities with which they are concerned into reconciling contact with other truths of which human intelligence demands the preservation.

If theology were to use the scientific method, theologians

would be primarily investigators. Theology would constantly be trying to adjust its hypotheses and theories to religious facts; it would get into a habit of judging the truth of its doctrines by their helpfulness in systematising and explaining religious experiences; it would cease to regard doctrines as ultimate realities, and to determine the reality of religious facts by their adaptability to doctrines. The Archbishop of York said, at Sheffield, that "theology is religion thought out." When theology has become a science it will have given up the attempt to treat religion as theology thought into human experience. If theological theories were treated as the theories of a science, they would be recognised as intellectual instruments for getting about among religious realities, conceptual short-cuts, leading to and among the realities of religious life. The intellectual instruments of theological science would require, and receive, expansion, contraction, re-shaping from time to time. The power of remodelling its conceptual apparatus is a vital mark of every branch of science.

If theology were to become a science, it would no longer be necessary to explain away theological doctrines; for the doctrines of the science would fall into their proper place as instruments of research into the facts of religious experience; they would cease to be intellectualistically constructed definitions, regarded by some as absolutely true, by others as effete and valueless. The intellects of theologians would no longer be vexed by the pursuit of Absolute Truth. It would even become possible to say what is meant by theological truth. Like all kinds of truth, theological truth would be inside human experience; like all scientific truth, it would be tested primarily by looking to the workings of it in that sphere of human experience whereto it is directly applicable. Theological truth would be a convenient name for the general body of theological truths.

Would not these changes be gains to theology, if theology is indeed a science?

THE SUB-CONSCIOUS AND THE SUPER-CONSCIOUS.

PROFESSOR PERCY GARDNER.

The views which Dr Sanday has set forth in his recent Christologies Ancient and Modern in regard to the unconscious element in the nature of Christ have naturally produced a keen discussion. They are controverted by the Bishop of Ossory in the last issue of this Journal. I am not sure that some kind of reconciliation between the views of these two excellent authorities may not be possible. That, however, is not the primary purpose of the present paper. The point on which I wish to lay stress is that any Christological theory of the unconscious must be a corollary of the views which we hold as to the true nature of the unconscious, and especially its relation to conduct. I think that we must make a distinction between the sub-conscious and the super-conscious.

I.

A great discovery which has changed our way of regarding our own nature and powers is the recognition of the importance of the unconscious in man. This path of knowledge was opened wider by the discoveries of Mesmer, who was the first to set forth in a striking and effective way the direct power of a mind and will over the mind and will of others. To whatever unworthy purposes mesmerism has been turned, however it has been mingled with imposture and the love of money, it was yet based on actual facts of human nature.

Almost every great scientific invention appears first as a toy, before its serious use is discovered. It was by a kind of instinct that the ruling schools of medicine, in their hidebound materialism, for a long while refused to allow that there was in mesmerism, or the hypnotism which has taken its place, anything save fancy and imposture. That phase of opposition has, however, passed away; no one capable of understanding the nature of evidence could now deny that hypnotism has brought to light unsuspected powers of the human spirit, and has proved how large a part of our life and personality never comes to the surface or into the field of ordinary observation. And investigations such as those of the Society for Psychical Research have carried the evidence further and brought into the light a mass of phenomena which are not necessarily connected with hypnotism, yet which belong to the unconscious side of our lives—dreams, motor automatisms, trances, eestasy, and the like,—which must be taken into account by anyone who hereafter may write on psychology.

The subject, though an interesting, is scarcely an alluring one. At present the true and the false, the healthy and the morbid, the moral and the immoral, are mingled almost inextricably in the writings which deal with the more obscure psychical phenomena. One feels in reading them that one is in a land where barbarous survivals are mixed up with lofty aspirations, where witchcraft is scarcely distinguished from religion, and the morbid visions of the hysteric are put on the same level as the sacred inspirations of the prophet. The science of the unconscious is yet in its infancy, and has not learned to know its right hand from its left, to distinguish between good and evil, to discern between fact and fancy. And yet one sees that many of the most sacred experiences of mankind are of the same class as the more repulsive phenomena of hypnotism. They resemble them as good wine resembles vinegar, or a sweet fruit a poisonous berry. Those who would learn anatomy are obliged to make very unpleasant dissections of dead bodies. And those who would

really understand the facts of the higher religions cannot afford to throw aside phenomena of which the early Christian Fathers would doubtless have said that they were produced by demons working in imitation of the angels of light.

There can be no question but that by the various means at the disposal of spiritualists it is possible to reach knowledge which exists beneath the level of consciousness in the mind of the medium. It is also apparently possible to reach through the medium some parts at least of the knowledge in the minds of those present at the séance. It seems certain that the medium can gain knowledge by other means than those of sense of things happening in distant places. Whether the medium has the power in rare cases of forecasting with some degree of success what will take place in future is a far more thorny question, as to which I cannot give an opinion.

Taking only facts which would be readily conceded by those who approach psychical phenomena with an open and unbiassed mind, we may readily see that those facts are of great importance as regards the psychology of religion.

(1) It appears that in each of us there lie strata of being below the level of consciousness, but stored with remarkable possibilities. Here are laid up records of every thought, experience, and feeling of our past lives, including many of which at the time of their occurrence we scarcely took note. Every deed we have done, every word we have spoken or heard, has made an indelible impression on something within us. And all these records, though in our ordinary life hidden far beneath the surface of consciousness, can be on occasion brought to the light. Theologians have talked of recording angels who went with us and entered in their books all deeds and words of our lives, to be set forth against us in a great day of judgment. But now we see that angelic agency is not necessary; that we are our own recorders, and bear within us an ineffaceable record of the past. Nay, more, we seem to see, from the way in which events of the past are by sensitives drawn from an unknown source, that even the death of the

body may not obscure or efface these records, which remain accessible, if not to men in their ordinary moods, yet to intelligence working in obscure ways.

(2) It appears that there are ways of communication between mind and mind other than the ways of sense. It has been shown hundreds of times that telepathy and telesthesia, however we may explain or account for them, are actual processes. The medium is in communication not only with the minds of those present at the sitting, but of those who are physically distant. Space is seen to be a condition only of sensation, and to belong only to the world of sense, while thought and spirit can act almost in independence of it. Just as Marconi has shown that wires are not necessary for the transmission of messages by electricity, so we find now that spirits when connected with bodies can yet under certain conditions communicate one with the other, apart from the connecting links of nerve and sense.

If psychical investigation had taught us only these two things it would have been of untold value. For it would have proved the existence of a great realm of spirit interpenetrating the world of matter, but yet in a measure independent of it, of which realm every individual soul is a member, with separate life, and yet with closest relations to all other souls. It has made it quite conceivable to us that the death of the body should be only a crisis in the life of the soul, changing its conditions but not its nature, and that each soul should embark on the new life, bearing with it an indelible and infallible record of its good and evil deeds done in the flesh.

Far more than this may some day be proved by the study of the unconscious; but it is doubtful whether as yet more has been proved, and in so saying I do not overlook the more recent developments of spiritism. I am aware that so highly trained and scientific a judge as Sir Oliver Lodge thinks that the recently shown phenomena of cross-correspond-

¹ The Survival of Man, 1909.

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ence in particular are sufficient to prove the personal survival of death, and the fact of communication with the departed. But I cannot agree with this view, which, of course, it is not possible here to consider in detail. What concerns us more in this connection is the ethical aspect of spiritism. If spiritism were an embodiment of noble ideas as to God and man, and set us in the way of a life directed to worthy ends, men would not haggle over flaws in its evidence. In fact, most religions are based on far less of ascertainable fact. But does spiritism meet this test? I think not.

We shall in vain search the spiritualist literature of our time for the great ethical ideas which have in the past history of religion made up, and do to-day still make up, its life-blood. It does not tell us of sin and of forgiveness; it does not represent the path to heaven as a steep and difficult one. It does not dwell on the nobleness of self-sacrifice, of the daily and hourly need of divine grace, without which man is but a poor phantom. It reflects nothing but a vague religiosity, and represents all men as alike in the way of salvation. It is but too true a reflection of what is weak and fanciful in the religion of the age. As in the stern days of the Reformation all the phenomena of sorcery and witchcraft took a lurid hue from the fierce religious feeling of the time, Satan and his spirits and the fate of the doomed showing large in the foreground, so the necromancy of to-day depicts a future state of being as colourless and meaningless as are the lives of many comfortable Christians, without spiritual passion or ambition. Mr Myers makes it a great merit of modern spiritualism that according to it "of evil spirits other than human there is no news whatever"; to which we may add that even human spirits seem in the spiritualist revelations to be often tricky and mendacious, constantly foolish and trifling, but seldom seriously wicked. But does a spiritual world of milk-and-water mediocrity bear any relation to our existing human world, full of cruelty and crime, as of noble self-sacrifice? The future world

As to this see Mr Gerald Balfour's paper in this Journal, 1910, p. 543.

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revealed by spiritualists is a fair reflection of their own belief, but no great revelation to man.

If on the whole the best, the only really safe, test of a creed be the character of those who hold it, this test is one which spiritism cannot pass. In a recent book ¹ Mr Raupert has put together some very important testimony, which goes far to show that spiritism not only does not raise the moral standard of those who profess it, but actually debases it.

There are reasons, obvious enough though not always recognised, why an abdication of the conscious in favour of the unconscious elements in man or woman should have a bad ethical effect. The will is enfeebled, and in place of the brain the subsidiary centres of nerve force are encouraged to act independently. But it is obvious that the result of this will be to loose from control the two primal instincts which lie at the roots of human life, the selfish instinct and that of sex. And to unchain the sexual passion, in particular, is to open the door to every kind of irregularity in the relations of men and women. History here confirms observation, since it shows that there is no more constant accompaniment of spiritism in the past than great laxity in sexual morality.

I am, of course, aware that at the beginnings of most great religious movements there is a general unsettlement which results in strange moral aberrations. This was the case in the early Church, and at the time of the Reformation in particular. But in those examples the aberrations were exceptional, and were discountenanced by the great leaders and the rising societies. In the case of spiritualism the case is otherwise.

Anyone who has studied the facts of witchcraft as they appeared in the trials of the seventeenth century will observe how closely they resemble the phenomena of spiritism. All the great religions of the world have had to combat witchcraft in some form or other; and they have made no terms with it. "Thou shalt not suffer a witch to live" is their usual way of procedure.

¹ Raupert, Modern Spiritism.

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Two reasons for this keen hostility between religion and magic may be suggested; and if neither of them is quite satisfactory, there may be in both something of truth. The first reason is that the fiercest enmity arises, by a law of human nature, between tendencies superficially alike but contrasted in principle. Religion and magic appeal to the same side of mankind, but in very different ways; and thus religion looks on magic as a debased imitation of itself. And certainly, as a matter of history, magic is more often a survival of a lower religion than an aberrant phase of a higher. The second reason which may be suggested is but a guess, but one full of suggestion. The present mental powers of man have been developed in him through endless ages by the working of an inner power. In the course of that development, the spirit of man must often have made choice between various possibilities, have determined to trust to one faculty rather than another, have relinquished certain possibilities of thought and of perception, in view of the general good of the race. If so, the abnormal powers of perception and thought which come out among the phenomena of spiritism, may be rudimentary survivals of powers which man might have developed, but from which he turned in the interests of humanity, as on the whole leading to a lower range of being. If this be supposed to be the case, it is easy to understand how bitterly hostile the higher consciousness of the race would be to the revival of these ways which it had deliberately rejected.

Nevertheless, in some ways psychical investigation has been valuable. It has set aside, it may be hoped for ever, those merely mechanical notions of inspiration and infallibility which satisfied many Christians of past generations. It has shown us how all inspiration, even that which is most divine, must work from within outwards, and must suffer in its passage through human faculties from the limitations and weaknesses of those faculties. And it has shown how the powers and the persons of men are rooted in a vast store of

spiritual force, ever flowing out upon the world, but ever confined and limited by the weakness, the folly, and the wickedness of man.

II.

When we come to the consideration of the relations between the conscious and unconscious phases of man's life, we cannot do better than accept Mr Myers' comparison of the conscious part of man's intelligence to a solar spectrum as it appears to the human eye. "The limits of our spectrum do not inhere in the sun that shines, but in the eye that marks his shining. Beyond each end of that prismatic ribbon are ether-waves of which our retina takes no cognisance. Beyond the red end come waves whose potency we still recognise, but as heat and not as light. Beyond the violet end are waves still more mysterious, whose very existence man for ages never suspected, and whose intimate potencies are still but obscurely known. Even thus, I venture to affirm, beyond each end of our conscious spectrum extends a range of faculty and perception, exceeding the known range, but as yet indistinctly guessed. The artifices of the modern physicist have extended far in each direction the visible spectrum known to Newton. It is for the modern psychologist to discover artifices which may extend in each direction the conscious spectrum as known to Plato or to Kant." "The range of our subliminal mentation is more extended than the range of our supraliminal. At one end of the scale we find dreams, a normal subliminal product, but of less practical value than any form of sane supraliminal thought. At the other end of the scale we find that the rarest, most precious knowledge comes to us from outside the ordinary field, through eminently subliminal processes."2 I cannot but think that if Mr Myers had grasped this clue with more resolution, and followed it up with greater tenacity, his work would have been more valuable than it is, though, of

¹ Human Personality, i. p. 17.

² Ibid., i. p. 72.

course, it is unjust to judge severely the work of the first explorer who "bursts into a silent sea." Other writers on psychical phenomena have sometimes not even seen the need of a scale involving higher and lower. This distinction is in fact essential. Our lower nervous centres have a life of their own, by which the necessary functions of the body are carried on, without any knowledge on our part. And through our lives, as we form habits, and learn to do unconsciously what we at first did by conscious effort, we are, so to speak, organising the unconscious, handing over to it more and more of our ordinary working day activities. But for what we give up in this way we may or ought to make compensation by the opposite process: by bringing into consciousness more and more of that which is above us.

The conscious personality of man is a thing which has gradually, through an unmeasured series of ages, been brought about by a slow organisation of the unconscious to serve the ethical needs of the race. As we look down the biological scale we see a dawning consciousness, the nature of which we cannot fully realise, in the animal world. Among all human beings found in travel or read of in history it is fully formed; so that its growth can be but a matter of conjecture and inference. Perhaps some of the most interesting studies in regard to it may be made in the case of such creatures as the ant and the bee, which have developed intelligence and purpose, by means of their peculiar social organisations, to an extent far beyond what might seem to belong to their size and structure. But man himself, when in an unconscious or semiconscious condition, or in a state of infancy, can give us much information as to the rise and the nature of consciousness.

Unless we grasp and hold fast the notion that there is a higher and a lower in the unconscious life, that it has a scale which is at bottom ethical, psychical phenomena will remain for us a confused tangle, or may be the means of leading us to moral ruin. The great defect and danger of spiritism is its want of an ethical standard, its way of confusing the higher and the lower in its revelation of the unconscious. I am convinced that as a rule the higher and more worthy of the inspirations which pass into the world pass not through the gate of the human faculties which have become unconscious as man has become more civilised, but at the other end of the scale, through the gate of human character and personality which is in touch with something not lower but higher than itself. It is not that which civilised man has in common with the savage that can serve as a connecting link between man and God, but rather the highest parts of human nature.

Even writers like Mr Myers, and (in a less degree) Professor William James, seem to me not sufficiently to distinguish between what is sub-conscious and what is super-conscious in men. It is true that from the merely psychological side it is not easy to distinguish these. But they can be distinguished by other tests, notably that of fruits. And they must be kept apart. It is not easy to distinguish logically between a good picture and a bad, but the difference is really enormous. It is not easy to make distinction between the love between men and women which is merely instinctive and that which is the basis of all the higher manliness and womanliness; but the distance between them is like the distance between heaven and hell.

By far the greater part of the phenomena on which the spiritualists pride themselves is in relation to that which is not above but below the level of conscious life. Some of the lower forms of animal life, insects especially, have powers which seem to us mysterious; their senses are open to impressions which we cannot discern. The way, for example, in which the male and female of rare butterflies contrive to find one another out over great distances shows a power, possibly of scent, of which we can scarcely form a notion. The senses on which wild animals depend for their living are sharpened to an almost supernatural acuteness. The savage will find his way through a forest by minute indications which he can scarcely explain to a civilised man. And the sensitively organised

among savages, who become magicians or medicine-men, do not merely live upon the ignorance and credulity of the tribe, but appear to possess second sight and other means of information besides those of ordinary sense. Among ourselves second sight and magic still linger in the more backward parts of the country. The possession of these faculties belongs not to the best and most ethical of the race, but to the most primitive elements among the people.

It is doubtless out of more vague and general faculties that the senses of the civilised man have been gradually formed in the long course of ages by the stress of a life becoming ever more conscious and personal. Man has given up some of the possibilities which once lay before him, in order to reach a higher level upon the whole. The præter-usual faculties of the sensitives are in fact a survival from a past level of being, or a reversion to it. In America they are probably one of nature's reactions from a too ordinary and prosaic level of life, a life without the passion, the poetry, the imagination, which are refined and spiritualised forms of the abnormal faculties of the savage.

Thus I certainly cannot agree with Mr Myers when he speaks of trance and ecstasy as the highest form of communion between man and the unconscious. While we must allow that occasionally spiritual truth and lofty impulse have come to man by way of trance, yet ecstasy is a phenomenon infinitely more familiar to the medicine man of the savage, and to the ministers of the lower religions, than to man in his higher forms. It is a rank shoot, such as are the suckers which spring from the roots of rose trees when the vitality of the tree does not flow properly into its branches. Such shoots need cutting and grafting before they can produce fair flowers. So races of men when oppressed by a too materialist and humdrum civilisation have a tendency to hark back to the ways of more keenly alive, though less cultivated, ancestors.

It is no doubt true that some of the highest teaching and of the noblest deeds of the past have been the outcome of trance and ecstasy. St Paul was caught up into the third heaven, and heard words unspeakable. Socrates would stand rooted to the ground, and insensible to all that was going on about him, and the divine voice by which he guided his conduct would at such times be heard by him. Joan of Arc implicitly followed the guidance of voices which she heard in her trances. So the saints of the earlier, and the religious leaders of the later, Church have frequently been in the habit of falling into states of trance, and have in those states received great messages for mankind.

But these divine communications have been few in comparison. And they have constantly become rarer as man has grown more rational and more fully conscious. The progress of civilisation may have deprived us of some things we are unwilling to lose, as it has given us much for which we may be thankful. In our day it is quite certain that no man of sound judgment would value a statement uttered by a sensitive in a state of trance more than the well-weighed words of a wise and good man.

In his treatment of the exceptional phenomenon which we call genius, Mr Myers does not take the best line. He speaks of it as a sudden uprush of the sub-conscious in a man. This is a better view than that of writers like Lombroso, who classify together genius and madness. Yet it is defective. An uprush of the sub-conscious in a man might be an intensification in him of what is most like the animals, and might drag him to a far lower level than that of the conscious self. But often in the flashes of genius it is not the sub-conscious which prevails, but the super-conscious. Something of heaven is drawn down to earth. The man of genius is the man who sees farther than others into the nature and causes of things; but he does so usually not by a sudden vision, but by long pondering. A better view of genius, as indeed Mr Myers allows in another place,1 is that it is an intensifying, by an accession of spiritual force, of the highest powers of a man

¹ Human Personality, i. 78.

the most clearly marked points of his personality. We must recognise the fact that in almost all inspiration there is a joint-working of man and not-man; that a man can in a measure prepare himself for inspiration, as an iron rod can be arranged to attract the lightning. Every good gift and every perfect gift is from above, and the gifts are not usually bestowed apart from the receptivity of those to whom they are given. There is an unexplained element. Sometimes God chooses the weak things of the world to confound things that are strong, and makes foolishness triumphant over wisdom. We may recognise here the working of a deeper law; but we must not commit the fatal mistake of supposing that God rules not by law but by caprice.

The highest thing we find in the world is a noble human personality. And it is one of the great practical paradoxes of life that the human personality which is most constantly in quiet and patient communion with the divine does not thereby become poor and colourless, does not sink into a mere vehicle of an external power, but develops more remarkably on its own lines, gradually growing nearer to the height of that side of divine power and wisdom with which it has affinity. In the mesmeric or spiritualist trance, on the other hand, the sensitive loses the conscious life to become the medium by which certain unexplained intelligences operate. And the more often this takes place the more completely does the sensitive lose in power of will and character, becoming possessed, the prey of other forces.

The contrast is like that between the Buddhist nirvana and the Christian heaven. If conscious human life be intrinsically bad, then the gradual restriction and destruction of it is a gain: it is good to check all personal desire, to merge in calm every wave of the soul. But this is no Christian or European teaching. The line "Our wills are ours, to make them Thine" expresses the higher doctrine admirably. Our wills are ours, and they must remain ours; but for all that they may be made consonant with the will of

God, turning towards it as the sunflower turns to the sun, without thereby ceasing to be a flower of earth.

III.

It is with a feeling of relief that I turn from the phenomena of spiritism to those of will and personality, from the sub-conscious faculties of man to those which are conscious, from the passivity of the medium to the activities of human character.

It may fairly be said that the essentially active nature of man, the place of will in the constitution of the world, is a truth which has gradually been growing upon humanity during all the ages of its thought. Little was made of the will in the philosophy of Greece, though it was better appreciated by Aristotle than by Plato, and better by the Stoics and the neo-Platonists than by Aristotle. Modern philosophy has made far more of the will than ancient; and in modern philosophy we may see a gradual appreciation of its primacy growing from Locke to Kant, from Kant to Schopenhauer, from Schopenhauer to William James.

The greatest of the discoveries which have resulted in modern days from the better application of method in psychological study is the recognition of the primacy in man of will, as compared with the powers of perceiving and judging. We recognise in man, in the first place, a force working from within outwards. It is of his very essence to strive, to try to impose his own forms upon the outer world. He is not a passive but an active being; and thought, in all its elaboration, must be regarded as a product, and not the primary product, of living.

And when we consider this active centre of force, we shall find it no mere mechanism for the weaving of sensations into experience, and for arranging facts in logical order, but a living creature whose origin goes back to the very beginnings of humanity, and whose evolution is the history of the race. It is the crown of creation, the leaven which the

Maker of the world added to the scheme of things visible, in order that by degrees it should leaven the whole, and transform it into a temple of the Divine Spirit.

We have long passed the time when it could be supposed that belief was a matter only of reasoning and consistency. Belief is the expression of a spirit, conditioned indeed by the data of experience and the laws of the human mind; but yet a thing fashioned from within, and not imported from without. What a man really believes, that he is; and by that he regulates his conduct, throwing all his experience into the mould of an inner life, and arranging it on the lines of character.

I do not mean that all belief is a merely individual matter, or that every man has to form it from the elements for himself. Every man is more than a mere individual; he is one of a family, a nation, a church. But we touch ground, so to speak, when we realise that in the last result the forces of which the human universe is made up are the wills of human beings and the Divine Will which stands over against them and yet works within them. And of any universe which is not human we can in the present state of our faculties know nothing. We only know nature as mirrored in the human consciousness; we only know the will of God as our wills find it out.

If this be the tendency and the result of modern psychology, of man's study of himself, it will at once appear how much the course of thought has done to bring us nearer to the point of view which was taken up by the Founder of Christianity. When He spoke the world of philosophy was filled with the notion that the intellectual faculties of man were sufficient not only to enable him to discern what was right but to induce him to do it. To follow reason was regarded as the sum of virtue, and man's passions and emotions were considered to be mere sources of delusion and error. Intellect was treated as the Godlike element in human nature; emotion and volition were placed at a lower level. His teaching that goodness lay in conformity with the will of God, that

even for the knowledge of spiritual things obedience was a surer guide than reasoning, that the test of doctrine lay in the fruit which it brought forth in the life, that man must be cleansed from the heart outwards rather than from the intelligence inwards—all this teaching was quite contrary to the doctrine of the Platonic schools, and might well appear to the Greeks as mere foolishness. And so deeply rooted was the opposite view of life that very soon the intellectual teachings of Platonism became grafted upon the root of Christianity. Even the author of the Fourth Gospel, one of the greatest of theologians of all time, imported into Christianity the Greek doctrine of the Logos, though he was in spirit too near to his Master to adopt a really Greek view.

Man must learn by degrees, and the race only reaches the truth after following misleading paths until it reaches a blind wall. It was impossible for the educated world of Hellenism to change in a moment its point of view. But we may fairly say that the teaching of Christ has been by degrees taking a stronger and stronger hold of thought. And we may fairly say that not until the newer psychology made its way, and the primacy of the active over the reasoning faculties of man was established, could the Christian view appear as really the most philosophic, as most in accord with the facts of human nature and the ways of God as revealed in the working of the world.

Not until the relativity of all knowledge had been clearly established could it be seen how right was the teaching of the Founder as to the priority of man over the visible world of sense. And not until the will of man had been shown to be the centre and pivot of human life could the teaching of Jesus as to the Divine Will be thoroughly appreciated, since the human will is the main channel by which the Divine Will can be approached.

IV.

It is necessary, however difficult it may be, seriously to attempt this distinction of higher and lower, to regard religion

as an evolution from the lower to the higher, to consider the will of God as a gradual revelation to the world. Of this revelation there are three kinds: (1) that in which religion is mainly concerned with the sub-conscious; (2) that in which religion is fully conscious; (3) that in which religion is directed towards the super-conscious. In all historic religions these three elements are blended, mixed in various proportions. It is the proportion in which they are mixed which fixes their place in the hierarchy.

(1) The Pagan religions of the ancient world, and the modern religions which are on a level with them, seem to live with faces turned backward, towards the origin of man. In them there survive many of the instincts which lie at the roots of our animal life. When they emphasise the relation of man to the deities, they think of these deities as representing the great facts and processes of nature, in close connection with which man has grown up—the sun as the source of light and heat, the rain which is the cause of fertility to the soil, the rising of the sap in the trees, and the influences of the seasons of the year and the successions of the moons on the instinct of self-propagation. The religions of Babylon and of Egypt, the lower strata of the religions of Greece, were of this character. Man realised that he shared the overflowing life of nature, and wanted to recognise in joy and in gratitude his kinship with things around him. It is evident that when men are at this stage, such conditions as those of dreaming, trance, and ecstasy are religious, since they give predominance to the sub-conscious faculties, to the life which carries on the necessary natural functions of man, as apart from the life of the intelligence. And we may readily hence understand that an intensification of the sub-conscious life would commonly be accompanied, especially among the abnormally sensitive in nerve, by a non-moral exaltation, often leading to gross debauch and sensual excesses of an extravagant kind. Indeed, such aberrations from the standard of the ethical life have marked most popular revivals of religion, from the days when

the Roman Senate put down with a stern hand the inroads of Oriental mysticism in southern Italy, to our own times, when some of the new religious societies of America have flung aside the precepts of the Decalogue.

Naturalist religion tends inevitably to decay as man becomes civilised. In the ancient world it survived longest in out-of-the-way places, among the hills of Phrygia or in the recesses of Syria. Thought and human intercourse weaken But it leaves behind it a progeny who carry on its ideas at a somewhat different level; it is continued in the lower mysticism and in poetry. The profound tendencies. rooted in the heart by unnumbered ages of feeling, cannot easily be extinguished. Nor is it desirable that they should. Happiness and enthusiasm, which in man depend in so great a degree on the instinctive feelings, must find an adequate expression; and without some such expression the life grows sad and stagnant. In actual living the sub-conscious faculties of man find their chief employment. In a more articulate way they find a vent and an expression in art, which is nearly always at bottom the ghost of dead religion, or at all events the outgrowth of suppressed religion. And not only art properly so called—painting, music, and poetry,—but also such mixed customs as dancing and personal adornment go back to a religious origin, and preserve for us some fragments of the enthusiasm of the sub-conscious.

(2) Of the religions which belong almost wholly to the conscious nature perhaps the best examples are the monotheism of some of the later philosophical schools of Greece, especially the Stoics, and the Confucianism of China and Japan. Here we have systems of belief and of conduct based upon reason, belonging primarily to the brain, and thence influencing the life. These religions find form in ethical maxims rather than in doctrine; they do not give birth to any elaborate ritual; they are even hostile to art. They seem to those who look on them dry and cold, wanting in adaptation to human nature, and cut off from all the springs of enthusiasm. Yet it would be a

mistake to suppose that they are without force in the world. They belong, it is true, to the intellectual, to the few rather than to the many. But in a healthy and normal state of society the intellectual few lead the many; and though the influence of intellect on life cannot be compared with the influence of love, sympathy, or enthusiasm, yet it is a steady and a uniform force. No one has more clearly shown than has Auguste Comte that, in spite of the weakness of human intellect in comparison with the active powers of man, it yet has a directing ability. The rudder does not propel the ship, but in the long-run it decides into which harbour the ship shall come, in spite of the most violent gales. In any organised and civilised society, if there be a clashing between the conscious and the sub-conscious forms of religion, the former will come to the top, and the latter find refuge among the ruder circles.

(3) But fortunately these are not the only factors. The religion of super-consciousness acts even in the most superstitious forms of nature-cult. And it tinges even the grevest phases of Stoicism or Confucianism. In some Greek writers like Epictetus it appears as an inspiring power, and throws a glow over the hard resolves of the moralist. But it is, of course, the religion of Israel which in the ancient world is its best embodiment. Judæa is the classical land of divine inspiration, so that, in spite of the limitations and the unlovely character of the Jewish people, it has been able to claim the position of the people of God in a special sense. The religion of Israel made long and bitter war on the sub-conscious cults of Palestine. It never could make satisfactory terms with Greek philosophy. But it became, when all that was best in it was incorporated into Christianity, one of the great lights of the world for all time.

I fully agree, then, with the Bishop of Ossory in his vindication of the superiority of the conscious over the sub-conscious in man. And I think the phrase which places the seat of the divine nature of Jesus Christ in the sub-consciousness unfortunate and misleading. But we may nevertheless hold that the

Founder of Christianity was as a man the vehicle of a great inrush of the super-conscious into the world of humanity. But if this inspiration would primarily act outside the field of consciousness, for the translation of such influences into the world of life and action, something else would be requisite, a perfect will which could interpret the Divine Will, and act ever in unison with it. The super-conscious and the conscious would thus be not opposed one to the other, but working together for the redemption of mankind. In the synoptic discourses we also find an abundant record of the working of the sub-conscious in the same life. The way in which the lilies of the field, the birds of the air, little children, are spoken of, shows a profound sympathy with the life of nature. But this sympathy never escapes the control of the will. It is ethical through and through.

The whole history of Christianity is one long proof that the lower parts of man's nature, as well as the higher, need to be allowed for in religion. In the existing Churches the subconscious, the conscious, and the super-conscious elements are all to be traced, and all must needs make terms with one another. With Matthew Arnold we may perhaps call them the barbaric, the Hellenic, and the Hebraic elements. But space and time do not allow any further exposition here of these matters, as to which there is a great deal more to be said.

P. GARDNER.

OXEORD.

THE CROSS: THE REPORT OF A MISGIVING.

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The limitations of this paper are in part indicated by its title. I do not here attempt any statement, still less any solution, of the mystery of the Cross of Jesus Christ: I confine myself to submitting a report, from the point of view of one of the crowd of men professionally entrusted with the ministry of reconciliation, "the word of the Cross." The submitting of the report is itself a tacit appeal for help in the solution of the problems it presents.

I have to report, then, as one whose business it is to examine and to endeavour to minister to current religious experience, that much of the religion of this generation is lacking in vivid apprehension of certain values formerly recognised in the Cross of our Lord and Saviour Jesus Christ; that in this matter there is very deep cleavage between representative Christian experiences of this hour and representative Christian experience of, say, thirty years ago; and that the absence of this note (in the contemporary religion) of appreciation of the Cross is to many old people the source of puzzlement, misgiving, and fear.

About the facts there will, I imagine, be little dispute. Were not this phenomenon to which I have alluded fairly widespread, we should not probably have received such books

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as Dr Denney's The Atonement and the Modern Mind, and Dr P. T. Forsyth's numerous articles on the authoritative position of the historic act of grace in the Cross, or his book on The Person and Place of Christ. And, to come back to humbler people, were there not widespread this deficiency (for so it appears to older people) in the religious experience of the hour, we should not have had over so wide an area of the Church, not running along denominational or temperamental lines, but athwart them, tremors of sensitive criticism of men and movements on the ground that they are not, as the saying is, "sound on the Atonement." I believe it is foolishness to shut one's ears to this criticism or to pooh-pooh it as the plaint of illiterate obscurantism. It is the protest and misgiving of a type of religious life which, after all, does represent the imperial vein of Christian experience from the Apostolic period downwards, because of the absence of that which was vital and central to that experience in the attitude of the men and women who are to be the transmitters of the faith to the next generation. Thirty years ago, the ordinary intelligent Christian man based his personal religion on what Christ had done for him, conspicuously in His atoning death. This was the ground of his acceptance with and standing before God, the source of his freedom and joy in religion and in life and in the prospect of death, the reason for a perpetual attitude of gratefulness, a sense of infinite debt and of the infinitude of duty; and, above all perhaps, the cause of a sense of enshelterment 1 and protec-

¹ The following incident may illustrate what I mean by "enshelterment." Some twenty odd years ago I was appointed for a time student-missionary in a Highland town. It was part of my business to visit in the worst slums in the town. One day I entered a tiny room where beside a fireplace an old woman sat smoking a tobacco-pipe. Her surroundings betrayed her extreme poverty; in one corner of the room I remember there were some live ducks caged in a crate. Entering into conversation with her, I found this old woman possessed of a rich spiritual experience, and as I gained her confidence she grew communicative as to some of its forms. Speaking in a mixture of Gaelic and English, she told me the following story: "When I was a young girl I passed through a time of great anxiety about my soul. I was so strained that I passed into the trance state. While in the trance I saw myself lying at the border of a harvest field. Around me the wheat was cut; in the distance twelve reapers

tion, the ground of an inexpugnable and imperturbable peace. To-day, if such experiences exist, they are somehow relegated to the field of the subconscious, or they are prolegomena assumed without a moment's emphasis like the axioms of Euclid, they lie below the articulation-level in personal religion and they do not rise above it because they are not needed in relating the personal life to the exigencies of the time. The background of the religious life of thirty years ago (as it had been the background of the religious life of many generations) was the colossal struggle of the Son of God with the powers of Death and Hell. What is the background of the commonest type of religious experience to-day? "To be a disciple of Christ," says Dr Lyman Abbott, "is to learn from Him the laws of life. To be a believer in Christ is to believe in Him as the inspirer of life; to be a follower of Christ is to join with Him in fulfilling His mission as He Himself defined it. And how did He define it? By His teaching. And these teachings may all be summed up in the one word-Helpfulness."

This, then, is the quintessence of the Christianity of the hour — helpfulness. In the dim background of a history semi-legendary, semi-mythological lies the Titanic struggle of the Son of God with Sin and Death in the agonies of Calvary,—flung back there as we flung back the legends of Arthur and Beowulf and Siegfried, while the Christianity of the hour is, as Sir Oliver Lodge said of cultured men, "not bothering about its sins," but is reducing itself to the spurious simplicity of "Helpfulness."

were still at work, and behind them One taller than they all, whose hair fell upon his shoulders like a shower of silver, and who was dressed in a white robe that fell to his feet and rolled there like the lapping of a sea wave. As soon as I saw him I knew that he was the Saviour, whom my soul yearned for; and my soul, in the form of a little naked child, fled from me and sped across the stubble with the whirr of a partridge and came to his feet. He turned and looked down, and said: 'What! thou here, and thou such a little one and so cold! I'll cover thee': and with that he took the folds of his robe and flung them around the shivering child. I woke from my trance. I have known a good deal of life's sharp distress since then, but I have always known this, that He covers me with the robe of his righteousness."

It is not wonderful that this new account of the Faith should arouse misgivings in the minds and hearts of older and slow-going people. The best and most patient of these are not afraid of, and are not slow to welcome, changes in emphasis in the popular apprehension of spiritual truths. They recognise that we are led from truth to truth by the Lord, the Spirit; and that that Spirit, like an economical lamplighter, turns down the lights just passed, reserving the full incandescence for the lights under which the Church is passing. And the older generation is far from charging the present with treason to the spirit of the Cross. They recognise that, as Lord Morley has said, "there never was a time, there never was an age when, from the highest to the lowest, there was more common human-heartedness, more earnest desire to alleviate the lot of those who have to perform the hard services of the world and face its gusty insecurities; and never a time when people were more willing to make personal sacrifices. I know," he goes on, "I know people who hate their own luxury; and if anybody, any statesman, would tell them how, by stripping themselves of this or that luxury, they would lighten the lot of those whose lot is hard, they would do it."

The subject of the humanitarian passion will come up later in our study, but meanwhile let me emphasise the point: that the older generation frankly recognises this restlessness of the social conscience, thankfully notes the increasing tendency to honour lives that incarnate the spirit of the Cross, sees God's hand in the general revisions of standards of value so that the greatest thing in the world is fast coming to be recognised to be "love in sacrifice." Further, the older generation is not without hope that when the restlessness of the public Christian conscience is cleansed of that element in it which is merely a sense of other people's sins, and men over a wide area come to recognise that sacrificial love is the greatest thing in the world, there will then be a return to the Cross as history's greatest expression of that Sacrificial Love. But all this does not touch the core of the misgiving.

For meanwhile the fact remains that that which was the vital centre of Apostolic Christianity, the undeserved grace of God shown in the atoning Death and the mediation of the Eternal Son, is not the vital centre of much of the active religion of the day; that indeed the whole redemption idea is out of vogue, or accepted only in some altered sense; that the precipitate of much of the current Christian thinking is declaratory rather than redemptive, if I may put it thus; and they fear this because a gospel which is declaratory only will not last; men will tire of it. For "men see already with exasperating clearness what their duty is"; the trouble is that they need complete adjustment to the sources of power for the performance of duty.

If the defect were merely in theological statement, I am not sure that precisely the kind of people would be affected by this misgiving whom one sees affected by it. But the defect is felt to be more than theological: it is felt as a want of thoroughness in personal orientation and adjustment. The older generation began at the point of a grave concern as to personal status before a holy God: it wrestled with the awful facts of guilt and of the ineradicable consequences of sin: it wrought its way into some apprehension (sufficient for the purposes of an infinite relief and of grateful trust) of the almost incredible mystery of the bearing by the living God, in the person of His Son, of the whole problem of sin, its punishment and consequences. Out from this crisis of fear, of appal, of appeal for mercy, of wonder at the greatness of God's grace, of new trust and new love, out from this it stepped into the new life in Christ, of joy in His fellowship and that of His people and of delight in His service. But the younger generation appears to know little of "law-work," of the apprehension of the reality of guilt, of any really searching crisis of self-adjustment, of the lifting of self off the platform of self-trust on to the platform of abased dependence on a holy God, holiest of all in amazing, bleeding self-sacrifice. Hence to the older generation the foundation of the religion of this

hour seems insufficiently strong; men who are unsaved are, they would say, going into the work of saving others; young people of clean high purpose are following an ideal Christ, but feel no need of His being set forth in His blood a propitiation for sin. And it is worthy of remark that the change is to be seen within evangelicalism itself. I began my ministry almost twenty years ago. I had come personally into a joyous religious life through the gate of such a crisis as I have described: and my personal religion was then, and it is now, founded on the Cross. But, as a young minister, I felt the difficulty of preaching the Cross: the impression of it was elusive, and I feared its vulgarisation; what was to me real and vital at the time was the companionship of Jesus: and I preached that as best I could. I remember that at that time I had the honour of preaching for a minister of the older generation, one of the most eminent of our Scottish clergy. When I called on him, I found him preparing an address for the General Assembly of the Church of which he was the presiding officer. He said to me, "I am writing about the changes in the evangelical outlook. We older evangelicals knew what Christ did for us on Calvary: but what precisely does this beautiful Apollo whom your younger men adore do for you?" The sting in the question lurked in the word Apollo. From that day to this I have never lost a misgiving lest there should be an infusion of paganism in the Jesus-cultus which neglects the Cross; lest it should be a beautiful but pseudo-Christian devotion which, like the Mary-cultus, has certain unmistakably beautiful effects in the realm of self-discipline and yet lacks the characteristically Christian element of conducting the abashed and contrite soul into the sin-scorching presence of the Supreme. Now in all this note what is the concern of the older types of religious experience. It looks with misgiving on the lightheartedness of the modern religious quest. In my childhood and adolescence religion had in it an element of awe and terror due not at all to the austerity of our parents or the supposed dreariness of our Sabbaths (by the way, what awful

nonsense much of this abuse of the old-fashioned Sabbath is!), but due to the severity of that struggle with self, that reluctance to yield to God, which one knew forewent the satisfactory religious state. And it was the consciousness of this background of a work of upheaval, the consciousness that our inmost souls were involved in the process by which we were born into the Kingdom, that made us shy and embarrassed when religion was spoken of. It was essentially the embarrassment of fear of exposure. Now, to-day, religion is among young people of, say, the student class, largely a matter of gay and hilarious interest. The Bible, the Church, the Kingdom of God, the opportunity of reading current history in terms of the Christian idea and the Christian programme, these things preoccupy the glad mind of clean-living young people: but where is the gloom and abasement of the fifty-first Psalm? That there is room for a happy spirit even amongst those who are standing at the very threshold of the Church, and are postulants rather than apostles, is surely true: else were the little children unchurched, and a man unchurches these at the peril of the wrath of the Lamb of God. But still the characteristic work of the Christian peace as the elder folks knew it is not hilarity but comfort—not gaiety but blessedness; not the boisterousness of unbroken self-confidence, but the gentle gladness of the healed and wondering soul.

Does, then, the new religion go deep enough? say the elder people. "A shallow view of life rejects the Cross," says Dora Greenwell, "just as a shallow theology rejects it, but it is in alliance with all our deepest experiences." Is the obscuring of the Cross to be connected with what the Bishop of Oxford calls the "multiplication of the eternal factor in our lives"? Substituting the Kingdom of God, the missionary idea with its varied interests, for the older interests of the Church and its doctrine and its service, have we but substituted one external for another, and are we leaving the roots of the weeds still in the soil?

What if the change involves or is a result of a fateful

change in the conception of God? The older emphasis was on God's sovereignty; now it is (surely rightly) on God's fatherhood. But is "fatherhood" an idea which we and our children are equipped to handle without some regulative and balancing conception? Is fatherhood among ourselves an idea of stable moral content? One recalls a solemn warning attributed to Saint Peter in an early Christian writing: "If," he says, "you are going to call on God as Father who, without respect of persons, judges according to every man's work, pass the time of your sojourning here in awe, knowing that you were redeemed not with corruptible things as silver and gold from your empty manner of life handed down traditionally from your ancestors, but with precious blood as of a lamb, blameless and spotless, the blood of Christ, who, foreknown indeed before the foundation of the world, was manifested in these last times for you who by Him do believe in God." Here distinctly the atoning sacrifice of Christ is commended to us as a regulator of our use of the idea of God's fatherhood, and it is broadly hinted in the word "by Him ye believe in God" that Christ thus conceived is the only safe gauge of our conception of God. Certainly nothing would be more ghastly than the thought that we may be in our time drawing perilously near the line that separates Christian from pagan conceptions of the Supreme, because we have lost hold of our governing and regulating guide. And can it be, the elder people ask, that without the atoning Cross men can continue to preserve the essentially Christian attitude to the world? The humanitarian passion is confessedly strong to-day: but is that peculiar intercessory solicitude for man, the expression of the priesthood of believing people, concerning itself with man's spiritual welfare, with his readjustment to God, as alert and alive as is the interest in man's comfort and the redress of his social wrongs? "Sin," it is declared, "is selfishness," and one agrees that the converse is true that selfishness is sin. But is the definition of sin as selfishness quite characteristically Christian? Do not the Christian Scriptures rather represent sin as

primarily that warp in human nature which makes us refuse God, or what is called in the New Testament unbelief? Now, no man can help feeling grave concern and alarm if he begins to suspect that vital elements are being left out of much of this generation's thought on such subjects as God and sin and the needs of men. For this vital element, whose absence is suspected, is the pride-destroying element: and it is no wonder if people are afraid of the future of a religion insufficiently ballasted by pride-destroying elements. For the whole history of religion makes clear that association with the things of God positively makes for human inflation and pride, except when central to this thought there has been such a pride-destroying conception as the Cross.

Such, then, is the misgiving which I have to report. A change, under one aspect bringing much relief, under another much anxiety, has come over the popular religion. How has the change come about? It is the veriest commonplace to recall the fact that with the passing of the eschatological background of older conceptions of the Cross a change in viewpoint was inevitable. As it became known that men of education could no longer stand on the older ground of eschatological certitude, certain ideas of the extramundane issues of sin, themselves somewhat terrible to believe and therefore really held on very frail tenure, immediately began to recede from the front to the back of men's minds. And with this passing out of the living thought of the time of the eschatological aspect of salvation, the social and the ethical came more into view. It has to be added, too, that there were grave faults of crudity and even of the violation of our moral reason in the way in which the Cross was often presented. An ethical contrast was set up between the persons of the Godhead. That ethical contrast George MacDonald crisply expressed when he made a little girl in one of his novels say, "I love Jesus, but I hate God." The unconscious ditheism here revolted men, revolted even those whose eyes were not fully open-many people's eyes are not yet fully

open—to the extent of the departure of popular modern religious thought from monotheism. The notion, too, of the substitution of one person for another in the punishment of sin was seen to be palpably an unjust thing, and no amount of theological quibbling would make it anything but unjust. Dr George A. Gordon quotes a minister of the Church of Scotland as explaining certain moral anomalies in the alleged actions of God in this fashion: "My friends, you must understand that the Almighty in His public and judicial capacity is obliged to do many things which in a personal and private capacity He would be ashamed to do." It is safe to say that reasoning of that nature is now for ever unacceptable to thinking people. To revolt, then, from such antitheses as these, as between the motives impelling respectively the Father and the Son in the manner of the treatment of mankind, or again as between the action of two attributes within the circle of the one divine Personality—to revolt from all this may no doubt in part be attributed this change of which we are speaking. But I cannot but feel that in addition to this revolt and allied revolts in the world of thought from the authority of obsolescent conceptions much is due to the very significant change in our modern attitude to sin. I am not thinking of the breaking down of older theories of the origin of sin by the alarming light which both the evolutionary hypothesis and literary research have shed upon the story known as the Fall of man. That is primarily a theologian's difficulty, and is probably to be described as well on its way to solution. I am thinking rather of the fact that neither for the man of science nor for the ordinary Christian believer is sin the grim reality that once it was. "Sin," we are told, "has no place in the vocabulary of science." It is a phenomenon which, like every other, appears in its inevitable place in the sequence of phenomena with which alone science deals: it is an aberration to be rectified, the shadow of progress, a by-product whose existence may be unwelcome, but which will give way to a compensatory opposite. "Therefore," says Sir Oliver

Lodge, "men of culture are not bothering about their sins, still less about their punishment," and one eminent English divine committed himself not long ago to the statement that God does not worry Himself about our peccadilloes. (The diminutive termination is significant.) It was inevitable that there should be understanding between the old and the new if views of this sort prevail. For, as Miss Julia Wedgwood reminds us in her book on *The Moral Ideal*, "No deeper cleft divides human spirits than that which separates the faith possible to men for whom evil is a mere negation, a mere shadow, a form of ignorance—from that which regards it as a real antagonist to every form of God."

But it is by no means only the man of science, the man of culture, whose attitude to sin has altered. The average person to-day who lives well within the influence of Christian thought is living a life sheltered from contact with the more awful aspects of sin-with the grosser, not necessarily the more sinful aspects. Just as for very many of us the hideous facts of disease are quickly covered up and hidden in our hospitals and asylums, so are the more hideous aspects of sin hidden away from us. Observe carefully the manner of our shelter. It is not that we do not know such things exist. We know some of their aspects better than our fathers did. But they come to most of us not by way of personal contact but by way of representation through the press. And the daily representation of tragedies which in real life we rarely see, may be just as truly a disintegrant of the susceptibilities as tragedy in the theatre is said to be. The newspaper and the novel represent for some of us in this matter the worst and most deleterious elements of the effect of the theatre. For if the grosser sides of life are hidden from us, we may be left with a refined horror of them that is æsthetic rather than moral, and we may meanwhile (and do) become unholily familiar with the more subtle, superficially clean, and really more damnable aspects of evil-sins of the disposition. The grosser aspects of sin have their value as storm signals, as every worker

among the poor knows. One cannot, I think, ignore the importance of the general rise of the standard of physical well-being and comfort in tracing changes in religious thought.

But, apart from this comfort, positively the Christian of to-day is not often, if at all, committing what he thinks of as "sin." The sin which we conceive of as deserving hell, as possibly calling for a great Divine Redemption, an Atonement which would be a miracle of vicarious love, the sin which we conceive of as calling forth the red wrath of a righteous God (sin like Nero's or like the horrors of the first chapter of Romans)—all that is remote from our life. Christianity to-day (making allowance for rare monsters who lead double lives) is for the most part professed by persons hedged round by a public opinion, a conception of what is right and proper, which simply excludes these horrors of iniquity: and in the sense of these deadly and awful transgressions, we do not sin: why, then, should we need the Cross? A certain sense of personal inadequacy to life is borne in upon us, and we are convincible that we do need Divine reinforcement; but guilt, guilt of the kind that needs an atoning sacrifice, how should we feel that? I think anyone who knows the life of the ordinary members of the churches will understand what I am speaking of. You know that for many hereditary Christians certain types of sin are practically impossible, rendered uninteresting and unalluring by refinement, by an inhibition therefore which is more a matter of etiquette and taste than of conscience. But at the same time you know that the most appalling sins of the disposition-jealousy, malicious gossip, resentment at the precedence of another, irreverence, misconstruction of motives, parochialism, the itch for human recognition, reprehensible ignorance, pride,-that sins like these are rampant in our Church life and almost unchecked. It is inevitable, then, that with one half of sin uninteresting and really uncommitted, the other cherished and practised in the sublimest unconsciousness of its incompatibility with the Christian position—it is inevitable that in such conditions the Cross of our Lord Jesus Christ should fall into the background, and men and women should play at patronising Christ's teaching and admiring Him in the rôle of sociologist.

The situation, then, would seem to be the outcome of at least these two great factors: first, a revolt in the realm of ideas; and second, a vast improvement in the realm of external conditions of life. Corresponding to this must, I think, be the conditions of a return to the Cross. First of all, it goes without saying, some reconstructive work in the field of theological thought must be done. We must have guarantees against any presentation of the means of salvation as being effected at the cost of injustice. We must be guaranteed, too, against any breach in our monotheism: we are, indeed, in dire need of new emphasis on monotheism. At a time when science has become monodynamic, it is the hour for theology to become more fearlessly monotheistic. How Christological thought will move in the next few years it is impossible, of course, to predict in detail, but I hope we may take it that we have passed the ridge of the wave of criticism which, in demanding an historical interpretation of Jesus as against a dogmatic, has assumed that the historical method would exclude the possibility of attaching the idea of Deity in any true sense to Him. There is no hope whatever of a return to the Cross until it is possible to say again fearlessly, "Jesus is God," or at least, referring to the atonement for sin, "Jesus, ad hoc, is God." For the whole value of the atonement is that the sufferer should be the living God. The deepest need of my guilty soul cannot be met unless my whole case rests finally on God. He, in the last analysis, is the alone object of Faith, the sole Being in whom a man in his extremity can trust. Unless Jesus be to all intents and purposes that Ultimate, I cannot rest my soul in Him.

And further, we await the advent of the thinker who will harmonise for us the historical and the timeless in religion.

What I mean is this: On the one hand it is true that Christianity is an historical religion, and that human progress is at once guaranteed and consecrated by its interpretation of history. But, on the other hand, there is truth which we must not miss in Pfleiderer's warning, "We are to free ourselves from the bane of an historicism which seeks God only in the dead past." The solution of the problem of religion which will finally commend itself to men must be such that its sufficient attestation can be found within the realm of conscience: indeed it must be an account of the phenomena of conscience. If it involves historical facts, these historical facts must be interpretable as projections on the plane of time of an essentially timeless, a present state of things; for God is not only here, if anywhere: but all of Him that it is of worth to know must be here if anywhere. A God once more active than He is now would be like a light brilliant at its source but fading towards the end of the radii of its beams. God, and the saving health of God, is here and now, or nowhere. If this thought be applied to the Cross of Christ, that Cross appears as the projection upon time's plane of the eternal state of things at the Divine Heart. That is equivalent to saying that it is true that when man sins God suffers: it means that a whole system of theology lies in the appeal, "Grieve not the Holy Ghost." It means that if the present grief of God over sin could be expressed in terms of human life, it must be, it has been, expressed in the pouring out of bloody sweat, and of a pure soul unto death. Such a God would be, by His very love of man, under a "doom" while sin lasts. "Finite Intelligence," says Dora Greenwell, "cannot conceive a doom more terrible than that which would befall an Infinite Intelligence who was compelled by some inner moral necessity in his nature to behold all the evil that is in the world, to see it all at once, without veil and without blind." Is it permissible to think thus of God condemned to this doom? Is it permissible to think of the line of the hymn, "In my place condemned He stood," as the record of something that is at present true of God? It is

a conception of God which has in rare moments visited the poets and prophets of heathenesse: is a higher conceivable? There are difficulties, I know, from the point of view of Christian theology. Patripassianism was once condemned as wholly heresy. "Patripassianism," said the late Professor A. B. Bruce, "is only half a heresy." Do we await the theologian who will make it wholly orthodox?

It is certainly a conception hard to compass—that every sin man sins stabs the heart of God with a pain that is not merely anguish, but atoning and saving anguish. But the difficulty of realising it is not decisive proof that it is not true. We cannot appreciate the tragedy of life as it is. "If we had a keen vision and feeling of all ordinary human life," says George Eliot, "it would be like hearing the grass grow, or the squirrel's heart beat, and we should die of the roar which lies on the other side of the silence." Certainly I know no thought that is so calculated to break a man's heart into healing penitence as the thought that God suffers, and suffers to blood, when man sins: and it would seem to afford an interpretative transcript of what goes on in our conscience. For when we sin and are ashamed, is it the sinning subject who is hurt and grieved? "I do not know," said Martineau, "where man's spirit ends and God's begins." What if that suffering of conscience within us, suffering which has stern hatred of sin at its heart, be the hither side of that in God which we try to express when we say, "the Lamb was slain from the foundation of the world"?

Along lines not wholly different from these I believe thought must move ere there can be for reasoning men a rehabilitation of the doctrine of the Cross.

But some other changes as well as those in the realm of theological thought must come. It is hard to suggest what they must be. But everyone who has studied or tried to preach the Cross knows that a vivid apprehension of its value lives only in a certain atmosphere of moral hopes and desires, in the atmosphere of a specific moral condition. That moral

condition is described in the New Testament as "being saved." an atmosphere which has two main constituent elements, those of consciousness of guilt and of fear of death. The impulse that cries out for atonement is that into which the man is wedged who sees his sin there, who feels that it has travelled up to God, who knows that that means the impossibility of cheap absolutions, who at once confesses and disowns the sin in that last paradox of the contrite conscience. Again, while death is airily defied, or its terror unrealised, the Cross may not be needed. If death be regarded on its physical side only, its terror may be overcome by methods not strictly religious: but there is literally no fear like the fear that men have of death to whom its moral meaning has been made plain, Now, just what will bring about this renewed consciousness of guilt-possibly an increased pressure on the social conscience operating with a keener sense of human solidarity —and just what will bring about the true understanding of death whose shadows Christianity has so markedly deepened -I cannot tell. I suspect that it will be through a fairly simultaneous crumbling or crashing into ruin of many institutions, mainly ecclesiastical, that to-day are obviously moribund. We are nearing, I believe, a new Reformation, a time not wholly unlike that in which Augustine wrote his City of God, or that in which Luther saw so vividly the doctrine of the freedom of the Christian man.

Meanwhile I believe the religion of the Cross is the religion of the future. The faith which magnifies the unmerited and sin-destroying grace of God is the only satisfying religion, because it is the only adequate interpretation of all the facts, is the only successful antagonist of pride, and the only religion that can form a permanent foundation for holy living and unpresumptuous hope.

G. A. JOHNSTON ROSS.

THE MORAL SERVICE OF THE INTELLECT.

LEWIS R. FARNELL, D.LITT.

PROBABLY no science or branch of human knowledge so pressingly demands a searching reinvestigation and restatement at the present time as the science of ethics. For no science has suffered more than this from the arrogant intellectualism of the a priori philosopher, ignorant of past humanity and only slightly acquainted with his contemporaries. The aboriginal treatise of the great pioneer Aristotle still shines out with a certain genial light among the narrower, more inhuman constructions of Spinoza, Kant, and Bentham. If it is now possible that a master-treatise of ethics should be written on an inductive basis infinitely wider than that of Aristotle and with truer constructive principles than those of these modern philosophers, we owe it mainly to two recent speculative achievements, the progress in social psychology and in that vague department which we call anthropology, and by which is here intended the study of primitive institutions. In fact, this tentative essay has been mainly evoked by my recent reading of Mr M'Dougall's Introduction to Social Psychology and Professor Westermarck's Origin and Development of Moral Ideas; as well as by the fact that both works accord to some extent with conclusions that I had myself arrived at from a study of ancient religions and primitive institutions.

No justification is needed for the assertion that a trained Vol. IX.—No. 3.

inquirer in social psychology can contribute much to the elucidation of ethical problems. But it may not be so readily allowed that the study of primitive customs and morals can help much to build up an ethical philosophy that shall be a true account of our modern complex morality. It may be urged that the moral psychology of the Fijian cannot be used to explain that of the present-day philanthropist, nor the social institutions of neolithic man those of modern England. And even if the earlier phenomena could be shown to be the source or origin of the later, yet, it may be said, the psychical facts in the course of ages are transmuted by a change analogous to the changes in chemistry, and the final result in no way resembles the aboriginal elements. In fact, a current sceptical dogma might be given this larger statement: "Origin does not (in the moral or religious sphere) explain or invalidate present validity." The dogma in its latter half is of course true in those cases where something is good and desirable on its own merits, whatever its origin may have been: it is not applicable in those cases where the present fact is justified by an appeal to an origin which is supposed to be good or noble or divine and which turns out on examination to be quite the reverse. But our concern is here with the first part of the aphorism, and we may maintain that wider and deeper study exposes its falsehood in respect of moral evolution. No doubt the horizon and content of modern morality have widened and deepened; but the moral moods and impulses of the average man of modern culture will not appear to have changed beyond recognition of affinity with those of his remote ancestors. For in dealing with morality we are dealing with a sphere where the conservation of immemorial feeling is a governing factor. The knowledge of the moral past is a necessary condition of understanding the moral present; and is still more obviously necessary for the answer to our problem, the moral service rendered by the intellect in the past and present.

In the ethical speculation of the past, from the time of Socrates to the generation of Mill, two main tendencies may

be discovered that explain the failure of most of it: the bias towards intellectualism and the bias towards individualism. Our contemporary literature is full of protest against that which is called "intellectualism," and the protest may give voice to an important truth or may be a mark of mental and moral decay; for it is eagerly caught up by those to whom all intellectual thought is fatiguing; and let us remember that those who discovered the moral truth about Dreyfus and saved France were termed "intellectuals." In moral science we deem "intellectualism" a fault in the sense that the writer or thinker regards the intellect as the sole or predominant factor in the moral judgment or in the moral development of the individual and the race. How far we are right depends on the exactness of our psychological analysis and on our knowledge of the past. The fault seems at least a "noble infirmity," to which only distinguished intellects in a distinguished period appear liable. Men were liable to it in the fifth and fourth centuries of Greece and in the eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries of England. (A clear account of it would have to distinguish between "intellectualism" and the championship of "wisdom" as the guide of life; for the "Wisdom" of Ecclesiasticus is much more than an intellectual mood, nor is the vir sapiens of the Stoics "an intellectualist" pure and simple.) But the second tendency in ethics, which we call "individualism," which would explain the moral phenomenon as arising from purely self-regarding impulses, the so-called Hedonistic theory for instance, is intellectually and morally the more vicious of the two: morally for obvious reasons, and intellectually because it ignores the root-meaning of the moral fact, which is a social fact and does not possibly exist for the isolated self; the very terms in which we express it—" ought," ὀφείλει, δεί, oportet, debet, devoir, sollen-imply a relation between persons in society; or if our views of morality were purely religious, it would still rest on a social relation, the relation between man and God.

This social view of all morality may be confronted by two objections: first, it may be thought inapplicable to the phenomenon of the operation of the private conscience, "the still small voice" that, rising within oneself, approves or disapproves of oneself, as it were in a solitude; secondly, it may not seem adequate to account for the highest moral natures who refuse to conform to the morality of the age, the men " of whom the age was not worthy," the men who might bear as their motto, "tenuisse animum contra sua saecula rectum," and whose action appears in a sense anti-social. But the social theory easily meets these difficulties: "the still small voice" can be the psychic reflex of a social voice that through long ages has been loud and strong; and, as Westermarck well says, "almost inseparable from the moral judgments that we pass on our own conduct seems to be the image of an impartial outsider who acts as our judge," the ideal spectator, whether divine or human. The second objection is even more transparent: the social theory of ethics does not mean that society at any particular time is right: the man who swims with the tide and the man who tries to stem it in order to turn the river into a better channel may both be moved equally by a social impulse. Therefore we ought to expunge the old term that we may still find in dry ethical handbooks, "self-regarding virtues"; for a state or an act can only be or indicate a moral virtue so far as it implies a reference to our fellows: otherwise we may only call it an excellence, an accomplishment, or a charming gift. For instance, purity, cleanliness, bodily ascetic training are not moral virtues unless practised for some social end. The cant phrase, "One owes a duty to oneself," is as silly as the definition of suicide as "selfmurder." If to develop one's own powers is a duty, it is so because of its social value to others; from the self-regarding point of view it may be profitable, delightful, admirable, but cannot be moral. Which is to say that there is much else in life besides conduct, many other good things besides a " good will."

To come, then, to the first theses of the more modern ethic, we may pose them thus: Morality from the earliest down to the latest period has been, is, and must remain a social phenomenon, and the intellect cannot provide us with its ultimate basis. For morality demands in its last analysis a choice between certain ends, and this implies a certain ratio of value as between different ends. Now it is obvious that the intellect cannot provide us with an end, moral or other; it cannot make us want pleasure, want happiness, want life itself, if we do not happen to want them, nor purely by itself can it prevent us wanting them if we are inclined. The intellect cannot by its nature issue orders; it cannot say, "Thou shalt eat thy cake," or "Thou shalt not eat thy cake," but only, "Thou canst not eat thy cake and have it"; and by such a simple intellectual formula it often does vast service to puzzled morality, but never the master-service of framing the hierarchy of ends. Our sentiment concerning ends is some form of emotional experience: nor can any intellectual calculation prove that one end is higher than another; at least it can never clinch the matter without the accompaniment of some mental motive force which is not intellect.

Apart from our own psychological experience, an indication that the origin of our moral consciousness lay in the region of the emotions is its extraordinary proneness to exaggeration; the devotion to truth or purity or bravery can be fantastically exaggerated up to the point where it becomes deadly to the community: for it seems characteristic of an emotion to admit unlimited exaggeration, but not of an intellectual process. And this law of exaggeration has played a constructive part in the shaping of primitive society, as I shall indicate below.

In what precise sense, then, according to this view, may we speak of a moral reason or a rational morality? If by moral reason or a νοῦς πρακτικός we mean merely an exercise of the intellect upon moral questions, the term is harmless but no more necessary than similar specific terms, such as

biological reason, astronomical reason. If it includes more than the intellect, the term is confusing and vicious. We may also speak with propriety of a rational morality as implying a code of moral precepts prompting to actions that are carefully calculated by exercise of the intellect or reason to secure the ends that the society regards as paramount. Or the proposition that morality is rational may mean no more than that it is eminently suited to the nature of a rational being: whether it is the peculiar property of rational beings is a question that depends on the answer to the other question-which I do not mean to raise—whether rudimentary moral action is not found among the lower animals. But the general recognition of the close affinity between morality and the intellectual part of our consciousness arises probably from a psychological fact: namely, that the mental faculties that both evoke are physiologically conterminous, both as we say belonging to the higher part of our nature.

We have been considering ends mainly, and the faculties whereby they are determined. Another question arises concerning the specific moral judgments that we are habitually pronouncing. When I say, "This is a lie," or "He is a liar," is it an emotional impression or an intellectual perception that constitutes the inward significance of this? Professor Westermarck holds that it is always the emotion that determines the judgment-and this accords with his whole theory that "moral concepts are ultimately based on emotions either of approval or disapproval." Fowler, on the other hand, maintained that in such moral propositions the intellectual process came first, whereby an act was labelled as a lie, and that then "the appropriate ethical emotion was at once excited." 1 Mr M'Dougall tries to mediate between these two opposite views.2 He agrees with Westermarck that "moral judgments are ultimately based on the emotions," but he would lay stress on the word "ultimately," meaning that our

¹ T. Fowler, Progressive Morality.

² Op. cit., pp. 214-216.

remote ancestors had the emotion that shaped the moral concepts, and that they handed down to us the tradition of which we may repeat the formulæ without emotion, just as a child may mechanically apply a moral law that his father explains to him. In another passage he also maintains "even moral approval and disapproval may be unemotional intellectual judgments." I cannot feel that Mr M'Dougall brings forward anything that disturbs or weakens Professor Westermarck's contention. If a moral judgment is alive, it is not the same thing as a judgment about morals. A father explains to his child what a liar is, and then gives him the simple facts about the Dreyfus trial: finally he asks him how he would call the accusers of Dreyfus: the boy of average intellectual capacity answers, "I should call them liars"; but Dreyfus has no interest for him and excites no emotion, and he is only practising an intellectual exercise. But we should not call this a moral judgment, any more than if the boy, prompted by a handbook on painting, wrote or uttered the proposition that "Raphael was a great painter," we should call this an æsthetic judgment. It is otherwise if the same boy at school in a heat of indignation exclaims, "Jones is a liar; let's kick him": a certain degree of intellect goes, of course, to the verbal expression of this sentiment; but it is tingling and alive by virtue solely of the moral emotion; and now it is a true moral judgment, one by which he tries to convey sympathetically the same emotion to the other members of the community. We are here no longer primarily in the intellectual sphere.

It is important to formulate in exact terms the manifold service that the intellect does or can render to morality. The psychologic analysis of the whole complex moral determination is difficult at certain points, because intellect, will, emotion, imagination are often so blent as somewhat to obscure our consciousness of each. But it is easy to discern this much, that it is the intellect that is chiefly concerned

with the suggestion of means to the end that society happens to value. Further, it may convey to the moral sense the apprehension that certain means conflict with the realisation of other ends that are also valued. Also it traces out the results of doing and forbearing, and thus may reveal that while the motive impulse is for good the results may be such as the moral sense pronounces evil; and here it is that we feel the claim of the intellect to a leading place in the analysis of the moral will; for Kant's absolute contentment with a "good will" seems a fool's paradise, unless we include in the content of a good will the determination to be intellectually good, so as to forecast results; since so much evil of the world is worked by "good men." Again, in respect of means, there is a special fallacy to which the moral consciousness with its tendency to blind enthusiasm is liable, the fallacy of mistaking means for ends, of extending to the means the same sentiment of devotion that the end itself has evoked, so that the real end itself may be obscured or forgotten. Perhaps our own race is specially prone to this worship of means: Greek literature is a lovely and desirable thing, therefore a Greek grammar paper or a Greek accent is an unspeakably lovely and desirable thing. The intellect can here render one of its many signal services by reminding us that the means now valued as an end were valued originally only as means: and, through thinking, a true sense of proportion may be regained.

It is possible that the intellect may sometimes be a force directly augmenting will-power in the pursuit of ends; if, for instance, we could regard as intellectual that strange mental faculty by which at times we most vividly realise or most intensely imagine the far-off end to which we are directing ourselves, or the moral results of certain actions which we may feel a call to do or to forbear doing. In my personal experience, a man rescued a child from a rough sea by jumping off a pierhead on a winter's day, and thereby earned a Humane Society medal by what was undoubtedly a very brave act. But he afterwards confessed to his most intimate friend that

he only overcame a paroxysm of cowardice by realising with painful mental effort the remorse and self-contempt which would rob his remaining life of value if he failed to imperil it then. Such a mental process seems to resemble the σωτηρία της δόξης, which is an important factor in the moral analysis of bravery that Plato attempts in the Republic. But what is the true psychological account of it? At certain moments the mind is able to present to itself an image so startlingly vivid of the end formerly selected by the moral will, that a new spurt of strength seems discharged for the pursuit of it; the image also might be a picture of our future self which, as we realise with glowing distinctness, must be the self that we shall pass into henceforth and for ever if we perform or forbear to perform a certain action. I should hesitate to call this power of moral presentation purely intellectual. Yet we find it in people of superior intellects rather than in the dull; on the campaign, for instance, rather in the officer than in the private. Through extreme fatigue all emotional sense of values, even of the value of life itself, may have perished; yet some brain-force may keep on presenting to the sinking consciousness the image or idea of that which is the goal of effort, and the will is stimulated to revive the bodily energy. A certain will, of course, belongs essentially to the continued exercise of the intellect itself; but in such situations as that just described an intellectual force seems to contribute to the sustenance of a moral will.

Another psychic phenomenon may be here noted that is unfamiliar to the average experience. Prolonged and excessive intellectual activity along a certain line may occasionally induce a certain numbness or paralysis of the moral emotion that started it down that line. The usual examples are found in the æsthetic or scientific spheres of work; many years of hard thought about poetry or painting or Greek philology may at last destroy in the thinker all emotional sense of the value of these things: we have heard from Matthew Arnold of "the pain of the grey-haired scholar," and those of us who

have long known our Alma Mater have had sad experience of the intellectual deaths that middle-aged men occasionally die, who continue to live otherwise in health. One may imagine that the same thing happens at times in the purely moral sphere. If one studied laboriously and for many years some of the special factors that construct our moral fabric, say, the laws concerning purity or concerning homicide in the various communities of the world, the immediate sense-perceptions which gave to these laws their immediate emotional value may be blunted in the student, for these perceptions derive much of their vitality from wonder, mystery, and awe. It may be that the nervous energy used up by the intellect is drawn away from the sustenance of the emotion, and that therefore the momentum of the one is in inverse ratio to that of the other. Hence may arise the instinctive aversion of the average moral man from any intellectual inquisition concerning the primary emotions upon which his morality is based: he may fear that such intellectual exercise may lower his moral vitality.

The facts of history have occasionally justified such fear. For intellectual expansion, while essential to all social progress, has been at times the cause of a society's decay and death. The sudden break-up of the crust of custom through the impact of new ideas may bring a temporary anarchy and debility, and the society may perish before it has had time to adapt these ideas to a new morality; its other alternative is a slowly creeping paralysis, and most communities, like most individuals, prefer this to a sudden convulsion. But if the invasion of new intellectual thought does act as a dissolvent, the cataclysm is not so much the result of the intellectual discharge of energy as of some mysterious lack of social will-power to accommodate it to the necessary social ends.

The full treatment of my present theme involves a vast historical inquiry into the moral past of mankind. I can only present cursorily a few inductions to which the facts appear to point. Two separate questions arise, one more psychological, the other more sociological. First, in the evolution of our moral systems, what proportion of the total complex action are we to assign to the pure intellect? Secondly, how far can we discern the intellect working in the past for secular utilitarian ends? In regard to the first, let us avoid the fallacy of imagining the long series of human social development as a series of rigidly separate "geologic" strata; of supposing, for instance, a primitive human stage when society was dominated solely by superstitious emotion, and intellectual activity had not yet begun. The most primitive human skull yet found contained as large a brain as ours, perhaps larger. An age when superstition was most rampant would yet call in the intellect to help it; we must suppose that the early social man, threatened by uncanny dangers arousing responsive tremors, horrors, and quiverings of emotion, did not simply run away and hide, but that an early intellectual inventiveness supplied him with an elaborate protective system. The intellect has long served superstitious, as it has served other, emotion: Aristotle was called to the aid of mediæval theology. And in many a primitive purification-code we find proof of considerable brain-power exerted to safeguard the individual and the state from the mystic danger, say, of bloodshed or the presence of a ghost. No doubt primitive ritual, from which so much of our law, morality, and even our religion may have arisen, may in its origin have been often inspired by a semi-articulate emotional motive force. Yet, once fixed and established with a long tradition, it could develop a logic of its own, a concurrent intellectual thought, and by the help of this could more and more elaborate mechanism for directing the impulse of the original emotion.

The second question, how far the traces that are discoverable of the early social history of man reveal secular utilitarian thought—that is, the intellectual calculation of means to secure some end of primary necessity, such as health and the conservation of life, the internal and external stability of the community—can only be summarily and allusively treated

here. The readers of Dr Frazer's works, especially of his Psyche's Task, will perhaps gather the impression that all our leading moral and legal institutions have had their origin not in the cool foresight of the higher intellects but in strange emotional superstitions now discarded. Yet in his most recent work on Totemism, where he puts forth a theory of the origin of exogamy and of the classificatory system of Australian marriage laws, he himself feels compelled to admit, and even eagerly maintains, that these laws manifest an astonishing degree of intellectual prevision on the part of some primitive Lycurgus anxious to secure a great social end, the avoidance of consanguineous sexual unions.

Fresh from the reading of Dr Frazer's concluding chapters, I do not see how we can evade his final conclusion that we have here a great primitive institution bearing testimony to the working of a high intellectual force, just as the mechanism of a watch attests the rationality of man. But even so we will not call it secular utilitarian intellect until we know that the end in the service of which it was working was secularly conceived. Could savages have been anxious to avoid incest for the sake of "eugenics," because they had anticipated modern science in the discovery that the unions of relatives too closely consanguineous are liable to injure the offspring? Or was not the true motive force the mysterious superstitious terror inspired by such unions, a terror that we have inherited, and of which we cannot yet give the true psychological account, being usually averse to examine it at all? If this is so—and Dr Frazer inclines rather to this view—then after all he has only provided us with a signal example of the intellect rendering most efficient service to an emotional impulse that cannot be called secular.

However this may be, the careful inquirer into modern savage morality and law, reading such works as Post's Africanisches Jurisprudenz, or Westermarck's treatise mentioned above, or many sociological papers in Man or the Journal of the Anthropological Institute, will occasionally be

struck with the apparent utilitarianism and practical sagacity of some law, some policy or moral custom, and will receive with suspicion the too absolute dogma that the savage is incapable of all utilitarian secular ethic.

It is our hope and faith that the modern savage reveals to us something of our very remote past. For if he does not, it is hard to say who or what does: since, according to the historical purist, all history begins at 4000 B.C., that is-roughly speaking-yesterday. Within the range of this narrow and almost ephemeral period, only very rarely may we discern the dominance of utilitarian intellect shaping a social organisation. This might happen in the case of a people of strong will and mentally well equipped, beset with continual dangers that threatened their existence. Thus the old Spartan constitution seems shaped by the clearheaded calculation of means to secure a necessary secular end, self-preservation; and if the story is true that the absent Spartan warriors, lamenting a dearth of males, recommended their women at home to form temporary and irregular unions with Helots and Perioikoi, we have here a remarkable example of utilitarian reasoning and a higher will-power triumphing over such primal and powerful emotional sentiments as sexual jealousy and pride of caste. But on the whole the glimmer that we discern of early society in its making and upgrowth reveals the comparative impotence of secular utilitarian moral thought; the social function of the intellect half paralysed by the predominance of raw emotion, by what I venture to call the law of exaggeration. Doubtless, in the weakness of early man's intellect and moral will, the action of this law was socially necessary, in that by it alone could a certain uniformity of custom be imposed and conserved. Unfortunately, it has often intensified a moral emotion, salutary in itself, up to a point where it may endanger the existence of the society. Thus the sentiment of the sanctity of life has at times become a fanaticism making good life impossible. Moralised emotion concerning the sexual instinct has evolved

in some races a sentiment of purity that is anti-social, engendering a violent anti-sexual bias and the exaltation of celibacy and virginity. The primal emotions are probably more liable than others to this law of exaggeration.

The social constructive power of superstitious emotion is most manifest in regard to the development of the law of murder, as I have tried to show elsewhere.1 It is in early Greece especially where we can trace the evolution of higher moral ideas concerning murder from an emotional sentiment of the impurity of all bloodshed. Strong as this became in the post-Homeric societies, it might have evoked unjust legislation, and in fact it did so occasionally; but it was fortunately checked and modified by a growing intellectual perception that an act was not an external thing merely, but had its internal side, being coloured by psychic qualities, motives, and thoughts. The processes whereby certain higher races have risen above the narrow clan-morality up to the conception that the wrongful slaying even of an alien is murder and an offence against the society are still wrapped in mystery. Our perplexity increases as we find that a few modern savage societies have without our help developed a law and a moral sense concerning murder more advanced than any discoverable among the Homeric Greeks, the Hebrews before the Exile, the English before the Conquest, or the pagan Icelanders. Two causes, both of them emotional, may be suggested for this momentous advance: first, the sense of collective responsibility; secondly, the growing sense of the impurity of all bloodshed, a sense which was often blended with the fear of the wrathful ghost. The first cause would work thus: as the whole clan is made responsible for the acts of any of its individuals, it may be involved in war by its individual member who kills an alien; hence it may strongly disapprove of that individual's act, and may visit it with a social resentment which reacts gradually on the individual conscience. Yet this operative motive would be weak in very bellicose societies who

¹ Vide Evolution of Religion, chapter on "Purity."

genuinely enjoyed fighting, like the Norsemen of Iceland; and at best it would not account for the thrill of horror which all murder comes to excite; for where there is a mystic thrill, there the cause generally lies deeper than in the motives of secular prudence. Ideas concerning the mystery of blood and life, the terrors of the ghost-world, supply the supranormal emotion that we desiderate to account for the ethic phenomenon.

In a certain degree, it implies some "secularisation" of sentiment when a society feels itself able to hang one of its own members or kinsmen for murder. It means that the sentiment of the holiness of life, as it extends further towards the circumference, is somewhat weakened at the centre; since, when the feeling of the blood-tie is most strong in the early tribe, the tribesmen may not be able to kill their own most heinous sinners, but only to expel them.

We cannot trace these processes of evolution in our own or any other Teutonic legal system, for Christianity entered into them all as a higher disturbing force. But it is not hard to trace here and there the print of primæval superstition; for instance, our law and custom concerning suicides are inspired by the dread of the vampire; the theory of "self-murder" is a legal fiction, and our moral condemnation of the act based on "secular-utilitarian" considerations is relatively an afterthought.

In many other departments of the legal systems of civilisation—in the laws concerning property, testaments, and forbidden degrees, for instance—we discover the action of sentiments that are charged with superstition, and yet have worked for social advantage in many ways. But we feel that cool secular thought working without emotional disturbance on the same subjects would have produced very different results. Therefore we cannot suppose that it has been working so long or with such power as the other force. When the marriage law proclaims to us, "Thou shalt not marry thy grandmother," we feel a responsive thrill of obedience, because an ancient and

weird emotion is at the back of it; when the new law of eugenics rules, "Thou shalt not marry an unhealthy woman," we may coldly assent, and certainly feel no thrill, because this rule is the product of a modern, secular, comparatively intellectual thought.

To conclude with a dogmatic judgment: civilised traditional morality is not the outcome of an intellectual utilitarianism, still less of divinely infallible instincts working towards the conservation and betterment of our race; but rather the product of long generations of emotional men strongly wanting certain ends, but liable to violent exaggeration of sentiment that impeded the all-round play of ethical reason.

Moral progress in the future of our race may depend on two conditions: that the intellect should work more powerfully in the moral sphere without weakening in us the moral appreciation of values; and again, that the best intellect of man should work "socially," and yet retain its freedom, without which it will not work at all.

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THAT there is a fascination in evil would seem to be illustrated in the perennial interest that blooms around the name of Judas Iscariot. With the ancients it is the synonym of sin; with Dante "that soul up there that suffers heavier sentence" is the eponym of the lowest circlet of Cocytus, at the apex of the funnel of Hell, champed by the central jaws of Satan, at the absolute zero of the divine warmth of the world. Each new commentary, each new "Life (?) of Jesus" has its fine-spun theory of the motives that actuated the great sinner, just as the ancients regaled themselves each with his own fancy concerning the sinner's death. These fancies and theories seem one and all to have about equal worth; comparison would be odious among infinitesimals. Illustrious scholars, whom it is mercy not to name, have strained the powers of rhetoric in description and denunciation of the appalling iniquity of the treasurer of the Twelve Apostles, lashing themselves into foam over the utterly passionless and indifferent words of the Synoptics. None of this sound and fury need detain the sober-minded critic a moment, but the questions remain perplexing and important: Who was Judas? What means (I)skariot(h)? It is the last of these that must be treated first. After all that has been written on the subject, it seems surprising how little appears sure or even highly probable. The form of the name, occurring ten or eleven times, is itself most uncertain. In Matt. x. 4 it is VOL. IX .- No. 8.

"Judas the Iskariotes," but in xxvi. 14 the article is omitted. In Mark iii. 19, xiv. 10 it is "Judas Iskarioth." but in xiv. 43 "Judas (the Iskariotes)," where the authorities for and against the parenthesis seem nearly balanced. In Luke vi. 16 we read "Judas Iskarioth," but in xxii. 3 "Judas the (so-) called Iskariotes." In John vi. 71 and xiii. 26 we read "Judas (son) of Simon Iskariotes," but in xii. 4 "Judas the Iskariotes," and in xiii. 2 "Judas Simon's (son) Iskariotes." Six times we find the suffix "who delivered him up" (never "who betrayed him"), once along with "the Iskariotes," Matt. x. 4. Seven times we read "one of the twelve," once "one of his disciples." Altogether this "Judas" meets us twenty-two times, besides John xiv. 22, where we find "Judas, not the Iskariotes." The textual variants are countless. Among the more important is the reading "from Karyotes" (απο καρυωτου) in N and others at John vi. 71; also the same in D at John xii. 4, xiii. 2, 26, and (with the article of prefixed) in xiv. 22; also the form "Skarioth" in D at Mark iii. 19, Luke vi. 16, John vi. 71: also "Scariotes" in D at Matt. x. 4, xxvi. 14, Mark xiv. 10. This D is so highly esteemed by great text critics, such as Volkmar, Zahn, Nestle, that they consider its strange reading απο καρυωτου as the original and even the only original reading in John (which Tischendorf also admits as possible), and as confirming the translation of Iskarioth as "man of Kerioth," as if from the Hebrew 'ish q'riyyôth, and this derivation may be called the accepted one. Holtzmann, e.g., says in Hand-Commentar, i. p. 97, "Iskarioth = the man from Kariot in Juda, Josh. xv. 25." This interpretation, however, is encountered by every kind of improbability. Dalman (Die Worte Jesu, pp. 41, 42) seems to recognise "Iskarioth" as the "original" form "unintelligible to the Gospel writer himself." His subtle philological reasons may be passed over. The more significant facts seem to be that the g'riyyôth of Josh. xv. 25 is not a city or town at all, but is the plural of the dialectic form giryath (city), and refers to a "group of places" (Cheyne) in a district Hezron

not really belonging to Judah, the Revised Version reading correctly Qerioth-Hesron; while the Qerioth of Jer. xlviii. 24, 41, Am. ii. 2, belonged to Moab. Keim (Jesus von Nazara, ii., 225, n. 2), though regarding the meaning "man of Karioth" as certain, saw the improbability of these Qerioths, and accordingly discovered in Josephus a third, now called Kuriut, namely, Koreæ (B.J., i. 6, 5; A., xiv. 3, 4) or Korea (B.J., iv. 8, 1), in the north of Judah, but few or none seem to have followed him in this identification. Wellhausen (Ev. Marci, p. 25) clearly sees the impossibility "of thinking of the Hebrew 'ish and translating 'man of Karioth,'" and, rejecting the notion that it is a gentilitial, wisely inclines to regard it as "a name of reproach like Bandit (Sicarius)." Moreover, it must be remembered that the Syriac form (Skariota) militates strongly against the identification with the Hebrew איש קריות. For this Syriac form, written in Hebrew letters, is סכריומא in both Sinaitic and Peschita, with or so (prefixed) in other less important MSS., and with occasional p for o in Cur. It is seen that the Syriac has p, not p, course it may be plausibly said that the Syriac has merely transliterated the Greek, as in many other cases, e.g. estratiota, from stratiotes (soldier). But the Syriac form presupposes the absence of the initial I from the Greek. True. the Syriac cannot let the word begin with a vowel; however, it would not drop the I, but would prefix an alaf (x), as in the transliteration of Akylas, Euodia, Herodes, Italia, Olympas, Hymenæus, and countless others, or else a yod (1), as in Italica (Acts x. 1).1 For every reason, then, we must reject the accepted interpretation "man of Karioth" as impossible, and at the same time the notion that the term is a gentilitial at all. Moreover, it seems quite impossible to bring the name Iskariot into any connection with the venerable and wide-

¹ Arimathæa (Ramthas) does not seem to be an exception, since the A appears to represent the prefixed Hebrew article Ha. Josephus offers various forms, as Armatha, Aramatha, Rhamatha, Rhamatha. Cp. Cheyne, E.B., 4011.

spread stem שכר, meaning drink, or with any place-name whatever.

At this point, then, the idea of the Hon. Willis Brewer (The Open Court, August 1909), that the name is connected with the Hebrew root S-K-R and means hired, deserves serious consideration. This root occurs often in the Old Testament, about forty-seven times, always in the same sense of hire, wages, reward, price. In all these cases the Hebrew letters are שכר, whence the common Aramæan terms for wage (Sekhîroth) and wage-earner (Sakhîr), but in one case (Ezra iv. 5) the later form occ is used, agreeing exactly with the S-k-r in Skariota. That Judas should be called the hired sounds very plausible, especially in view of the use made by Matthew (xxvii. 9, 10) of the passage (Zech. xi. 12), where my price (שכרי, Sekhari) is twice mentioned. However, while admiring this suggestion, we must not adopt it hastily. For the older narrative (in Mark) makes no mention of this Old Testament passage. The name would seem, then, to have originated independently. Besides, the termination remains unexplained, though this is not so important, and one feels that an active rather than a passive sense is demanded.

But there is another root S-K-R (מכר) appearing in the Old Testament, and once in the exact sense which the New Testament seems to require (for the frequent repetition of the specification about delivering up can hardly be meaningless or unintentional). In Isa. xix. 4 we read, "And I will give over Egypt into the hands of a cruel lord." It is true this stem regularly means "shut up" in Hebrew, Aramæan, and Syriac, and so may be rendered even here (Cheyne); it is also true that Ezek. xxx. 12, "I will sell the land into the hand of the wicked," suggests that the p may be a mistake for p, sikkarti for makharti. But neither of these facts can affect the case, for the text was certainly read and understood in that day precisely as it is now. This is proved by the Septuagint, which renders the v'sikkarti by καὶ παραδώσω=and I will deliver up (exactly as in Matt. xxvi. 15, καὶ παραδώσω). It

is well known that this Greek verb παραδιδόναι does not mean to betray, but to give up, to hand over, to deliver, to surrender, like forgive in its obsolete sense, as in Ben Jonson's line, "It shall if you will; I forgive my right" (Cynthia's Revels, v. 2), and so it is rendered countless times everywhere in the New Testament save in connection with Judas, where it is universally rendered betray. But if the Evangelist had meant betray, he would have said it; the Greek prodidónai was familiar and at hand, and is constantly used by ecclesiastical writers instead of the New Testament παραδιδόναι. That betray was not meant but deliver is plain from the apparent avoidance of the notion betray. There were many occasions to speak of Judas as the Traitor (prodotes), but only in Luke vi. 16 is he so called, since there is no word paradotes, deliverer-up, Ueberlieferer; elsewhere a circumlocution is used, as "who delivered him up," etc. Furthermore, the Sinaitic Syriac version (teste Adalbert Merx) definitely terms him always the Deliverer-up, never the Betrayer, even in Luke vi. 16, where alone the Greek does read prodotes (traitor).

At this point someone may take down Liddell and Scott, and read under παραδίδωμι: 1 "Also with collat. notion of treachery, like προδιδόναι, Lat. prodere, Xen., Cyr., v. 4, 51, Paus., i. 2, 1." Now undoubtedly a man might surrender traitorously, even as he might kiss or embrace, or write or speak, or do many other things traitorously. But all this by no means implies that to kiss, to embrace, to write, to speak, ever means to betray. Accordingly, in none of the instances cited is it proper to render the word by betray. Whatever "collateral notion" of treachery may be present is to be found in the circumstances of the case, not in the word used, which still means simply "deliver up." In Xen., Cyr., it is stated that two strongholds, under fear of Cyrus and persuasions of Gadatas, were induced to give up their garrison (ἐπεισε

¹ When H. Stephanus says: "Apud Evangelistas de Juda Iscariote dicitur παραδιδόναι pro προδιδόναι, Prodere," he merely assumes everything that is in dispute—which is easy, but unprofitable.

παραδοῦναι τοὺς φυλάττοντας). Perhaps Gadatas did corrupt the authorities, but Xenophon has no interest in that fact, it would do no honour to Cyrus, and accordingly he is content to say they gave up the guards, with no further specification. He did not wish to say they betrayed the guards, else he would have said so, and Dindorf has correctly translated, "perfectum est ut custodes dederent." In Pausanias's Attika we read that "at the entrance into the city there is a monument to the Amazon Antiope that when Herakles laid siege to Themiskyra on the Thermodon, but was unable to take it, Antiope, enamoured of Theseus (who was warfaring with Herakles), delivered up the stronghold." Such was the story of the Troezenian Hegias; the Athenians told another. Doubtless the surrender in this case was traitorous enough. But there is nothing in the language to show it. Monuments are rarely erected to traitors; the story-teller was too gallant to blacken the memory of the Amazon, and hence he preferred to say she delivered up the stronghold. Now, if someone says that the deed of Judas, however described, was quite as treacherous, the answer is that we have no interest in denying this assertion. We are not concerned with the moral quality of Iskariot's act, but only with the Evangelist's representation of the act; and without any palliation of his offence we must reaffirm that the Gospel everywhere represents it not as a betrayal but merely as a surrender. It seems curious that the same word (he was delivered up) should be used of John the Baptist, where there is no question of treachery, and yet no visible propriety in the term deliver up. Who surrendered him? and why? It seems useless to conjecture. But however such questions may be answered, we may still say with perfect confidence that the Gospels everywhere represent Judas as the Deliverer-up, never as Traitor.

Now compare the words (I)skariot(h) and Sikkarti in their Hebrew and Syriac forms, one under the other:

Surely the resemblance is altogether too great to be accidental. It is still further increased almost to practical identity when we reflect that the form Iskarioth, apparently the oldest, requires n instead of v, and that the Syriac alaf (x) is regularly used to vocalise, representing both \bar{a} and \bar{e} , and this long ē confounds with ī. However, on vocalisations, whether initial, medial, or final, one can lay no stress. The important point is that the epithet (I)skariot and the Hebrew Sikkarti (deliver up) are nearly identical in form. The immediate and unescapable inference is that (I)skariot(h) is only a very thinly disguised 1 form of the Hebrew and simply means the Surrenderer, so that the recurrent phrases of the Greek text, "Who-also-delivered-him-up," "the Deliverer-up," etc., are merely translations of the epithet (I)skariot(h), where the καί (also) in the Greek seems to re-echo the initial 7 in the Hebrew. This seems to be as natural as possible, almost inevitable. (I)skariot(h) is then precisely what Wellhausen felt it must be, a "Schimpfname," a sobriquet, an opprobrious nick-name — the most appropriate and even unavoidable.2 We recall finally that in Isa. xix. 4 the surrender is into the hand of a cruel lord, and in Ezek. xxx. 12 the sale is into the hands of wicked men, echoes of which we seem to hear in the Gospel phrases "into the hands of sinners" or "sinful men." The possible claims of שקר (deception) in this connection, in spite of the phrase ממין דשקר, need not be canvassed.

The second problem, of (I)skariot(h), would seem then to be solved, and in fact in a surprisingly satisfactory manner. But the question remains, "Who was Judas?" Against the view that he was a mere man, like Arnold or Burr, there lie the

¹ Absolute identity is, of course, not to be sought for. The artist who first devised the name knew that the word in Isa, xix. 4 was a verb, and he designed to reproduce it in a noun-form nearly enough only to make the name a kind of a riddle "vocal to the wise" alone. One may suspect that he modelled the form Skariota on 'estratiota, though there are other possibilities.

² Of course, Wohlenberg rejects Wellhausen's contention peremptorily and refutes it with an exclamation-point (!) (Das Evangelium des Markus, p. 105 n.).

weightiest considerations. In the first place, any motive to the surrender seems utterly lacking. The conceit that he wished to provoke Jesus to a display of miraculous power and an immediate establishment of the Kingdom is quite inadmissible, though championed by De Quincey and mirabile dictu by the later Volkmar (Jesus Nazarenus, p. 121). Suppose the plan had succeeded, what good would it have done Judas? Would Jesus have kept him in his place as treasurer after such treason? That Judas was a veritable devil from the start seems to be the most plausible explanation, and extreme orthodoxy might indeed maintain that he was chosen by Jesus because of his devilry, as an instrument towards the divinely appointed end. This would seem to be consistent enough, and orthodoxy shows itself here, as at so many other points, far superior in dialectic alertness to liberalism, which is deplorably illogical, limping on both legs. But can anyone seriously entertain such a notion? There is not the slightest hint of it in the Synoptics. These know nothing of Judas as a bad man. They say he "surrendered" Jesus to the authorities, nothing more. Even the money (a contemptible four months' wages, according to Matthew) appears as a perfectly voluntary bonus in Mark's account, promised him after his proposal to the high priests. But on this circumstance we lay no stress.

It seems strange, however, that the Synoptics should have no word of condemnation for the surrenderer. Still stranger that they should never assign any motive for the surrender, especially as they are very free with motives in general. Apparently they were no wiser than the moderns, and could find no explanation. Otherwise Luke would hardly have ascribed Iskarioth's conduct to the devil that had entered into him, which would seem to be a dernier ressort. John, according to his wont, goes much further, declaring that Judas was a thief, that the devil prompted him to the surrender, that Satan entered into him, who himself was a devil. All this we recognise at once as part of John's manner in working over the Synoptists. It seems even plainer from these imaginary reasons than from

the discreeter silence of Matthew, and especially of Mark, that the Evangelists could imagine no plausible reason for the surrender. And yet the reason, had there been any, could scarcely have been kept so profound a secret. Moreover, even if it had not been discoverable, why were Matthew, and particularly Mark, so utterly indifferent thereto? Their fancies were lively, why did they not invent a reason? The only answer would seem to be that Mark at least felt that the matter was not one for the assignment of human motives, that it could not be understood in any such childish way.

If the surrender be contemplated from the side of the authorities, it is equally incomprehensible. What need had they of Judas and his kiss? None whatever; undoubtedly they could have arrested Jesus at any time anywhere in broad daylight, in perfect safety. His disciples seem to have been unarmed or indisposed to much resistance, even if one did cut off an "earlet." He himself sits apparently alone and unnoticed, quietly watching the throng cast in contributions to the temple treasury. And what need to fear the people, who cried "Crucify him, Crucify him"? Look at it, then, what way you will, the surrender appears unmotivated, unnecessary, unintelligible. Moreover, it seems to have formed no part of the earliest tradition. In the Apocalypse (xxi. 14) the Twelve appear unbroken in array, as immovable foundations of the celestial city-wall,—there is no hint of defection. "The Apostle" too speaks of the Jesus as appearing to the Twelve, though it is possible that twelve might be used here technically, even if only eleven had been present. To be sure, he does refer to a surrender in the words "the same night in which he was surrendered," but makes no allusion to the Surrenderer. Someone may say such allusion was unnecessary. Perhaps, but on closer scrutiny we are astounded at the nature of the Apostle's statement: "For it is from the Lord that I received what I also delivered to you, that the Lord Jesus," etc. (eyw) γάρ παρέλαβον ἀπὸ τοῦ κυρίου ὁ καὶ παρέδωκα ὑμῖν). Notice the emphatic position of the ἐγώ: Whatever others may say,

"I received from the Lord," etc. Critics in despair may say that "from the Lord" means from the Jerusalem Church, the Urgemeinde of German imagination. But such a consummate Grecian as Georg Heinrici knows better, and plainly tells us (in Meyer's Commentary, p. 325 f.) that there is no such reference. It is, indeed, plain that none of the Apostle's readers would think of understanding "I received from the Lord" as "I received from Peter or John"; it is only the bewildered modern commentator that could stumble on such an idea. The reference must be to some form of supernatural revelation. Hence it can at most testify to a subjective experience of the Apostle's, not to any tradition of the Twelve. Besides, the present writer seems to have proved elsewhere decisively that this passage is an interpolation in the Corinthian Epistle. As to the account (in Acts i.) of the election of Matthias (of whom we never hear again) to the vacancy caused by the lapse of Judas, its late origin lies open to view in the statements about the field Akel-damach = field of sleeping = cemetery. The consciousness revealed is clearly impossible for one speaking of an event that could have occurred at the earliest less than two months before. The speech, then, has been composed by the historian ("for the Scriptures must needs be fulfilled") and placed in the mouth of Peter. We notice that Judas is here spoken of as a "guide."

We are unable, then, to find the conception of Judas as Surrenderer in the very earliest extra-evangelic forms of the Christian story; outside of the Gospels there is no real support of the statements that the Gospels themselves fail to make comprehensible. Now consider for a moment what it is that one can properly be said to surrender or deliver up. Surely nothing but what one has; surrender and delivery seem to imply (in some sense) previous possession. But in what possible sense could Judas be said ever to have possessed the Jesus? As a man, in none at all. Moreover, as the conduct of a man, his surrender has been seen to be every way un-

¹ On this point, however, no stress at all is laid.

intelligible. But are we sure that he was a man? To my mind he was surely not. He stands for Jewry, for the Jewish people. This seems to become a necessary hypothesis as soon as we perceive the impossibility of understanding Judas as a man. On this hypothesis everything becomes clear. The delivery was really to the Gentiles: the phrase, "they (the Jewish authorities) shall deliver him to the Gentiles" seems to belong to the earliest Gospel narrative (Matt. xx. 19; Mark x. 33; Luke xviii. 32), and to lay bare the heart of the whole matter. Noteworthy that while in Matthew and Mark the surrender to the Jewish authorities is mentioned first, and afterwards the surrender to the Gentiles, in Luke this latter alone is mentioned. Luke certainly presents generally a younger form than Mark, but occasionally, it would seem, an older, which need not surprise us. I suspect that the oldest thought was of the surrender of the great Idea of the Jesus, of the Jesus-cult, by the Jews to the heathen. This, in fact, was the supreme, the astounding fact of early Christian history, and engaged intensely the minds of men. Not strange that it should find such manifold expression by parable and by symbol in the Gospels. The wonder would be if it had not.

The story of Judas and his surrender seems to be the most dramatic treatment the great Fact has anywhere received. Other less elaborate sketches are found in the parables of Lazarus and Dives, of the Prodigal Son, and of the Rich One who "with lowering look went away (from Jesus) sorrowful, for he had many possessions" (the Law, the Prophets, the Promises, the Oracles of God). That Israel is here meant becomes evident, if not already so, when we compare Mark x. 22, "But he with lowering look, at the word, went away grieving," with Is. lvii. 17, "and he was grieved and went on with lowering look in his ways." The prophet is describing God's dealing with Jacob, who is still his beloved, though grieved for a brief season (βραχύ τι). The very rare Septuagint

¹ ὁ δὲ στυγνάσας ἐπὶ τῷ λόγῳ ἀπῆλθεν λυπούμενος.

² καὶ ἐλυπήθη καὶ ἐπορεύθη στυγνὸς ἐν ταῖς ὁδοῖς αὐτοῦ.

verb στυγνάζω shows that Mark is merely re-echoing Isaiah, although Dittmar does not note the parallel. There are enough other considerations that confirm this interpretation, but there is space to mention only one, namely, that the Jesus "loved" this Rich One. Now this ascription of such a feeling to the Jesus is quite without parallel in Mark, whose picture of the Jesus is singularly devoid of human attributes σπλαγχνίζομαι (compassionate, used thrice of the Jesus) is an exception that strongly confirms the rule; it merely renders the Old Testament orn (vitals), constantly and practically exclusively used of or in connection with Jehovah, the seeming exceptions being again confirmatory. The explanation is simple and nearlying. Says Jehovah (Hosea xi. 1), "When Israel was young, then I loved him." That Matthew xix. 16-26, felt such to be the reference is hinted with exquisite art in the word νεανίσκος, which he applies to the Rich One who, according to Mark, had kept all commands "from his vouth," which must then have been behind him. But Matthew, as everyone knows, was a literalist, setting great store by the exact words of the Scripture, and, observing that Israel was young when loved, he boldly turned Mark's one ($\epsilon \hat{i}_{S}$) into a youth ($\nu \epsilon \alpha \nu i \sigma \kappa o_{S}$). What other explanation can be offered for this "correction of Mark"?

Of course it is easy to say that the symbolism of Judas (= Judæus) has not been carried out consistently. The surrender is made to the Jews themselves (High Priest and other dignitaries),¹ who then deliver to the heathen. We answer that the symbol has come down to us only in a highly elaborated and historicised form; such elaboration must always do violence to the original idea. A symbol no more than a metaphor will bear pressing, though often pressed. A single point of even remote resemblance will suffice for any simile.

"Beholding whom, men think how fairer far Than all the steadfast stars the wandering star!"

¹ Observe that critics (as Loisy) regard the part played by the Jews, the whole trial by night, as a later fiction.

In a cool hour Mr Lang would doubtless confess and deny not, and that, too, without prejudice to the great beauty of his verses, that the likeness of Lord Byron to any known member of our planetary system is extremely faint and elusive. The ways of the overworker are past finding out; it would be idle to attempt to trace the steps that have conducted to such a composite result as now lies before us in the Gospels. Yet even there the evidences of gradual evolution from Mark to John are open and manifest. Let us remember that even the former transports us not to the source, but only half-way up the stream. When we consider other parts of the evangelic narrative and note the rich harvests-thirty, sixty, a hundredfold—that have been garnered from single seminal ideas, the development assumed in the present case seems scarcely excessive. But the interpretation of Judas here suggested is not presented as a finality nor as proved by the considerations advanced. It is part of a general system of New Testament exegesis; it stands or falls with the present writer's total conception of the genesis of Christianity, to which it lends, from which in far greater measure it borrows, strength.

Not so, however, the decipherment of (I)scariot(h). This is a philologic matter, not by any means sharing the fate of any theory of Christian origins, but emulating the aseity of Kant's Thing-in-Itself. But even it may nevertheless enter into relations. For the well-attested D-form απο καρυωτου must now appear as an early attempt to interpret the epithet Iskariot, the force of which was no longer felt. Hereby a strong sidelight is thrown on a seemingly similar attempt to interpret the far more important epithet, Nazaraios. It seems to be proved that this appellative was a very old one, antedating our era (see Der vorchristliche Jesus, ii.); in fact we find the name Nasiru embedded in a list of tribes or classes on the clay-tablet inscription of Tiglath-Pileser III. We may be sure that the name is not derived from Nazareth, but is a development from the familiar stem N-S-R, meaning guard, protect. However, in Matt. ii. 23 the term is referred to

Nazareth, which city under various forms of the name is thoroughly naturalised in our Gospels. Even in Mark i. 9 we read that "Jesus came from (ἀπό) Nazareth of Galilee." This seems like a later addition to the narrative, as indicated by the title 'Inσους, used here without the article, but elsewhere regularly with it, in this Gospel. Moreover, the text is uncertain, the reading είς for ἀπό may be older. In Matt. xxi. 11 we find "the prophet Jesus ὁ ἀπὸ Ναζαρέθ," and the same Greek phrase also in John i. 45, Acts x. 38. We may now understand this phrase. It seems to be nothing but an attempt to explain Nazoraios precisely as απο καρυωτου is an attempt to explain (I)skariot. As to Nazareth itself, of course it is there now, plain to see, but in olden times it seems to have borne another name, Hinnaton, according to the testimony of the El-Amarna tablets and the Annals of Tiglath-Pileser III. Both words mean the same, namely, defence, protection, and we may now see how the "city called Nazareth" may have come into being. The new name Nazareth, meaning defence, was applied to the old town Hinnaton, meaning protection. Some perceived that this name would not yet yield the desired gentilitial Nazaree, and accordingly wrote it Nazara, the form preferred by Keim, but too weakly attested. It would seem, then, that the mystery surrounding these names is clearing up.

The passages in the tablets are, according to Winckler, in 11 (13–17), letter of Burrakuriaš, King of Karduniaš, to Naphururia, King of Egypt—"Now my merchants who journeyed with Ahi-tâbu, and tarried in Kinahhi on business: after Ahiṭâbu went on his way to my brother, in city Ḥi-in-natu-ni of land Kinahhi [i-na (âlu) Ḥi-in-na-tu-ni ša (mâtu) Ki-na-ah-hi, etc.]." Ki-na-ah-hi = Canaan. Further, 196 (24–32) in the continuation of a letter we find, "but Surata took Lapaja out of Magidda, and said to me, 'Upon a ship I will bring him to the King.' But Surata took him and sent him from (city) Ḥinatuni home" [u ji-tar šir-šu iš-tu (alu) Ḥi-na-tu-na a-na bîti-šu].

The inscription in the *Annals* (as edited by Paul Rost, 1893) reads, i. 232 [šal-lat] (âlu) Ḥi-na-tu-na, 650 šal-lat (â lu) Ḥa-na [captives] (city) Ḥi-na-tu-na, 650 captives (city) Ḥa-na As the record is lost after Ḥa-na, we cannot be sure that Cana of Galilee is meant. If one should find a scrap of paper torn immediately after the letters *Adria*, one would not be sure that the reference was to Adria in Italy, it might be to Adrianople. But since Hinatuni was certainly in Canaan, the suggestion of Cana six miles north of our Nazareth (=Hinatuni) is very nearlying.

That Judas Iskariot typifies the Jewish people in its rejection of the Jesus-cult seems so obvious, it seems to meet us so close to the threshold of the inner sense of the New Testament, that it may move our wonder that anyone should overlook it. However, the ablest and even the rashest, the most lynx-eyed critics have passed it by. In Cramer's Catena we find only inanities on the theme of Judas; he is no longer the Surrenderer but the Traitor (prodotes)-pro has indeed quite displaced para -and his covetousness and general vileness wax page after page. At John xiii. 30 it is asked: "Why does the Evangelist say that it was night when Judas went out? To teach us how reckless he was, for not even the time (of day) could restrain his impulse." From such there is naught to hope. Bruno Bauer of course "resolved" the whole thing into a caustic curve formed by reflections from the Old Testament. In this case he found the main surface of reflection in Psalm xli. 10: "Yea, mine own familiar friend, in whom I trusted, which did eat of my bread, hath lifted up heel against me." Kritik der evangelischen Geschichte, xiii. 85, 4: "Aus jenem Psalmwort ist die ganze Scene entstanden." But he does not seem to connect Judas with Jewry. Strauss discusses Judas at length (Leben Jesu kritisch untersucht, §§ 118, 119), but without throwing any light on the matter. Volkmar, who fixed his gaze so intently on the Gospels and who saw deeper than any of his contemporaries (with the possible exception of Loman),

in his great work Marcus (p. 555) declared that "for Mark, Judas one of the Twelve is the symbol of the Judaism that slew the Christ, which in the first disciples was most closely united with Him till the end." Iskariot, however, he still regarded as historical and as "actually notorious as apostate." Upon him Mark seized as a fitting vehicle for his own idea of Judaism. and the fusion of the symbolic and historic vielded us Judas-Iskariot. Volkmar has no doubt that this last word means "man of Kerioth" and is rightly explained by D's form ano καρυωτου in John. The great Züricher had wonderful insight; his Marcus (1875) is indeed a volume of visions, but it is almost unreadable, and was long since sealed with the seven seals of oblivion, which even Wrede could not loose. He himself shrank back half affrighted at what he saw, and in his swan song (Jesus Nazarenus, 1882) we seem to hear a palinode. Meantime his central critical thesis of the priority of Mark has become a commonplace of criticism, though the Logoi-source, so diligently exploited by Matthew, might seem to boast justly still higher antiquity. Volkmar's notion that the Pauline Mark, by insistence on the phrase "one of the Twelve," means to hint that a certain element of the old Judaism clung to the last to "the primitive group of disciples," has indeed a certain plausibility, but it seems to assume a primitive group that never existed, to make this Gospel unnecessarily controversial, and to magnify a relatively insignificant matter, as did Baur's criticism in general even in its later and most severely critical presentments.

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VITALISM.

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In one of the oldest biological treatises in the world the soul or life of an organism is defined as an activity of a natural, living, organic body—life being autonomous nutrition, and growth, and decay. The activity may, however, be latent or patent, passive or active, without losing its peculiar characters. It is substance, but substance as "form" as opposed to the material substance of the body, and the living body is therefore also a substance in a double sense.

It is not identical with the body, but as form, proportion, activity, essence, it is related to the body, mere matter and potentiality, in just the same way as the seal is related to the wax; and the body is the instrument whereby it effects its purposes. Though subsequent in time, it is prior in thought to the body, as all activities are to the materials with which they operate.

At the same time neither it nor its parts are separable from the body (with the exception, possibly, of mind). It is, indeed, the actual or possible functioning of the body, like the seeing of the eye, or the cutting of the axe, and, with the disappearance of the capacity of this functioning, the soul itself also perishes.

Lastly, it is a cause in a triple sense, as the source of motion, as that for the sake of which the body exists, and as its essence or "formal" cause.

This soul or life is of several kinds which together form an ascending series, each member of which is necessarily involved in those above it.

The lowest is the nutritive soul, found in all living things, and the only soul possessed by plants. It is defined as motion in respect of nutrition, decay, and growth—processes which involve alteration in the body—and its functions are to utilise the food for the maintenance and reproduction of the form of the body, and to control and limit growth.

The second is the perceptive soul. This also is a kind of alteration, and consists in being moved and affected. The fundamental and indispensable perception is touch, for it is concerned in the acquisition of food. It is invariably present. The others may or may not, some or all, be present.

All animals possess perception, and some have a capacity for locomotion, the performance of which function requires, again, a special kind of soul.

Lastly, there is the reasoning soul or mind. This is found in man alone, unless there be other things similar to him, or even nobler than he. Mind alone is eternal and separable from the body.

Though the observation and experiment of modern science would doubtless find much to alter in the details of these definitions, yet it must be conceded that by what is certainly a most fortunate guess, if it is not the most wonderful insight, Aristotle has here laid his finger on the cardinal point of modern physiological doctrine. For, putting aside for the moment the mental faculties, it is here laid down in the clearest manner that not only the functions of growth and decay, nutrition and reproduction, but also the capacity of responding to stimuli are to be ultimately resolved into some kind of movement of the particles of which the body is composed. Life, in short, as we might say with Virchow, is a mode of motion.

The biology of to-day distinguishes living from inanimate bodies by the possession and exercise of the three principal functions of metabolism, irritability, and reproduction. Further, the body which performs these functions is not only composed of chemically complex substances—proteids—which are not found in things which are not alive, but possesses a structure. In no case, even the simplest, is the organism a mere homogeneous lump of protoplasm, but has parts or organs, visibly different from one another, and obviously connected with the activities appropriated to each, and it is the preservation of that structure, in the individual and in the race, which is the end towards which the collective performance of all these functions, or the life of the organism, is apparently directed.

Some of these peculiarities are shared by certain things that are not commonly regarded as alive. Crystals have, of course, a definite structure; they can divide, and when broken they can make good the missing part, but they do not assimilate to the substance of their own bodies a food-material which is less complex than it, and they are not irritable. The dissimilarities, indeed, between the living and the lifeless are so profound that it is not to be wondered at that there should have been in all ages natural philosophers who have held that living activities are phenomena sui generis differing toto cœlo from the properties exhibited by lifeless bodies, and never by any conceivability to be expressed in terms of these.

This doctrine is vitalism.

It exists in several varieties, but one at least is of very ancient lineage, and can be traced back to the speculations of the Greeks.

Whether properly to be attributed to Aristotle himself or not, it is yet certain that vitalistic views appear and reappear down to the end of the Middle Ages in treatises which bear the stamp of his persistent influence.

For Galen the soul is a quasi-material "pneuma"; for Vesalius it is an animal spirit elaborated in the ventricles of the brain; for Paracelsus and Treviranus it is wholly spiritual, a conscious "Lebenskraft" shaping the physical forces of the body to its own ends, dreaming dimly in the grain of the promise of the full corn in the ear.

This is vitalism in its extreme or "animistic" form, and it is curious to observe the revival, at the beginning of the twentieth century, of such mediæval mysticism in the speculative writings of so accomplished an experimentalist as Hans Driesch.

Driesch is an embryologist who, in his earlier days, had enunciated a theory of organic development, according to which differentiation is a mechanical process, set in motion by fertilisation or some other cause. Given the presence in the germ or ovum of a certain number of parts or substances capable of acting upon one another with a fixed co-ordination or harmony of the stimuli and the responses to them, given, further, a proper constitution of the external environment, then a definite result must follow: the production of an organism which is like the parents that gave it birth.

But in his later writings this hypothesis has been repudiated, and, by a remarkable volte face, replaced by a dogma of a wholly different kind. For now it is urged that no merely material factors can possibly account either for the harmony of development or the functional harmony seen in the activities of the adult.

For example, it is asserted that any fragment of an egg (of a sea-urchin) that is not too small can give rise to a whole larva with all its parts in correct proportion. And, again, we are told that the cells of the segmented ovum may be disarranged to any extent without prejudice to the ultimate normality of development. Each part of the ovum can therefore, according to the needs of the case, give rise to any part of the resulting organism. "Jeder Theil kann nach Bedürfniss jedes." For each of these acts of development in the whole uninjured larva an explanation may conceivably be given in terms of formative stimuli exerted by the originally distinct parts of the egg and calling forth responses in other

parts. A mechanism may be thought of which, when set in motion, will achieve a certain end in accordance with its own pre-established harmony. But a mechanism which can be subdivided ad libitum, and the parts of which will still achieve the same end, will still behave as wholes with their parts co-ordinated in the same ratio, temporally, and specially! Such a mechanism is an inconceivability; for, to ensure the result which does follow, the relative amounts and positions of the necessary substances must be imagined to be identical in every possible fragment of the egg.

Something is therefore required to superintend, to coordinate the causes of development in the case not only of the part but of the whole egg as well; and this something is not material. Driesch describes it as a rudimentary feeling and willing, as a "psychoid," as "morphæsthetic" or perceptive of that form which is the desired end towards which it controls and directs all the material elements of differentiation, like Treviranus' grain of wheat dreaming dimly of its destiny. It is thus a vera causa—an unconditional and invariable antecedent—a psychical factor which can intervene in the purely physical series of causes and effects, and for it he revives the Aristotelian term "entelechy."

Such is the vitalism of Hans Driesch, a teleological theory clearly, but no mere metaphysical doctrine of final causes; rather, a dynamic teleology which not only sees an end in every organic process, but postulates an immaterial entity to guide the merely mechanical forces towards the realisation of that end. Such a theory is open to very serious criticism from both the scientific and the philosophical sides. But before we pass to that criticism, let us turn to examine some of the other aspects under which the Proteus of vitalism presents himself.

The physiologist Bunge's view that the essence of vitalism lies in starting from what we know, the internal world of our own consciousness, to explain what we do not know, the external world, appears to rest upon an epistemological confusion between an idealistic philosophy and an animistic biology. Similarly in Johannes Müller's conception of the "unconscious idea," homogeneous, existing throughout the mass of the organism, and divisible with the organism without suffering any diminution of its powers, the formal and the final cause are confounded with one another; the idea of the end to be realised present at the beginning in the mind of the artificer with the end itself.

Of this "unconscious idea" we seem again to catch an echo in the "autonomy of the organism" proclaimed by Dr Haldane and by those who, not content with the assertion that at present we have not succeeded in reducing the activities of the organism to physical terms, maintain the utter futility of any such endeavour, and pronounce over the hidden mysteries of life an eternal "ignorabimus."

One other view retains now but a historical interest. De Buffon's doctrine of the existence of a special vital material endowed with a special vital force could not of course survive the rise of modern chemistry. Its death-knell was sounded when Lavoisier and Laplace showed that the bodies of organisms were composed of the same elements met with in inanimate nature, and it has long since passed into the limbo of discredited speculations.

Frankly opposed to vitalism in all its forms is the conception of the living body as a mechanism. It is in the physiology of Descartes that this first appears unmistakably in its modern guise.

For Descartes the body is simply an earthly machine. The nerves are tubes up which—in sensation—the animal spirits flow to the brain only to be reflected (whence our term "reflex action") down other tubes to the muscles.

"All the functions of the body," he tells us, "follow naturally from the sole disposition of its organs, just in the same way that the movements of a clock, or other self-acting machine, or automaton, follow from the arrangement of its weights and wheels." The rational soul, the soul which thinks—that is, understands, wishes, imagines, remembers, and feels—is not material. Though it always acts through the machine, yet that machine can go on perfectly well without the soul.

Like Descartes, Leibniz also affirms that the body is a machine or natural automaton. Unlike Descartes, however, he refuses to believe that the mind directs the machine in any way. Rather, there is a complete series of psychical parallel to a complete series of physical processes, and between the two a pre-established harmony.

Although the details of Cartesian physiology have long since been exploded, yet the mechanical principle which that philosophy enunciated so clearly has persisted, and has indeed proved to be the rock on which modern physiological science has been built. For, when once the chemists had discovered animal and plant structures to be composed of elements found in lifeless bodies, and had proved that compounds found only in the organism could yet be synthesised in vitro, there was no longer any reason why the properties of the compounds should be considered as of a different order to the properties of their component elements. A method applicable to the one was applicable to the other, and, as Claude Bernard has put it, mechanical, physical, and chemical forces are the only effective agents in the living body, and they are the only agencies of which the physiologist has to take account. The substances of which the living body is made up are, no doubt, extremely complex, yet none the less-to quote a more recent writer, Verworn—physiology is in the last resort the chemistry of the proteids.

The mechanical principle has now for nearly a century guided and stimulated research into the functions of the organism; to it physiologists too numerous to mention have not been ashamed to subscribe; under its banner some of the proudest triumphs of the science have been won. Yet it is precisely this which modern or neo-vitalism has challenged,

and asks us to relinquish in favour of a theory of "psychoids" or a pseudo-metaphysical theory of life.

The vitalistic position may be assailed from two points, the scientific and the philosophical.

In the first place the vitalist asserts that mechanism is inadequate to explain the phenomena of metabolism, of transmission of nervous stimuli, and of development. It is upon the last of these that Driesch lays especial stress. As we have already seen, Driesch has stated that any part (that is not too small) of the undeveloped ovum, any cell of the segmented ovum, is capable of giving rise to a complete, correctly proportioned individual, and has urged that a machine which could be subdivided in this way is unthinkable.

The reply to this contention is simple. It is not true that the development capacity of every part of the germ is so unrestricted.

For experiment has taught us, first, that there are in the unfertilised ovum certain different substances, definitely and necessarily connected with the development of certain organs, since their removal entails the absence of the organ to which each is appropriate; and, secondly (and here some of the evidence has been brought forward by Driesch himself), that in the process of segmentation a time always comes when these substances become allocated to the several cells, and that thereafter the potentialities of those cells are limited. At what particular moment that limitation occurs depends on the original arrangement of the substances in the ovum, which is variable. Only so long as each cell contains a sample of each substance, does it retain the capacity for total development.

Hence up to a certain point the parts are interchangeable. When isolated from its fellows each totipotent part—brought now under new external conditions—becomes an actual whole, just as such a mechanism as a rocket out of which, under the appropriate stimulus, a certain pattern of stars is developed,

might be subdivided into two or more rockets of half size or less, each capable of being developed into a similar whole pattern.

If the number of these organ-forming substances were very large, as large, let us suppose, as the total number of separately inheritable characters, it might indeed be difficult to imagine a mechanism divisible into even two totipotent moieties. But from the need for this assumption we are saved by the second part of Driesch's own Analytische Theorie, which accounts for the later processes of differentiation by attributing the production of new parts to the mutual interactions of those that are the first to appear. For this also experimental evidence, though meagre, is not lacking, while a close parallel is found in the dependence of certain bodily functions upon substances—the "hormones" of Professor Starling—secreted by other organs.

In the second place, the vitalist maintains that the processes of metabolism defy, nay more, always will defy, chemical and physical analysis. The first part of this statement may be a true description of the knowledge of to-day, but the existence in the living body of the same elements as are met with elsewhere, the synthesis of complex organic substances, the establishment of the equivalence of the energy which leaves the body as mechanical work or heat to that which enters it in chemical form in the food, should surely make us pause before abandoning all hope of attaining to a chemistry of life.

And, thirdly, there are still physiologists who believe that the complex phenomena presented to us in the activities of the nervous system are susceptible of a purely mechanical explanation. I cannot do better than quote the authority of Professor Gotch.

"A feature," he says, "which more particularly suggests spontaneous cellular activity is the well-known fact that centrifugal discharges may continue after the obvious centripetal ones have ceased. This is pre-eminently the case when the central mass is rendered extremely unstable by certain chemical

compounds, such as strychnine, etc. There are, however, suggestive indications in connection with such persistent discharges. The more completely all the centripetal paths are blocked by severance and other means, the less perceptible is such persistent discharge, and since nervous impulses are continually streaming in to the central mass from all parts, even from those in apparent repose, it would seem that could we completely isolate nerve-cells, their discharge would probably altogether cease." Even in the hyper-excitable condition produced by strychnine the spinal motor nerve-cells do not discharge centrifugal impulses when cut off from the centripetal connections. The physiologist therefore "has definite grounds for believing that, as far as present knowledge goes, both the production and cessation of central nervous discharges are the expression of propagated changes, and that these changes reveal themselves as physico-chemical changes of an electrolytic character. The nervous process, which rightly seems to us so recondite, does not, in the light of this conception, owe its physiological mystery to a new form of energy, but to a circumstance that a mode of energy displayed in the non-living world occurs in colloidal electrolytic structures of great chemical complexity."

To all these considerations we must add the fact that life did once originate upon this planet from matter which was not alive, and that even now some inorganic phenomena present at least remote analogies with certain vital processes. Such are the structure, the division, and the regeneration of crystals.

We turn now to the philosophical objections that may be raised to vitalistic speculations; and here we must be careful to distinguish the psychological from the metaphysical form of the doctrine.

Driesch has maintained that the belief in a morphæsthetic psychoid finds support in the philosophies of Kant and Aristotle. Let us examine the merits of this claim.

Like the scientists of to-day, Kant, in his Critique of the

Teleological Judgment, lays it down as a rule that the mechanical method, by which natural phenomena are brought under general laws of causation and so explained, should in all cases be pushed as far as it will go, for this is a principle of the determinant judgment.

There are cases, however, in which this alone does not suffice. The possibility of the growth and nutrition—above all, of the reproduction and regeneration—of organisms is only fully intelligible through another quite distinct kind of causality, their purposiveness. Such purposiveness is internal, for the organism is at once its own cause and an end to itself.

Such is the principle of the teleological judgment. It is a heuristic principle rightly brought to bear, at least problematically, upon the investigation of organic nature by a distant analogy with our own causality according to purposes generally, and indispensable to us, as anatomists, as a guiding thread if we wish to learn how to cognise the constitution of organisms without aspiring to an investigation into their first origin. The principle of purposes does not make the mode of origination of organic beings any more comprehensible, and this is just what natural science requires to know. Science, therefore, needs determinant principles as well, which alone can inform us of the possibility of finding the ultimate explanation of the world of organisms in a causal combination for which an understanding is not explicitly assumed.

The general meaning of these reflections of Kant's upon organisms is perfectly clear. He who would "complete the perfect round" of his knowledge must think not only in beginnings but in ends. Such a position is quite intelligible philosophically, but the testimony it brings to the theory of the psychoid is of very doubtful value, as Driesch is well aware. He complains, indeed, that Kant's teleology is descriptive or "static" rather than "dynamic," as is perfectly true.

We turn, then, to the second authority.

As we have seen already, the souls or functions of nutrition and perception are, in the Aristotelian Biology, eventually

resolvable into alterations or movements of the particles of the body; mind alone is separable from the body and eternal.

In the development of the individual mind comes in from outside, but the two souls of lower order are present in the germ which results from the commingling of the male and female elements, or, as we should say, the fertilised ovum. The material and efficient causes of development are not, however, both contributed by each of the parents. The teaching of Aristotle is that the matter is provided by the female, the form, the "correct proportionality," by the male. The male, which is qualitative, and activity, imparts to the female element—which is passive and merely quantitative—the same kind of motion which itself possesses, the motion which was present in the particles of food in its final form from which it was itself derived. The communication of this motion is enough to set going the machinery; the rest then follows of itself in proper order.

At the same time Aristotle evidently does not regard this mechanical explanation as complete. For elsewhere he compares the male element to a cunning workman making a work of art. It uses cold and heat, as he uses his tools. For the older naturalists, he expressly tells us, were wrong in supposing that the heat and cold could ever of themselves—by coagulations and condensations—produce the form of the body. The organic body, indeed, is not what it is because it is produced in such and such a fashion, rather it is because it is to be such and such that it must be developed as it is.

And here lies the kernel of the whole matter. The formal cause of a work of art is an intelligible vera causa, it is the idea in the mind of the artist antecedent to the execution of the work, but the formal or final cause of an organism, the end which it apparently strives to attain, can only be said by a metaphor to be prior in time to the existence of the organism itself. Prior in thought, however, it certainly is, for it is only the performance of its functions by the organism complete in all its parts that makes the mere mechanism of development

comprehensible to us; in this sense, the process exists for the sake of the end. Only as efficient cause is the soul prior in time. Only so far as it is prior in thought can it be said to be a final cause.

Such a teleology is, it is obvious, indistinguishable in principle from the position in which Kant leaves us. It is the position adopted by Driesch himself in his earlier Analytische Theorie, but discarded in the Vitalismus in favour of a theory of psychoids.

To this belief there are grave objections.

This "psychoid," to which the name "entelechy" is surely misapplied, this rudimentary feeling and willing, which is aware of the form it desires to produce, must be psychically at least as complex as the phenomena it is designed to account for, and stand therefore as much in need of explanation as they. As Kant has observed, this will involve us at once in an infinite series of such entities. In fact it is only a "photograph" of the problem, and no solution at all.

Nothing is gained by multiplying these entities beyond necessity, and the progress of science would be better served by a simpler philosophy.

The second type of vitalism is the metaphysical or pseudometaphysical. Even when the "psychoid" has been abandoned, we still find vitalism preaching the "autonomy of the organism" or the "unconscious idea." The "dynamic" teleology of Driesch has disappeared, only to be replaced by the final cause.

We may point out perhaps in passing that the organism is by no means so autonomous as might be desired. The end towards which the creature strives, the maintenance and reproduction of its own specific form, is no constant terminus ad quem, for species are as mortal as individuals; nor is it always achieved. The autonomy of a worm which, bisected in a certain way, regenerates a tail instead of a head, or of a frog which after a particular injury develops six legs instead of two, has surely renounced its rights. But setting this

aside, it must be seriously questioned whether any good purpose is served in biological discussion by decrying the value of mechanical conceptions or by confounding two distinct orders of thought. The questions are grave ones, for the issue at stake is no less than the existence of physiology as the science of the causes of living activities.

"Recte ponitur," said Lord Bacon, "vere scire esse per causas scire." The maxim of the great founder of modern inductive science has been the lodestar of biology in the past, and is still its watchword to-day. By exact observation and crucial experiment, utilising every canon of induction, the activities of the living organism are to be brought under wide general laws of causation, which will be in the first instance physiological laws-of response to stimuli, of metabolism, and of growth. By means of these laws predictions can be made and verified as often as we please. But no bar can legitimately be set to the scope of human inquiry; the thought process will not rest here, and ultimately it may be found possible to state the widest generalisations of biology in chemical and physical, and these again in purely mechanical terms. The maintenance and evolution of form in the individual as well as the larger evolution of form in the race, become but the final term in a far vaster cosmic process, from "homogeneity to heterogeneity."

The idea is, of course, perfectly familiar. It is the analysis of purely physical causes carried to its extreme limit. Phenomena are thought out in terms not of origins merely, but of one origin; and that one origin is the only mystery that remains. This unification of the sciences has always been and must still remain the dream and the faith and the inspiration of the scientific man, and could such an edifice of the intellect ever be realised, the task of science would have been completed.

But only when this purely deterministic method has been pushed as far as it will go does science leave off. Only where science leaves off does philosophy begin. There is an order of time, and there is an order of thought. Science works in the order of time, and necessarily so; for although science can never say what constitutes the invariable link between antecedent and consequent which it terms causal, yet it rightly speaks of the first as cause, determining the second, as effect, since it is its function to predict from the past which is known to the future which is not.

But the outlook of philosophy is different. Dissatisfied with the endless regress of cause and effect, sceptical of first causes and original homogeneities, out of which by no conceivability could any heterogeneity have ever been developed, philosophy looks to the end.

The activities of living organisms at least appear to be directed to an end. They are apparently purposive, and it is this purposiveness which lends to biology, though built on the fundamental conceptions of chemistry and physics, peculiar features of its own, and is, of course, answerable for the teleological language which biologists so frequently employ. And by a knowledge of the end the view of science, to which qua science it cannot too rigidly confine itself, will doubtless be supplemented and enlarged.

But plain and definite though the end of an individual life may be, the end of the race—of the human or of any other race,—the end of the universe are things only to be guessed at, and all we are left with is an indefinite series of evolving systems emerging out of an infinite past and fading into an infinite future.

In the final issue indeed the last effect is as delusive an ignis fatuus as the first cause. The philosophy which has rejected one must divest itself of the other, and seek its end if anywhere in the logical prius of the mind which, though last in time, is yet first in thought, since through it alone can that ordered knowledge of nature which we call science be born and brought to perfection.

J. W. JENKINSON.

WATER-FINDING AND FAITH-HEALING.

THE VERY REV. CHARLES T. OVENDEN, D.D.,
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THE history of the art of water-finding has been given fully in two volumes of the *Proceedings* of the Society for Psychical Research, viz. part xxxii., vol. xiii., July 1897, and part xxxviii., vol. xv., October 1900, written after many years of study by Professor W. F. Barrett, F.R.S.

I need only say, for the sake of clearness, that when a water-finder or "dowser," as he is called, walks over a place beneath which running water is confined, the forked rod which he holds in his hands indicates its presence by moving either upwards or downwards.

The question which I wish to discuss in this short paper is the cause of the phenomenon. Is the rod moved by the subconscious mind of the dowser acting on his muscles, which by their motion either elevate or depress the rod? or, is there another cause of the phenomenon, in which the dowser takes an essential part?

My first experience of water-finding is given in a letter which I wrote to Professor Barrett at his request, and which he published in the *Journal* of the S.P.R., No. cclvii., vol. xiv., March 1909, in which I said: "I went to Rossory Glebe as the Bishop's representative on a commission of repairs and dilapidations, a new rector having been appointed. We found in the corner of an old kitchen a small well of clear water. The outside well was 39 feet from the ground to the surface of

the water. We asked the outgoing rector where the clear water came from which supplied the indoor well. He replied, 'I don't know.' Mr Jervois, the architect, said, 'Come out until we look for the source.' He cut a forked twig of a snowberry bush, shaped like a Y. Then he held his elbows close to his sides, with his palms upward, the little fingers being next one another. He bent the forks of the twig outwards, and gripped them at the two ends, with the point projecting horizontally before him. I noticed that he held the bent forks very tightly. In this attitude he walked across the bank sloping towards the rectory. For some time the stick remained pointing straight outwards; then, suddenly, as he crossed a certain spot, the twig bent upwards violently and hit him on the chest. He was holding it so tightly that the parts held in his hands could not turn, and the wrench broke the stick like an untwisted cord. I was amazed. He passed beyond the spot, and the twig remained inert; but going backwards and forwards, always at the same spot, where the stream was running underground, the twig leaped upwards. He said, 'Now touch my hand and you will neutralise the effect.' I laid my hand loosely on his closed fist, and we passed over the spot without any movement in the stick. Being more surprised, I said, 'Let me try it.' He said, 'You would be no good, for you stopped my power by touching me.' However, I held the twig as he did, having cut off the broken part, and when I passed the spot I felt the light twig suddenly become as heavy as if it were made of steel and were being pulled downward by a strong magnet. I held it as tightly as I could close my strong hands, but in spite of my efforts it twisted round and pointed downwards. Mr Jervois said (and I heard this for the first time in my life) that with most dowsers it did point downwards."

Commenting on this letter, Professor Barrett says (p. 53): "The Dean, I may mention, has published some useful little books on elementary science, hence he does not take refuge in the usual electricity theory, albeit nothing will shake his con-

viction that some force external to the dowser moves the rod. The unanimity with which all dowsers hold this view shows how distinct from our conscious personality are the involuntary actions of our subconscious life."

In reply to my letter he kindly sent me his published Memoranda on the so-called Dowsing Faculty, in which, explaining the motion of the rod, he says:—

- "1. A certain number of persons—say one or two in every score—have a marked idiosyncrasy, which manifests itself in slight, involuntary, and unconscious movements usually of the arms and hands. Doubtless all persons exhibit this to a less degree.
- "2. These movements may be cultivated by repetition, by expectant attention, and by inhibiting the conscious and voluntary control of those particular muscles.
- "3. They are best revealed (a) by the oscillations of the so-called pendule-explorateur, a ring or ball suspended from a thread held between the thumb and finger; and (b) by a motion of the so-called divining or dowsing rod, usually but not always a forked twig, the branching ends being held one in each hand, so that the whole is in somewhat unstable equilibrium.
- "4. These instruments, along with other less portable devices, such as planchette, may be called *autoscopes*, as they reveal minute automatic movements of the muscles.
- "5. Motor automatism, as their phenomenon is termed, is a reflex action excited by some stimulus, derived either (i.) from a dormant idea or a subconscious suggestion in the automatist's own mind; or (ii.) from a subconscious impression produced on the automatist by an external object, or by an external mind. The former create auto-suggestion, or autogenous movements of the autoscope; the latter are hetero-suggestive movements.
- "6. Abundant evidence has been obtained, showing that the sudden twisting of the dowsing rod may arise from both (i.) and (ii.). Hence, to infer, a priori, that the motion of the rod is due to a particular stimulus, arising from the presence

of underground water, is absurd. Albeit this false inference is usually drawn by professional dowsers, who thus sometimes lead the credulous to very costly mistakes.

- "7. Underground water and metallic ores are often indicated by surface signs, imperceptible to the ordinary observer, but which become known to the experienced dowser. Such indications, even when not consciously perceived, may create a subconscious impression on the dowser that will excite the automatic motion of his rod (5, ii.). A plausible explanation of the success achieved by some dowsers may thus be given.
- "8. But there are numerous cases where this explanation completely breaks down, and yet the dowser, often an unobservant, ignorant man, has succeeded where the most skilful observers have failed. Mere chance coincidence, lucky hits, can also be shown to be wholly inadequate to account for their successes.
- "9. Nor can we explain them by some electrical or other known physical agency, or radio-active emanation, proceeding from underground water or ores and detected by the dowser. For dowsers are not peculiarly sensitive to such influences, and, moreover, they have been successful in many objects of search besides water and ores. The true explanation is probably to be found in something new to science, which may be stated as follows:—
- "10. Amongst those who exhibit motor-automatism, a certain proportion have a subconscious, super-normal perceptive faculty. Any particular object sought for—it seems immaterial what that object may be—excites an impression on the automatist when he approaches it, though the object is usually out of sight, and may be far beneath the surface of the ground.
- "11. This impression in most cases remains entirely subconscious, and is only revealed by its exciting the reflex that moves the dowsing rod, or other portable autoscope; not infrequently, however, it reaches the level of an obscure sensation or emotional disturbance, and in some cases it

actually rises to a conscious perception of the object sought for. In these latter cases motor-automatism may be absent.

- "12. A good dowser is, therefore, one who possesses this super-normal perceptive power, and instinctively allows it to be operative when dowsing. Like other instinctive acts arising from some unexplained perceptive faculty, such as the 'homing' of pigeons and of certain animals, the intrusion of reason or of any conscious volition is prejudicial or fatal to the end in view.
- "13. Hence for 250 years it has been noticed that children or simple country folk—children of Nature—whose minds are free from preconceived ideas or reasoning, form the best dowsers, being less liable to auto-suggestion.
- "14. When the normal self-consciousness is more or less in abeyance, or when it is completely submerged, as in the hypnotic state, we should expect to find this super-normal perceptive power more apparent.
- "15. Inasmuch as something akin to an emotional disturbance (11) is excited in the percipient by the discovery of the object of his search, we should expect to find corresponding changes in the circulation of his blood, or in arterial pressure. Modern sensitive methods of detecting and registering these changes might thus supersede the dowsing rod, and would in any case form an interesting investigation for experimental psychologists."

Two difficulties presented themselves to my mind in accepting Professor Barrett's explanation of the phenomenon.

- 1. In my first experience of water-finding, given above, I knew that I was not thinking of the lie of the ground nor of any indication of water; also that I had expected that the rod would twist itself upwards, and that I had done my best to prevent it from moving in any direction.
- 2. Professor Barrett said (p. 59, March 1909): "That the vigorous motion of the rod, one limb often being broken, is really caused by the unconscious muscular action of the dowser is, as I have said, hotly contested by every dowser,

who is persuaded the twig moves his hands, and not vice versa. For example, Dr Eshelby of Stockton House, near Worcester, writing to me about a young farmer in his neighbourhood, named Skryne, who is a very successful dowser, says: 'He (Skryne) tries to resist the motion of the rod, and I assured myself of this by clasping his hands tightly in mine, and then walked over a buried pipe of running water at night-time. The moment we came over where we subsequently found the pipe to be, the sensation was as though someone had seized the apex of the forked branch and forcibly pulled it down. Our hands resisted this downward movement, and the two sides of the forked twig gave way at the spot where they left his hands, and showed a green-stick fracture. I certainly should have detected any muscular movement sufficient to break the forked stick, and I know he did not move his hands or wrists, as I had hold of them all the time."

This statement, which corresponds with my own sensations and experience, makes it impossible for me to believe that the muscular action of the dowser is in any sense the cause of the rod's movement. The rod is suspended from the clenched fists just as a church bell is suspended from two gudgeons. The spoke of the bell-wheel represents the rod, and the rope at the circumference, being pulled downwards, is the only known force which moves the bell. Let the rope be unpulled, and the bell could not possibly be moved by any force in the gudgeons, so small, if at all there, that it could not be detected by the closest observation. Professor Barrett comes to the opposite conclusion. He says (p. 59): "It is not any known physical force that attracts the rod."

However, at the end of his article (p. 60) he makes a further statement with which I am in perfect agreement. He says: "It is possible we may have to fall back on an involuntary, unconscious exteriorisation of the muscular force of the dowser. If so, it would bring the motion of the rod into the same category as many of the 'physical phenomena' of spiritualism; for I am convinced there is a much closer con-

nection than is at present recognised between these phenomena and the actual physical personality of the medium."

In making my first experiment with Mr Jervois, when I observed that his rod moved upwards and mine downwards, I concluded that this repellent and attractive force was akin to the similar action of electricity. I met Mr Alexander Wilson of Belvoir Park, Belfast, and we made experiments together. I found that he was twice as sensitive as I was, for at certain places his rod went down fully, whereas mine only sank to an angle of 45 degrees.

We next investigated whether the phenomenon were in any way connected with electricity. Mr Franks Lubbock Robinson, my nephew, was there, and the rod in his hands made no movement, no matter where he stood. He was a non-sensitive. A water-pipe passes under the floor of the large hall, and I was asked to find its position. I did not know where it was, but my rod indicated that it passed diagonally under the hall. This was so. Then we placed a slab of thick plate-glass on the carpet over the pipe, and a rubber tobacco pouch near it, and we took off our shoes.

Mr Wilson stood on the glass, and his rod made no movement. He placed one foot on the tobacco pouch, with the same result. Then he touched the carpet with the toe of one foot, and immediately his rod pointed straight down.

Next, we placed Mr Wilson on the glass with his back towards us, we standing on the carpet so that he could not see us. Mr Robinson touched the back of his coat with the tip of his finger so lightly that Mr Wilson did not feel it, and the rod remained pointing horizontally as it was. I touched him in the same way, and at once his rod pointed downwards, but only at an angle of 45 degrees. Then Mr Wilson stood on the carpet, and his rod sank down straight; but the moment Mr Robinson touched him as before with the tip of his finger, his power disappeared. I touched him, and his rod rose to an angle of 45 degrees, thus indicating my lesser power; and then,

when Mr Robinson touched my coat from behind (I did not feel his touch), he deprived us both of any power.

We removed our fingers, and at once Mr Wilson's power returned, and his rod went down with full force.

The next day, at Seskinore, Colonel M'Clintock and I tried other experiments. Our snowberry rods pointed downwards in a lane where a pond discharged its overflow in a small channel which ran under the lane. We took rubber mats out of the carriages and spread them over the place in the lane, and when walking over them the rods remained inert, as light as twigs. I then stood on a bridge made of firbranches which spanned the narrow pond, and held my rod over the water. It made no movement, although it had gone down over the running water in the channel.

The obvious inference was that the force which moved the rod did not proceed from water as such, but from friction or some other force made by running water confined by a solid substance, such as the sides of a drain or a water-pipe, which, ascending through the ground, passed into my feet and from me to the rod, on the condition that my feet were not insulated from the ground.

Having thus discovered that the force, whatever it was, was subject to the same laws which regulate the insulation of electricity, I reasoned that if it were due to that cause, the rod ought to move in presence of dry electricity in the same way that it moves over an underground spring of running water. I therefore connected the two cells of my hall-door electric bell with common iron wire. The current was so feeble that it gave me no shock, nor could I perceive any when I placed the cut wire ends in my mouth. I only perceived the same taste as when one places a silver coin on the tongue and a copper coin under the tongue, and brings the edges into contact. Nevertheless, when I stood on the wire, having reconnected it, my rod felt heavy, but not so heavy as to make it move.

Then I went to Mr J. Maguire, a motor engineer who

lives here, and we tried the experiment in a room, first tested by the rod, which made no movement in it. We connected the poles of a 4-volt battery, with a lamp on the circuit which allowed the passage of half an ampere. Standing on the floor and holding the rod over the charged wire, the rod made no movement, but when I stood on the wire it went down slowly. Mr J. Maguire had no power, nor had four ladies who joined in the experiment; but when Mr B. Maguire held the rod, standing on the wire, it went down more strongly than with me.

Later, we tried the effect of a 25-volt current, with the result that Mr J. Maguire became sensitive, and his rod moved when he stood on the wire. My last experiment was made in order to explain why Mr Jervois' rod twisted upwards, while mine sank downwards over the same place.

When I held the point of the rod for some seconds touching the positive pole of the dynamo, feeling the 25-volt current as a tingle in my arms, and then walked about the floor of the workshop, the rod pointed downwards, as if the whole floor were over running water; but when I held it against the negative pole, feeling the same tingling, and walked away through the workshop, the rod floated in the air, feeling lighter than a feather, with a decided upward tendency.

Let me now state the inference which I draw from these experiments concerning the phenomenon of faith-healing. At the Church of Ireland Conference, held in Belfast last October, the subject of "The Connection between Mind and Body, with reference to the Miracles of Healing in the New Testament," was under discussion. The Right Rev. C. F. D'Arcy, D.D., Bishop of Ossory, showed in his paper that the gift of faith-healing was not confined to believers in orthodox Christianity, but was found to exist in all sorts and conditions of men and women, and that the faith of the person healed might be faith in God, or faith in the grossest superstition. This he proved from reliable statistics.

It occurred to me that, this being so, it was possible that

the gift of faith-healing might have a physical cause, and might be analogous to the gift of hypnotising, or waterfinding, or even to the gifts of mediums.

The chief work of the subconscious mind is to keep the body in repair, both by healing a wound and by digesting and distributing food to all organs of the body. When the mind is vexed and worried, one of the first effects is a diminished power of digestion. A monotonous and depressing occupation often produces an anæmic condition in factory girls; but when their minds are cheered by the prospect of a holiday, or by an offer of marriage, the raising of brain-power brings about an improvement in health. So powerful is the effect of mind on body that it can kill as well as cure. Two cases came under my notice. I knew well an elderly woman who was making a good recovery from an attack of influenza when her sister died. She said, "Now that Anne is gone I have no wish to live any longer." Her doctor told me that from that day all assimilation of food and medicine ceased, and she died in three weeks.

My late brother, a doctor in New Zealand, told me of a young and healthy Maori woman whose child was fatally ill. She said to him, "If my child die, I die too." The child died, and the young woman lay down and died three days afterwards, although he was certain she had no disease. She willed to die, and she died.

On the other hand, the subconscious mind can be directed in its healing operation by enabling it to call into action the latent or dormant energies which are in the body. In fact, no power can cure the body except the mind. The reserve store of energy which is in the body can be called into action by shock, by fright, by suggestion from outside, by determination of the will to live, or by the stimulation of medicine. But when this store of reserve energy is exhausted, as in the comatose state which precedes death, no medicine, nor any of these other causes, can heal or cure. Of course, to enable the subconscious mind to heal, the wires and lines by which it

communicates with the organs must be there; e.g. no faith exercised by the healer or the patient can set a broken bone in position, but when set in position all the knitting together of the break is carried out by the action of the subconscious mind. In faith-healing this power of right direction passes to the subconscious mind of the patient by the laying on of the hands of the healer. A hypnotiser usually induces a state of hypnotism by directing the points of his fingers towards the person operated on, and by making passes with his hands in close proximity to him, or by touching him by his hands.

This was done to me once by a hypnotiser. He told me to gaze at a disc, he made passes before my face, and he placed his thumb and one finger on the top of my head, but I was unresponsive to his influence, although he caused many others to fall into a trance at the same time.

In the exercise of these three gifts, the laying on of hands has a mysterious power.

In the matter of water-finding, the only one of the three on which I can speak from personal experience, the touch of my finger on the back of Mr Wilson's coat produced an immediate effect in transferring the same exact measure of power which was in me to him.

In the records of the case of faith-healing, as given in the Gospels, of the woman with the issue of blood, the following remarkable words occur: "For she said, If I may touch but His clothes I shall be whole" (St Mark v. 28). "She came behind Him, and touched the border of His garment: and immediately the issue of her blood stanched. And Jesus said, Who is it that touched Me? And when all denied, Peter said, and they that were with him, Master, the multitudes press Thee and crush Thee. But Jesus said, Someone did touch Me: for I perceived that power had gone forth from Me" (St Luke viii. 44–46 R.V.).

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¹ Cf. Professor Barrett's explanation, par. 11, supra.

A STUDY OF THE RESURRECTION.

THE REV. NEVILLE S. TALBOT, M.A.

I CAN start with the assumption that everyone finds it hard to believe in miracle. If this is so, then there is a concentration of difficulty upon the miracle which is represented as essential to Christianity, namely, the Resurrection of our Lord from the dead.

It would take an entire article to examine the reasons for the hostility of our minds to miracle. Each probably feels his own stress of difficulty. But I suppose that one much-embracing reason for the difficulties presented by the Christian miracles to men's minds to-day, is that men have the sense that the view of the universe which formed the mental and imaginative background of the minds of those through whose experience the Christian miracles have been transmitted to them, and the view of the universe which forms their own mental background, are fundamentally different. I must not stay to define the difference.

At any rate, however this may be, I think it is commonly agreed upon that, prima facie, no historical argument is reinforced by the mere attestation of miracle as its proof, but rather the other way; whereas in former days miracle was looked upon as a powerful reinforcement to historical assertion.

At any rate, again, howsoever we explain it, it is undeniable that modern thought in its sensitiveness to the difficulty of miracle has laboured to extricate from the body of Christian tradition a gospel freed from the offence of the miraculous. In particular this has meant a swerving away alike from the miraculous beginning and climax of the Christian story, so as to arrive at a simple residual amount of teaching to be grouped round the human, though no doubt inspired, figure of Jesus of Nazareth.

In other words, many of us have tried to see whether we could do without the Resurrection: whether, that is, we had a sufficiency of Christian material so securely based as to justify the treatment of the Resurrection as incidental or non-essential to the truth about Jesus. The question I would here raise is whether this position is justifiable. That is, more precisely, whether it is capable of harmony or kinship with the apostolic position. For evidently a demonstration of such harmony is fairly to be asked of those who would build some of the apostolic material into their edifice of Christian truth, whilst rejecting the rest. In one word, if we would make the Resurrection non-essential to ourselves, we must at any rate ask the question whether it was non-essential to the first disciples of Jesus.

I do not, therefore, propose to deal at all with the evidences for the appearances of our Lord after the Crucifixion: I wish to try and answer the question, "What was the mind of the disciples at the Crucifixion?" in order that I may have some material for suggesting an answer to the further question, "What must the Resurrection have been to them?" The battle for the clause of the Creed, "and the third day He rose again from the dead," has to be fought out not only round the evidential details, but also in the realm of presupposition wherewith the evidence is approached.

I intend to take the Synoptic Gospels as they stand and use their material harmonistically. At the same time (1) I believe the same line of interpretation can be made effective with only Marcan material; (2) so far as I can judge, the synoptic records are emerging from the ordeal of minute criticism with their main unity proved incapable of dissection. By this I mean that, apart from the attribution of parts to

different sources and authorities (indeed, noticeably in spite of this), there yet remains a wholeness in them which cannot be splintered into parts. It is the wholeness of the personality of Jesus. That means a mediated wholeness: for the person of Jesus is only given to us through the wholeness of the apostolic conception of Him. Further, the wholeness of their conception of Him is, as I will try to show, derived from the dramatic action of Jesus. The structural unity of that action seems to be found in its greatest purity in St Mark, and is in a sense disfigured by the grafting into it of additional material by the other Synoptists. There is, nevertheless, a main unity in the whole Gospel record (which, I may remark, when found to inhere in synoptic material, is then seen to harmonise with Johannine). It does not seem to be an artificial unity which the writers pieced together, but rather a unity into which they had been so wrought by events that they could not help the material they used reflecting the unity of the Personality central to the events.

At any rate, the fact of this unity justifies the question which I would attempt to answer: "What place did the Resurrection hold in the unity of the apostolic conception of Jesus?"

Finally, before I leave preliminaries, I should add a word of caution necessary to justify the use of Gospel material taken out of its context. I mean that if it be allowed that the bulk of St Paul's Epistles are earlier in date than the writing down of the Gospels, then, in going straight to the simple story of Jesus, we must remember that we are consciously leaving on one side that belief in the glorified and ascended Christ and that fellowship in His Spirit which we find reflected and implied by the Epistles. That is, we are leaving on one side what was both context and source of the material we are handling.

We set out, then, to attempt to arrive at the mind of the contemporaries of Jesus at the time of His death. We must begin on the plane on to which Jesus moves as He appears in

Galilee, preaching the Gospel of the Coming of the Kingdom (Mark i. 14). If we start on that plane we must ask whether we can stay on it.

The world into which He enters is completely Judaiclittle, local, racial. But the little world is in movement and expectation. A prophet has appeared with the orthodox marks of a prophet (Matt. iii. 4), and has set in vital commotion all Jerusalem and all Judæa, and all the region round about Jordan (Matt. iii. 5). The mission of John the Baptist was so popular and deep that at the end of Christ's ministry the Pharisees dare not seem to discredit it, out of fear of the people (Mark xi. 32). It had met and fanned into flame the expectation alive in a few faithful hearts which looked for the consolation of Israel (Luke ii. 25). Into that Judaic world, ever impregnated, not to say suffocated, with orthodox scriptural tradition, and now roused to the expectation of its coming to fulfilment, Jesus enters. His mission is to orthodox circles. In the synagogues (Mark i. 21) He preaches, and with precise intent. We read of His taking a classic passage of Messianic prophecy and deliberately affirming that "To-day is the Scripture fulfilled in your ears" (Luke iv. 16). If John has roused his fellow-countrymen, Jesus rouses them more. It seems that only a short time elapses before the report of Him goes forth into all Syria, and great multitudes assemble from Galilee and Decapolis and Judæa and Jerusalem and from beyond Jordan (Matt. iv. 25).

A Jewish movement or revival, then, is set on foot, and not by accident, but in accordance with the express mind of Jesus. He sets Himself to appeal to them as Jews, to those who know the Scriptures and live with Him under the law. True, He has new and startling teaching to give, but it is not independently new, but new only with the newness of interpretation of the old. If His contemporaries are faithful Jews, He calculates that they will respond to the appeal—read the Sermon on the Mount for its reiteration—which He makes.

So He is careful to keep moving on, that He may preach

the faith that He can find in Israel (Matt. viii. 10), and He must give all the faithful a chance of hearing of the day of fulfilment. Thus as soon as He has gathered round Him a nucleus of followers, and as soon as He has called into existence the plans of the authorities for His destruction and the time already begins to be short (Mark iii. 6, 14), He sends out messengers into places which presumably He Himself had not time to visit; and their orders are (Matt. x. 6) to go into no way of the Gentiles nor city of the Samaritans, but rather to the lost sheep of the house of Israel; and the nature of their equipment is such as will throw them upon the goodwill and hospitality of those who are worthy Jews (Matt. x. 13), and their message is the message for expectant Jews—the Kingdom is at hand.

Hence at the outset of our inquiry into the contemporary understanding of Jesus, we must first observe how clearly He meant to be He that should come (Luke vii. 20).

But He meets with little understanding. He finds a faithful remnant; but with the mass, the day of fulfilment is also the day of rejection. (1) True, great multitudes come together to hear and to be healed, but they do not understand; they come—to use a bit of Johannine material for once-for the meat that perisheth; they come, as crowds do come, to stare. But they come for no more, and He has to reject them. They cannot understand, it seems that their hearts have waxed gross and that their ears are dull of hearing (Matt. xiii. 14). (2) If it is thus with the many, neither do the official few understand Him. They understand well enough what a religious teacher ought to be, but it is just because He breaks out beyond the limits of their normal conceptions that they begin at once to strike out at Him as unintelligible and reprehensible. "Why does He blaspheme?" they mutter as they sit by in the crowded house reasoning in their hearts (Mark ii. 7). "Why does He eat and drink with publicans and sinners?" (Mark ii. 16). "Why do John's disciples and their disciples fast, and His disciples fast not?" (Mark ii. 18). "Behold, why do they on the Sabbath that which is not lawful?" (Mark ii. 24). "Will He Himself heal another on the Sabbath day?" (Mark iii. 2). But they get no answer which they can reconcile with their ordinary conceptions. The skin of their conceptions is too old for the new wine (Mark ii. 22). (3) Nor, thirdly, do His own circle understand Him; or rather, they, like the Pharisees. assume that they understand Him to a point, and then find that He passes beyond the limits of their understanding. So when they hear of Him amid the thronging multitudes, they can only conjecture that He is beside Himself (Mark iii. 21). Thus again in His own country, when He preaches they understand Him well enough as the Carpenter's son, whose mother is Mary, and his brethren James and Joseph and Simon and Judas; but all the more then do they ask, "Whence then hath this man all these things?" (Matt. xiii. 56).

So He has to reject them too, and break beyond their circle and the circle of their conceptions of Him. He cannot turn back to them, call as they may (Mark iii. 31). He must press forward on to the open road before Him to find a wider family circle (v. 35).

Therefore, misunderstood by crowd, official, and neighbour, He turns for understanding to the sifted remnant. "On that day" (Matt. xiii. 1)—the day of His separation from home—He begins to preach in a manner which he knows may be unintelligible to the many in order that He may startle into apprehension the minds of His followers. Thus in parable (Mark iv. 10) hard of understanding, and thus by sign by coming on the sea (Mark vi. 45), by calming the waters (Mark iv. 35), by feeding the many (Mark vi. 34), He drives forward their education. Scarcely once do they fail to show us the kinship of their minds with those of their fellow-countrymen who cannot "place" Him within their normal ideas. Scarcely once but they cry out with the remark

which springs in more prosaic form to our lips as critics of later days. "It is an apparition, of course—that figure on the waters" (Matt. xiv. 26). "What manner of man is this who commands the sea and the winds?" (Matt. iv. 41). "What is this questioning of His about being touched in the crowd, when one and all are being shouldered about in its very midst?" (Mark v. 31). Indeed, theirs are no soft hearts nor credulous minds that He can easily enter, but hearts, as afterwards they remember (Mark vi. 52), which are hardened, and minds that can reason but will not perceive nor understand (Mark viii. 17).

Nevertheless, He brings them to a stage of understanding, up on to a level not reached by their fellow Jews. The crowd may have formed confused and varied notions of Him (Mark viii. 28). But the question He would have the disciples answer is, "Whom say ye that I am?" and Peter's answer marks an epoch. They understand so far. They see, as their contemporaries do not, that He is indeed the Messiah (Mark viii. 29 ff.), howsoever disappointing His career may seem to be.

But it is only a stage. Once reached, it is immediately passed. A higher level has yet to be reached. There is more to understand: "From that time began Jesus to shew unto His disciples how that He must go into Jerusalem and suffer and the third day be raised up" (Matt. xvi. 21 ff., cf. Mark viii. 31). But once again He passes out beyond the limits of human comprehension—open though the minds of His friends may be to the idea of Him as the Christ. How far Peter is from full apprehension, despite the revelation not of flesh and blood, is seen in the hostility of his mind to the further prospect (Mark viii. 32). His mind is full not of the things of God but of the things of men (v. 33).

Here, then, is the mind of the disciples before the last act of the drama begins. They apprehend what is hidden to others; they understand something of the mystery of the Kingdom (Mark iv. 11); they know that He is the Messiah.

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But they get no farther. They follow Him farther indeed, but the climax of all their following, to which He sets His face, is hidden from them (cf. Mark ix. 32). He may show them fearful things upon the Mount, but they wist not what to say to them (Mark ix. 6). Nor does it seem that it matters—their not understanding, for the vision is not to be told to any man until a rising from the dead occurs. That is just the mystifying point (Mark ix. 9). They can reassure themselves of the complete fulfilment of all Jewish expectation, in that in the forerunner of the Master the Elijah that first had to come was already come (v. 11); but the saying that He should rise again, that they can only keep, questioning among themselves what it should mean (v. 10).

Further they cannot get. They receive the warnings, explicit and repeated (Mark ix. 31, x. 32), but they cannot understand them, and they are afraid to ask Him.

So the drama moves to its climax. The days when the bridegroom shall be taken away draw on (Mark ii. 20). He can only warn them and march forward, once more, out beyond the limits of their conceptions of Him, to the main issue of all. Thus physically and morally they drop behind Him. He with His face toward Jerusalem going before them, and they following, amazed and afraid (Mark x. 32).

We can see something of their mind on its negative side. Let us ask why it is negative. Why cannot they understand? What are their positive thoughts whose crowd is impenetrable by the Master's warnings? Psychologically there must be a conflict of ideas in their minds, which no spoken word can bring to decision.

Positively their mind is full of the Kingdom. Must this not be so? Given that they are Jews and proven faithful Jews; given that they know that the long roll of Scriptures is in fulfilment, and that the day of the Lord is in arrival; given that they know and are assured that He in their midst is the Messiah; given that—then what a maze of scriptural notions, Messianic schemes, apocalyptic visions may well be

thronging through their brains to the repudiation of any fresh ideas, most of all ideas so antagonistic, so alien, so redolent of utter bathos as those which speak of betrayal, scourging, spitting, dying!

Thus as they follow the awful figure of the Master their mind betrays itself. The fulness of their expectation that the Kingdom is immediately to appear (Luke xix. 11) draws forth a parable of warning. They press on Him with their ambitions as to their coming greatness in His glory. They ask Him for places on His right hand and on His left in His kingdom (Matt. xx. 22 and Mark x. 37). They are astonished exceedingly when they learn that this Kingdom, so much spoken of, is hard of entry by the great and rich (Mark x. 24 and 26). They are too busy with their grown-up aspirations to dream that the Master can be bothered by the bringing of little children to Him (Mark x. 37).

So at last Jerusalem is reached, and for one moment—was ever climax of false hope in tragedy so poignant?—they seem to be justified in their hopes. In regular, deliberate fashion He enters Jerusalem as King, and the hearts of all the disciples leap up, and in their whole multitude they rejoice and praise God with a loud voice, crying, "Blessed is the King that cometh!" (Luke xix. 37). Their enthusiasm, too, is caught by others, for all the city—Zion, the central hearth of Jewish patriotism—is stirred at His coming; and the hosannas of the Kingdom that cometh (Matt. xxi. 10), the kingdom of Father David (Mark xi. 10), are taken up even by the children singing in the Temple (Matt. xxi. 15).

But it is a false climax. The King has come, but to a different throne than they can conceive of. He has broken through the bonds of their conceptions of Him, and they cannot recapture Him. He has moved up, from the plane of Messianic expectation, on to a plane which they cannot scale. The difference of plane on which Master and disciples move is brought out during the days of waiting, while the Pharisees manceuvre for His capture and the crowds hang on His

words. The disciples would rally Him with the spectacle of the great city, so fit for royalty: "What manner of stones, what buildings!" (Mark xiii. 1). But His vision stretches far beyond, beyond and through the false peace and beauty of the faithless city. So He warns and prepares them for the terrible days that shall come in the remoter future. So too He warns them once again of that which so nearly impends. He can only warn, but they cannot understand. He tells them of betrayal, denial, universal offence. But they fend it all off. They will never deny Him nor be offended at Him (Mark xiv. 29, 31). Both He and they are quite assured. But it is because their minds move on different levels that their thoughts are so sharply distinguished from His. Thus while they are murmuring at the sad waste of money by the woman with the ointment He views the incident in relation to the preaching of a gospel throughout the whole world (Mark xiv. 9). The two circles of thought do not intersect.

So at last the true climax arrives. The hour comes and He goes out to meet it. But this time He goes forward alone. They cannot follow: they cannot move on to His level: they cannot keep pace with Him: they cannot watch one hour (Mark xiv. 37). He is blotted out of their understanding by the inconceivable end: they are scattered: they betray, forsake, deny Him (Mark xiv. 43, 50, 66 ff.).

I must not go further over the familiar and sacred ground of the Passion. Rather I would now revert to the original question which I raised in order to ask and answer a further question. First, I ask, what was the mind of the followers of Jesus when He died? Secondly, what must the Resurrection have been to them in the mind with which they see Him die?

Firstly, then, I cannot touch this intensely dramatic unity which rises to the climax of Calvary without being forced to the conviction that the severance of Jesus from His disciples through the awful facts of the Passion left them shattered in mind, confounded in morale, flung out into the darkness of disillusion. Whatever had been the image of Jesus that they had received upon the sensitive plates of their understanding, it was fogged and blotted out by the fatal exposure made by the inrush of the final facts. If that was all—if as the religious teacher, as the well-known neighbour, as the Messiah trusted to to redeem Israel (Luke xxiv. 21) Jesus died and departed as other men depart into the silence and darkness of death, not only is it hard to say what non-miraculous gospel could have been preached in His name, but that no image of His personality whatever would have been given to history.

For there is, again, the positive side to be added to the negative. The disciples did not understand, or rather they were full of a fatally partial understanding. But their fellow Jews, the religious authorities, the official defenders of orthodox monotheism, are positive that they do understand. All along they had been nearer the truth which had passed beyond the comprehension of the friends of Jesus, only they had apprehended His claims not as possible truths, but as impossible notions. To them He was a man whose monstrous ideas had to be put to the decision of life or death. So when at last He falls into their hands, they are in no doubt or misunderstanding: what further need have they of witnesses?—they have heard the blasphemy (Mark xiv. 63-4).

Thus by either way of approach—whether by that of the friends whose minds had been paralysed by the facts which broke in to shatter all their notions about Jesus, or by that of the foes to whom Jesus was but the source of blasphemous imposture to be put to the proof of fact—we come to the second question: What must the Resurrection have been so as to restore the one party and to confound the other?

My answer is, that, as fact had broken the one, and as by fact the other had triumphed, so only fact, as equally distinct from notion, or ideal, or vision, or expectation, or preconception, or any kind of subjectivity, as the fact of the Cross, could have reversed all. How He rose who can say? But of what nature His reappearance to His disciples must have been we are bound to try and determine. This is what I meant by saying that we have not only to examine the evidences of the appearances of the risen Lord, but also to ascertain the presuppositions wherewith the evidence is to be approached.

I cannot express the presupposition with which I have come to feel bound to make that approach otherwise than by saying that, of whatever nature was the death of Jesus as concrete and actually happening fact, of that nature too was His reappearance after death. No facts in all early history are, I suppose, more certain than those of the ministry and death of Jesus. So certain, indeed, do men assume them to be that they never tire of taking extracts from them, according to their tastes, in order to give therewith a Christian tinge to their philosophies and ethical systems. Yet so completely is this inner kernel of fact inextricable from its miraculous context, that without that context all knowledge of it would have disappeared out of history. Perhaps some trace might have been left of Jesus the impostor—of that deceiver (Matt. xxvii. 63) who had given himself out to be somebody and had drawn away some of the people after him (cf. Acts v. 36, 37),—but of Jesus the Master, from the attraction of whose person the thoughts of men's hearts cannot be withdrawn, no vestige would have remained.

This same line of interpretation can be pursued further in the tracing of the stages whereby the broken, clouded minds of the followers were opened (Luke xxiv. 45), cleared, unified by the Lord Himself, who, when He had suffered and triumphed in very deed, could make the word interpretative of act accomplished, perform the work that the word prophetic of mere future act was powerless to do (Luke xxiv. 6, 26, 46).

To go so far will be to be carried further past Ascension and Pentecost, out of the local Judaic world (within whose limits critics of later days would still imprison Jesus and His Gospel) so expectant to the end of the restoration of the

Kingdom to Israel (Acts i. 6), into the world of Catholic faith in the glorified Saviour of all men.

Of course the open Bible makes it always possible for any who will to take a short cut, independently of the Church's faith, back to the story of Jesus. This is the usual practice of those who hold to the perspective, though not to the dogma, of the literally inspired Book. But belief in Jesus, knowledge of Him and of God in Him as distinct from opinion about either, was not so given to the world. It was born of the Body, whose witness, whose life, whose inspiration, whose given sacramental relations to the ascended Christ in His continued action, are the source first of the Pauline writings and their assumptions, and later of the writing down, revision, and preservation of the narrative of the ministry.

But I would conclude this paper at the stage in revelation of the Resurrection. It is central to all else. Had He not risen, the rest would have been still-born. I will only add as a corollary that the Christian revelation is not something proved by miracle, nor is it a spoken word supposed to be once accompanied by but not bound up with certain marvellous acts. The good news are the deeds themselves. The acts of God in Christ are the revelation. The miracles are the revelation. The crucified, risen, ascended Christ is the revelation. Only in relation to the whole given action of God, only as illuminated by His spirit given to the Church, did the words of Jesus or the conceptions formed of Him come to coherence; and only so, as it seems to me, can they now be shown to cohere.

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THE PROBLEM OF THE CHURCH OF ENGLAND.

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THE recent discussions on the Education question have brought to the front two painful facts, viz. that the Church of England is the object of dislike and distrust on the part of Nonconformists, and that it is itself wanting in that common belief and principle which can stir the hearts of its members as one man. Whatever be the cause of the hostility felt by Nonconformists, or of diversity of aims within the Establishment, they exist as facts which are fraught with menace to our national well-being.

The danger, however, lies not so much in the disturbance of the existing order of things as in the weakening of the saving power of religion. When religious men quarrel, materialism gets what is not its own. There is the enemy. Who is to fight it? Are the champion's arms of the right temper and requisite kind? Is he true, and strong in inner and outer freedom? This present paper is an attempt to claim for the Church of England her right and duty to be the leader in the stand for Religion which the nation must make, or perish. Let us see what are the conditions on which she can vindicate her claim to leadership.

In the first place, then, let us clear the ground by dismissing from our attention spiritualism, theosophy, faith-healing, positivism, solar self-culture, and all the hundred and one minor creeds or cults which are trying to staunch the wounds

from which modern man is slowly bleeding to death-an attempt which, on the whole, must be pronounced ineffectual. We must also leave out of account the Roman Catholic Church. It is impossible to say what might not happen as the result of some great upheaval, some earthquake which might force us to reconstruct our social order from the bottom. But it is quite as impossible to think of the Roman Catholic Church possessing any determining voice in the religion of the future—unless she herself is first reconstructed so as to bring her on to the line of modern progress; and then she would be no longer the Roman Catholic Church, but something entirely different. Of course this is not to say that either the Roman Catholic Church or the minor cults around us contain no essential truth, or will contribute nothing to the religious movement which is already going on Every one of them has something of value, even if it be only a secondary truth which the more powerful religious bodies have suffered to sink into oblivion for a time. But, unless the stream of national progress is diverted into a new channel, it is pretty safe to say that not independent activity, but absorption, will as heretofore be the fate of all the more eccentric religious bodies. They will be the spur, not the rider.

There remain, then, only the Church of England and those bodies which are more or less loosely associated under the Free Church Council, or at any rate are roughly represented by it. These are Wesleyanism in one or other of its forms, the Congregational and the Baptist Churches. Unitarians and the Society of Friends occupy an honourable place of their own. Now, no sane person underrates the immense debt which we in England owe to these bodies. They have kept the lamp of Evangelical truth alight in times and places when nobody else seemed to care about it; they have fought for freedom and individual rights against aristocratic exclusiveness and class oppression—not always, it must be confessed, with the moderation of the wise man; they have done the

Established Church the great service of providing an everactive and vigilant criticism, the indirect effect of which on her public action and on the edification of her members is far greater than is generally recognised; above all, they have up to the present been on the side of progress, and in thought have for the most part led where their great rival has been content to follow at a distance. Nevertheless, I cannot, with all the good-will in the world, convince myself that they possess at present any power to take the lead in the religious movement which the times demand. They may neglect their trust-deeds-they are probably justified in doing so-but none the less they are always conscious that they work with a ghost in the back room, which may at any moment be evoked by some cantankerous or aggrieved adherent. The case of Dr Agar Beet affords sufficient evidence that Wesley's Sermons are as grave a hindrance to progress with the Wesleyans as are the Thirty-Nine Articles with the Church of England. In both cases the ship moves, but the anchor drags. Moreover, symptoms are not wanting of the deadening effect of security and prosperity on the spiritual life of many of the more wealthy chapels; and as against this is the equally deadening effect of poverty, with its attendant anxieties and worries, on the life of many of the poorer chapels. Last and worst of all is the deadly influence of the competitive method in religion. One has merely to compare the sensational methods of the cheap newspaper with those of the struggling chapel, to see the utter hopelessness of maintaining that calm and confident spirit of conquest which should animate all whose declared object it is to make the kingdoms of this world the Kingdom of our God and of His Christ.

For these reasons I doubt very much whether the Free Churches possess an inherent capacity for taking the lead in that new crusade which is to recover England for Christ; and it is with unfeigned reluctance that I form this judgment, which can be, after all, merely provisional, and may be any day reversed if they develop in some unexpected way.

Of course, it may be, and will be, retorted: You speak with a biassed mind; as an officer of the Established Church, you could never be expected to allow that any religious body save your own could be supposed for a moment able to take the first place. Well, if I have doubts about the Free Churches, I have none about the Church of England as she is at present. Not only does she show no sign of power to ride the storm; she is in the still more hopeless condition of ignorance whether there be any storm to be encountered at all. Custom seems to have dimmed her eye and abated her natural strength; because she has been here for so long it seems incredible she should not continue to be what she is. The religion she succeeds in bringing forth is too often open to the taunt of being a religion in nightshirt and slippers. Those who think otherwise, and are discontented with her as a representative of Christ's Gospel, are labelled as political Dissenters, or loose Churchmen, or bad Catholics, or selfopinionated ignoramuses, or are dismissed with some similar label which expresses the speaker's prejudice, but is otherwise futile as a reason. In spite of the certain danger of being presented with one or other of the above labels, I venture respectfully to solicit the attention of those that be great among us to the following points.

1. The principle of evolution is now accepted by theological thinkers as a fact, thanks mainly to the spade-work of Mr Huxley. The suspected enemy has been taken to our hearts as a useful friend. But it is one thing to accept a principle which will not be denied entrance; it is another to be swift to draw its practical consequences and to be bold to act on them. The still lingering reluctance to surrender the cosmogony of Genesis; the attempts made from time to time to translate "Heaven" in the Lord's Prayer in terms of a wider astronomy; the refusal to see evolution in the New Testament while admitting it in the Old; the belief fondly cherished that the faith of the Church is, what Creation was once thought to be, a fixed product given once for all at birth, and un-

changed and unchangeable ever since,—these are but a few indications of the inability or indisposition of Christian thought to reshape itself in obedience to a principle which it has already accepted. Stability was once thought to be the perfection of life, and then it was reasonable to hope that it was the function of the Church to provide the fixed nucleus of a social system which should sooner or later embrace the whole of human life. But the ideal of stability has now given way to that of progress—of a line of movement, under the control of the Inscrutable, of the beginning and end of which we know nothing whatever. The point is that we cannot have our cake and eat it too. We cannot expect to be allowed to accept evolution as a theory and deny, or at any rate ignore, it in practice, when it is seen to render necessary a resetting of our previous view-point, and with that the surrender of some of our most dearly beloved formulæ.

2. This means also that we must strike afresh the balance between the past and the future, and that very much in favour of the future. As Dr Creighton was wont to say, the past is for our instruction and warning, but not for our imitation. The assumption—for it was never more than an assumption -that at some more or less remote moment in the past a truth, a view of life, a revelation was given, which as understood then was to be valid for all time afterward, must be admitted frankly to be nothing but an illusion, useful before but pernicious now. What past ages have thought and felt and seen of the deep problems concerning God, the soul, and the world must be always of the most intense interest to us of a later age. But what, in the light of the principle of evolution, we cannot give them is the right to decide, as a court of final appeal, what we are to think about the same problems now. We will reverence their attempts to solve the Insoluble and to define the Undefinable, and will use freely and with a grateful heart the treasures of honest thought which we inherit from them; but we will not, because we cannot and may not, do them the dishonour, and ourselves the disservice, of attributing to them an infallibility which they would never have claimed of themselves. If it be retorted that in every science certain conclusions when once established are not to be disturbed again, but used as postulates on which fresh conclusions are builded, I reply that this is not true. No conclusion of any science has any finality, any immunity from criticism and, if necessary, from modification. Do we not hear whispers to-day that even the Newtonian view of the universe is being questioned? Why then should it be said that theology enjoys the honour of being the sole exception which disproves the rule that all sciences are progressive? The allegation is true neither in substance nor in fact. If an evolution of thought may be discerned in the writings of St Paul, if a greater than he grew in wisdom, why should the Bible as a whole, or the New Testament as a part of it, be treated as a gift independent of all the relativity of human affairs, and not as the germ out of which all subsequent Christian life has grown, as the norm by which all pretenders to Christian experience must be judged? Why should the philosophy of the twentieth century be condemned to follow blindly at the heels of the Greek philosophy of the fourth, or be forced to fit itself into the swaddling-clothes of the infancy of Christian thought? Why should we not be at liberty to reject Augustine, or Aquinas, or Luther, or Cranmer, or Andrewes, or Wesley as authorities in cases where they can be shown to be insufficient, and therefore out of court? For no reason, except that we have not found the courage to accept the consequences of a principle that of evolution—to which we profess in words to pay homage.

3. Official authority in matters of belief is practically a thing of the past. Dr Salmon has reminded us that all good men reverence the authority of superior knowledge, but in matters of belief pay little attention, and rightly so, to the authority of mere official position. What he says of popes is surely a fortiori also true of bishops and party leaders. The bishops of our Church are of the same opinion, for out of the many good services they have rendered to our ingratitude, is con-

spicuous their refusal to be parties to any attempt to harry those who are seeking to bring peace to the intellectual unrest of the age. Would that all of us could emulate their wisdom in this respect! They see clearly enough that, whatever the form of the Christian organisation of the future, it will not be determined by the exclusive claims of any intellectual system.

All that has been said justifies the statement that we are living in an age of transition, which means both that we are moving away from the old, and that the new is not yet fully here, and, therefore, is still very imperfectly known. Our comparative ignorance will be allowed, perhaps, to be excuse sufficient for the audacity of a suggestion which will be made directly by way of a partial removal of the present impotence of the Church. For impotent surely she is. A vast mass of thinking men, and one that is growing, either rejects the Church as a guide altogether, or else pays tribute to her established prestige only. It is becoming more and more difficult to induce young men to enter the ministry. So little enthusiasm does she awake that nobody is rash enough to propose for her any million-guinea scheme so as to pay her clergy a living wage. Lastly, what is most serious of all, a very great part of Christian work is done outside her borders, and perhaps outside the borders of any professed Christian organisation. The effectual remedy for this impotence is not in human power at all; but meanwhile, while waiting for that remedy, something may be done by way of levelling the mountains and filling up the valleys so as to make a highway for our God.

The most pressing requirement, to which the preceding remarks are intended to lead up, is the official, formal, and public degradation of theology to its proper place in the Christian life, and the restoration of the Christ-life as portrayed in the Synoptics, and spiritualised by the Fourth Evangelist, to the supreme place of honour. With this shifting of places there must go a revaluation of the Creeds. At present they are the test of Churchmanship, of loyalty to the Body of

Christ, much as obedience to ecclesiastical authority is in the Church of Rome. In both cases the experience of history assures us that a gigantic mistake has been made. The divided state of Christendom, the contempt in which the Church is held-in which all Churches are held-are proof enough of the gravity of the mistake. Our chief consolation is to be found in the fact that the experiment of erecting an elaborated baptismal Confession of Faith into a test of Churchmanship could not be surely known to be a failure until it had been tried. Now that it has been tried and found wanting, we should be doubly guilty if we lacked courage to steer in another direction. It would be worth our while to try whether the direction in which the logic of events points is not that of the relaxation of formularies, and whether the Church would not be stronger, purer, and more effective because more united, if she were to insist more on moral and spiritual life after the pattern of Christ's, and less on the ability to toe a straight line of orthodox belief.

There is much to be said for this new departure, even if much will be found to be said against it. For in the first place it is the most thorough-going application of that appeal to antiquity which the Church of England has been making for some four centuries. This appeal to the primitive Church cannot stop before it has rested on the original account of our religion, and that by common consent is mirrored most clearly in the Gospel which bears the name of St Mark. Of course we can trace a theology even there, even though it be of a rudimentary character and in germ. But the chief difference between then and now is, that theology then was in the background, implicit and not explicit, subordinated to life and enthusiasm, not their cause but their form, and even as a form elastic, not fixed, but capable of taking up new elements, of ejecting old, and of selfadaptation to meet the requirements of the life it enshrined. The appeal now made is that we should do what the Church of England desiderates, go back to this antiquity, so as to correlate life and theology as, for example, St Paul did.

But, it is urged, the closed door of history never is reopened, and history does not repeat itself precisely. Quite so;
but it is not suggested that we should attempt to revive the
earliest age precisely, any more than the old man who falls
back on his childhood's simple faith, after strenuous years of
struggle, doubt, and growth, revives that faith in its naked
simplicity. What he takes is the early faith with all the
garnered wealth of his accumulated experience. It is the same
faith, but it is now based on reason and experience. It requires
no longer the adventitious support of external authority, because its knowledge is no longer mediated but direct. Is
not, and ought not, the Church to be wise enough, after the
experience of eighteen centuries, to adopt the same attitude?

Another advantage which we should reap from the proposed change is the substitution of reality for sham. That all good men are of the same religion, is a proposition on which all good men act-until the pale cast of thought sicklies o'er their natural instinct for what is good. Yet we go on pretending that by some jugglery moral worth is changed before our eyes into orthodoxy, and that he cannot be wholly worthy who thinks differently from the Athanasian Creed. But in our heart of hearts none of us believes this; we only shrink from letting ourselves realise that we do not. In other words, we give occasion to the enemy to taunt us with being insincere and cowardly; and of all the charges made against preachers of the Gospel, none cuts deeper into their souls than that of believing less than they preach, and none is, in proportion to its truth, more fatal to their influence for good. If it were no longer held necessary for us all to think alike, then at all events the temptation to think that we ought, and to pretend that we did, would be greatly lessened.

A third advantage would be that the Church of England would regain that intellectual life which she has lost, and become once more a leader of the higher thought. It is commonly believed on the Continent that we possess no theology—no living theology, that is, in the sense that

German theology is alive. Where, for example, is the English equivalent of Harnack's Dogmengeschichte, or of that large class of works of which Wernle's Anfänge may be taken as no unworthy representative? and what English commentary can touch for thoroughness and freshness of treatment the Hand-Commentar of Holtzmann or of Karl Marti? And in saving this I am not ungrateful for the sound work which is shown in many an English work of recent years. But the German work of the same kind is less hampered by the weight of tradition, and is, therefore, more in touch with facts; while in proportion as English theologians approach its freedom their work shares in its value. It is obvious that Truth demands the single eye, and the Church which can supply that is in a higher position than another which compels one eye to be kept on Truth and one on Tradition. And it may be not irrelevant to add that the two are not always found along the same lines.

The candid reader who has followed me thus far sees, of course, that it is not proposed to do anything so foolish as to abolish all creeds, nor yet the present creeds of the Church. All that is wanted is that the note of compulsion should be removed from them and attached instead to moral worth and spiritual purity. It is not chaos which would result, but harmony, and this for a reason which is based on a basal psychological fact, which is this: Theology and creeds are the product of the reasoning faculty working on the materials supplied from the world of spirit within. The latter is the permanent factor, and it is the province of reason to find out for it its fitting form. But all form is mutable, and confusion arises only where the attempt is made to give form the character of unchangeableness, which is the prerogative of spirit alone, that is, of life. In the higher reaches of human life unity comes from the spirit, and division (sometimes, as now, ripening into chaos) from the attempts of reason to explain the data of the spirit. But let it be once admitted that theology and dogma are at best imperfect vehicles of a life which is ever understood more fully in proportion as experience becomes

more mature, and it will then follow that they must be restated from time to time to match the fuller knowledge.

But, it will be urged, if your proposal were adopted our Christianity would become that backboneless and shadowy fraud which we call undenominationalism. To this objection the answer is that it is not proposed to do anything so impracticable as to abolish all creeds, but merely to remove the compulsory character which attaches to them, and to secure an official recognition from the Church that, while she puts forth a certain form of theology as what she holds at the time, she fully admits the right of her members to criticise it, and to help to make it better.

But again I hear the voice of the timid saying that this is practically all one with abolishing all creeds; if a creed is not compulsory its value is nought, and the last state of unbelief will be worse than the first state of chaos. This objection is plausible, but it is not supported by experience. The truth is that this objection and others like it are from the Conservative mint, and the Conservative is an adept in the art of conjuring up bogeys to fright fools from the path of progress.

But the advocate of progress need not content himself with humbly praying for wider freedom. He can point to the hard fact that everybody takes it, even if it is not everyone who owns it. Does the sturdy Evangelical declare his belief in the Roman Church, when he says that he believes in "the Holy Catholic Church" of the Apostles' Creed? If not, by what right does he deviate from this, which was indubitably the primary meaning of the phrase when it was put into the Creed? Does his "Catholic" neighbour believe in a local descent into Hades when he recites another Article? If not, where is his consistency when he stigmatises as heretical a third who doubts whether the Ascension can be conceived adequately as a passage through space, or whether dishonour is not done to the Risen Christ by insisting on a carnal resurrection? If the Conservative is sure that no change in belief is possible to a Church which is truly Catholic, how does he

account for the early fluctuations in the Article which was finally crystallised as "Conceived by the Holy Ghost and born of the Virgin Mary"? The truth really is that the opponent of freedom does not come into court with clean hands. He takes liberties himself, but objects to others going further than he does himself, and he objects because he is timid and of little faith.

If it be said by some reader who is in general sympathy with the foregoing remarks that they are true enough to be truisms, and that what is wanted is some practical proposal which shall give them point, then I reply that the first necessary step to take is either the repeal of the Act of Uniformity or a modification of it. No doubt its framers were wise men, but they were not so wise that they could foresee the problems of two hundred and fifty years' later date.

If the Act were repealed, it would be necessary to commit to some trusted body the work of drawing up such terms of subscription as should safeguard our heritage from the past and yet leave us free to champion Truth in the present, and go forward faithfully along the unknown path of the future.

The objection to this method is that there is at present no representative body in the Church of England which Parliament trusts. It is not likely to put so important a business into the hands of the clergy in or out of Convocation, and it is not convinced—for nobody is convinced—that the Houses of Laymen or the Representative Church Council are representative bodies, in the sense in which representation is commonly understood. Nor are we likely to get any trusted representation of the laity until we have made up our minds what a layman is.

It seems better, therefore, to appeal to Parliament to relax the Act of Uniformity, and to give reasonable liberty under proper safeguards. If it were asked to specify the direction in which liberty of prophesying should be first of all sought, the example of the American Protestant Episcopal Church may be referred to. According to the Book of

Common Prayer which was accepted by that Church in General Convention in the month of October 1892, certain changes were formally adopted so as to put less strain on sensitive consciences. In the Form of Baptism, for example, the Apostles' Creed is not recited, but a simple question put:

Dost thou believe all the Articles of the Christian Faith as contained in the Apostles' Creed?

The history of the proceedings in committee which resulted in that question would throw a flood of light on its significance.

Before the Apostles' Creed at Morning Prayer is the following rubric:

Then shall be said the Apostles' Creed by the Minister and the People standing. And any Church may instead of the words, He descended into hell, use the words, He went into the place of the departed spirits, which are considered as words of the same meaning as the Creed.

What is still more important is the fact that the Nicene Creed is appended to the Apostles' as an alternative form.

Article VIII. of the Articles of Religion in the same book runs:

The Nicene Creed and that which is commonly called the Apostles' Creed ought thoroughly to be received and believed: for they may be proved by most certain warrant of Holy Scripture.

The Athanasian Creed accordingly disappears from the Book.

These changes are such as have commended themselves to a sister Church without putting her out of communion with our own. Why should not members of the Church of England enjoy the same liberty which they introduce without losing communion with her?

Of course it will be said that Parliament has no business to deal with such purely spiritual matters. To this the retort is obvious. Parliament does not want to interfere in spiritual matters, and would not interfere in ecclesiastical matters if you had behaved yourself wisely and won its confidence. But as you have chosen to sow the wind of disunion, you must not complain if you have to reap the whirlwind of legislation.

But, after all, the appeal made here is not so much for any specific change, as for power to make such changes as may

commend themselves to the sanctified common-sense of the general body of the Church. It is the living voice we ask to be allowed to hear. It is the dead hand which we feel oppressive. The Church of Rome has a living voice; the Free Churches have a living voice; the Church of Ireland has a living voice. The Church of Scotland and her offshoots have a living voice. The Church of England alone among the Churches of the West has none.

Two final objections may be briefly touched on. Some may say, some will say, that while agreeing on the whole with what has been urged here, they yet doubt the wisdom of saying it. Things are no doubt pretty bad, but Time the great improver will mend them, and it is better, therefore, not to stir up trouble by dwelling on unpleasant facts. This attitude is, as I am aware, a very common one, but it must be left to answer for itself. In the opinion of the present writer it springs from a spirit which is the spirit of death. He pleads only for freedom for Truth to win its own way, unfettered by human devices for keeping it safe in a prison, and he believes that to be the way of life.

The other objection is weighty. It says that, even if it be desirable to give full intellectual liberty, yet Establishment makes it impossible, and therefore the proposal must be dropped. I reply that there is an alternative form to the argument, and it is this: Liberty is desirable; Establishment makes it impossible; therefore the Establishment must go. If the lower good stands in the way of the higher, it is not the higher which should be sacrificed. It is for those who appreciate properly the importance to the Church of intellectual liberty, and yet wish to retain the Establishment, to insist that the terms of Establishment shall be so varied as to allow due liberty. If they do not do that, for whatever reason, they cannot be surprised if those who value freedom to speak out for Truth above all things, do not wax very enthusiastic about the benefits of Establishment.

ESSENTIALS OF EDUCATION.

PHILIP OYLER.

THE difficulty of the educational problem lies at the very heart of things and is unsuspected, for the most part, by both the teachers and those who demand reforms. It is just this: that changes are made to suit what seem to be the present needs of a nation, but little is done to help children learn those things which must be valuable to anyone of any nation in any age. Now the classics receive special attention, now science, now games, now art, now philosophy. These are all educative, no doubt, and may well be included in any system, but they are not of pre-eminent importance. They are merely dictated by the ebb and flow of fashion. For the foundations of life do not consist in knowing a dead language or in the ability to measure the stars, or in captaining a team or appreciating a picture or understanding an Eastern system of philosophy, though these may lead to happy places. Life is very ordinary and very practical, and yet full of poetry. It has to do with food and clothes and shelter, with work to buy them, with sleep and play and pain, with comradeship and faith and love-simple things, beautiful things (if we choose to make them so) that affect us all. And any form of education, if it is to be true and worthy and efficient, must primarily give heed to these simple things, in order that children may at first be equipped not for any particular calling or profession, but for every possible situation in which they may some day find themselves. The children of the rich

who are unable to fulfil their own simple needs, because they have always been waited upon and made to grow up dependent upon others, are rather like those ants who have kept slave ants and have become so helpless that they cannot even feed themselves; and such children, when adult, are quite as bad citizens as those poor children from the slums who, through lack of food or clothes or what not, grow to manhood but are physically unfinished. The elementary stages of education are the most important—the time on the mother's lap and the years following it,—for the younger the child, the more plastic is it and the more easily influenced. And even from those early days the child must learn to be independent, learn to do things for itself, must learn to amuse itself. To provide expensive toys is not nearly so educative as to provide pieces of wood and string, for example, for expensive toys seem to invite destruction from the child's point of view, whereas string and wood present a chance of exercising ingenuity in producing some plaything. Nor is it wise, when a child cries, to immediately attempt to amuse it or divert its attention. English mothers might well learn something in this respect from the Japanese, who show such profound maternal skill and deem it well to let their children cry till the fount of tears is dry. Not when the tears are those of real distress, but when the crying is naughty, passionate, or rebellious.

No matter in what country we are to live, or in what profession we are to be engaged, when we become adult there must be some things which are essential and common to us all. For instance, we all eat, breathe, sleep, walk, desire, and, without mentioning anything else, we can say positively that it is to these elementary things, in which we nearly all err, that we need to give the greatest care. And when we re-read our notes on the educational methods, which we have examined in many countries, we find that it is invariably these primary things which are most neglected. The fact is that they are neglected because they are so common and elementary, whereas they ought for that very reason to receive early attention.

But it is the way of us humans all the world over to watch for comets and ignore the dawn, to risk our lives in obtaining a small flower on a mountain crag and overlook the many blossoms that make bright our home fields.

It is idle to suppose that we or any civilised communities know instinctively how to do these elementary things in a sensible way. Children will soon develop little habits, and there is no doubt that we must begin by showing them how to breathe, how to sleep, how to walk, how to eat (quite as important), what to eat, how to care for the teeth and for the body generally; and not only show them how to do these things, but why they should do them. The children want to know the reason why, and we ought to explain how important good teeth are to our health, how it has been discovered that practically all the feeble-minded breathe badly, why a good coarse stone-milled bread is so much better than white soft bread, why loose clothes are better than tight ones, and woollens better than linens, and so on.

There are people who maintain that children do these elementary things instinctively, that there is no need to teach them how to sleep, eat, walk, etc. But instincts, which are only inherited experiences, are liable to fail, and are subject to change, like all other things, and though children certainly do these things instinctively, they nevertheless develop bad habits in the way they do them. Does the child instinctively lie on its right side to sleep? Does the child, like a wild animal, know instinctively what food is poisonous and what not? Does the child instinctively know that clothes made of sheep's wool will be more hygienic than those made of vegetable products?

If these examples do not make that opinion appear untenable, let the reader undertake a special study of some subject. Let him, for example, pay attention, as we have done, to the way people walk. Let him stand in any street in any town and watch. Dozens and dozens go by, each walking differently, before he will be able to say, "There is a good walker." How

few, how very, very few there are whose steps are easy, supple, free, elastic, springing from the toe and displaying the poetry of motion, giving evident delight to the walker through the movements of well-trimmed limbs and muscles! Most of them shuffle, roll, waddle, slouch, stagger, or amble along on any part of the foot; no matter how, provided only that they get along. It occurs to but a small number of them that there may be immense enjoyment in walking; to the rest it is merely a means of travel, a poor one too, and those who are rich enough to buy some more rapid means invariably do so.

There are others who are opposed to the teaching of these simple habits of life on the ground that it is through giving too much thought to our health, for example, that we often lose it, and they say or imply that what we do instinctively we do correctly. But such people cannot have undertaken any very careful observation, for, if they had done so they would have noticed how very badly most of us breathe or walk, how too rapidly or immoderately many of us eat-merely to mention two or three examples. And through lack of observation or though careless observation their conclusions are both dangerous and erroneous, for the fact is that, unless we have learned something about hygiene, we are in the habit of studying our health only when we have lost it. When we are well, we can study hygiene without becoming nervous about our health, for health implies such perfect poise that we are not conscious of any part of our body.

Everyone who has been concerned in both the theory and practice of education must have felt how inadequate or useless much of the instruction in vogue is, and must surely have formulated or tried to formulate something different, something more efficient. We probably all have great impossible dreams of ideal schools and ideal communities, but we are brought back suddenly to earth when we remember that our schemes must be practicable. It is well to build beautiful places of dream, for they will assuredly be realised somewhere in posterity's if not in our lives, but it is useless to proffer an

idea before the spirit is ready to receive it. The poet and the lover know in the dawn, but the community as a whole sees only in the full light of noon. And as life in any community is largely taken up with very practical things, is a compromise, in fact, between the practical and the ideal, between what we are and what we aspire to be, between what we have to do and what we would like to do, so any system of education must be a compromise too between the practical and ideal if it is to afford us some equipment for life. Herein is the secret of success; that whatever we teach must be taught in such a manner as to show that it has some direct relation to life. (It is idle to pursue subjects merely because they provide exercise for the brain. Such exercise might be taken over many useful things.) Here too in this compromise is the key to our methods. We must continually try to introduce something wider, nobler, truer; but we must not disremember the relation of work to life, of the hand to the heart; we must not forget those principles which are useful, nay, essential to us all; we must keep our vision of earth and sea and sky, of flowers and animals, that we may remain true to ourselves and to the world in which we live. and to the universe of which we are a part, however small. Those who learn early in life how to fulfil their own simple daily needs and how to keep well, will always find the world a happy place and find a place in the world. Their health and independence and adaptability (through the generalisation of their early training) will ever prevent them from becoming unemployable, and their knowledge of the relation of labour to life will ever prevent them from becoming of the idle rich.

And here perhaps we ought to say that we believe that the early training of boys and girls should practically be the same, and that they should, of course, be educated together. It is, as we said, the secret of success that education should relate to life, and as the sexes are not segregated in any adult communities, so is it useless to attempt the best while boys and girls are brought up apart. The influence of unrestricted comradeship between the sexes is amongst the greatest, if not the greatest, power to high thoughts and pure feelings and noble hearts, and it is almost inconceivable that we should have allowed this segregation so long. When shall we realise that to elevate morals we must take away restrictions, not impose them? When shall we realise how much harm is done by the impure secrecy about our deepest instincts? When shall we realise that the child's mind can contemplate anything without the slightest idea of evil entering?

Before we proceed, it would be expedient to state at once that instruction, when it is the conscious effort of parent or teacher to influence or to impart knowledge, is but a very small part of any really good system, and is not by any means the most valuable. (To teach those simple things we have suggested occupies but a few minutes of the day.) Surroundings instruct, climate instructs, personality instructs, and perhaps, above all, suggestion instructs. Long, long before children can speak, or understand the meaning of our words, they learn by what we do and by what we suggest, and still more by what we are. A mother look teaches, a mother touch teaches, example teaches, character teaches, pain teaches, experience teaches, imagination teaches, friendship teaches, love teaches. And that is what we, who have charge of children, are so apt to overlook or undervalue, no matter whether we are parents or teachers. Time and again we are worried if children do not seem to progress in their lessons, or do not develop as quickly as we hoped. We are distressed when their writing is illegible or their composition a complete failure, or if their letters to home consist of no more than a few empty statements. But love makes us all over-anxious, and we are so eager for their success in every possible direction that we forget that their characters may be expanding nobly the whole time; and we forget, too, that we have really no right to expect any results, any finished products, no right to expect any constructive work from our little people while they are little people. If they show promise, that is

enough, for the fact is that they are so busy observing, inquiring, absorbing, assimilating with all their faculties, are so full of wonders and mysteries confronting them everywhere, are so alive with curiosity and other emotions, that they have no room yet for the critical and analytical spirit (which constructs) to win out. Everything is still in the making, as it were. Soul and mind and body are so occupied with growing and becoming, that they do not know what they know and cannot, of course, express it, or are not conscious of any means of access to it. We may even go so far as to say that almost without exception those children who are able to express themselves well when they are children, do so not because their knowledge is greater than that of those who mumble and stutter (metaphorically, of course), or remain silent and are often passed over as failures, but because they can manage to summon up the little they have learned. Very rare, indeed, are those whose reputation for greatness at school or college has been continued into the wider ways of life, to the nation's or the world's betterment. They have gained scholarships or captained teams or won athletic contests, and have thus attracted the eyes of the public for the moment, but in a few years they have sunk into obscurity, because that at which they were proficient was not something of lasting or essential worth to life. We must not blame them, however. They strove for those things which were held out to them to strive for, and they were never told that it was personality and character that counted, that a wide knowledge of nature and human nature was of inestimable value.

They showed early some special aptitude and were allowed, nay, encouraged, to follow it to the exclusion of many other things, before ever they were taught the principles of the universe and of life. Hence it was only to be expected that when they set out alone on the great highways of life they found that they knew not whither they led or whence they came, and knew not the rules of the road or its dangers or the joys to be gleaned from the wayside blossoms. Soon, very

soon, they found that their one commodity, which they had for sale, had only a very poor market value, and realised how dangerous and improvident it was not to carry a variety of goods with them. To be successful in science, for example, one must learn the general principles of all sciences, before embarking on any original research; and to be successful in life, one must learn the general principles of nature and human nature before choosing a calling. To ignore or break the laws of men is to offend society and does not necessarily bring harm to anyone, but to act in opposition to the ways of nature is to offend against truth or God, and is sure to invite disaster, physical, mental, or spiritual. One single subject is quite as poor provender to the mind as one single form of food is to the body. To develop one part of the brain is as improvident as to develop only one muscle of the body, and is the way to lunacy. To develop only emotions, or only thoughts, or only muscles, is equally dangerous. It is plurality that spells greatness for the most part. To specialise is to be exclusive, to be exclusive is to be narrow. The great souls embrace all, and specialise late in life and then only in moments.

It is true that we civilised folk often break the ways of nature, but, heaven knows! we suffer for it, and shall continue to suffer till we obey them. It is true, too, that children usually become all-engrossed in a subject and exclude everything else, but it is only for the moment. Seldom, very seldom, does their interest in any particular subject last long. And though we are often disappointed at their change of interest and deprecate it as a fault, still it is perfectly natural and right for them to continually alter and place their curiosity and enthusiasm otherwhere. Unreflectively they are aware that there is so much to be experienced in the great wonderful world, that they feel they often have only time to give hurried glances, as it were, to their surroundings as they pass along the road of life. And no doubt they are wise. For though they seem to us cruel, when we watch them

snatch short-stalked the wild hyacinths as they race laughing through the woods (only to cast them aside when a cuckoo call demands their ears and whole attention), who shall say how much more they really gather than the blossoms themselves? Who shall say that the sacrifice of those flowers will not be compensated for by more beautiful blooms that shall spring somewhere out of the hearts of those children and increase the total of the world's delight?

Children, whether boys or girls, of poor or of rich parents. should know how to do simple cooking, needlework, housework, gardening; should be able to handle a few tools, go shopping, and keep their little accounts as well as learn those elementary things which each school teaches. Even if children, as they grow up, will not have to do any of the menial offices of life (which can be made as noble as any other), it is nevertheless most important that they should be able to do them, if necessary. They will then remember and preserve a sympathy with and keep the point of view of what is called the working classes—which is of immense value, for the more people with whom we can find sympathy the better. And they will always be able to look after themselves in any emergency, and be independent of the help of others. This may sound a little thing, but if everyone in a nation could do these few simple things and had, moreover, learned too the principles of hygiene, the problem of unemployment and the equally serious question of luxury and dependence would practically disappear in one generation. Health and the ability to satisfy the needs of daily life must ever decide the basic power of a people. Here, for example, is Canada's strength: that from the great lakes to the west and northwest, over thousands and thousands of miles, there lives family upon family (independent of the outside world), of which each member has learned to attend to every daily need by the age of ten, and has by simple diet and fresh air attained to such health that is so far ahead of anything in European civilisation that we must call it a superhealth. And though

conditions preclude our following closely this example, we can at least take the lesson to heart and apply what is practicable of it, just as they might learn something from us.

It is a commonplace that a knowledge of nature is at the source of most true thought and pure feeling, and the children, like the Japanese and many others, who have no nurse and nursery to divide them from the noblest influence, and who see the sky and trees and hills from their mother's backs long before they can walk, enter life with an enormous advantage over town-bred ones. And those children who, when they can walk, have liberty to wander up streams, to climb trees, to make mud pies, to catch the falling autumn leaves, to help bring home the cattle, to pick the cowslips and watch the birds and clouds and rain—those children are educating themselves all unconsciously by their direct comradeship with nature. And though nature-study be taught (and rightly too) in town schools, it will always be a poor substitute for the open air and that unconscious, happy learning. Only genius rises above streets to the stars, all the rest are influenced for the bad by the sight of too many walls. As the sea-gull is like the white of the waves over which it rides incessantly; as the blue hare is like the mountain rocks which it frequents; as the caterpillar is like the plant on which it lives, so are we to a large extent influenced by our surroundings. We are so apt to become what we contemplate, and that is why we find crimes committed among slums and not in the hayfield; that is why we find narrow-minded people in narrow valleys and not on the mountain sides.

It must not be supposed that we are pleading in favour of a return to cave-dwelling and its law of club and muscles (for human life has emerged from the days of purely physical force and, with occasional lapses no doubt, is ever greeting the dawns with greater tenderness), but we would like to preserve from the youth of the race (as from the youth of ourselves) those things which are still of service to us. There is intuition, which is always more efficacious than tuition; there is curiosity, which in the wild makes for self-protection and in us becomes a thirst for knowledge; there is physical health, which is not opposed to gentleness and is closely connected with happiness; there is intense interest in the occupation of the moment. however commonplace it happens to be; there is freedom, which encourages self-reliance and independence; there is solitude, which alone gives us the opportunity of being truly ourselves (children are instinctively solitaries) and of developing our individuality; there is imagination, which is responsible for the myths of all time and is the weaver of the poetry of life; there is the need to work directly or indirectly for food, which prevents us forgetting that as we all consume so ought we all to produce; and there is a constant communion with the wind and flowers, earth, animals, and sky, which will keep us simple and sincere.

And side by side with those sterling qualities of our ancestors we wish to preserve those precious essences that we have distilled, or are distilling, by civilisation from the flowers of the heart and the soul and the brain of many centuries. There is love, which grows wider and wider, embracing family, country, empire, all humans, animals, flowers, and strives to be worthy of relationship with the stars and the angels and God; there is sympathy, by which we are able to understand everyone and everything; there is foresight, which tells us to lay up stores in our granaries of the heart against the grey days; there is wide-mindedness, which promotes tolerance, and prevents the cruelty of warfare and the injustice of prejudice; and there is humour, which (amongst other things) gives us the power to maintain a sense of proportion.

We do not declaim against the rough ways and savagery of the race when it was young, for it was groping blindly through the jungle towards the open, and, thanks to its desires and endless striving, has won out through the ages to us. Nor do we declaim against the cruelties of civilisation, for just as the race has learned from the cave-dweller, and just as each

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one of us learns from pain and grief, so the human race and each one of us will doubtless learn something from the great pains and griefs of city life and commercial competitionwhich is but the jungle in another form compatible with the spirit of another era. What the pain of disease is to our body and mind, such is the pain of the disease of civilisation to the race as a whole—something to remind us of the truth, and to show us nobler, wider ways. Disease is due to our own faults. or, alas! to those of our ancestors, and there is surely no doubt that it is the penalty for disobeying those principles of the universe which are necessary for us all to know. Medical science will doubtless find a cure for every disease, but there will always be some new disease beyond, so long as we ignore the methods of nature. Moreover, it is not cure that we want so much as prevention. And though prevention be not possible for us adults, there is no reason why we should not see to it that it is possible for our children or our children's children. It is the most trite and most true of all commonplaces that a close communion with earth and sea and sky spells greater health for soul and mind and body. And even when life has been artificial and unnatural for many, many generations, there is such recuperative power, and such a response to the call of the open, that disease quickly disappears. We have proof of this in the superhealth of those thousands in the west of Canada and the United States, for they, be it remembered, have mostly been drawn in this or the last generation from the very civilised places of Europe.

Education, if it does not lead to greater happiness and is not a source of joy in itself, must be wrong somewhere, for there is no reason why school and college terms should be less happy than vacations and later life. The trouble and discontent arise from the fact that as children we are forced to do things for which we see no use whatever, things which have not been shown or cannot be shown to have any relation to life, things of which we have asked the reason and received no satisfactory answer. And here, as we said before, is the Vol. IX.-No. 3.

path of success or failure. To succeed we must be able to relate all instruction to life. So many of us have been through conventional routines and have found at the end of them that, if we are dependent upon the knowledge acquired by them for a livelihood, there is nothing left to us but to continue to teach those things which we have found useless in any other phase, but which have taken up so much of our time that we have had no opportunity of becoming efficient in anything else. No wonder there is an incessant cry for reform, not so much from the children (for their loyalty to the system by which they are trained is wonderful) as from the poor adults, who realise that so many good years have been practically wasted and that they must now set to work to educate themselves.

That there exist regular systems of rewards and punishments is in itself a sign of great weakness. Reward or punishment may be considered advisable occasionally, but only very rarely. Why should children be bribed, or rewarded rather, for doing that which gives them pleasure? Is not the simple joy of doing well or rightly reward enough? And why any punishment at human hands? Is not disease sufficient punishment for disobedience to natural laws, and is not the remorse that our conscience sends us sufficient punishment for any wrong-doing? It is idle to suppose that we can ever profitably be driven, bullied, bribed, brow-beaten, argued, wheedled into accepting an idea. We can do so by sympathy or not at all. If we accept it by any other way, we sell ourselves. And the boy who invariably gets punished for not knowing a lesson, which has not been shown to him to have any connection with life, is worthy of quite as much respect as (if not more than) the boy who carries off the prize. has been obedient, but the latter has obeyed the dictates of a teacher and the former has obeyed his inner sense of right.

It is not true that some children are born lazy and without any desire to know. Every child is as anxious to learn as a parent is to teach, and all learning is delight until we compel instead of encourage or suggest an interest in things. We often err through explaining too much in our over-anxiety to impart knowledge, forgetting that we ought only to point out the road and leave it to the children to make the journey along it one of adventure and discovery.

We often forget, like most of those who write books for children, that children love things that are beyond their complete understanding. And we are apt to forget that we shall not keep their confidence and attention unless we can by sympathy see things with their eyes, and unless we treat them as we should treat people of our own age. If in our actions we show, or if in our hearts we cherish any sense of superiority, we shall no more be looked up to by them than we should by any others. We must keep before our eyes the example of the great man who considers himself no better than anyone on earth.

The noblest influence on any child that can possibly be is that of a good mother. The best school cannot hope to excel that, but the best school will bear that in mind and will follow it where it can and will strive to keep a close bond between the home and itself. Those schools which consider the parents rather a nuisance and disapprove of their frequent visits, because the excitement upsets the children's lessons, cannot be acting very wisely. If the parents are such that they really do not know how to manage their children (which is, alas! a very common thing), it is for the school to educate them to their duty, and not drive them away.

We cannot, of course, describe here the methods employed to obtain these essentials (they will appear fully in a special work), but we will just sum up as shortly as possible our aims.

We believe that there are some things which are valuable and necessary to us all, and that at the outset any form of education should be general; specialisation to come later.

We believe that we ought not to impose our thoughts upon children, but try to keep the original meaning of the word "educate" and lead out their individuality.

We believe that our example, our suggestions, and, above

all, our characters instruct more and better than our conscious, deliberate attempts to impart knowledge.

We believe that we ought to preserve the child in the child, in order that we may preserve the child in the adult too, and so preserve wonder, faith, curiosity, trust, simplicity, enthusiasm.

We believe that only by sympathy can pupil and teacher meet on the same plane—that of mutual understanding.

We believe in character rather than in the knowledge of facts, in the heart rather than in logical reasoning, in intuition rather than in instruction.

We believe in discipline of self more than in discipline by definite rules.

We believe that we ought to encourage: that we ought to be content to rouse curiosity and to keep the children's minds and hearts open to all that is.

We believe that with pure minds, simple hearts, and healthy bodies we need have no care for the soul, for that will work truly and nobly, without ceasing and without our help, in its own silent realms.

We believe in self-reliance and independence, in a measure of freedom and solitude.

We believe that an understanding of the universe by direct communion with the wind and flowers, with the earth and skies and waters, is at the source of most of our noblest pleasures, thoughts, and emotions.

We believe it advisable to assume that the child, on entering life, is like a field of newly fallen snow, and that we parents and teachers mar or maintain its purity.

We believe in simple diet, simple dress, simple faith.

We believe in mother influence, in the home, in observation, in discouraging any prejudice, in enthusiasm, in earthcraft, woodcraft, handicraft, in what is called spirit and matter, in kindness to all living things, in imagination, in experience, in humour, in friendship, in doubt, in love, and in God.

PHILIP OYLER.

BEYOND MORALITY.

THE REV. E. W. LEWIS, M.A., B.D.

PROFESSOR CAIRD, in his Introduction to the Philosophy of Religion, says: "Religion rises above morality in this, that whilst the ideal of morality is only progressively realised, the ideal of religion is realised here and now."

Father George Tyrrell, in *Christianity at the Cross-roads*, writes: "Morality is not our highest life"; and again, "For Jesus, the moral is not the highest life, but its condition."

Rudolf Eucken has revived somewhere the distinction which the mediæval philosophers drew between use and enjoyment. The characteristic thing about our moral life is that we use our experiences, we do not enjoy them. We "use" that which we desire for the sake of what it leads to; we "enjoy" that which we desire for its own sake. This might almost stand as a distinction between morality and religion. Moral experience is what we desire, because it serves an end—our moral perfection; religious experience is what we desire, because it is supremely blessed and of eternal value in itself; it leads to no end; itself is the end of all things.

Religion gives us possession; morality gives us promise. Religion gives us actual here-and-now realisation; morality gives us endless development towards an unattainable perfection. The symbol of religion is a circle; the experience of enfoldedness, central rest, completed life. The symbol of morality is that, familiar enough to the mathematician, of two lines which ever converge but never meet.

In religious experience we possess, in moral experience we

progress. In religious experience we grasp, in moral experience we ever reach out towards what exceeds our grasp. Religious experience we enjoy; moral experience we employ. In moral experience we are striving on towards an end; in religious experience the beginning and the end are one. The central fact of the religious consciousness is rest and rootedness; the central fact of the moral consciousness is strain and change.

We are constantly living the moral life; many with earnestness, strenuousness, and determination. For most people this, too, is the religious life also. They do not distinguish. They admit no distinction. When the pulpit preaches ethics, the pew acknowledges it and acquiesces in it as the real, the ultimate thing. No other is real to them; they know no other. They do not dream that there is another, save possibly under some imagined post-moral conditions.

"No; when the fight begins within himself,
A man's worth something. God stoops o'er his head,
Satan looks up between his feet—both tug:
He's left, himself, i' the middle; the soul awakes
And grows. Prolong that battle through this life!"

That is the common habit and attitude of the morally earnest man. "Never leave growing till the life to come." In that Better Land there may be rest; but here, all that there is to do is to "keep the nerves at strain." At times he may imagine himself standing on some final and ultimate peak of perfect moral manhood, forgetful that, according to ethical theory, it is precisely in the nature of the Moral Ideal to be unattainable. Perfection is the last enemy of morality; at that point the man would become a "finished and finite clod, untroubled by a spark."

We use life, for the most part. We regard its manifold experiences as so many rungs in a ladder of ascent; they are stepping-stones, the things we rise by. The pleasures of life and its pains, its joys and sorrows, its alternating up-lift and down-thrust, its disciplines and its liberties, its failures and its triumphs—do we not often say that these are given to us that

we may use them to help us on towards the high goal of moral life? Our ultimate goal is fixed somewhere at the farthest term of the moral plane. The question we ask concerning the experiences of life is, Have we "grown but an inch by them"? They are the means which minister to progress. The interrogation we keep before our eyes is, Are we getting better? Indeed, the morally earnest man scarcely ever abandons himself to an experience which stirs him to the depths; he never loses himself; it is the habit of his life to pull himself up and scrutinise and ask, Whither will this lead me? What will it make of me? Will it profit, or will it disadvantage?

We seem to stand perpetually on guard. When we are living in earnest, we seem to be playing policeman to ourselves continually. And at the heart of our normal conscious life there is not rest, but effort; not peace, but labour; not enjoyment, but strain. In this rough and narrow way there are two experiences which come to the writer—experiences which he knows to be shared by a few, whose number would probably be largely increased if frank confession were commoner than it is. Let them be stated.

The first is a strange mixture of weariness and rebellion. The pursuit of the ever-receding rainbow wearies us; and if the conclusions of introspection may be trusted, the bottom element in that weariness is not exhaustion so much as disgust. We are rebels in that warfare from which "there is no discharge"; not because we shirk the fighting, or are sickened with failures, but because we feel somehow that the whole situation is infra dignitatem.

Of an intellectual life which may be described as an infinitely progressive apprehension of that which is, in itself, inapprehensible; of a moral life which may be described similarly as an infinitely prolonged pursuit of a Good which is absolute, and qua absolute unattainable; of the "leagues and leagues, and still more leagues"; of the "other heights in other lives, God willing," we confess that we get tired. The "wages of going on and not to die" seem to involve us in a

perpetual and unescapable bondage to an ever-revolving wheel of life. Inwardly we rebel against this, if it is represented as the whole, or the truth of life.

Is it our fate to be for ever rolling and pushing a stone toward a hill-top which may never be reached? or only reached to disclose other hill-tops? Is there not something painfully inadequate in the message of the preacher who is always thundering out moral imperatives, convicting us of our moral unworthiness, bringing us face to face with our imperfections and our sins; or luring us on to renewed efforts, by drawing pictures for us of the moral ideals which stand like lofty rose-rimmed mountains, and quicken yearning within us only to answer it by an everlasting bafflement? Is it the whole truth of life, or even approximately the central truth of life, that it is like a continuous school-time. in which the very walls of the playground are plastered over with rules and prohibitions, and carefully over-watched by the master from the upper window? Or, probing still deeper, does it really satisfy us to be told that the striving is itself the And does Pascal really convince us when he says that we should not be seeking had we not already found that for which we are in search; does this really help, if we are never to come into the consciously-enjoyed possession of what we are supposed to possess with a potentiality that never becomes an actuality? Are we satisfied that this should be the whole truth, the completed plan, the ultimate purpose of life? Or is there not some instinctive revolt against this being true? The experience suggested by these complaints is a real one; and, as we believe, not an uncommon one. It would be important if we could come at its proper significance.

We know that it is the experience of some in whom there is no lack of moral heroism in confronting life as it comes day by day; and in whom there is, whatever the conclusion may be, no intention whatsoever to make answer by moral indifference or laissez-faire. That would be altogether too cheap and too cowardly.

It cannot be written down as the plaint of the weakling or the sigh of the slackened will which yearns for the short cut and the easy path. Most often it is precisely to the healthy-minded and morally robust man that these experiences of rebellion come; and it is with progress and not retrogression in the moral life that the feeling of revolt becomes deeper in its intensity and more frequent and insistent in its call.

We postulate that this impulsive, instinctive rebellion against the merely moral life, with its continuous risings and fallings, its constant getting-up and beginning again, means that there are deeper elements in our personal consciousness which cannot be satisfied by progress, but which demand possession; which crave, not the use of life, but the enjoyment of it. We suggest that this revolt is nothing more or less than the religious consciousness of a man, as distinct from his moral consciousness, quickening to be born in him.

To the possible objection that such an experience is simply a reactive mood, and not by any means the herald of the arrival of a new quality of personal consciousness altogether, it is a sufficient reply to state the second of the two kinds of experience to which we have referred.

There are times, rare enough, we know, in the personal life of a man when he knows himself to be standing at a height from which he can look down and see, as it were, far beneath him the region of moral questions, moral strivings, moral issues. At the point where he stands, morality is simply irrelevant. It is a moment of exaltation. He stands there high above morality. If, at the next moment, he finds himself debating the question as to whether he ought to do this, or ought not to do that, suffering the intrusion of the moral imperative, he feels somehow that he has achieved a real descent. He has come down from the mountain.

Sometimes we get a hint of what this exaltation may be. The writer remembers, for example, resting among the heather and the gorse of one of the Surrey hills, and looking out north and west across one of the loveliest stretches of landscape in this country. Its alternating hill and dale lay there flooded with summer sunlight. About a dozen larks seemed to be holding a sort of Eisteddfod singing competition in the upper air together. A fly of brilliant metallic green colour poised motionless at the side of a lowly flower at our feet. Suddenly it seemed as if all barriers and limitations had vanished. There was perfect rest. There was the sense of realised partnership with the universal life; a kind of cosmic feeling, in which the boundaries of individuality remained, but remained only to emphasise the unhindered course of a common life which linked us up with all things visible and invisible. The question of a companion, "Ought we not to be moving on?" which broke in upon that strangely uplifting silence, seemed to drag us back to a lower level of life altogether; that word "ought" was the earth-voice breaking in upon our heaven. We do not suggest that this was a religious experience, but the deepest ultimate religious experience is something close akin to that.

For those of us who stand largely within the tradition of historic Christianity it is natural to seek in Jesus the beginnings of this "new creation." There are obvious difficulties and dangers in any attempt to construct the inner consciousness of Jesus from documentary records of His life; but as our purpose is suggestive rather than dogmatic, we may take the words at their face value. It was the blossoming of the religious consciousness as contrasted with the moral consciousness of Jesus which enabled Him to say, "I beheld Satan as lightning fall from heaven." That is to say, He saw the end of things, held it vividly, triumphantly, in His consciousness as a realised fact. The intervening process, to be spread over ages, was eliminated, and He saw the whole as with the eyes of God.

It was the blossoming of the religious consciousness in Jesus which enabled Him to say, "It hath been said by them of old time; but I say unto you." That is to say, it gave Him a spiritual authority to enunciate the higher law. It lifted Him above the received traditions and the current moralities. It made Him supremely a law unto Himself.

Similarly, it was the blossoming of the religious consciousness in Jesus which enabled Him to say, "I am alone, yet not alone"; or, "I and the Father are one." It gave Him the sense of the immediacy of the Divine Presence. It linked His mortality with immortality. It displayed eternity in His heart. It bore Him witness that God was with Him.

In view of these things, we find ourselves reluctant to admit that the whole truth of the life of Jesus can be expressed by saying that He learned obedience through the things which He suffered. We suggest that through the things which He suffered another quality of consciousness altogether was liberated in Him, on the level of which the notion of obedience was meaningless, or at least irrelevant. It would be a mistake to limit the possibility of these uplifted experiences to Jesus, or to the master-souls of the world.

When Shelley wrote:

"The One remains, the many change and pass;
Heaven's light for ever shines, earth's shadows fly;
Life, like a dome of many-coloured glass,
Stains the white radiance of Eternity,
Until death tramples it to fragments,"

he expressed a conception of the Universe in which the possibility of such experiences would seem to lie to hand for us all, could we but learn its secret.

When Wordsworth wrote the familiar lines:

"And I have felt
A presence that disturbs me with the joy
Of elevated thoughts; a sense sublime
Of something far more deeply interfused——"

he expressed in magical language what many have truly felt; and yet he was standing then on the threshold only. Another step was necessary to take him to the luminous heart of the ultimate experience of the human soul. Not "I have felt a presence," but "I myself am in some sort a part of that Presence. I am one with that which is deeply interfused. It is in me. I am of it. In the deepest depth, I am it."

There is at a certain popular seaside resort a swimming-

bath built of concrete on the shore, unroofed, and so placed that at high tide the in-rolling sea floods it. Let us attribute consciousness to that swimming-bath. We can then imagine something like this. During the long intervals between the high tides it will feel its littleness, its narrow limitations: perhaps even, when the tides are so low that not even at high water do the waves leap the barrier, but stop far away and ebb out again into the deep, it may become conscious of stagnation, and the development of poisonous growths within its waters—the sense, we may almost say, of unhealth. Against this, whatever purity remains to it will be in ceaseless antagonism. But on those glorious days when the great breakers come pounding up the shingle, rising higher and higher until, rushing and pouring over the concrete wall, the ocean takes the bounded waters into its embrace, flushes it to the depths, lifts it out of itself, purifies it, links it with the wide currents that beat upon many shores, fills it with the sounding echoes of the great deep-in those days can we not imagine that the swimming-bath, still retaining a consciousness of its limitations, its self-hood, will realise joy and satisfaction and freedom in perfectness? In those days it would be redeemed from its shallowness, its narrowness, its impurities, not by a continuous process of striving against them, but by an immediate and full sharing in the wider, the boundless life of the great waters.

Or let us think of those rivers, which are to be found in some parts of the great continents, which periodically overflow their banks. In the low-lying ground along their shores stand, for many a burning thirsty day, a succession of separated pools and marshes. There they lie undisturbed, stagnant, until they are overgrown with weed, and filled with putrefaction, and over-shrouded by miasma dank and dreary. Some of them, maybe, by reason of secret wells within are able through constant effort to resist the conquest of the death-forces, and to retain some degree of pureness and health. Then, when the snows begin to melt in the far-off mountains, the river rises; it reaches out redeeming arms on either side, and takes,

one after the other, the pools and the marshes into its embrace. The bitter waters are made sweet again; the places of pestilence are healed; there comes the disturbance of great joy; they are caught up in the currents of the great flood; they acquire the sense of breadth and purity and power. It is conceivable that deep down they retain—so we may imagine—the consciousness of separateness, their individuality; they are not altogether absorbed, blended into the stream; there is no absolute mergence; but the sense of oneness with the mighty river saves them from all their shallows and their miseries.

If these analogies have any validity, then the experience of Salvation, that goal of all true religion, is not in the attainment of a moral perfection; it is in the conscious sharing of the All-life. The "one far-off divine event, to which the whole creation moves," is not a point at the farthest boundary of the moral plane. The moral life is secondary; it is, as Father Tyrrell says, not the highest life, but its condition.

Just as conscious life preceded for many æons the appearance, on this planet, of self-conscious life; just as the fundamental meaning of all the warfare and agonising of that pre-human, but conscious, creation which is said to be altogether "red in tooth and claw," was the preparation for the arrival ultimately of a higher type of consciousness altogether, self-consciousness; so also, we suggest, the strain and the striving, the victories and defeats, the bafflements and half-attainments, of the moral life, which is the characteristic of self-conscious creation, are not an end in themselves, neither do they lead it to a goal attainable in its own sphere, but look towards the emergence, the deliverance, of a still higher quality of conscious being which, by distinction, we may call the religious. or the cosmic, consciousness.

The final cause of the moral life is to be found in an order other and higher than itself. All the process of the moral life, with its strain and effort and discipline, is to shake loose within us the tassel of the rose of a cosmic, a true religious, consciousness. The discipline of the moral life must not be shirked, but it looks towards the liberation and the illumination of the religious consciousness, the blossoming of the eternal within the confines of time.

We say that our deepest, ultimate Self has not yet come to consciousness in us; it is entombed; it is in cerements: our Soul is in chrysalis. And the stress, the discipline, labour, warfare, breakage, and disturbance of the moral life is not to refine and polish us so that we become gems of pure moral manhood and womanhood, worthy to be set in the Crown of the Moral Governor of the Universe; rather is it to burst open the tomb, to strike off the fetters, to shake loose the clinging cerements, to work through the hindering envelope, in order that we may enter into the blissful consciousness of fullgrown sons and daughters who know themselves to be now and eternally in the Father's House. None of us should be altogether content—as most people are—with simply getting better and better; we should not be satisfied with mere improvement; we should attempt to garner the spiritual fruits of the moral life, the harvests of discipline and patience.

May we not say that there must be many men and women who, if they would deliberately set themselves to practise the spiritual life, if they would put themselves in the way of communion with God, if they would give their deepest Self a chance to realise consciously its oneness with the Universal Life; if they would withdraw, and be still, and commune, and dream, and aspire, and pray, and lie open to God; if they would exercise that immortal element in them which already the struggles of the moral life have served to loosen; would be able to realise, to a degree they have not yet dreamed of, a knowledge beyond all that eye has seen or ear heard, and a peace which passeth understanding? We speak to-day of a knowledge that is communicated by so-called "disembodied spirits"; who can tell the tale of the knowledge that might be imparted, for the Light and the Life of the world, by these liberated Souls?

PERSONALITY.

MISS E. M. ROWELL.

The notion of personality belongs essentially to the modern world, and the making explicit of this notion is essentially a problem of modern thought. Modern life, with its insistent individualism and its inevitable introspection, has brought into relief the conception of personality, relief all the more striking when viewed against the background—also modern-woven—of mechanical uniformity and abstract necessity. There has been a gradual development of the conception corresponding with a gradual deepening of the sense of personality from its dawn in the first days of the Christian era up to the present time.

In the ancient world the conception of personality was so rudimentary as to be practically non-existent. Although philosophy was groping after such a conception, there was no isolation of the notion, and very little distinction between what we may call the person and his personations, between the man as an implicit self and as explicit in action; a recital of deeds by a Greek chorus was an adequate reflection of the personality of a hero.

Christianity, with its principle of self-analysis, involved in its essence, and soon gave rise to, a consciousness of personality. It made a distinction between the carnal and spiritual man; henceforth man was no more the simple agent of a list of deeds, but a self-conscious complexity of actual and potential; "man partly is, and wholly hopes to be." Such a consciousness of complexity, while induced by Christianity, was at the

same time minimised thereby, in so far as early Christianity demanded an unambiguous surrender of the whole nature to the law of conscience, and thus focussed the divergent faculties of man into a central unity, in this way healing, as it were, in some measure the breach which itself had made. Again, the Church Councils of the first centuries of our era helped to make explicit the notion of personality; all the disputations on the nature of substance and the relation of the persons of the Trinity, though in themselves technical and dogmatic, yet brought into prominence the conception of personality as such. Since those days the conception has developed in meaning and intention. We may say that in the ancient world personality consisted in the abundance of things which a man doeth, in the Christian world in the abundance of things which a man is; and in the modern world in particular-our strange sad modern world with its pathetic tolerance of theory and intolerance of practice—the conception is stretched to cover the outlying abundance of things which a man might have been. Browning sums up the modern attitude towards personality. In Rabbi ben Ezra he says:-

"But all, the world's coarse thumb
And finger failed to plumb,
So passed in making up the main account;
All instincts immature,
All purposes unsure,
That weighed not as his work, yet swelled the man's amount:
Thoughts hardly to be packed
Into a narrow act,
Fancies which broke through language and escaped;
All I could never be,
All, men ignored in me,
This, I was worth to God, whose wheel the pitcher shaped."

Again, the whole of the Ring and the Book is a profound and comprehensive study of personality as recognised in the twentieth century. The same story, the identical sequence of events, and the different interpretations of that story, the manifold determinations of these events in the consciousness of the persons involved! All that might have been and was

not, all that was and just might not have been! We have it all—all the characteristic intention of the individual point of view, of the individual self-consciousness. From St Paul, who exclaims, "The good that I would I do not: but the evil which I would not, that I do," on to the modern world, there has been an instinctive postulation of the element of potentiality in personality, a postulation which rests upon cognisance of unfulfilment, and which is made in more explicit fashion by a disillusioned twentieth-century world.

We come now to a strange discrepancy and striking paradox, viz. that, while for modern consciousness the conception of personality is growing in richness and in content, for modern thought, on the other hand-for modern psychology, philosophy, and scientific thought in general—the conception is becoming more and more difficult, and less and less intensive, receding further and further before modern scientific analysis. The self of man seems helpless to maintain itself against the ruthless investigation of his intelligence. To begin with, the word "self" is ambiguous: it may be used for what we may call roughly the body or the soul; and although soul and body in their conjunction may make one being, yet many selves seem to emerge from that being. There is the self which exists as an object to the self, the self as it appears to other selves, the self as it may appear to God, besides the subjective self, the ego. These different selves are not completely synthesised; we are different at different times; we present a different self to each of our different friends; to ourselves we are inconsistent; there is discrepancy and want of unity in every direction; and in such a swirl of divergent tendencies and actualities the self, par excellence, if such there be, is swallowed up, distorted, indistinguishable. In the modern world this clash of the selves within the self is becoming louder and more marked, owing to the growing range of personal interests and the inadequacy of the old synthesising factors of religion and philosophy to comprehend such divergence, and unite the various elements into a consistent whole of purpose or of aim. There is, then, not one self but many selves, the association of these selves with one organism being a rough practical link between them.

And not only are there many selves, but, moreover, the distinction between the self and the not-self is hard to define and maintain. The material of the self is simply the notself. The contents of the self are not of the nature of possessions, private, inalienable, secure. Rather the contents of the self are the common-land of sentient and cognitive experience, shared with a multitude of other selves; nay, rather has the self no content till it come out of itself and accept the being of the not-self. There is a continual passage of the self through the not-self; the self is perhaps of the nature of a rhythm or beat which pulses through the not-self, and causes it to oscillate according to the law or prescription of the particular self involved. The self is nought except by the medium of the not-self. A man is himself in so far, and only in so far, as his interest and being extend beyond himself. Personality is a coming out of oneself, a mingling with the world, a losing of one's soul, which results in the saving of the same. A man's environment—his wife, his children, his business, to some extent his house, his town, his country—is part of himself; remove this or that element, and though it is true that you do not destroy the self, yet the self is more or less mutilated thereby; and if you proceed to divest a man more and more of his possessions you will probably reach a limit when you will be hard put to it to maintain that the man is still himself. How often after a man has sustained an overwhelming loss do his neighbours agree that he is a different creature; how often after a severe shock is it not said he will never be himself again! Where, then, are the limits of the self? How much of the normal content forms the irreducible minimum of personality?

Moreover, the connection of the self with its phenomenal environment presents a further difficulty. The objective world, the world of experience, although it forms the contents of the self, does not exist as such in the self. Bradley says of the self that "its content is never one with its being; its 'what' always is in flagrant discrepancy with its 'that.'" "A man is not what he thinks of, and yet is the man he is because of what he thinks of." The soul is not experience as such, but transcended and characterised, as it were, endowed with a unity and uniqueness, a bias which influences its own changes.

The self thus becomes as it were a centre of attraction, round which the matter of immediate experience ranges itself in characteristic form according to the law of attraction. Two men have much the same environment, much the same experience, but their personalities are as the poles apart; the patterns into which their experience falls have little or no resemblance. We cannot explain these differences of reaction upon the same experience; we call them centres of feeling, selves, personalities,—words which only serve to hold the mysteries which they cannot reach.

We cannot, I say, explain the self, but we recognise it, each self for itself, by a certain nearness and intimacy of its contents; there is a self-feeling which will not be gainsaid.

Besides this felt warmth of selfhood there is a certain temporal continuity of existence and a certain identity of character which may be taken as more or less indisputable marks of the self. We may be almost entirely changed both outwardly and in respect of character and attainments from what we were as a child, but we accept the memories and records of our childhood as belonging to ourself, because at no time has there been any evident lapse or change of consciousness. We have passed from the one stage to the other by almost imperceptible gradation. "The child is father to the man," and our days are bound each to each by consciousness. As a rule men do not repudiate the years that are past, though after a revolutionary change in their mode or motive of life they may do so, and though all men to some extent forget the things that are behind. Some discontinuity is required for any adequate separation of present from past; witness the

many instances of phenomenal success of a certain cataclysmic form of religious experience in inducing and enabling a man to depart from his sins and to live a new life.

The two characteristics of selfhood indicated above, viz. a certain intimacy of feeling and a measure of continuity in experience, may be compounded and described under the more significant formula of self-participation in experience, and is recognised in language under the guise of the reflective pronoun. The self-conscious creature enjoys himself, as it were, and such self-enjoyment is a link between the past and present self, and yields the required measure of continuity.

But though some degree of continuity both in respect of time and of character is required for the establishment of personal identity, the limits of such continuity are indeterminate and vary with every individual. A man's self may be designated as "the usual manner in which he behaves, and the usual matter to which he behaves,—that is, in so far as he behaves to it." Assuming that the manner is more or less determined by the bias of habit and the freedom of will which minimise external influence, yet the matter which makes up the self, the metamorphosed matter which is the "what" of the self, is almost entirely indeterminate. It would seem as if any portion of the surrounding not-self may be seized upon and made to subscribe to the being of the self; while, on the other hand, almost every portion of the self, except perhaps an unanalysable central core of feeling, may pass over into the not-self, become, i.e., an object for the self. Such perpetual interchange between the self and the not-self induces instability in the self: it becomes wavering, soon lost and won, vague in outline, elusive, unsatisfactory.

Men have always sought to establish the identity, the unchangeableness, of the self; men change, but something in them persists, they say—the real self, immune amid the mutability of its adjectives. But when you investigate this claim you are forced to yield it or to accept a mutilated, stripped, inadequate self instead of the warm reality as you

knew it. The only unchanging part of the self, if such part there be at all, is a limit without substance, and with sole attribute the quality of immutability, a central core of feeling which may be postulated, but which cannot be proved, and which, when postulated, is felt to be inadequate and unworthy of the traditions of a self.

Rejecting this, we must perforce accept the conclusion that personal identity is mainly a matter of degree, and that the limits of the self can only be vaguely indicated in and by the quality of persistence in general. Indeed, we must be content to shift the traditional base of personality and make it consist, not so much in identity, in the unambiguous separation of self from self, nor even in self-participation, but rather in the capacity of the self to participate in the world of experience and to communicate with other selves. The exaggerated individualism of the modern world has been the cause of a certain separatist emphasis; self-respect, self-culture, selfcontrol, are the virtues inculcated by an individualistic community; but the lesson which the modern world has still to learn, after twenty centuries of Christianity, too, is that there is no such thing as self-realisation as such; that the self has no kingdom of its own; that it lives and is only in so far as it goes out of itself and is content to wear the humble badge of the not-self. Self-isolation is suicidal; communion is the life of the self, participation its realisation. The self, then, from its very nature both is and is not; it successfully eludes philosophical analysis.

However it be, though, with philosophers and psychologists, there is no doubt that the ordinary layman is becoming more and more interested, in the present day, in the solution of the problem of personality, for it is personality which gives the vital quality to all experience.

There are several reasons for the present-day recognition of such a fact. In the first place, the modern world has experienced, and is experiencing, an unprecedented awakening of the sense of personal responsibility; secondly, the interest in the problem of human immortality—to some extent perennial and universal, but heightened in the Western world by an advanced individualism—brings the question of the powers and potentialities of the self into prominence; and lastly, a vast mass of evidence concerning certain abnormal manifestations of personality is being co-ordinated and sifted, is being added to day by day, and is exciting more and more interest, and gaining more and more credence with each advance of such research.

The large output of personal reflections and essays of the present day bears witness to an introspective attitude of mind: G. K. Chesterton, A. C. Benson, H. G. Wells, one after another, all transcribe their personal conclusions on such ultimate questions. They do not solve the problems; for the most part the reflective layman gives us characteristic restatements of the question, pictorial rather than profound. For instance, H. G. Wells, in First and Last Things, analyses the self in the following words: "I seem to be a consciousness, vague and insecure, placed between two worlds. One of these worlds seems clearly 'not me'; the other is more clearly identified with me and yet is still imperfectly me. The first I call the exterior world, and it presents itself as existing in time and space. In a certain way I seem able to interfere with it and control it. The second is the interior world, having no form in space, and only a vague evasive reference to time. . . . And that consciousness itself hangs and drifts about the region where the inner world and the outer world meet, much as a patch of limelight drifts about the stage, illuminating, affecting, following no manifest law, except that usually it centres upon the hero, my ego." For H. G. Wells, the rather pessimistic socialist, the interest in the problem lies in the possibility and the limits of personal reaction upon environment—of personal responsibility, that is to say.

For the student of psychical research the centre of interest is changed; for such the capacities of the self are to be gauged with a view to determining whether, and in what

way, they may be made to include certain limiting cases of personality. The phenomena of dreams, hallucinations, abnormal powers of memory, of computation, the problems of telepathy, clairvoyance, hypnotism, and of alternating personality, the evidence of mediumship, of automatic writing and the like, in their cumulative weight cannot be entirely disregarded or set aside as the results of fraud and hysteria. The Western world is to-day waking up to the fact that there are more things in heaven and earth than are dreamt of in its philosophy; and rigid and careful research is being carried on in this field of the abnormal manifestations of the self. So far, very little has been done in the way of actual solution of the problems; before results can be co-ordinated there is an immense mass of preliminary work to be done in collecting and sifting evidence. In this respect the Society for Psychical Research has done much, but in the long run I expect the problems can only be attacked with any chance of success by expert mental physiologists and psychopathologists. Amateur meddling in these matters has certainly retarded scientific progress in this direction, and brought the whole subject into some disrepute.

Attempts at a theoretical solution of these abnormal phenomena have of course been made, the most prominent being by means of the postulation of some sort of underlying self, called the "subjective," or the "sublimised" self; a self less restricted in capacity, less dependent on the body, less known and more esteemed. We shall consider the theory of the "subliminal" consciousness as put forth by Frederic Myers.

For Frederic Myers the question at issue was not the theoretical solution of problems presented by certain outlying tracts of life; the interest was vital rather than scientific; this man was passionately and whole-heartedly bent on solving the problem of immortality, on gauging the evidence for and against a future life, on experimenting with a view to obtaining more conclusive evidence. The result of his life-long labour Myers published in the two volumes of his *Human Personality*

and its Survival After Death. The evidence collected is of considerable value, and the book is one of great interest, owing largely to the impress upon it of the author's ardent personality, and to the courage with which he leads the forlorn hope of an immortality, finished and finite, discerned from earth's purlieus, proved experimentally. Such obvious bias detracts, however, from the scientific value of the book; indeed, it can hardly be said to have scientific value at all; the conclusions are too largely foregone, and the hypotheses are constructed to fit them.

The question of human immortality brings us directly up against the problem of the relation of soul and body. The researches of experimental psychology and mental physiology have established conclusively the fact that there is a rigid and indissoluble correlation of physical and psychical changes; a direct relation between emotional, volitional, mental-in short, spiritual activity, and cerebral and nervous configuration; between soul and body. We cannot say which is cause and which is effect; to attempt to do so would be rash dogmatising -indeed, cause and effect are but rule-of-thumb phrases for practical purposes, and would be but misleading here. All that we can say is that there seems to be a necessary action and reaction between soul and body. The closeness of the connection between the self and its body seems to adumbrate the annihilation of the self with the death of the body. For this reason Myers has recourse to a secondary self of a less dependent character, for which self he claims immortality.

Myers accepts "the old-world conception of a soul which exercises an imperfect and fluctuating control over the organism, a control exercised along two main channels, that of ordinary consciousness and devoted to the maintenance and guidance of earth life, and that of subliminal consciousness adapted to the maintenance of our larger spiritual life during our confinement in the flesh." In every-day life the ordinary or supraliminal consciousness prevails, the subliminal consciousness being quiescent. The two seem to be partially

separated by an "imperfect diaphragm, as it were, of which the permeability varies greatly in different individuals." It would seem that certain states of the organism, certain configurations of the nerve systems, lower the threshold of consciousness, and the subliminal self at such times assumes control and evinces powers and faculties of which the ordinary self is quite incapable. In sleep the subliminal self conducts our dream lives and has the entire control, during which time it pours spiritual energy into our bodies. The subliminal self also rises to the threshold of consciousness in cases of inspired utterance, and it accounts for the often short, unconscious creative power of genius. The subliminal self is also capable of exerting a great influence upon visceral and organic functions; it may surpass the normal self in arithmetical power, in retentiveness, in histrionic capacity, and in cunning. Thus incidentally the subliminal self is made to bear the weight of all the anomalies of the ordinary self, and at the same time it must be capable of an independent existence after the death of the organism.

A large number of cases cited by Myers are pathological in character, and doubtless some light will be thrown upon the problems involved, especially those of divided consciousness and multiple personality, by the modern researches of expert psychopathologists. We shall not, however, here consider the contribution—increasingly valuable as it is—of pathological science to the study of personality.

The main conclusion that strikes one after reading Myers' book is that the immortality which he so zealously and ardently seeks to establish is not of much account to us mortals, so long as it is confined to this very inaccessible subliminal self. We do not know ourselves or our fellows under the guise of the subliminal consciousness, and in the end it is a question of little moment whether or not such an abstraction can persist after the death of our bodies. The whole problem of immortality is shelved, not solved, by the somewhat gratuitous postulate of a secondary self, and the solution which Myers

offers carries no comfort and no conviction. It is "like a tale of little meaning though the words are strong."

Myers recognises the existence, not only of subconscious and unconscious operations, but of superconscious powers which transcend the limitations of ordinary cognition and "remain not below the threshold, but return above the horizon of consciousness, illumining our normal experience only in transient and clouded gleams."

It may be that the stray fragments of unconscious intelligence which we call intuition, and which flash ever and anon across the twilight plane of intelligence, belong to a wider synthesis of consciousness of which our normal cognition is but a straitened tract. It may be that the alternating selves of double consciousness, the selves of our dream life, the many and sundry aspects of ourselves which come and go among the changes and chances of this world, belong to a more fundamental unity, which perhaps finds in what we call life very inadequate scope for manifestation and realisation.

However these things may be, modern psychopathological and psychical research goes to prove that the self is not an accomplished fact for us, at least on the plane of present experience; is not finished and finite, and rigidly and once and for all determined. But then, as a matter of fact, nothing except the highly abstract and artificial mechanical system of the world as wrought by the ordinary intelligence is so finished and finite and rounded off, so perhaps the indeterminate nature of the self need not greatly trouble us.

Let us consider this. There are degrees of selfhood of which the human intelligence takes no account; indeed I believe that selfhood is in some degree a mark of all differentiated being. The function of the intelligence is mainly and in the last resort utilitarian; its business is to enable men to act, and to sustain and guarantee life. The method of human intelligence has therefore always been that of reducing to order, simplifying, neglecting the practically negligible, imposing an artificially made mould of systematic and

mechanical uniformity upon the given fluctuating and elusive phenomenal world.

Such a system of mechanical uniformity we call Nature, and in the world of Nature we consider only the working of so-called natural laws—laws, that is to say, which in accordance with utilitarian scientific principles are framed upon the assumption of averages, aggregates which allow of no idiosyncrasy and eliminate all deviation and individual bias.

We may say that the principle of identity is absent, or at any rate is ineffectual, has no motive power, in Nature. The top of a tree does not sway in the wind because it is an individual tree with a certain bias towards wagging its head, but merely because it is a tree, and a tree subject to such and such forces must always sway in such and such a manner. The forces which operate and the resulting phenomenon are all external in character; the individuality of the tree has no part or lot in it. The denizens of Nature's world have content and being, but no real selves, have a "what" and a "that," but are denied a "this." In Nature there are no Christian names, as it were. Now such denial indicates, to my mind, a very highhanded and dogmatic attitude on the part of the human intelligence, and is not borne out even within the limits of experimental science. There is almost always a measure of discrepancy between abstract scientific law and its application to concrete phenomena, a certain degree of error due in part to the difficulty of taking account of all the conditions in a particular case, and in part to the bias of the experimenter. This latter error has been called the personal equation, and is the difference between the results of different investigators, all the conditions being the same for each. But may there not also be the personal equation of the object as well as that of the subject? It seems to me purely gratuitous to deny such a possibility, and I cannot help believing that the absence of individual bias in inanimate Nature is a mere assumption of human intelligence, made for the sake of dealing more compendiously with the surrounding phenomenal mass. I think it

is probable that trees and flowers, nay, even stocks and stones, have some slight degree of individuality, only such individuality is swamped and overridden by their more obvious mechanical qualities.

Such rudimentary selves have little chance of assertion or recognition; they are practically helpless, and are turned hither and thither by the stress of external conditions and external forces. Speaking generally, the individual differences between one thing and another of the same kind don't matter; what matter are the likenesses, and so we ignore the fact that everything is unique, a fact which we emphasise of humanity in the phrase of the infinite worth of one human soul, and the like. We relegate too much of life to the undifferentiated domain of the indefinite article, and thereby forgo a certain intimacy of relation which the individual offers. When a wasp buzzes round the tea-table our first thought is plural in extent, and in chasing this wasp it is really "wasps" with all their cumulative propensity for stinging which prompt us. This wasp, as such, we ignore, in him defending ourselves against the species, while all the time this particular wasp is probably unconcerned with us and simply has a taste for a special sort of jam. It is a substitute of an abstract incorrigible many in the place of the concrete and comparatively innocent one. It is a harsh compelling of creatures to wear the badge and pay the penalty of professionalism. We find in poets, and seers as St Francis, occasional recognition of such extended selfhood; and in our own day Kipling and Joseph Conrad have offered us vivid and sometimes cruel insight into a sort of individuality inherent in trains, ships, and mechanical and purposeful wholes generally. Still, on the whole it is true to say that the principle of identity is assumed to be effectual in the world of Nature.

In self-conscious existence, on the other hand, the reverse is the case. To a large extent the soul is itself its own laws, consists itself in the identity between its present and past, and, unlike Nature, has its own ideal essence not quite external to itself. Psychology must take account of the law of identity. A man is not the slave of his environment; a man often does this or the other thing, not because there is any firm reason to be rendered, but because he has done it before, because such and such has become habitual to him. Habits are the outcome of the potency of the principle of identity in man. Speaking generally, and having regard to the abovementioned minimum of personality involved in all differentiated being, the experience of inanimate Nature is spasmodic, discrete; that of man cumulative and dynamic. The selfless inanimate object is, as it were, new born at every instant; it has no past, it gives itself without reserve to the forces of the moment, without prejudice to the future. For man, on the contrary, every act, whether voluntary or involuntary, predisposes the agent to repeat that act; circumstances might pass the man with no effect, but circumstances supported by bias determine life and character, and so man goes on working out his own salvation by a process of self-determination. The power of reacting against environment, the quality of individual bias, is the characteristic par excellence of selfhood. Not uniform, necessary, and predetermined reaction, but reaction specific, spontaneous, self-determined, characterises the individual as opposed to the mechanical. Selves are in the making; that is to say, in the making of themselves along the thread of identity. In Arms and the Man Bernard Shaw gives what I always think is a very unfair picture of a man. The author strips Sergius of every vestige of personality to begin with, and then holds him up to derision for his lack of it. Sergius does not get fair dealing at the hands of Mr Shaw; and not only this, but the poor denuded man is exhibited in support of the thesis how vain a thing is man, and especially a fighting man. Sergius has no self-determining power; he is the slave of impulse and the sport of the moment, and is blown this way and that, as a leaf in the wind. This, then, is an unjustifiable presentment of a man, but it serves to illustrate and bring out the crux of personality, which is self-determination, self-determination in

the making, resulting in something which only partly is, however much it may hope to be. We come, then, once more to the fact that personality is a matter of degree, that it exists in a gradually ascending scale in the world of inanimate Nature, in the vegetable and animal kingdom, and finally is more or less explicit in the human self-consciousness. It seems that a certain web of finality, a certain indeterminateness of outline, is a necessary quality of selfhood, and that such indeterminateness need occasion no distress.

The very notion of self-determination implies instability. Self-determination has to run the gauntlet on the one hand of self-diffusion, on the other hand of self-isolation, and to steer some course between the two danger rocks. All individuality on the plane of human life is subject to this twofold stress. Theorists emphasise now one aspect, now the other, but concrete personalities must suffer both, and in consequence be distorted more or less between the positive and negative. The negative element reacts against the submergence of the person as such; it is the saving of finitude, and therefore the possibility of the making explicit in finite form of personality. positive aspect prevents self-isolation, unites the self with other selves, reveals its true being as communion with such selves. Both aspects are essential to personality on the level of human life. Either alone spells destruction: the positive by way of expansion, the negative of compression. The school of philosophers of to-day who call themselves Personal Idealists seem to over-emphasise the negative element in personality. Dr Rashdall in his essay on personality, in Personal Idealism, brings into relief the notion of what we may call the invulnerability of the person. Personality becomes thus a shell which, while meant to preserve, tends to crush the self, tends at any rate to keep from it the normal means of sustenance, i.e. communion with other selves. I think that in these days of a rather obvious individualism what is wanted is the emphasis of the positive social side of personality. Self-isolation means self-annihilation.

The positive realisation of personality is potential, by no means actual. Nevertheless, each self has some dim-felt consciousness of its potential being, and perhaps it is in such feeling that the unity of the self must in the last resort be said to lie.

Such unity is outside the ken of the intelligence, and is vaguely apprehended, and not at all comprehended.

The self is not co-extensive or co-intensive with knowledge of the self. There is a vast difference between knowing about a thing and knowing it, although on the plane of thinghood we may choose to ignore the distinction; and there is all the difference in the world between knowing about a person and knowing the person, and such distinction cannot be ignored. Our acquaintances know about us; our friends know us. Selfhood is a wonderful reserve power behind the various manifestations of the self, and the significance of friendship, the faculty of friendship, lies in some measure of sympathetic apprehension of such reserve—an apprehension which is in part of the nature of cognition, and in part a ministration to such reserve. Browning calls such apprehension by the name of faith:

"Why, what but faith do we abhor and idolise each other for?

Faith is our evil or our good, which is or is not understood

Aright by those we love or those

We hate, hence called our friends or foes."

Perhaps Browning does not here take into account sufficiently the constructive power of friendship; but by whatever name we call this apprehension, I think that by its means we touch, and in some degree realise, *i.e.* make real, the potential selfhood of our friends. Friendship is the revelation, the surety, and perhaps the very goal of selfhood.

We are thus brought back to our twentieth-century dictum on personality as that which a man might be, and we are forced to accept a potential rather than an actual unity of personal being, a unity, moreover, which transcends the understanding. Intelligence moves through the precincts of the self, lighting up now one corner, now one aspect, but it cannot show the whole as such; one aspect recedes as the next appears, and intelligence gives but sorry illumination.

And the conclusion of the whole: What of these selves? Yourself? Myself? Well, they are not very satisfactory selves, but then they have not yet attained to the full measure of the stature of personality. I expect the way to such attainment is the paradoxical way of self-relinquishment; but though the way may be clear so far, the goal is hidden, for "it doth not yet appear what we shall be."

Finally, at the end of a long discussion of personality it occurs to me—with all the irony of such retarded realisation—that any attempt at an explanation of personality was foredoomed to failure. I believe that personality is the one reality of the universe, that it is all-present and all-prevailing, that it is at the back of all being, revealing itself more or less adequately according to the capacity of the different media it uses, and therefore it would seem that it is not personality at all which requires explanation, but all the other things and modes of being. Science is then, perhaps, justified in her method of mechanism, so long as it is merely a method and not a philosophy; justified in leaving alone the underlying personality of things; justified in refusing to make much ado about the ultimate and invulnerable.

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DISCUSSIONS

N.B.—The contributions under this heading refer to matters previously treated in the "Hibbert Journal." Reviews of books are not open to discussion. Criticism of any article will, as a rule, be limited to a single issue of the *Journal*. The discussion ends with a reply from the original writer.—Ed.

THEOLOGY AND THE SUBCONSCIOUS.

(Hibbert Journal, January 1911, p. 233.)

I.

In the January number of this Journal Bishop D'Arcy of Ossory scrutinises Dr Sanday's venture into Psychology for illustrative material for Christology. The custom is long established of looking to human nature for help in conceiving singleness of person together with duality of nature-" As the reasonable soul and body is one man, so God and man is one Christ." Dr Sanday hopes that, by the help of modern psychology, a better analogue may be found in the human mind alone; that the double process of the life of every mind in a conscious and a subconscious stream may be taken as a more luminous analogue for that concurrence of a human and a divine consciousness within one personality which the theology of the Church maintains. In making the venture Dr Sanday has scarcely invested himself with the scientific authority for this view of mind which was at his disposal. Most readers will hesitate to commit themselves to the lead of Frederick Myers, admirable in so many ways as his writings are; and even William James will not carry such weight as belongs to the psychologists who are more systematic and comprehensive, though less gifted with expository faculty, than he was. But the general consensus of modern psychology is available for Dr Sanday's purpose; the life of mind cannot be confined to the series of experiences which pass through full consciousness, whatever difference of view there may be as to the nature of mind beyond that range.

Dr Sanday's venture in the two chapters in his Christologies Ancient and Modern is a first excursion, and certain defects in it expose it at once to adverse criticism.

First: there is an exaggeration of the dissociations of mental life. Experience undoubtedly is grouped in masses, but the employment of the term "selves" has perils and carries the separations too far. Especially Myers' employment of it to the extent of speaking of a subliminal self of grandiose

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powers is unacceptable to science, and was rejected by Dr Stout in this Journal (October 1903) in somewhat scathing terms. But this exaggeration is really not in favour of Dr Sanday's purpose, but rather is against it. as he is in search of a distinction which is to work within a single self, This criticism he can accept, therefore, as assisting his own inquiry. Secondly: Dr Sanday sets forth the subconscious as a deposit of our past experiences, a storehouse filled with what Dr Stout calls "persistent aftereffects." At the same time Dr Sandav is careful to show that it is a scene of activity; not an accumulating mass of inert effects, but itself a region where work proceeds, where improvement and development contribute to the progress of the mind as a whole. But he has not given due prominence to the fact that the subconscious mind is also recipient of new material; that in this dimmer region also we are in contact with the universe and not merely working up old material. Some psychologists, it is true, do not acknowledge this, but it is the conception which I take to be the scientific one initiated by Leibniz with his doctrine of petites perceptions and confused and undistinguished intimations, and followed by Höffding, Ward, Stout, and Carveth Read. Dr Sanday comes to see the importance of including recipience later on (p. 178), when he speaks of the receptacle as not only receiving from the consciousness above the line, but as also "open at the bottom"; and he sees too that this is "ultimate and most important." I invite him therefore to bring it to the front and place it in his primary exposition side by side with the view of subconscious mind as a storehouse of the past.

There is another emendation which is indispensable for Dr Sanday's success. The distinction between consciousness and subconsciousness is somewhat entangled with the distinction between personality and what I may call subpersonality. The former rests upon intensity of consciousness; the latter upon the presence or absence of certain important functions of mental life. In a lecture published since the book, of which I have been privileged to see an advanced proof, Dr Sanday himself sets out the conception of personality as the exercise of the functions of unity, identity, reflection, initiative, and control. These may be taken as indicating what is generally accepted: and subpersonality will be the exercise of these in minor degree of efficiency, and impersonality their absence altogether in the region of mental life sufficiently described as automatic. Now, are we to take these distinctions as giving rise to divisions which are coincident? Is all the consciousness above the line "personal" also? and is the exercise of these personal functions always and entirely in full consciousness? I had thought that Dr Sanday was regarding the coincidence as complete, and under this supposition I felt strong objection to his assignment of our knowledge of God, our susceptibility to Divine influence, to the subconscious mind as its "proper" sphere. It is this objection which is expressed emphatically by Dr D'Arcy, by Mr Clement Webb in the Oxford Magazine, by Dr Hugh Macintosh in the Expository Times, and doubtless by many others. But if we consider

these two divisions we shall find, I suggest, that they are by no means coincident. Certainly our stream of mental life in full consciousness is far from being absorbed by personal activity as above defined: there, too, our experience includes much that is automatic in its character. And again, I do not think that we have evidence for confining personal activities to the upper level: the centralised Ego is so powerful that even when its intensity in consciousness is so diminished that it sinks below the line it is not therefore reduced to nullity, nor does it entirely lose its potency over the processes among which it then is operative. I think that Dr D'Arcy limits personality unduly when he says "the conscious ego is and must be the expression of the concrete whole of the personality"; while I fully agree that it is by means of conscious will and reason that the highest operations of personality are performed. But the syntheses effected are too vast and too complex to be ascribed to functions proceeding entirely within the narrow limits of focal consciousness.

For Dr Sanday's purpose my criticism comes as an ally. For he wishes to maintain that our knowledge of God is attained in the wider region, more varied and more far-reaching as that is. Now if personality is absent from this region the width and variety will not compensate for the absence of higher quality: he is assigning our knowledge of God and our recipience of Divine influence to the automatic level of our mental life, a proposal which will arouse general opposition. But if personality continues to operate below, even when the upper level of consciousness is absorbed with activities and interests only quasi-personal, largely automatic, then the capacity for receiving impressions of the Divine presence, and not only perceiving them but adopting them and taking them into our inner selves, is provided for. In his subsequent lecture Dr Sanday accepts this view and corrects his first exposition: he now makes clear that in claiming that the subconscious region is the proper sphere of the influence of the Divine Spirit he does not mean, as from his book we took him to mean, that it is only an automatic region of inferior activities: he fully recognises that the functions of personality are indispensable, and that it is only where they are exercised that the highest knowledge can be attained.

There is another correction due to the disentanglement of the distinction between consciousness and subconsciousness from the distinction between personality and impersonality. Dr Sanday regards the subconscious level as the proper "seat or locus of all divine indwelling" in a way that excludes full consciousness from participation in this supremely momentous prerogative of our mental life. He has stated this so strongly that I do not feel sure that he will be willing to do more than accept the inclusion of personality below the line and continue to maintain that it is below the level that the important work is done; up above we have only the index recording the primary operations taking place below. I maintain the contrary. Allowing for the greater extent, the superior variety, the greater frequency of the subconscious processes, I claim that

in fullest intensity of consciousness also it is given at times for man to see God, to feel Divine influence, and to set himself in the attitude of piety and obedience. There is exchange between above and below the line in our experiences of Divine things. Divine influence is accessible to us whenever we call off our attention from superficial and ordinary experiences: but this we may do in full consciousness; and more, it is there that we should always seek to set the ideal of our contact with the deepest aspects of Reality, our most intimate communion with God.

These criticisms are offered with the purpose of assisting Dr Sanday in his endeavour to advance our Christology by enriching it with a more luminous analogue than was available from older psychology. How far he can accept them it is for him to judge: and how far the acceptance would involve some modification in his statement of the Christological terms of the analogy I leave in his hands.

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II

ALL students of religious psychology must feel grateful to the Bishop of Ossory for his timely warning as to the dangers and absurdities which lurk in the fashionable theories concerning the "subliminal self," a symbolic diagram which bids fair to become the Mesopotamia of Liberal Christianity. Like so much of the concrete imagery of modern science, the "sub-conscious" - originally only a convenient name for all those powers and qualities in a man which were not, at any given moment, conscious-has been too easily personified in the popular imagination. Identified with the "Watcher on the Threshold," the "Dweller in the Innermost," and other such figures of speech used by mystically-minded and "suggestive" writers, it is now regarded as a sort of imprisoned angel, gazing out on to eternity and possessed of supernormal powers. One cannot but fear that Dr Sanday's attempt to establish the theory that the locus of the Deity in Christ was the subconscious self, will encourage this view. Soon we shall have entirely forgotten that the "subliminal mind" is neither place nor personality, but a convenient term under which we can resume a group of facts; and further, that the main content of this normal subconsciousness is either (a) those qualities which education and environment have forced out of the life of the conscious personality-man's half-savage instincts and vices, the odds and ends for which he can find no use, the tendencies which he has deliberately thwarted and so forced "below the threshold"; or (b) those latent powers which the accidents of his life have not called into play. Now, it is true that in the average man (b) will often include such spiritual faculties as he may possess. These are "in the hiddenness"; but they are kept there, surely, not because it is their "locus," but because the accidents of "practical" life do not call them into activity. The whole justification of the "ascetic life" lies, of course, in the fact that it provides an environment which calls out these spiritual faculties, steadily forcing the opposite

or "earthly" side of character "into the hiddenness." The man in whom these spiritual faculties are strong enough to overpower the contrary tendencies of character—the seer, the prophet, the mystic, the saint—always declares, in defiance of the preachers of the "subliminal," that he is conscious of his link with the Divine, whatever the terms may be which he uses to describe it. True, his mental life, subconscious as well as conscious, is—like that of all persons of genius—extremely rich. Hence those experiences which we label "uprushes from the subliminal region" may be of great value in his case, whilst in other men they are often mere chaotic dreams. But the central fact is not that he possesses this capacity for automatism, but the fact that his conscious will is set upon Divine Reality. In the picturesque language of psychology, his genius for the Infinite "captures the field of consciousness," and becomes the dominating influence of his life. He is sharply aware of this, and often declares it as plainly as he can. Hence St Paul's "I live, yet not I," Plotinus' "The soul participating of Deity knows that the supplier of true life is present," St Catherine of Genoa's "My me is God," Madame Guyon's "I have lost the created for the Uncreated." These, though he did not call them, are surely the best witnesses for the case which the Bishop of Ossory defends. Mystical literature abounds in such statements; which are clearly the reports of consciousness, though it may be of a form of consciousness which we find hard to understand or fit into our arbitrary diagrams of man's mental life. If this be so in the case of normal human sanctity, why should it be necessary to suppose in the case of Christ that the locus of His Divine powers—the link of His humanity with God—lay below the threshold of consciousness?

If it be necessary to include in Christological speculations of this kind—which, however stimulating they may be found by some types of intellect, are necessarily inconclusive,—surely it were better to take as our starting-point the declarations of those heroic types of personality which, exhibiting spiritual genius of a high order, have most nearly approached the Christ-consciousness; rather than the explorations and generalisations of a psychology which is, to a large extent, founded on the observation of pathological phenomena? These types of personality—the mystical saints—were far from confusing their divine or transcendental powers, their link with God, with the totality of the subconscious mind. Their powers of self-criticism were singularly delicate; and in using them they seem to have displayed a more scientific spirit of discrimination than the new psychologists. "There is a seed or spark in man," these old mystics used to say—the Fünklein, Synteresis, Spark of the Soul. As we can hardly do without some spatial symbols—and these are innocuous so long as their diagrammatic nature be kept in mind,—surely this were a better formula than Dr Sanday's "narrow-necked bottle opening on the Infinite"; a bottle in which all man's latent savagery and imprisoned vices, as well as his spiritual intuitions, must find a place. This point, this spark, is conceived by them as the Gemüth—heart or core of our immortal person-

ality,—where, says Rudolph Eucken, "God and Man initially meet." The ordinary man may be no more aware of this spark within him than he is of the mysterious vitality by which his bodily existence is carried on: but in the spiritual genius, heir of a more abundant life, it is central for consciousness. The *locus* of his transcendental life is *not* subliminal; and it is exactly this which distinguishes him from other men.

Since the most orthodox Christological doctrine declares that our Lord's divine nature was manifested in and through the normal processes of human nature, perhaps it is not wholly improper to suggest that we may have in the study of mystical psychology, and particularly in the declarations of the great mystics concerning their own powers and experiences, that which they called their "union with God," a hint as to the character of that which we call, for want of better language, the "divine nature of Christ." I do not wish to press this parallel, to belittle the difference between that nature and the "divine union" enjoyed by the greatest of the saints; but surely it is here, in the persons of those who declar one and all that the source of their supernal vitality was a transcendent life, a union with Divine Reality, of which they were clearly conscious-rather than in the investigation of hypnotic phenomena, or the elaboration of fantastic theories concerning the metaphysical qualities of the "subliminal mind."—that we touch, as it were, the fringe of that mystery which is central not only for the Christian faith but also for all who believe in the immortal destiny of man.

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DR K. C. ANDERSON ON WHITHERWARD? A QUESTION FOR THE HIGHER CRITICISM.

(Hibbert Journal, January 1911, p. 345.)

T

No one can read Dr Anderson's article without recognising the intense seriousness and the reverence of the writer. All the same, one cannot but feel that he is "beating the air" when he endeavours to sublimate the Person of the Founder of Christianity altogether away into a nebulous product of the religious imagination of certain enthusiasts in Judæa in that epoch of time which is now known as the first century of our era. I do not intend to follow Dr Anderson into all the details of his ably written article; I will deal only with his reference to St Paul. On what was the experience of St Paul of the life of the "Christ" within him founded? I will confine myself in my search for the answer to this question to the four universally admitted genuine epistles of the apostle, viz. Galatians, 1st and 2nd Corinthians, and Romans. Dr Anderson, by the way, does not seem quite sure of Galatians. This is what he says:

"In what seems a piece of genuine autobiography, we are told by an early Christian—whom some place in the first century and make a contemporary of the Jesus of the Gospels, and others place in the second century-what becoming a Christian meant to him. It is not at all what we should have expected." He then goes on to quote from the first two chapters of the Epistle to the Galatians, and proceeds: "This piece of autobiography is interesting, because it tells us what becoming a Christian really meant to one at least of the early Christians. It was the revelation of the Son of God within him. To reveal is to unveil. The Son of God was within him before this took place, only he was unconscious of the fact. He became conscious of the Divine within him. . . . The phrase 'of Nazareth' never occurs in this man's writings. . . . By the Son of God, therefore, he did not mean a historical Jesus of Nazareth. He meant the Divine that dwelt within him. . . . Hence the writings of this man say nothing about the historical Jesus, and quote nothing of His teachings. . . . The term 'Christ' is this man's name for the consciousness of the Divine within him. . . . If one supposes that by the term 'Christ' he means Jesus of Nazareth, the actual historic person, whom some suppose was his contemporary, his language will seem enigmatical; but if one remembers that by the word 'Christ' he means the Son of God within him, a wondrous light will be cast upon his words." The argument then proceeds to deal with "the potential Christ in every individual of the race."

Now, this is just the old controversy as to "Jesus or Christ" in another form; and along with much that is true in what Dr Anderson says, there is a failure to perceive the real bearings of the case which vitiates the whole argument. To answer one question we must ask another. Was the "Christ" of St Paul's experience a fact that can be isolated from its relationship with "Jesus"? All that St Paul says shows that it was not. The "Christ" of his experience was the Risen and Ascended "Jesus," whatever these phrases may mean; and it was the association of all that is involved in the Christ-idea with the definite historic Person, whether "of Nazareth" or not, who died and rose again, that alone gave it its vitality and its power.

To prove this by a detailed examination of the epistles named would far exceed the space allowed. Let us just take one or two salient passages from each. Gal. i. 3, 4, "Our Lord Jesus Christ who gave Himself for our sins"; ii. 16, "the faith of Jesus Christ"; iv. 4, "God sent forth His Son, made of a woman, made under the law"; vi. 17, "I bear in my body the marks of the Lord Jesus." See also ii. 20; iii. 1; v. 6; vi. 2, 12, 16; 1 Cor. ii. 2; vi. 11; viii. 6; ix. 1, "Have I not seen Christ Jesus our Lord?"; x. 16, 17: here he speaks of "the blood of the Christ," which is absurd unless he is referring to Him who was "Jesus" and became "the Christ"; xi. 23-29; xii. 3; xv. 3-8: here again it is "the Christ" who "died and was buried and rose again"; 2 Cor. i. 2, 3; iv. 5: here "Jesus" is equivalent to "Christ Jesus the Lord," and there is a distinct reference to the source whence is derived the record of our Lord's teaching, that He

came "not to be ministered unto but to minister" (Mark x. 45, Matt. xx. 28); v. 16 sqq.; viii. 9, "Ye know the grace of our Lord Jesus Christ"; xi. 4, "another Jesus"; xiii. 4, 5, 14; Rom. i. 3, 4, "His Son, Jesus Christ our Lord, which was made of the seed of David, according to the flesh, and declared to be the Son of God with power by the resurrection from the dead"; 24, 25; iv. 24, 25, "Jesus our Lord, delivered and raised again"; vi. 1, 21; vi. 3, 4; viii. 3, 34, "the Christ died"; x. 6, 7; xiv. 8, 9; xv. 3, "Christ pleased not himself"—this surely refers to definite events in a historical life? This is only a selection of passages, but they sufficiently prove my point that the word "Christ" is not used by their writer only to express "the consciousness of the Divine within him," but indifferently with "Jesus" or "the Lord Jesus" to express definite facts in the life of a "historic person."

Again, it is not true to say that this writer "quotes nothing of his teachings." The whole ethical teaching of Rom. xii., xiii., for example, is, if not based on the Logia, the Q of the critics, at least in close correspondence with it; and in Acts xx. 35 the same person, i.e. the Apostle Paul, is represented as quoting "words of the Lord Jesus" not recorded

in the gospels: "It is more blessed to give than to receive."

Thus, though we concede to the Higher Criticism of the gospels all that it is able to accomplish, we still have the testimony of St Paul to the historicity of the Person of "Jesus the Christ," and we agree with Professor Schmiedel that "criticism is never likely to be able to prove that He never existed," though we may not follow him when he adds that "it would not make any difference to us if it were proved." Christianity is to-day what it has ever been, a religion founded on devotion to a Person in whom we see and meet God.

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EAST RUDHAM VICARAGE.

II.

No Christian, orthodox or unorthodox, can read the paper contributed by the Rev. K. C. Anderson to the January issue of the Hibbert Journal without finding much with which he is in deep agreement. That "the Christ must be born within us, must grow in consciousness and power, must receive Divine illumination, must die to the lower self, must rise to newness of life and power," that "the individual must live through and experience personally the life of the Christ," is the felt need and realised experience of all Christians more than nominally such. But the author of this arresting and spiritually minded paper fails to see that by treating the Gospel-story as symbolic only, he is cutting away the ground from under his own feet. Though it may be at once conceded as true that "the deepest religious teachers have always passed from history to the facts of the inner life when they have sought to move the religious emotions of men," it must yet be remembered that they made the passage. History was the door through which they entered and taught their

disciples to enter the profound mysteries of the inner life. It is the door through which unnumbered Christians enter to-day upon that realisation of the Christ-life, which, as Dr Anderson truly says, is potential in every man. Because the spiritual transcends the historical, we cannot therefore say that the latter is superfluous. The relation between them is intimate and vital, far more so than appears in Dr Anderson's assertion-"It is not the historical which is the foundation of the spiritual, it is the spiritual which is the foundation of the historical." To those who recognise that the universe is essentially spiritual, the words indeed convey an incontestable truth, but its expression leaves much to be desired. The analogy is too architectural to be satisfactory. The historical is not built upon the spiritual after the fashion of a superstructure upon its foundation; it is part of the living and developing form which the spiritual creates for itself, to suit the exigencies of its self-expression under temporal conditions. All true history is life-history (whether it be of the Natural Order as a whole, or of that human experience which in all its developments is an intrinsic element in that Order), and every life has a history, the facts in which are expressions of spiritual truths. The life and death of Jesus are no exceptions to the rule. Regarded "merely" as historical facts, they have no spiritual significance. Regarded as spiritual truths expressed in historical facts they interpret to man his temporal experience, as non-historical allegories could not do. Mystical experience, taken alone, is inadequate to this task because its necessarily individual and subjective character precludes the truths to which it bears witness from becoming a racial possession unless they are also capable of objective presentation—in other words, of entering into history. It is quite possible, it has indeed been a common error, to lay as much stress upon the historical aspect of the Gospels as upon their spiritual appeal. Consequently, the uncertainty thrown upon their records seems to be as necessary a discipline to the Church of to-day as the withdrawal of their Master's visible presence from the first disciples.

In all ages the lesson has to be learned that not the witness of a life, nor the story of a life, but the Life itself, is the transforming, regenerating force which the world needs, "the one victorious power which masters men and women of all conditions, and of all grades of culture." Yet history plays its part in the setting of the lesson. Though not the temple, it is the scaffolding of the temple, and not till the last living stone is laid, not till the earth-experience of the human race is fulfilled, will it be possible to dispense with the scaffolding.

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¹ Hort, The Way, the Truth, and the Life, p. 183.

PRAYER.

(Hibbert Journal, January 1911, p. 385.)

I.

Mr Stewart's objections to petition in prayer are not as conclusive as he supposes.

- 1. He does not think it likely that God can "give serious ear and individual consideration to each and all" of the suppliants who seek His help. Mr Stewart seems to imagine that the amount of "weighing and sifting which these petitions must require" is too complicated a problem for the Deity. He thinks it more probable that they are dealt with according to general laws. But surely this is an amazingly petty view of the Divine Nature? How infinitely worthier is the teaching that not a sparrow falls to the ground without God's knowledge and care! It is more philosophical also. To imagine, as Mr Stewart does, that God's interest in His universe is entirely concerned with general laws, is a deification of red tape. The truth is that, in the actual world, reality is always concrete and individual. The law is a mere abstraction.
- 2. Mr Stewart reproduces the old objection that prayer as petition implies "want of trust in God's judgment and benevolence." God will do what is best. To ask Him for what we desire is to distrust Him.

But Mr Stewart forgets that, if there be such a thing as a moral government of the universe, the highest and best gifts (and this may include physical benefits as well as spiritual) can only come to those who are morally fitted to receive them; and what is prayer but the expression of the moral attitude which alone makes the gift possible? Prayer is not an asking of God to change His mind. It is, or it marks, that change in man which fits him to receive benefits which otherwise could not be given to him.

3. Finally, Mr Stewart declares that "those who have given thought to the matter generally recognise that the benefit is *subjective* only." I suppose he holds that the laws of nature preclude all other benefits?

But the laws of nature do not prevent man from carrying out his purposes. Man deals with the forces of nature and makes them to subserve his ends, bringing about results which the physical world, apart from human volition, could never produce. So all human works are done. So it is that one man can help another.

Are we to suppose that the Almighty labours under a disability from which His creature, man, is free? Is it possible, while man can so guide the forces of nature that he can answer the petition of his brother and give him often health instead of sickness, life instead of death, that God is so shackled by His own laws that He is powerless?

I think Mr Stewart will see, if he will consider these points, that the traditional practice of Christendom is not as incapable of reasonable justification as he imagines.

CHARLES F. OSSORY.

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II.

Surely the article on Prayer in the January issue is a striking instance of the application of purely logical and intellectual methods to a subject quite transcending their reach and measurement. It is true that the writer makes statements which might be met on their own level, as where he condemns prayer for spiritual help, because "power to resist evil was given us at the creation of man, and at our birth." So was the power to walk, but we do not therefore refuse to develop and sustain it by the use of

proper food.

But can this writer ever have had even a glimmering perception of what real prayer, real communion, means? He asks whether it "can rationally be supposed" that God hears us, points out the illogicality of supplication, and quite fails to see that the essential life and spirit of prayer must inevitably be killed by a deliberate undertaking of "devotional exercises for self-improvement"—surely a contradiction in terms. He actually sets out a compact little table of topics on which man may be allowed to hold converse with his God! What a gulf between all this and that true experience of which Meredith says that "he who has in him the fountain of prayer will not complain of hazards"! It is impossible not to stand amazed before Mr Stewart's conception of God—a God to whose will we ought to express our submission and yet who cannot be expected to know enough about "our bodily circumstances and mental conditions" to give our prayers "serious consideration." "Consider," he says, "the weighing and sifting which these petitions must require"! Will he try to realise the nature of the intercourse between a human mother and her flock of little children? They cling to her, seek her presence, tell her what hurts and what delights them, and ask quite illogically for all sorts of things, possible and impossible, and she would not have it otherwise; they are hers and she is theirs—she would set up no barriers, have no reserves to check their confidences. When we perforce use these symbols, speaking of motherhood, or of the Father who seeth in secret, we feel that the comparison, though poor and feeble, is not false—only utterly inadequate to express the living reaction and interplay between the Great Spirit and the human souls from Him derived, by Him nourished and sustained. Shall their communion with Him be broken in upon by a critical outsider who dares to prescribe what they may, or may not, "rationally" pray for? When a man opens wide the doors and windows of his soul, and invites the visitations of that Divine Spirit without which his life is joyless to himself and useless to his fellows, is he to be told that he is "improperly selfish"? "Selfish"? Could we bear, could we live under the knowledge of the bitter pains, the grinding miseries of human life around us, and of the small relief our utmost efforts can bestow, if we could not take that intolerable burden into the only Presence where it can be borne, and where the same Spirit who inspires our appeal replies to it in an assurance, a hope, which makes it possible to go forward without

any logical solution to our problems? Sometimes there are those in bitter, humanly hopeless straits whom we would die to save, and we can reach them in no other way than this. Does Mr Stewart tell us that it is "not only undesirable but inconceivable" that there should be anything but a "subjective" result? Then we take leave to tell him that "reality expresses itself in many ways other than those which fit into the forms of conceptual logic." His God sits cold and silent at the receipt of homage. Ours invites us to confide to Him our keenest joys and our sorest needs. Have we no logical proof that He responds? We have at least on our side an innumerable company of witnesses, world-wide and age-long. Can the denier prove his negative?

A. WATSON.

SHEFFIELD.

THE ROMAN CATHOLIC CHURCH IN ITALY AT THE PRESENT HOUR.

(Hibbert Journal, January 1911, p. 307.)

In the January number, Professor Luzzi, D.D., Florence, professes to give Englishmen a correct idea of "the present conditions of the Roman Catholic Church in Italy." He feels the difficulty of giving "an exact and complete idea" in a few pages. I feel a greater difficulty in pointing out what I believe to be the false impression he leaves upon the English mind in a few short notes.

I. Mine may appear a bold venture. He is an Italian professor; I am but an English ecclesiastic of a humble type; but I have known Italy and every grade in Italian Society for a great part of my life, and am in constant correspondence not merely with "the thinkers," but with men of the working class and the poorer classes. That must be my excuse.

II. I believe the Professor fails because he is purely (1) academic. He seems (to borrow a phrase) to be "in contact only with ideas, not with facts." His is an attack on Religion in Italy and a defence of Modernism, which is futile, because, in many particulars, not borne out by things as they are.

(2) He fails by placing things in mistaken proportion. I cannot defend the Roman assumption of the Papal position. I regret the attitude of Pio IX. in 1848, and 1854, and 1870, and the mistakes and ignorance displayed by those whose intrigues led Leo XIII. into his foolish and untenable utterances on Anglican ordinations. I deplore, with the Professor, the state of the Curia, and hope it may be reformed. Intrigues—whether in "Broad Church" caucuses, or at Lambeth, or at the Vatican—are always to be deplored; but that does not close one's eyes to the real reforms worked by the quiet, simple, and Christian endeavours of the present venerable Pontiff. One must agree with "Sibilla" in one thing,

viz. "God conferred a great blessing upon His Church when, through the force of events, He liberated her from that earthly power which subjugated the great Lordship of the Church to the smaller interests of a kingdom." Still, neither speeches of a Mayor of Rome—of course "noble-minded and a great patriot"—at the Porta Pia, nor the attacks of Modernism will bring peace. One sees the difficulty of passing from an old position to a new; but a constant knowledge of Italy has shown me how, with the passing of the Temporal Power, Religion—real, practical religion—has increased among the people. I think the personal influence and religious—as distinguished from diplomatic—character of the present Pope has greatly contributed to this. I find people loyal to their Pope and loyal to their King, and if busybodies and "Modernists" do not work mischief, the old controversy between the Vatican and the Quirinal will, by patience, tact, and prayer, die out.

(3) The Professor fails, I think, by being a slave to shibboleths, and by grossly-though unintentionally-misstating facts. We are used to the shibboleths in this country. Here professors, pedants, higher critics, have made us at home with them. We are used to "ideals of freedom, justice, and science," and to "the cold observance of formulæ and traditional precepts" in religion, and to "seeking the Living God, and not a system of dogmatics encircled by cast-iron formulæ," and to the value of "Christ's Christianity," and to the discovery of "the Social Question," and to "Groups of Noble Souls recovering the essence of Christianity," and "the Spirit of the Gospel," and "the Modern Conscience," and "the Modern Mentality." These forms of cant are now familiar to us in England, and, hand in hand with them, the Infallibility of Higher Critics et hoc genus omne, compared with which the infallibility claimed by the Roman Pontiff is as the shadow of a dream; and with all this an increasing laxity in morals, and a moral miasma breathed by our young lives in England, from which young Italy is extraordinarily free. Then there are gross misstatements: (1) "Church-going men a small number." I have again and again been scarcely able to enter a Church in Rome and in country places for the crowd of devout men. (2) "The young are growing up more than ever refractory to religious education." Had I space, I could give numberless instances which refute this absurdity. (3) The old cathedrals are utterly deserted." This sounds as if meant of cathedrals in England, not Italy. In our "unfurnished houses" we find one or two leisured ladies or pious laymen at Mass, and a crowded congregation for an afternoon or evening "concert," called perhaps an "organ recital," and given a "powder of piety" by an irrelevant Collect said just before. I adduce one instance out of many. Milan has never been marked, in modern times, by excessive piety; a week or two ago I was in a crush of men, devout and attentive at High Mass and sermon in the Duomo there. (4) "We have never found anyone of the poorer classes praying to anyone but the Madonna." Well, I have; and I have lived with the poorer classes in out-of-the-way places all over Italy. (5) "Few prayers are addressed to our Saviour, and scarcely a trace of any to

the Eternal Father." Had I space I could refute this from personal experience. I can only say I know no country, and no part of the Catholic Church, where the "Our Father"—our Lord's own prayer—is more constantly used with intelligent intention. (6) There is a charge of sentimentalism, truly absurd. You find plenty of it in England. It is foreign to the Italian nature.

I could enlarge on these themes and prove my propositions up to the hilt; but I can claim no more space, nor analyse the various categories of Modernism, very clearly put by the Professor, but from most of which, I am glad to say, he seems to dissent. Let me add, for Romolo Murri I have a sincere respect. There are many good things in the Battaglia d'Oggi. I believe prayer, patience, gentleness, and charity will bring things right, please God! Lacordaire's methods had more effect than Loisy, Houtin, Lagrange, and Tyrrell all put together. There are good priests and bad priests, good laymen and bad laymen, believers and unbelievers everywhere; but in Italy there is much real religion and real devotion, and—which is most important—the poor and sorrow-laden find (as they do not with us) that for young and old at any moment their Father's House is their home. I do not think "the sacred right of rebellion" exercised by men who say they are "not rebels" in the name of "Christ's Christianity" will improve the religion of Italy so much as Christ's own way of Love and Prayer.

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REV. CANON DANKS ON THE CLERGY, CONSCIENCE, AND FREE INQUIRY.

(Hibbert Journal, January 1911, p. 365.)

I AM not an outsider, impertinently meddling in a home affair of England; for one who is an American, and who tries to be a Christian, is in both respects too nearly akin to be disinterested. Of course, however, I make no attempt to defend Lord Morley, though his words in the sense intended seem to be entirely defensible.

It is rather that a significant point of view has been overlooked by the Canon, and generally by those who defend the present order of things ecclesiastical in Great Britain. The point is the supreme value of conscience in this discussion. To be sure Canon Danks mentions conscience in his title, but he (and the others on his side) avoids the question which is practically the whole question. Freedom of thought, except with reference to limits involving conscience, is perhaps sufficiently established in England, both in law and in practice. But the trouble arises when a clergyman who holds certain "new ideas" is obliged to declare that he holds certain old ideas to the contrary. Now the critics of the Church are quite aware of

the freedom, and are glad to see it, but they regret and condemn the hypocrisy and the law which makes it practically necessary. And when they complain about freedom, they mean for the most part merely that a man is not really free when he is bound by law to violate his conscience. On the other hand, the defenders of the present order, if they ever touch the subject of morals, are quick to drop it, as if it were too unpleasant to be discussed, and they turn aside to unessentials.

Let me illustrate the fact that the Canon is not really thinking of conscience by stating the substance of his paragraphs one by one, and then adding in brackets a comment, or an inference such as would correspond to the substance if the question of morals were uppermost. In the first paragraph of his reply to Lord Morley he names many great and worthy men, and asks if they were "emissaries of darkness"... "obscurantists," etc. [They certainly were. Thus the earlier ones, though they antagonised some errors, taught others. And as to the later named, they were emissaries of moral darkness by the authority of the Dean of Westminster, who in 1862 declared before Parliament, if report be correct, that all the clergy of his day "had signed according to law, yet none could honestly

do so," which, of course, is to say that they were all dishonest.]

The next long paragraph asserts that the pursuit of truth is not the chief business of the clergy [and therefore the liberal clergyman may with good conscience publicly profess opinions that he believes to be not true]. The long paragraph beginning on page 369 is to the effect that organisations, civil or religious, naturally impose some kind of restraint or compromise on their members [therefore a man is not to be blamed for compromising his conscience]. Page 376 suggests that a humble-minded and sincere doubter must admit his own fallibility [and therefore he may say what he believes to be untrue]. The second thought of this diffident man is that, having changed his mind once, he may change it again [and therefore he can now without offence affirm what he thinks to be false]. His third thought is that he already agrees with the Church in many things [and therefore he may honestly pretend to agree in other things wherein he does not agree]. His fourth thought is that Churches, like men, have their changes [and therefore he may profess to believe in the Virgin Birth when he does not really believe in it]. Finally, "the most fruitful conception of all" is that in its growth the Church reclothes itself in the intellectual forms of successive ages [and therefore one of the present age may honestly profess his faith in the doctrines of ages long past, doctrines which he does not believe]. And then we are told on page 372 that a man who is aware of this growth will not be worried in his conscience by being obliged to accept ancient and outgrown formulæ. The next paragraph, on page 372, says that the strict constructionists, apparently including Lord Morley, belong to a "lower level of thought," to "an intellectually extinct order." [Comment is omitted]. Then we read that one must have "immense patience" with slow-moving people [and therefore he may meanwhile tell them that he believes what he does not believe.

or, to follow a phrase of Dr Rashdall, he may assent to what he regards as the most contemptible creed in the world.

On the whole, the thoroughgoing discontinuity of premise and conclusion in the above seems to show that the important question of morals, of false profession, has not entered Canon Danks' mind. Really he seems to be avoiding the moral aspect, and is attempting, unconsciously of course, to show how a liberal clergyman may confuse or smother his conscience. Thus, by remembering that he has pious purposes at any rate, and by cultivating humility and loyalty, and so on, he may transfer his attention to other matters; and in the end he adds that of course there must be "no compromise in our own inward life"—just as if lying were not an affair of the inner life.

In effect, then, Canon Danks and the Church in general are cultivating indifference to truth-telling, and are imposing on men a form of compulsory perjury.

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REVIEWS

The Christ Myth.—By Arthur Drews, Ph.D., Professor of Philosophy in the Techn. Hochschule, Karlsruhe.—Translated from the third edition (revised and enlarged) by C. Delisle Burns, M.A.—London and Leipzig: T. Fisher Unwin, 1910.

The relations of German professors of Biblical study to the lay world are not exactly ideal. Until impelled by Professor Friedrich Delitzsch (an Assyriologist), they kept the lay world very much in the dark about the bearings of the Babylonian and Assyrian discoveries, and the future historian is but too likely to pronounce that in the New Testament field they have, till lately, made but little provision for the wants of practical men. The consequences of this neglect have been hardly less than disastrous. The lay world in Germany has (since the time of D. F. Strauss) become fully conscious that there are great problems in the life of Jesus, and recent solutions of these problems have too often been popularised by

persons entirely innocent of critical training.

Such a populariser is Professor Arthur Drews of Karlsruhe. philosopher, and the history of religions can hardly nowadays be combined successfully with the serious study of philosophy. And yet Professor Drews must have taken a great deal of trouble to write this book. He is also highly conscientious; he is not an agent of der Geist der stets verneint. His aim is to liberate the religion of his own race and people from insecure supports. He is of opinion that the strong Catholic element in Protestantism has hindered sound religious progress, and prevented the religious unification of Germany. And being so much opposed to Catholicism, he is bound to have a repugnance for that form of Semitised Theism from which the form and colour of the religion of Romanised Christendom is to a large extent derived. "Semitised Theism" is Professor Drews' phrase. He tells us explicitly that he does not mean by it "ordinary Judaism," but a Theism whose central idea—that of redemption—was suggested by an ancient widespread myth of a Divine Being who, after having died, came to life again, first for the promotion of the earth's fertility, and then for the good of those initiated worshippers who had identified themselves mystically with him. There are, I should suppose, many besides the author who hold the Christian doctrine of redemption through the Godman (Jesus Christ) to be derived in part from this myth; but Professor Drews goes further. He does not believe, like Harnack, in unique

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personalities. Each man must get redeemed from the oppressive sense of dependence on nature by himself (i.e. by the indwelling God who is his

true Self, agreeably to the doctrine of Indian philosophy).

The author (who is a spiritual Monist) is so clear, both here and in his earlier work on Religion as God's Self-Consciousness, that misunderstanding is impossible. He thinks it a matter of life or death for the Germanic peoples to possess themselves of a more consistent religion on a sounder philosophic basis—a religion centering in a reformed doctrine of redemption. The theory of the unique divine-human personality, which he awkwardly calls Jesuanism, and Mr Robertson Jesuism, is no longer, he thinks, tenable or adequate. It must, therefore, be stoutly combated, and the best way of doing this is critically to examine the traditions of its origin and development. With the notable exception of Mr J. M. Robertson, no other layman has ventured on these thorny paths. Both writers have paid the penalty of their audacity in a plentiful crop of errors.

The main result at which the author arrives is that the Jesus of the canonical Gospels is a largely humanised form of a pre-Christian cult-god of that name, and that all those parts of the Synoptics which are of any religious significance find their best explanation on that theory. It may be remarked, however, that even if it were in the highest degree probable that there was a pre-Christian deity worshipped in Palestine and called Jeshua or Jeshu, it would still be possible that there was a great teacher and healer bearing the same name, who was confounded with that supposed deity. Just so, according to a very probable theory, characteristics of the saviour-god sometimes called Dôd have penetrated into the story of King David. Let us, then, limit our endeavours to filling up a lacuna in the mythic explanation of the stories of the Nativity of the Christ, and of his Resurrection and Ascension. That lacuna is the absence of proof that Jeshua or Jeshu (or some name from which this name may have arisen) was a divine name in Palestine before the Christian era.

The direct evidence for the divine name Jeshua or Jeshu in pre-Christian times is both scanty and disputable. Yet, as will be seen, I incline (on grounds of my own) to agree with Professor Drews in his view of the main point in dispute. In a text commonly known as the Naassenian hymn, because it is quoted by Hippolytus in his account of the Naassenian Gnostics, we find Jesus referred to as the divine Son, who requests to be sent down from heaven for the relief of suffering mankind. The hymn is of uncertain age, but at any rate old, and possibly has a pre-Christian basis. And in the great Magic Papyrus, published by C. Wessely, these words occur: "I conjure $(\dot{o}\rho\kappa i\zeta\omega)$ thee by the God of the Hebrews Jesus." At the risk of being thought pedantic, I will add that the next word $(Ia\beta aia\eta)$ seems to be a distorted form of the well-known Israelite God Jahwè (Yahwè). The date of the text may be soon after A.D. 500, but the material is doubtless old, i.e. the cult of Jeshu (Jesus), or Jeshu-Jahwè, possibly existed among some circles of Jews in pre-Christian times.

There is, however, for one practised in these inquiries, more safety in

referring to the old Hebrew name Joshua (or Jehoshua), whence admittedly comes the post-exilic form Jeshua. First let us consider Professor Drews' statement. Joshua, he tells us, means "saviour," which is a common divine epithet (cp. Matt. i. 21). Probably he was an Ephraimite form of the sun-god. But his name (as Epiphanius held) also conveyed the idea of "healer"; indeed, the name Jesus (so Robertson and Drews assure us) is connected with Jasios or Jason, the mythic name of a pupil of Chiron in the art of healing.

I am sorry to say that almost every word of this is contrary to the present decisions of scholarship. And yet Professor Drews is not wrong in thinking that, if the beginning and the ending of the life of Jesus of Nazareth are formed on the model of the myth of the God-man who died and came to life again for the good of man, the name Jeshu, or Jesus, ought somehow to be organically connected with that theory. If the belief in such a God-man was taken over by the Christists, we are entitled to presume that they did not leave behind the cultual name of the Godman. And that name ought to underlie the popular form Jehoshua, whence the late form Jeshua, or Jeshu, has come. It ought to, and so it is in the highest degree probable that it does. We know that in the "valley of Megiddon" there was a ritual lamentation for the "only" or "firstborn" son of the Supreme God, i.e. Adonis, and that the local name for this God-man was Hadad-Rimmon, which is a compound of the names of two related deities (Zech. xii. 10, 11; see the reviewer's The Two Religions of Israel, pp. 183, 213). Precisely parallel to Hadad-Rimmon is Jahu-Ishma. Jahu is the well-known alternative form for Jahwè; Ishma (=Shema) is the short for Ishmael. The origin of the latter name is as uncertain as that of Jahwè, but at any rate it is a god-name (Two Religions, pp. 65, 400), and does not mean "God hears" any more than "Joshua" means "Jahwè-help." It appears, then, that Jeshua or Jeshu is a corruption of the second part of the cultual divine name, Jahu-Ishma[el].

To the question, how, if the account of Jesus Christ was modelled, in important sections, on the myth of the God-man, he comes to be represented as "son of David," i.e. "a human king of the race of David" (Drews, p. 42), our author replies that the conception of the Messiah varied at different times, just as the parallel conception of Saoshyant varied in the Iranian eschatology. This I believe to be an error. The dying and rising God-man was originally not called "the son of David," but "the son of Dôd." Dôd was one of the popular titles of the chief of the gods, officially more often called Jahwè, Jerahmeel, Ishmael, Hadad, or Rimmon. Either he, or a son of his, sacrificed himself in human form, for the good of man. The religious authorities, however, and those Jews who followed them, altered Dôd into Dâvîd, implying that the God-man of the old popular belief was merely an exalted human king like David, just as they probably altered the name of the goddess Şebâith into the innocent word Şebâoth, "hosts." This took place as early as the shaping

of the well-known legend of King David's birth at Bethlehem. There must have been a sanctuary of Dôd at Bethlehem (there was also one at Beersheba), where the initiated took part in the ritual lamentations over Adon (= Adonis) and his sister or spouse, as Jerome (by an anachronistic fiction?) asserts that they did in his day.

The intrinsic importance of the subject justifies me in giving these details. It is no use to collect a medley of uncriticised facts from different sources, nor can a philosopher, however subtle in his own line, be expected to find his way in the labyrinth. In lieu of detailed criticism I may refer to the facts in *Traditions and Beliefs*, pp. 46–49; *Decline and Fall*, p. 54. Now, perhaps, we can see how Jesus came to be called "son of David," and why Bethlehem became his birthplace, more clearly than was possible under the guidance of Professor Drews. Whether the dying and rising God-man can have been called "son of Joseph" as well as "son of Dôd," I may consider later. But if "Joseph" is really a divine name, no thanks are due to the author, whose extravagance here passes all bounds. Of Mary, too, he writes thus (p. 117); Agni, of course, is the Indian (Vedic) Fire-god:—

"Under the name of Maya she is the mother of Agni. . . . She appears under the same name as the mother of Buddha as well as of the Greek Hermes. She is identical with Maira (Maera), as, according to Pausanias, viii. 12, 48, the Pleiad Maia, wife of Hephaistos, was called. She appears among the Persians as the 'virgin' mother of Mithras. As Myrrha she is the mother of the Syrian Adonis; as Semiramis, mother of the Babylonian Ninus (Marduk). In the Arabic legend she appears under the name of Mirzam as mother of the mythical saviour Joshua, while the Old Testament gives this name to the virgin sister of that Joshua who was so closely related to Moses; and, according to Eusebius, Merris was the name of the Egyptian princess who found Moses in a basket and became his foster-mother."

I have no space to spare to examine these second-hand statements. But even if they were always correct, and had no need of verification, the inferences are impossible. One is sorry that the name of Burnouf should be attached to what I may call the Agni-heresy, and, in general, that a Burnouf should have set the example of the misuse of the Indian (Vedic) key to religious archæological problems. It is true it is not the great Burnouf but a relation who is responsible for the substance of the following sentences (p. 145):—

"And indeed the Latin expression for lamb (agnus) also expresses its relation to the ancient Fire-god. . . . In this sense 'Agnus Dei,' the Lamb of God, as Christ is very frequently called, is in fact nothing else than 'Agni Deus,' since Agnus stands in a certain measure as the Latin translation for Agni."

Professor Drews takes a very bold line indeed about Nazareth. He thinks that the original reading (Mark x. 47, etc.) was not "Jesus of Nazareth," but the Hebrew (!) "Jeshua ha-nôṣri," the latter part of which

is rendered (impossibly) by him "the Protector" or "the Guardian"; the common Greek rendering being an incorrect explanation of the true titles. This view is based (by Professor W. B. Smith and Professor Drews) on the non-existence of a place in Galilee called Nazareth at the time when Jesus Christ is said to have lived. For this result he refers to "Nazareth" in the Encuclopædia Biblica, carelessly omitting to state the other part of my theory, which is that Nazareth (or some name like it) was originally a synonym for Galîl or Galîlee, so that "the sect of the Nazarenes" (Acts xxiv. 5) would mean "the sect of the Galileans," and "He shall be called a Nazarene" (Matt. ii. 23) would mean "He shall be called a Galilean." It was no doubt inferred from Isaiah ix. 1 that the Messiah would arise in Galilee; and of this the Galilean ministry of Jesus Christ was regarded as the fulfilment. If "a Nazarene" in Matt. l.c. means "a Galilean," the passage can be adequately explained; otherwise, I think, decidedly not. It is plain, at least if our Gospels are at all to be trusted, that the Galilean origin of Jesus was an offence to the Jews of Judea. "Jesus of Nazareth" they sometimes called him, but also "Jesus of Galilee" (Matt. xxvi. 69, 71). In each case the same taunt was conveved: "Can any good thing come out of Nazareth?" "Out of Galilee ariseth no prophet.'

Into Professor Drews' treatment of the Virgin Birth, the Resurrection, and the connected beliefs I shall not enter; these narratives have been treated with perfect openness but more scientific caution by some earlier writers. The section which does appear to require immediately a fuller investigation is that of the Passion, i.e. from the Last Supper to the Death on the cross. Is there any historical nucleus? As the critical inquiry stands at present, one may reasonably hold that an extraordinary teacher and healer called Jesus, who began his career in Galilee, incurred the displeasure of the Roman authorities, and suffered the extreme penalty as a rebellious and unrecognised "king of the Jews." But is it not possible that the statements of the Messianic claims of Jesus, and consequently also of the intervention of the procurator, may be imaginary? One cannot of course treat that important subject-"Did Jesus claim to be the Son of Man or Messiah?"-in a few lines of a review article. Certainly the details of the Passion story appear to have suffered considerably through modern criticism, even if we attach but little weight to Dr Frazer's ingenious combination of Jesus and Barabbas with the mythologically interpreted Feast of Purim. It is almost needless to say that Professor Drews adopts this theory. For my own part, I think that the Barabbas story may be most simply explained from a Babylonian source. As Zimmern has shown, there are traces of a primitive custom of decking out some person of inferior rank as king, and finally putting him to death in place of the real king (cp. Frazer). On occasion of what ceremony this took place, does not appear, and it seems plain that the author of the Barabbas story only knew of a far-off reflection of the primitive custom in the shape of a popular story. As for the name Barabbas, it is surely a corruption of

Karabas (the form in a strange narrative of Philo), which probably indicates the Arabian origin of this supposed fierce bandit.

The main objections to denying the historicity of the Crucifixion are: (1) that the idea of a suffering Messiah was strange to the Jews; and (2) that Paul attaches such mighty hopes to the Cross of Christ. As to

(1), the conclusion arrived at by our author is as follows:-

"It cannot be denied after all this, that the conception of a suffering and dying Messiah is of extreme antiquity amongst the Israelites, and was connected with the earliest nature-worship, although later it may indeed have become restricted and peculiar to certain exclusive circles" (p. 84).

In my opinion Professor Drews and his authorities are right in the main. Strong as I once thought the arguments on the other side to be, I now think that in certain Jewish circles the idea of a suffering divinehuman being must have been current both in the age of Jesus and in earlier times. There is amply sufficient proof that the idea referred to was uralt (Drews, German edition, p. 47). How the Jews can have escaped hearing of it till the second or third century A.D., I profess myself unable to understand, just as Professor Gressmann is justified in finding it incredible that Israelite eschatology (including the Messianic belief) was a post-exilic product. Our records are unfortunately very scanty, but we can draw many safe inferences from the undoubted fact of long-continued Babylonian influences on the peoples of Palestine. We can hardly doubt, for instance, that the titles which underlie ben-Joseph and ben-David existed in primitive times as titles of the Messiah, and that the two personal names both belong to the Supreme God. It is perfectly possible that, to magnify the ultimate glory, the Messiah was made to suffer at the hands of his enemies, but only for a brief season.

As to (2), Professor Drews flatly denies that any evidence for events in the life of "the historic Jesus" can be drawn even from the four great Pauline epistles, because "Christ's life and death are for Paul neither the moral achievement of a man nor in any way historical facts, but something super-historical, events in the super-sensible world" (p. 206). Once, however, he admits that Paul appears to refer to an experience of the "historical" Jesus—"The Lord Jesus, in the night in which he was betrayed, took bread," etc. (1 Cor. xi. 23 sq.). But he assures us that the whole passage, vv. 23-32, is obscure and interrupts the line of thought. It is, he thinks, "clearly a later insertion" (p. 175).

To consider these statements adequately, whether in the way of affirmation or of negation, would require more time than I can devote to them. Literary criticism, to be of value, must take account of various hypotheses, and the truth (at any rate when ancient documents are in question) is rarely simple. Did Paul really write the famous "Four Chief Epistles"? The tendency of criticism is, on the whole, to an affirmative conclusion, but the question of the existence of later insertions is by no means ripe for decision. I cannot say that Professor Drews has done justice to the able and fair-minded men who have worked and are working at the Pauline

problems. As the evidence now stands, I think that Paul most probably knew a little about a great teacher called Jesus, and that he identified him with the pre-existing Christ from an intuition that only so could the precious doctrine of the Christ be made a practical power among mankind. We seem, at the present day, to want a second Paul to revise the work of Paul, and I hope that earnest, religious men on both sides of this great controversy may at last prove to have prepared the way for this Great One, and to have made his paths straight.

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Jésus et la Tradition Évangélique.—Par Alfred Loisy.—Paris: Nourry, 1910. Pp. 288.

MANY persons will be grateful to M. Loisy for putting together with convenient brevity his conclusions about the evangelical records. The thoroughness with which the author sifts out from tradition what he considers to be doubtful, sets in high relief what remains. But it is somewhat tantalising to the reader that M. Loisy hides himself behind a certain reserve when he is speaking of the meaning of the life of Jesus. Perhaps we must be content to take the author at his own word. these lucid pages he gathers together the gist of his two works, Le Quatrième Évangile and Les Évangiles synoptiques, with their minute analysis of the career and teaching of Jesus, and of the character and development of the evangelical tradition. M. Loisy is right in thinking that he will find readers for such a summary. Them he seeks not among believers, least of all Catholic believers, "whose faith it is in no way proposed to disturb," but rather among those "who consider the problem of the Gospels, without any dogmatic preoccupations, in the light of religious criticism and philosophy" (p. 7). We must expect, therefore, to dispense with the rhetoric by which nearly all our English criticism is relegated to limbo. The relative absence of English names from Schweitzer's bibliography in The Quest of the Historical Jesus, furnishes a lesson which cannot too soon be laid to heart on this side of the North Sea.

The fact is, that we are so unaccustomed to hold our judgment in suspense, we are so eager by a pronouncement of our will to settle off-hand the alternatives which the study of the Gospels offers, that we run from one extreme to the other. Rather than confess that we have made this or that mistake in detail, we prefer to complain that others have been false to the truth. Unless Jesus comes to us with the lineaments of a popular presentation we refuse to receive him. There are not even wanting those who would blot his name out of the book of human history in order to exalt in his place misty phantoms of dubious origin. It is well from time to time for us to be reminded that if criticism in the hands of a master can destroy the belief which lacks foundation, it can also exhibit the rock

upon which truth is based. Compared with indiscriminate negation, the indiscriminate acceptance of tradition is perhaps the less dangerous alternative for the historian. But happily this choice of extremes cannot be imposed upon us. In the work of many scholars we can trace the slow but almost certain convergence upon facts which, in the highest sense, are verifiable. "The appearance of Jesus," says M. Loisy, "in the time of the procurator Pontius Pilate, is a fact as certain as a thousand other facts as to which no one dreams of raising the least suspicion, nor is it more doubtful that he announced the near coming of the Kingdom of God" (p. 9). "The state of critical exegesis is not so desperate that it can only formulate doubts and negations upon the subject of Christ" (13).

We are dealing, therefore, with an historical personage. The author would offer to his readers what he judges to be "the historical physiognomy of Jesus and of his preaching; and, in the second place, the work of Christian thought upon those primitive views where we ought to see the memories and the faith of those who listened to Christ and who were the witnesses of his life and of his death" (43). In a word, what M. Loisy withdraws from the figure of Jesus, he adds to the figure of the Church. And here, I think, one may do justice to some elements of Roman Catholicism. It is the Church which has offered to the Roman Empire the figure of the mother and child. The adoration of Mary is the unconscious popular commentary upon all attempts to separate Jesus from his context. Such a commentary is adequately symbolised in the Eastern legend that St Luke was a painter and portrayed the Virgin Mother with the Child in her arms. If in the Revelation the woman who flees into the desert personifies the Christian Church, and if the same personification is to be traced in the opening of the Second Epistle of John, it is not improbable that a similar personification is intended by the Fourth Gospel, where, from the cross, Jesus commends his mother to the care of his disciple. Those pages are very illuminating in which M. Loisy traces the contributions which were made by the Church to the portrait of Jesus as it is presented in the New Testament.

M. Loisy does not minimise the inherent difficulties of his task. But he finds them chiefly in the "historical reconstruction of a distant past": that is to say, "in the discernment and understanding of the facts attested, rather than in the discussion of the evidences" (p. 47). Now there are two points in which M. Loisy seems to me to carry his caution to an extreme. In the first place, he refuses to Jesus the saying: "My kingdom is not of this world" (p. 104). In the second place, we are informed that with reference to the title Son of Man, "the comparison of the texts invites to the thought that it was introduced into the written tradition, and that it does not usually belong to the most ancient edition of the evangelical discourses." Now before deciding these questions it seems to me that we ought not to shrink from that "historical reconstruction of a distant past" upon which M. Loisy rightly lays so much stress.

We must set in high relief just those facts in the life of Jesus by

which he is riveted to his special place in the history of the world. If we overlook these, we reduce him to a shadow. A purely literary criticism confines itself to those characteristics which can be transferred from one age to another. But this is not enough. If we are to attain a right perspective, we must mark the lines along which Jesus retires into the distance measured by nineteen centuries. On that dim horizon he moves as a Syrian prophet for whom devils are a reality and the use of names is powerful. We lose sight of this fact, perhaps, because neither Paul nor the author of the Fourth Gospel were genuine Orientals. There is the less need for me to say anything further about the power of the name, because this has passed into the common possession of the Christian Church. But it is probable that if we dwell for a moment upon those passages in which Jesus speaks of the dominion of dæmons, we shall understand rather better his career as the Messiah.

M. Loisy, in a fine passage, depicts the Messianic character, but treats it as merely an ethical ideal which cannot be realised in this world (p. 141): "to free oneself from every earthly tie, to withdraw from the moral inconvenience and the embarrassment caused by the care of material interests; not even to have regard to the common necessities of nature, clothing, drink, and food; leaving all, to rely for everything upon the providence of God; to live as freely as the birds of the air, with the love of God and of men, patience amid all difficulties, trials, and death, in the hope of the great event." M. Loisy's comment upon this, however, does not seem convincing: "It is only as an ideal that such a moral system can have survived the collisions and contradictions which reality has not ceased from the beginning to inflict upon it." In the first place, I cannot attach any meaning to an ideal, except in so far as it is a reality only partially postponed. In the second place, the very conflict between the ideal and the real, of which M. Loisy speaks, is of the essence of the Kingdom of God. Perhaps it may be allowed to assume for the moment that the belief in the final victory of the Kingdom of God has been a necessary part of Christian belief from the very first. This will relieve us from the task of discussing whether the belief in demoniacal possession involves any limitation of the divine power.

The coming of the Kingdom of God, then, was marked in the mind of Jesus by certain events in the world of spirits. "The seventy returned with joy saying: 'Lord, even the spirits are subject to us in thy name.' And he said to them: 'I saw Satan falling from heaven like lightning." This is a pictorial way of saying that the kingdom of this world is at an end. "If I in the spirit of God cast out dæmons, then is the Kingdom of God come upon you." To blaspheme against the spirit of God is to refer the subjection of evil dæmons to Beelzebub, the ruler of this world, hence this blasphemy "cannot be forgiven in this æon nor in the æon which is to come." It thus appears that the Kingdom of God had already come when the seventy returned from their mission. Such a conception of the coming of the Kingdom cannot have been invented under Pauline

or Johannine influences, because, as we have seen, the notion of demoniacal possession loses its prominence in the Fourth Gospel and the Pauline epistles. If this is the case, it follows that the reconstruction of the career of Jesus by Schweitzer must be modified in some of its details. Perhaps it should be said in passing that there is reason to believe that the presence of Jesus exercised a controlling power over many persons who apparently suffered from nervous diseases. It is also probable that his influence largely depended upon the new order of life, of which, as M. Loisy tells us, he was the author.

It thus appears from unmistakable evidence that Jesus went up to Jerusalem in the belief that the Kingdom of God was come; that is, in the sense which is implied in the narratives of demoniacal possession which appear in the three Synoptic gospels. It is doubtful, therefore, whether M. Loisy's inferences can stand in so far as he limits the coming of the Kingdom of God to a single impressive event. To follow out the conclusions which may justly be drawn from Jesus' attitude to demoniacal possession, is a task which will repay careful study.

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Christ and Civilisation: A Survey of the Influence of the Christian Religion upon the Course of Civilisation.—Edited for the National Council of the Evangelical Free Churches by Rev. J. B. Paton, D.D., Sir Percy W. Bunting, M.A., Rev. Alfred E. Garvie, D.D. Memorial Hall, E.C., 1910.

This is a volume of twelve Essays by as many scholars, all whom are Free Churchmen. It belongs to a class of literature that has been rapidly increasing of late years—that, namely, in which departmental specialists pool their knowledge and literary skill on some large subject, with a view of attaining a higher standard of accuracy and a wider sweep of treatment than is possible to any single writer. The accumulation of historical and critical material has recently been going on at a greater pace than can be assimilated by individual scholars, and, pending the emergence of some encyclopædic mind in each department of research who can combine accurate grasp of detail with a sufficiently ample breadth of vision, there is no safer method of dealing with such subjects as are covered in the volume than by a kind of joint-stock enterprise in which a general plan and method and spirit are combined with a certain freedom of individual The chief danger in compiling such a volume is for each contributor to forget his collaborateurs, and fail to dovetail his work articulately into the general plan, a danger which can only be avoided by courageous and tactful editing. Judged by this criterion, this volume stands forth as pre-eminently well edited. The general subject was first of all well divided into periods, and the several writers were evidently well

instructed as to the scope and orientation of their own special aspect before they began to write. The result is that we have here a thoroughly consecutive, harmonious, and well-balanced treatment of a vast and complicated theme, which is nothing less than a careful survey of the whole history of the Western World from the beginning of the Christian era till now from the standpoint of the influence exercised by Christianity in ameliorating, directing, and purifying that very complex issue of the struggles and tragedies, aspirations and ideals of humanity which we call modern civilisation.

It is, indeed, somewhat remarkable that this subject has not been adequately dealt with before. We have, it is true, not a little literature which refers in a more or less incidental way to the political, humanitarian, and ethical effects of Christianity on the civilisation of Europe. Lecky's European Morals and his History of Rationalism in Europe contain many acute and valuable suggestions; Ulhorn's Conflict of Christianity, and his Christian Charity in the Christian Church; Mommsen's various writings; Hatch's Hibbert Lectures; Storrs' Divine Origin of Christianity, and many other books and studies more or less valuable, furnish us with abundant material for general impressions. Brace's Gesta Christi, though a mere compilation by an earnest but scarcely scholarly writer, has done good service in its day to the general reader and the hard-worked pastor. Still, it must be confessed that the ground is even now largely unexplored, and the appearance of careful and scholarly books like Dill's Roman Society from Nero to Aurelius, and Roman Society in the Last Century of the Eastern Empire, showing what startling revisions of judgment as to the moral and religious condition of the ancient world lay in store for us; and Glover's Conflict of Religions in the Roman Empire, with its fine sympathy and skilful handling of the relations of Christianity to the rival cults which it finally displaced, suggest a wide field of fruitful research for the future student of history on its spiritual side. Meanwhile such a volume as we It is, indeed, somewhat remarkable that this subject has not been student of history on its spiritual side. Meanwhile such a volume as we are here dealing with is a very valuable outline of a vast subject. All the writers are experts in their particular period; they manifest a signal self-containment and moderation of judgment; and while their Christian stand-point is evident on every page, there is a scrupulous fairness of temper in all of them. It is needless here to give a synopsis of the contents in any detail, but a word or two may be permitted by way of indicating the line of treatment. Dr Scott Lidgett starts with an introductory survey of the Modern Social Problem (an inversion in the natural order of treatment for the justification of which one seeks in vain); Professor Bennett follows with a very lucid account of Social Ideals in the Old Testament; Dr Garvie unfolds the Christian Ideal revealed in Jesus; Professor Angus deals with the *Preparatio Evangelica* in the Gentile World. All this is in a sense preparatory to the real subject, though each of these chapters contains necessary material for rightly understanding what follows. The "Factors in the Expansion of the Christian Church" we find naturally entrusted to Professor Orr, who has made the subject his own;

Professor Scullard follows with an able essay on the "Influence of the Christian Church on the Roman Empire"; Dr A. B. Workman writes vigorously on its "Influence on the Social and Ethical Development of the Middle Ages"; the "Reformation Period" is well handled by Professor Andrews; the "Evangelical Revival and Philanthropy," by Dr Cummings Hall, of Union Theological Seminary, New York; "Christianity and the French Revolution," by Dr J. Holland Rose; the "Social Influence of Modern Missions," by Dr Dennis (author of Christian Missions and Social Progress), and (last but not least) "Modern, Scientific, and Philosophic Thought regarding Human Society," by Professor Henry Jones of Glasgow University, whose stimulating pages stir the reader to think on lofty lines even if his philosophic predilections may be a little unsympathetic to the joyous idealism of the brilliant Welshman.

The above brief outline of the divisions of a fascinating subject gives little indication of the rich plethora of material provided in this volume. A second and more careful reading will only deepen a first impression of the literary and scholarly competency of the various writers, and of their fairness of spirit, their balance of judgment, their desire not to exaggerate This volume carries home the conviction that those who, like Buckle, would give hardly any room for Christianity as a factor in modern progress, or who, like many modern economic (especially socialistic) writers, would denounce it fiercely as one of the chief hindrances to a civilised millennium, are hopelessly biassed in their attitude. Without denying the fact, so brilliantly illustrated by Dr Dill, that in the old Roman Empire there were religious movements of a very high and elevating kind contemporaneous and quite independent of Christianity, it is clear from the issue that none of these had in it the elements of permanence, and that Christianity ultimately triumphed over all rival cults not only through the beauty of the lives of its adherents, but because it was the one influence that could rescue the dying empire from final destruction, and at the same time save the insurgent peoples of the north from disintegration and a passion for mutual extermination. If when heathenism in the Middle Ages flung itself in a last desperate rally on the world, and Thor and Woden, and "misshapen Asiatic monsters," had succeeded in overthrowing the Cross; if even Leo, Bishop of Rome, had failed to divert the terrible Attila from his projected attack on Rome; -what would have happened? It may be boldly claimed that at more than one critical moment in mediæval times the Church saved civilisation from the desolating attack of barbarian forces; just as we may claim that the faith of which the Church has been the always fallible but nevertheless necessary instrument is to-day saving civilisation from inherent elements of decay that would soon bring it to an end if with the poison the antidote were not found together. true this is can be seen in the blighting influence of the contact of modern civilisation with the less developed races of the world when that contact is purely secular in character, and in the moulding power of Christian missions on the national development of other peoples who have been fortunate enough

to come under their sway. Scarcely less convincing is the testimony provided by this volume of the permeative effects of the Christian spirit on the temper, institutions, and ideals of civilised peoples. Here is an influence that has extended far beyond the confines of the Christian Church, and has been even more potent for good. It is, indeed, one of the besetting sins of Church historians and apologists that they have identified too readily the Church with the faith for which it stands, but whose operations it cannot confine. Too often the actual Church has been the enemy of progress, the refuge of bigotry, the centre of reaction; it has sometimes opposed the very spirit of advance in the world which has gone forth from its own bosom. But he that would identify Christianity with its institutions is a poor apologist, for he leaves one of the best arguments for Christianity out of count—its permeative influence on society and national life. This aspect of the subject is vividly presented from many suggestive points of view in this volume. What the Christian spirit has done for the home, for social regeneration, for liberty in its broadest sense, for the humanising of social and international relationships, for the mitigation of the horrors of war, for womanhood and childhood-these and other similar topics are dealt with as they emerge in successive eras, and as they find their issue in the life of to-day. One defect is very evident to the serious student of the volume: while there is a capital index, there is no bibliography of the subject such as a company of such scholars might easily have compiled for those anxious to pursue the study. Even the references given in footnotes are in some of the essays irritatingly brief and insufficient. In another edition this defect might well be remedied.

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The Scientific Study of the Old Testament.—By Dr Rudolf Kittel.—Williams & Norgate (Crown Theological Library), 1910.

Lex in Corde: Studies in the Psalter.—By W. Emery Barnes, D.D.—Longmans, Green & Co., 1910.

Studies in the Book of Isaiah.—By the Rev. M. G. Glazebrook, D.D.—Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1910.

The first volume is a translation of six lectures for elementary school teachers, originally delivered in 1909 by Professor Kittel at the request of the Ministry of Public Worship and Education of Saxony. This fact should in itself commend the book to the careful consideration of English educationalists. The essentials of modern archæological discovery, of the critical analysis of the Old Testament and of the reconstruction of Old Testament religion, are explained with care and lucidity. In giving a just estimate of a work of this kind, it is well to bear in mind two things: first, that a résumé of the "assured results" of criticism set forth to assist

in elementary Biblical instruction presupposes a certain amount of careful and guarded statement; and secondly, that, however much an author may endeavour to make amends for a quasi-negative attitude in this respect by enlarging and reconstructing the original lectures, the original limitations cannot but still be apparent to scholars. The book throughout bears the impress of Kittel's scholarship, but fails to reveal his exact attitude in relation to two, if not more, important elements of modern research. one case, however, this unsatisfactory result is no doubt due to an inadequate translation of the author's statement, viz. as to his attitude towards Wellhausen (pp. 74, 75). In regard to an element in which one feels there is much to be desired-apocalyptic-the writer, while dealing with prophecy in a masterful manner, is content to ascribe to "Israel's hope," as he somewhat indefinitely terms it, a general sufficiency in accounting for much that to an ever-increasing number of scholars is essentially and definitely apocalyptic. In regard to another element, it is extremely unfortunate that the author concerns himself so little with the hypothesis of the Kenite origin of Jahvism so ably presented by Stade and Budde, and so widely discussed and even accepted by many scholars of note.

In view, however, of a general misunderstanding of Kittel's critical position on the part of certain ultra-conservatives in England, it is gratifying to note the almost unstinted praise of the work of Wellhausen and his school generally. The author confesses himself on the side of modern criticism in its "assured results." Still, one must hesitate to accept certain statements as altogether satisfactory where critical judgment is concerned; for instance, he lays stress on the necessity of weighing carefully "degrees of certainty," or, as we should say, the necessity of distinguishing between absolute and relative certainty, and between greater and less degrees of probability, and in this he might easily be misinterpreted by unsophisticated readers as attaching greater importance than he really does elsewhere to the conservative attitude of criticism. Of real value, however, is the occasional warning against thoughtless and hasty inferences deduced from brilliant though uncertain theories of individual critics. An example of this is the skilful and just way in which he disposes of the "Pan-Babylonianists." On the other hand, in dealing with the Book of the Covenant (p. 28), he states that this is found in Exod. xx.-xxxv. (but the German edition has 20-23), while on p. 35, in an astonishing and apparently irreconcilable manner, he implies that a law in Exod. xx. 25 is not a part of, or within, but only "closely related to the Book of the Covenant." This, in part at least, is due to an inadequate translation of the paragraph in question.

A similar injustice is done to the author on p. 1 ff., where we find "authentic results" instead of "assured results" (gesicherten Ergebnissen). On p. 40, line 4, "conspiring" should be changed to "designing" or "planning" (Anschläge machen) before the words "to get another man's property" as a description of what covetousness meant to the ancient Hebrew; p. 258, lines 10 and 11, should read, "in their original oral

form" (in ihrer mündlichen Urgestalt), instead of "as they were verbally known"; line 19 (on the same page), the important qualification "retrospective" (rüchwärtsschauende) has been omitted before "prophecies." On pp. 74 and 75 this defective translation becomes more serious as creating a misconception of the author's position as regards Wellhausen. Thus on p. 74, line 18, "forcefully" should be "brilliantly" (in glänzender Weise); lines 21 and 22 should read, "expressed their doubts against important points" (ihre Bedenken gegen wichtige Punkte geltend machen) instead of "asserted their opinions against some of its most important points"; line 23 should read, "the weak points (die Schwächen) of Wellhausen's position" instead of "the weakness of." But most serious of all are the first ten lines on p. 75, wherein the author sums up, as it were, his opinion of Wellhausen's work. A careful and truer rendering would be, "We may, I think, without depreciating or exaggerating the actual merits (wirklichen Verdienstes, not 'benefits gained'), make the following remark: Old Testament science (Wissenschaft, not merely 'criticism') in this domain as well as in others (auf diesem und auf andern Gebieten, entirely omitted!) owes more to Wellhausen than to any other living man (als sonst einem unter den Lebenden). But his (seine, not 'this') theory of the Pentateuch ... has not proved itself to be tenable. The objections with respect to important points (gegen wichtige Punkte, entirely omitted!) have been clearly justified." Two lines below, "the blustering of the over-sanguine" appears instead of "the pæans of the over-zealous" (Siegesfanfaren Übereifriger).

Unfortunate as these mistranslations are, since they obscure both Kittel's own position and his estimate of other scholars, enough has been said to demonstrate the usefulness of these lectures to the English reader and especially to the beginner, to whom "the discussions at the close of the lectures," contained in the Supplement, will be especially valuable.

Dr Barnes' Studies in the Psalms—better Sermons or Meditations on them—are practical in their aim rather than critical in their method, and devotional in their outlook rather than scientific in their treatment. Consistency and uniformity are not their chief virtues. In certain instances (e.g. Ps. xlv.) even scholarly and judicious attempts to find a historical background for a psalm are condemned; in other cases the author sets out to argue for a particular date or author, and bases his meditation upon the particular theory of origin which suits his taste. Thus he argues at some length, though ineffectively, for the Davidic authorship of Ps. xviii. (cf. also Ps. xl. ascribed to Ezra, Ps. lxxviii. to Nehemiah). In short, his distinction between Psalms with a historical background and those he relegates to the category of "the timeless" is entirely subjective. Moreover, to describe Duhm's commentary on the Psalms as "perverse in tone, but the English reader can learn something from it" (p. x.), happily does not represent the general attitude of English scholars.

Comparison with the Hebrew text or some standard translation reveals many defects and inconsistencies in the translation. On p. 55 ff. the

translation of that majestic poem of the moral and spiritual deity of the Hebrews (Ps. xviii.) is marred by lines such as

"Making the gathering (so in 2 Sam.) of the waters the thick clouds of the sky, his shelter (booth)."

On the next page we read:

"And with the perverse thou showest thyself tortuous (so S. R. Driver)."

These are only two of the very numerous and deplorable intrusions into the text of matter which should have been relegated to a footnote, a method which Dr Barnes himself sees fit to employ in only two cases (pp. 57, 237).

To pass over more delicate and detailed points of Hebrew scholarship which are thrust aside, quite as incomprehensible in the work of a scholar of Dr Barnes' reputation are the strange principle which dictates his treatment of the Tetragrammaton and the method in which he applies it. He explains his difficulty and gives his solution on p. 12 f. But this thoroughly bad compromise is made worse by the fact that he does not strictly adhere to it: in each of the Psalms xviii., xl., lxix., Jehovah appears twice in the translation, while in Ps. cx., where the Tetragrammaton is employed four times in the Hebrew text, Jehovah does not appear once in the translation. Lord in the very type one hoped would be reserved exclusively for the purpose of representing is used for in the fifth verse of the last-mentioned psalm without explanation. In Ps. xvi. 10 שׁאַל is hellenised into "Hades"; in Ps. xviii, 5 it is transliterated. The author claims that "the English version, given in this book, is a cautious revision, which differs in comparatively few places from the Revised Version"; but in Ps. viii. no reason is given for the total omission of the second half of verse 1, which reads in the R.V., "who hast set thy glory upon the heavens."

The third volume—Studies in the Book of Isaiah—is strikingly different in character. "Everything of the nature of homily" is excluded in this, the work not of a specialist but of one who assumes the rôle of a "professional teacher," acting only as the "interpreter" of "great scholars" (p. iv.). When the latter differ, he has chosen that point of view "in each case which seems to be best supported" and has "left the others unnoticed."

Canon Glazebrook is to be congratulated on the general usefulness of his brief introduction to, and translation of, the major portion of the Book of Isaiah. It is delightful reading and should do much to popularise the study of the great Hebrew prophets. In fact the Isaianic group of writings in Dr Glazebrook's hands must fire even the least imaginative with the desire to go deeper into the study of these inspired writers of Israel, whose poetry, figures, style, and thought are compared, in the Canon's inimitable manner, now with classical writers, now with Dante, and yet again with modern stylists, historians, and philosophers, and that too rarely to the disadvantage of the representatives of the Isaianic School.

The volume is characterised throughout by a wholesome restraint, the writer avoiding controversies which tend to confuse all but specialists. He does not, for example, raise the questions: Were Deutero-Isaiah's expectations doomed to failure? Was there any return in 536 B.C.? However, it should be noted that the development in prophetic teaching as to the relations of Yahweh with other gods was probably not so great, at the outset, as is suggested by the contrast drawn between Amos and Hosea on the one hand and Isaiah on the other hand (p. 6). And certainly Jeremiah's close personal communion with God is an indisputable and prominent example, though it may be an isolated one, of personal religion before the Exile (p. 6). The Shekinah is purely a post-exilic expression and therefore inapplicable to the context where it is used on p. 2. On the last line of p. 181, to call Babylon "distant" from the prophet's point of view is to contradict the statement on p. 176 that he was "living in Babylon." Somewhat too modern if not too popular is the tendency to use "Nabis" (p. 14) as the plural of Nabi, or to speak of Nathan as David's "private confessor" (p. 11). In spite of these and other minor points to which exception might be taken, Dr Glazebrook's work, when compared with other popular volumes of this type, is manifestly superior and deserving of high rank.

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The World of Life.—By Alfred Russel Wallace.—London: Chapman & Hall, Ltd., 1910.

For more than half a century the name of Alfred Russel Wallace has been associated with that of Charles Darwin as one of the first exponents of the theory of Natural Selection, and during that time Dr Wallace has contributed many important works to the literature of biology. As a biological explorer and field-naturalist he stands unrivalled, and his great work on The Geographical Distribution of Animals has long been regarded as a classic. His more popular books have made him known to a very wide circle of readers, and he is naturally regarded as a high authority, whose opinion must be listened to with respect. His new book on The World of Life is essentially a popular one, and will doubtless be read by a great many people who may be disposed to accept it as an expression of the latest views of the scientific world on the subjects with which it deals. Nevertheless we venture to think that it is, in some respects, an eminently unscientific work, in which the author far outsteps the legitimate bounds of scientific speculation.

It is, in fact, the old story—the story which Darwin and his school have done so much to discredit, but which persistently crops up again in some new guise. Man is the centre of the universe, and for the sake of man the world exists, and all the innumerable kinds of plants and animals have been created—not specially and separately created, however, as in the older

variants of the myth, but guided throughout the whole course of their evolution by an army of divine or semi-divine intelligences, under the direction of a Supreme Being, towards the great consummation. The earth is man's school, where he undergoes the necessary preparation for his future, spiritual life, in which his education will be continued. Throughout all the long ages of the earth's history, for untold millions of years, this single aim has been kept in view, and guardian angels have been ever on the watch lest the scheme should miscarry by some wrong turn in the particular line of evolution which culminated in man himself. Other organisms have arisen and passed away—myriads upon myriads—to prepare the earth for man, and to provide the means for his intellectual and moral training.

Dr Wallace's views remind us of the well-known schoolboy's remark about the wonderful benevolence and forethought of the Creator in making the rivers run through the towns. The doctrine of the scientific evolutionist, that man is what he is because he and his ancestors have, through countless ages, been able slowly to adapt themselves to a constantly changing environment, is rendered utterly unscientific by the assumption that the environment was prepared beforehand in accordance with the anticipated needs of the human race.

Apparently we are to believe that the scheme existed in the mind of the Creator before ever the evolution of the universe commenced, like the plan of a great building in an architect's office. If so, how are we to account for the plan itself? Did that also owe its existence to a long course of evolution in the mind of the Supreme Being? and if so, where are we to stop? Such a view appears to be closely akin to the old idea of the "preformationists," who held that the egg contains within itself a complete miniature of the future animal, the development of which consists merely in growth and unfolding ("evolution" in their sense); an idea which was reduced to absurdity by the logical deduction that inasmuch as each miniature must contain more eggs, and these in turn more miniatures, any one egg must contain the miniatures of all future generations one within the other, like a nest of pill-boxes.

We fail to see how Dr Wallace's remarkable theory helps us in our futile attempts to comprehend the incomprehensible. Such a view still leaves us face to face with the old difficulty of reconciling the belief in the omnipotence and benevolence of the Creator with our own experience of pain and evil in the world, for we do not think matters are much improved by the notion that it was all foreseen and arranged beforehand with a view to the education of man. Perhaps, after all, man is not of so

much importance in the universe as it pleases him to suppose.

The whole question is, it appears to us, at present at any rate, beyond the reach of scientific treatment, and if we open the door too widely to speculation, there would seem to be a strong probability that science will fly out of the window. We can quite understand, however, that an ardent spiritualist like Dr Wallace, who does not hesitate to introduce the

teaching of "modern spiritualism" into the book before us, may feel himself bound to endeavour to justify his views by scientific evidence. He must excuse us if we do not find that evidence convincing.

As an example of Dr Wallace's methods we may take the passage concerning the different kinds of wood, "whose qualities of strength, lightness, ease of cutting and planing, smoothness of surface, beauty, and durability are so exactly suited to the needs of civilised man that it is almost doubtful if he could have reached civilisation without them. The considerable range in their hardness, in their durability when exposed to the action of water or of the soil, in their weight and in their elasticity. render them serviceable to him in a thousand ways which are totally removed from any use made of them by the lower animals. Few of these qualities seem essential to themselves as vegetable growths. They might have been much smaller, which would have greatly reduced their uses: or so much harder as to be almost unworkable; or so liable to fracture as to be dangerous; or subject to rapid decay by the action of air, or of water, or of sunshine, so as to be suitable for temporary purposes only. With any of these defects they might have served the purposes of the animal world quite as well as they do now; and their actual properties, all varying about a mean value, which serves the infinitely varied purposes to which we daily and hourly apply them, may certainly be adduced as an indication that they were endowed with such properties in view of the coming race which could alone utilise them, and to whose needs they minister in such an infinite variety of ways."

It is difficult to treat this argument seriously. We might well inquire what have either man or the lower animals got to do with the matter? No one knows better than Dr Wallace that large size, hardness, strength, and durability are essential qualities in the trunks and branches of forest trees. Indeed, he himself tells us, only a few pages further on, in speaking of the germination of the seed, that a shoot is sent "into the atmosphere, from which the whole plant with all its tissues and vessels are formed, enabling it to rise up into the air so as to obtain exposure to light, to lift up tons' weight of material in the form of limbs, branches, and foliage of forest trees, often to a hundred feet or more above the surface." It is doubtful if there is a single character amongst those enumerated which is not demonstrably useful to the tree itself, or at least correlated with some useful character. All have arisen in the course of evolution because they are advantageous to the tree, and natural selection would very soon have eliminated any individuals in which they had failed.

Dr Wallace's argument concerning the evolution of pain, by which he endeavours to prove that nature is not cruel, appears to us to be no less fallacious. He considers that the sole purpose of the earlier forms of life was to be eaten by somewhat higher forms, that they possessed the minimum of sensation required for the purposes of their short existence, and that anything approaching to what we call pain was unknown to them. He thinks that being eaten may even have been slightly pleasurable to

them, "a sensation of warmth, a quiet loss of the little consciousness they had, and nothing more." "All animals which exist in vast numbers, and which are necessarily kept down to their average population by the agency of those that feed upon them probably suffer nothing at all when being devoured. For why should they? They exist to be devoured."

If this is so, how are we to explain the fact that so many of the lower animals possess special adaptations—protective resemblances, warning colours, unpalatability, defensive spines, and so on—which apparently serve the sole purpose of helping them to avoid being devoured? Surely they, like all living things, exist primarily for their own benefit, and are adapted to their environment accordingly. If not, where does natural selection come in?

As an anti-vivisectionist Dr Wallace fully realises the danger of his arguments concerning the absence or, in the case of the higher animals, the relative absence of pain, but apparently he objects to vivisection chiefly on the ground of its evil effect upon the moral nature of man. For man himself pain has a great educational value, and it is seriously suggested that the loss of his hairy coat served to render him more sensitive, in preparation for his further education by sad experience. This, indeed, savours of the methods of the human pedagogue!

It is a relief to turn to some of the less speculative portions of the book, in which the author deals with such problems as the distribution of species, temperate and tropical floras, heredity, variation, adaptation, and the geological record. All of these subjects he treats in his usual lucid style, and though these chapters contain little that is new, they will be read with keen interest by students of nature. He has made extensive use of quotation and illustration, and has been fortunate in being able to borrow many figures from the admirable British Museum Guides and other sources, which render the chapter on the Geological Record in particular very attractive. It is a pity that a number of inaccuracies should have found their way into the text. The ear-bones of whales are not usually called otoliths, a term which is applied to totally different structures in some of the lower animals. The coast-line of South America is surely much more than 1200 miles in length, as implied by a statement on page 178. Preyer's observation on the chemical composition of hæmoglobin, published, as Dr Wallace himself tells us, in 1866, can hardly be regarded as a "recent result," and the statement that protoplasm has been divided into three groups of chemical substances-proteids, carbohydrates and fatsalthough qualified later on by the remark that the two latter are products rather than the essential substance of living things, is open to serious criticism. Nor can we pass over in silence the off-hand manner in which the theories of "Mutation" and "Mendelism" are thrust on one side. They may be "ludicrously inadequate as substitutes for the Darwinian factors in the world-wide and ever-acting processes of the preservation and continuous adaptation of all living things," but they are of the highest importance in helping us to understand the complex problems of variation and heredity,

and it is upon variation and heredity that the whole theory of organic evolution, with the subsidiary theory of natural selection, is based. We cannot help thinking that Darwin himself would have extended a cordial welcome to the remarkable results obtained by Mendel and de Vries and their numerous followers.

ARTHUR DENDY.

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Riddles of the Sphinx: A Study in the Philosophy of Humanism.—By F. C. S. Schiller, M.A., D.Sc. New and revised edition.—London: Swan Sonnenschein & Co., 1910.—Pp. xxvii+478.

AFTER the lapse of nearly twenty years from its first publication, Dr Schiller's Riddles of the Sphinx undoubtedly remains one of the brightest and most interesting contributions to metaphysics made during the whole period. As it happened, I reviewed the first edition in Mind for October 1891; but I have always felt dissatisfied with my own review, and I am glad to have this opportunity of stating some new impressions.

Dr Schiller remarks quite rightly that the central doctrines are essentially maintained; and this, he thinks, "may be taken to attest the stability of the author's personality." That this should be so has some bearing on his own metaphysical doctrine, which consists essentially in the position that the self or person is ultimately real. Now on this point, as distinguished from that of method, my own view has approximated more closely to his. While continuing to hold certain "monistic" positions which he rejects, I find that within any accurately thought-out monism room has to be made for a kind of ultimate "pluralism." In their view of the self Berkeley and Mill were substantially, if to some extent "uncritically," right. Hume's and Kant's criticism, as Dr Schiller says, does not succeed in dissolving the self as reality; though it does undoubtedly stop the facile process of deduction by which it was once thought that personal immortality could be immediately concluded from it. I must add that I have also been led to see that in the great monistic or "pantheistic" systems there is a recognition of ultimate plurality which escapes attention at first, but which makes needless Dr Schiller's rather indiscriminate attacks on them. His own view regarding the worldprocess, and even his conception of the way in which individuality is ultimately preserved, has considerable resemblance to the corresponding doctrines in a system as pantheistic as that of John Scotus Erigena. Incidentally, I have seen reason to suspect that the notion of eternal individuals would be found latent even in the Vedanta if closely studied.

On the other hand, I have never been able to see the value of the "pragmatic" method of proof which Dr Schiller so enthusiastically advocates. The subject has been so much discussed that I do not propose to add anything further to the controversy whether truth can be under-

stood as simply that system which "works," or which is practically "applicable." I can see how the "pragmatic" thinker, precisely through his bias, may arrive more rapidly than the "intellectualist" at an insight into the plurality of real being and the teleology underlying natural processes; for intellectualism, if this means setting up formal logic or mathematics as the norm, itself diverts the eye from some aspects of things. But, when it comes to proof, must not the arguments inevitably be intellectualist in the sense that they appeal to the intellect? Most of Dr Schiller's own I should describe as quite sound intellectualist arguments.

I also do not share what I would call (to coin a word for once) the apirophobia which Dr Schiller has in common with some other thinkers. I agree, indeed, with his view that the extended universe, if it is to be scientifically thinkable, must be conceived as finite—that is, as containing a theoretically measurable quantity of gravitating matter and of ether; but, after considerable reflection, I reject the view (maintained also by Renouvier) that the notion of the infinity of space and time originates conceptually in processes of mathematical addition, geometrical or arithmetical. Indeed, Dr Schiller himself, in one place, speaks of "the suggestion of infinity contained in the perception of spatial extension" (p. 253); and this agrees with my own introspective memory. Here I admit that the only true infinity in the case is that of a subjective phantasm; but does not this show that the particular mind is in a sense infinite? Hence, from Dr Schiller's own "humanist" point of view, our minds are not incompetent to assert infinity of real Being. As regards space, there is no insoluble puzzle. Imagination simply follows perceptual experience in refusing to figure space as a bounded whole. And the "infinites" of mathematics are all shorthand formulæ that have found their solution in the theory of limits without any assumption of a realised infinite. Time, however, as Dr Schiller also admits, is nearer to metaphysical reality than space; and here an ultimate difference comes in of which the effects are far-reaching.

In comparing the different "voluntarist" thinkers, one or two curious points are observable. The present tendency of those who maintain "the priority of the will" is to reject "the real infinite"; yet Descartes found infinity in the will as distinguished from the intellect. And, while Renouvier associates belief in the real infinite with philosophical doctrines of evolution, Dr Schiller holds that "all evolutionist or historic methods imply that Time is limited and that the world had a beginning" (p. 245; cf. pp. 175, 320). The doctrine he himself puts forward is that there is a complete cosmic evolution, limited in time, from a "pre-cosmic" beginning to a "post-cosmic" end of the world. In the beginning God (who is finite, for that is the nature of all real being) coexisted with a chaos of isolated spirits that were to be brought into a harmonious system. To bring about this system against a resistance that is real is the end of the world-process. The final state is neither "rest" nor continued

"work" like that of the world we know, but an energising beyond time and change, such as was conceived by Aristotle to constitute the divine life. While the world that is in process is phenomenal, the Being that sets it going as First Cause is non-phenomenal; as is also the final heaven.

The implication of indeterminism in this view Dr Schiller quite distinctly recognises. From determinism, if carried through consistently, there follows, as he points out, an "infinite regress of conditioned causes"; and this, he tries to show, involves a logical contradiction. Here I arrive at the point of divergence. It is easy to show that the supposed past infinity of numerable phenomena is at one end limited by any arbitrary "present moment" we like to take; but, in admitting this, the "partisans of the infinite" have not admitted that it is closed by a limit at the other end (which they deny to exist); and therefore formal logic is powerless to reduce their assertion to a contradiction. Their reason for making the assertion is that the metaphysical reality which is the ground of the phenomenal series cannot be interpolated or prefixed as if it were a member of the series. To this series, since it goes on strictly according to law in the sense of Hume or of Positivism, there can be no reason for assigning a limit either in the past or in the future. How this can be reconciled with teleology in a certain sense I have myself tried to show; and I here give the briefest possible statement of the position. The conception of an infinite series of determined events in time can be cleared of logical contradiction, though from its nature it cannot be realised as a completed imagination. Of the cosmic process as a whole there is neither beginning nor end, nor is it properly an evolution; but each particular system within the cosmos has its evolution in time; and within our own system we may hope to interpret this as an intelligible history, not a mere aimless fluctuation. What other evolutions there may be, we do not know; but metaphysical imagination is permissible. I have no objection in principle to the kind of conclusions that Dr Schiller admits to be "romantic" but declines to apologise for.

In reviewing the first edition, I could not help noticing especially the treatment of immortality; and this strikes me again. It has been observed by Dr Shadworth Hodgson that there is a certain rivalry in the minds of philosophers between the interests of Theism and of Immortality. Dr Schiller's interest is most in the second problem; though doubtless he would say that the rival interest is not that of Theism in the proper sense, but of the Pantheism that would absorb all in the Absolute and Infinite. In one passage, however, he himself indicates a way of holding that the parts may be real compatibly with the reality of the whole conceived in a pantheistic sense. "If the whole is necessary, the parts would also have to be necessary. There could be no such thing as coming into or passing out of existence in the relation of the parts to such a whole, no possibility therefore of regarding their relation under the category of cause and effect" (p. 337). There would, of course, be again strict determinism, since phenomena, as the necessary manifestation of uncaused being, would

go on according to laws of nature; but, from a point of view which we may, if we like, call religious, this seems to me much more satisfactory than the indeterminism championed by Dr Schiller. With a finite God, who is only one member, though the most powerful, of a whole of being which is not a Reality for itself but only a sum of parts, and with a real indeterminism, what security have we against the actual existence of a malign chance? And is not Dr Schiller's aim, as a teleological thinker, to show that the appearance of this, in spite of all pessimism, is illusory? He does, indeed, hint at a kind of determinism that would have this effect, though he sets it aside on grounds he would not admit as conclusive against any metaphysical doctrine of his own. "Unless each agent is himself eternal—and this hypothesis neither science nor ordinary determinism would tolerate—he is the helpless product of an inexorable fate," etc. (pp. 454-5). But, according to his own doctrine, each agent is eternal, being ultimately non-phenomenal and pre-cosmic.

T. WHITTAKER.

LONDON.

Sin as a Problem of To-day.—By James Orr, D.D.—London: Hodder & Stoughton, 1910.

In this volume Dr Orr sets himself with characteristic courage to the performance of a difficult task. There can hardly be a more trying position for a teacher, especially at the present time, than to be a Professor of Systematic Theology and Apologetics. The combination seems in itself to suggest that he must first of all translate or transform Christianity into a system, that he must then defend that system against all comers, and finally, reviewing the whole field of knowledge and speculationphilosophical, scientific, and religious, - pronounce judgment upon all opinions which seem to conflict with his own intellectual construction. In some such way as this Professor Orr appears to regard his mission; and the very conscientiousness with which he attempts to fulfil it may be one reason for the obvious imperfections of the present work. The conception of Christianity which underlies the book is too formal, abstract, and logical. Too wide an area is covered: consequently the treatment is sometimes meagre, fragmentary, and even misleading. The implied necessity also of pronouncing categorically upon the results of other equally competent thinkers even in relatively unimportant matters is one from which the sensitive scholar naturally shrinks, and Professor Orr must be the first to regret the unfortunate dogmatism of the book.

At the outset the author's conception of Christianity is made clear. The "essence" of Christianity is found in a "plan," a plan we gladly recognise of Redemption, but still a plan; and so at the very commencement a process of abstraction begins, which soon leads to the cold and cheerless feeling that what passes before us is not the grace and truth of the Gospel, but an aspect of it; an aspect which can hardly fail to be in

some small degree at least affected by being regarded in isolation and presented in a highly controversial book. This may seem to some inevitable. If it be so, let us at least submit to the inevitable with our eyes open to the limitations of the human mind.

Professor Orr is possessed, one might almost say obsessed, with the idea of Christianity as a system of doctrines, each capable of accurate definition, each exactly fitting in with the rest, and no one of which can be removed or altered without shaking, and it may be overthrowing, the whole edifice. And not only so; but there are certain presuppositions, which are not themselves of an exclusively doctrinal or religious character, but belonging to the provinces of natural science, psychology, and general philosophy, which must each be decided in a given way, in order to make them harmonise with and support a preconceived scheme. The author is, therefore, an apologist of a very determined sort, not satisfied with tactics of defence, but carrying fire and sword into the enemy's camp and sometimes, alas! into the camp of his friends.

The crowded and fragmentary nature of the contents is also certain to provoke suspicions of unfairness and occasion passing resentments not otherwise justifiable. If anyone needs space it is the Christian apologist, for he is anxious beyond all others to state his opponent's case with great clearness and adequate fulness. Apologetics are worse than useless if any doubt remains in the reader's mind as to the accuracy and completeness with which the apologist states the case against himself. An illustration of this evil is to be found on p. 74, in the references to the Vedic and Babylonian religions. A single quotation from the Rig-Veda, in which "Varuna is piteously appealed to for mercy, but sin is conceived of as infatuation," is placed over against a single extract from the Old Testament in which a psalmist expresses his heartfelt contrition for sin. Would it not have been more satisfactory to the reader, and ultimately have served better the purpose of the apologist, if another quotation had been added from the Rig-Veda in which, e.g., the doctrine of sin as "selfcommitted guilt" is found. So the passage selected from Babylonian literature is not one which reveals the ethical quality of Babylonian thought at its best; and, in addition, the sceptic can make the very obvious retort that the ritual element was sometimes too prominent even in the Old Testament. Nothing can possibly be lost from the Christian point of view by absolute frankness, and if candour requires space, that requirement should be met, or the subject dismissed. As it is, Dr Orr lays himself open to the suspicion of being actuated by conflicting motives: on the one hand, the desire in the interests of his own theory to recognise as authentic the testimonium anima naturaliter Christiana to the fact of sin; and, on the other hand, the desire unduly to disparage that testimony in the interests of a higher revelation.

Another illustration of the way in which the author has failed to do himself justice is in his very confused and unsatisfactory treatment of Freewill. Considering the tremendous stress which he lays upon the necessity of correct ideas upon this subject, we should have expected to find a fairly clear and complete exposition and vindication of Free-will. But if the reader will turn to pp. 53–4 and then to pp. 145–7, I believe he will come away more bewildered than before. The reasoning there appears to me a menace to the idea of moral responsibility rather than its support. And when one recalls the names of Christian philosophers who have reached a different conclusion from that of Professor Orr without finding the basis of Christianity give way beneath their feet, one cannot help surmising that his particular psychological and philosophical theories of Free-will are not essential parts or supports of an intelligent appreciation of the facts of the Christian Redemption. The author may be able to reconcile the ideas of a "free will" with that of a "fettered will," of an impossible exercise of freedom with the possibility of moral obedience, of an indeterminism which he seems to teach with a self-determination of which he speaks, but the solution is at least not on the surface.

A considerable section of the earlier part of the book is composed of comments (to use Dr Orr's own expression) upon a number of philosophers and philosophies. The reference to Professor Stout appears singularly unfortunate, but many observations strike one as just, and illustrate the author's wide reading and critical acumen. Yet, after all, can mere "commenting" effect much? Will not every philosophy ultimately stand or fall by its own merits or demerits? Even after the comments the philosophers have to be met on their own ground.

Dr Orr's survey of contemporary science in relation to his theory of sin is interesting and valuable. He has here little difficulty in showing that the assured conclusions of science do not overthrow his presuppositions. In the case of the philosophers little more was attempted beyond exhibiting the discrepancy between his own views and their conclusions. But here the appeal is from one authority to another, and the verdict is at least non-proven. Yet suppose Weismann's views should ultimately be shown to be true, would Dr Orr's Christianity suffer the kind of shock that would

be given to Herbert Spencer's philosophy?

With a few exceptions Dr Orr has comparatively little to say regarding the views of sin held by modern theologians. But Ritschl is a notable exception; and, judging from the index of the book, one would say that the author had given more attention to Ritschl than to any of the notorious assailants of the Christian doctrine of sin. Happily, however, the references sometimes show agreement as well as disagreement: and the conviction naturally comes to one, that the book would have been much more effective for the purpose for which it was written, if for once the minor differences of theologians had been forgotten and attention concentrated upon those tendencies (and they are numerous enough) which all earnest Christians regard as inimical to a Christian doctrine of sin and of the atonement of Jesus Christ their Lord.

H. H. SCULLARD.

The Life of Cardinal Vaughan.—By J. G. Snead-Cox. London: Herbert & Daniel, 1910.

Every student of Catholic books of devotion must have been struck by the infinite number of changes which may be rung on a few simple themes, by the impossibility of ever getting to the end of it, by the surprise with which for the thousandth time one comes on some perfectly obvious thing one never has thought of before. It is a world in itself, infinitely touching, alluring, appealing. Before the Oxford Movement this world was absolutely closed to the majority of the English people; that movement gave a glimpse into what was behind the fast-shut gates which must have caused extreme bewilderment to many. We ourselves remember an old man in a country village opening a little prayer-book at random and beginning to read, "O Jesus, I desire to love thee with my whole heart, to unite my will to Thine," and abruptly breaking off with the remark, "Dear me! this is very different to anything I ever heard about those people." Our own copy of Challoner's Meditations for Every Day in the Year has scrawled in it in blue pencil "E. B. P.," which we like to think may mean "Edward Bouverie Pusey." It is impossible to imagine books of devotion setting forth a more solid and serious piety, and yet one more solemnly and touchingly beautiful, than those of Challoner and Alban Butler and the older English Roman Catholic writers. We confess that to us there is no book so beautiful as the Garden of the Soul. These books breathe an atmosphere of tender recollection and devotion. They might be the musings of Nicodemus returning from Calvary in the twilight of Good Friday, with the Crown of Thorns threaded as a bracelet on his arm.

This atmosphere of old-fashioned Catholic piety was breathed by Cardinal Vaughan from his earliest years. The most interesting part of this Life is the account of his childish days at Courtfield, and of his mother, Mrs Vaughan. He writes: "I was only a little boy when we lost our mother. It is a loss I cannot think of now, after half a century or more, without a shudder. To all of us she was the very ideal of everything that is lovely and holy. . . . Of course we used to kneel round her lap morning and evening to lisp after her our childish prayers, and then were carried off clinging to her skirts to the chapel, where on great feasts we were privileged to kiss the altar-cloth, or even the altar itself. Our mother reminded us that there in the Tabernacle One was always abiding, who loved us more than even she did, ever ready to greet us when we went to see Him. . . . When I look back it seems to me she could only talk about God, or the poor, or our father. She made heaven such a reality to us that we felt we knew more about it and liked it in a way far better than even our home, where, until she died, we were wildly, supremely happy. Religion under her teaching was made so attractive, and all the treasured items she gathered from the lives of the saints made them so fascinating, that we loved them as our most intimate friends, as she assured us they most certainly were. . . . But it was of our Lord's agony in the garden,

and His sacred Passion and death, that she never tired to remind us." I have quoted at some length to give an idea of the influence which moulded Herbert Vaughan's whole life. Mrs Vaughan was in the habit of praying an hour every day (she did this for twenty years) that all her children might become priests or nuns. "In the event," we are told, "all her five daughters entered convents, and of her eight sons six became priests." It is here that with most English readers a still, small voice will make itself heard. Teresa Vaughan, a Sister of Charity, dies in her convent in London; and a few months afterwards her sister Clare dies at Amiens, at the age of nineteen, after having been a Poor Clare only nine months. Herbert Vaughan writes of these deaths with great unction as "martyrdoms." The poor child herself writes: "I have glorious news to tell you—that I may hope in a few days to see my Celestial Spouse in heaven, and to gaze on that Face the beauty of which no words can tell. . . . The doctor says that not only my chest, but everything in my body is attacked."

Herbert Vaughan as a priest gave himself quite simply to his religion, and to the life of "detachment" and "mortification" to which it aspires. Other things were not so much subordinated to the interests of Catholicism, as simply non-existent for him. Hence the picture the book draws is unattractive. The attractive people are the people who are spontaneously and naturally themselves. This is the charm of little children, that they are natural, that they live in the moment, that they are sincere. The words "detachment" and "mortification" indicate a problem for any Christian who realises how urgently his religion seems to demand them, and how impossible it is for many temperaments at least to comply with the demand. "Detachment," of course, does not mean merely "detachment from sin," but from the whole sensible and visible world with all its interests. It is to be merely a shadow to us, our true life is elsewhere. This absorption in a supreme end, with its consequent deadness to mere human virtue and earthly goodness, of course, produces the paradox with which we are so sadly familiar of the effort after an angelic goodness going hand in hand with complicity in Congo, Phillipine, Dreyfus, Ferrer horrors. That one wretched Jew should be punished unjustly, that a few negroes should be flogged by white men instead of tortured by their own chiefs, cannot weigh one moment against the interests of the Church and the consequent salvation of souls.

Of Vaughan his biographer writes: "The cataract was harnessed and all his natural energies were trained to bear the yoke of the Church. His perfect consecration to the service of God implied a perfect detachment from all earthly ties." The poet, Aubrey de Vere, was amazed at the "ascetic detachment" his friend had reached. "I really believe," he said, "that if someone told you your father, mother, and brothers had been burned to death, you would simply ring for the servant to clear away the ashes." He loved them indeed dearly "secundum carnem," but "secundum spiritum" always came first. His father, Colonel Vaughan, said on his death-bed, with a flash of humour, "Herbert is very distressed about

me, but if you tell him I am in a sweat of suffering, he will be a little consoled."

Absorption in the end, use of all other things merely as means, was the note of Vaughan's whole life. The account of his purchase of the Salford Aquarium, for instance, is very amusing, and the guileless leading article quoted from a local newspaper about the Bishop's "enlightened appreciation of every enterprise undertaken for intellectual and elevated objects." His predecessor at Westminster, Cardinal Manning, would have been quite capable of labouring to preserve an aquarium to the inhabitants of Salford without ulterior motives. Here was the difference between the two men. Cardinal Manning was no more "detached" than Mr Gladstone was. He was alert, alive, spontaneous, natural childlike, full of genuine interest and sympathy with all earthly things. We know not if these characteristics are really reconcilable with the Christian sense of being "dead," "hidden," "buried," and the like, but we hope they are. Manning was a humanist as well as a Christian. Possibly the "tanquam ut cadaver" was the secret of his detestation of the Jesuits, whom he said were a great hindrance to the conversion of England. He was always preaching humanism and wider sympathies to Vaughan: "I lay it upon you to read the *Critic* and the *School for Scandal*. You would be holier and happier if you would enter into such things with patience and learn to laugh." Again he declared that Vaughan "was already a good Catholic, and he only needed to sit at the feet of General Booth to be a good Christian."

In a brief review it is impossible even to refer to a hundredth part of the interesting things in this book. We should like, however, to refer to the very attractive picture of W. G. Ward as a lay teacher of theology at St Edmund's College, Ware. Ward's religion surely was not so much laborious as spontaneous, not so much a "mortification" as a realisation of his true self. The whole book is, for those who care for the history of religion in England, of fascinating, indeed absorbing interest. It shows us the inner life of a man who must have won, if man ever did, the blessing of the single eye and heart. He pressed on to one goal, he minded one thing. But will some teacher ever arise, saint and philosopher and humanist in one, who will give us the rationale of a humanised Christianity?

R. L. GALES.

GEDNEY, HOLBEACH.

The Child's Inheritance.—By Greville MacDonald, M.D., Fellow of King's College, London.—Smith, Elder, 1910.

VERY clearly and with close reasoning Dr MacDonald drives home the argument on which his philosophy of education is based. He emphasises the fact, every day becoming more familiar to modern science, that the potential capacities of the race, and of every child of the race, must have

been present in that primordial cell whence earthly life unfolded. And then, having made a limited but powerful use of Weismann's theory, he asks in effect what was the parentage of that earliest ovum. In Wordsworth he finds a philosophical and impressive exponent of the true answer:—

"Whether we be young or old,
Our destiny, our being's heart and home,
Is with infinitude, and only there.
With hope it is, hope that can never die,
Effort, and expectation, and desire,
And something evermore about to be."

Never before, perhaps, has Wordsworth's Prelude so fully come into its own as in this striking book. The quotations are wonderfully telling throughout. Dr MacDonald makes us feel anew the illuminating splendour of many of the lines, and rightly uses the poem as a guide to the child's true inheritance. If, then, the child is really born of the divine by means of the human, if in that mysterious pre-natal development, which repeats in epitome the history of human evolution, there is hidden a potency surpassing anything inherent in mere mortality, education, if it is to attain its true end, must lead forth the results of that power into such mastery and efficiency as shall enable the child to take from its environment all the nourishment and strength demanded by its growing manifestation. And, in spite of Weismann's reasoning, Dr MacDonald makes out a very good case scientifically for believing that an increase of susceptibility to certain acquired characteristics is a possible enrichment of the inheritance from generation to generation, though doubtless the vital transforming power was present from the beginning. Wantonly to crush, or mechanically to mould, must then be the very antithesis of true education. Life and joy are divine, and the child must be awakened to the power within, through the delight of work and play and handicraft, as well as through the love which includes justice and the rigour of a wise discipline and obedience in self-renouncing service, so that his will may be strengthened to meet the sorrow and the sternness of earth's schooling. His questions must not be brushed aside with evasions. He will soon become aware of the fact that, having been "created out of others," he is not "all good," that he has a kingdom of his own, with doors which he can open into both heaven and hell, translating his whole domain into either; that he has a "jungle-life" which he must hold in subjection. It is, as Dr MacDonald reminds us (p. 59), to Blake that we owe those momentous words—words made to live again in these pages: "Energy is eternal delight, and the outward circumference of energy is reason." "Truth has bounds," he says, "error none."

"Man," says our author, "has survived, and something more—he has evolved his humanity from out the seeming chaos of his evolution. He has found and held on to a most priceless gift of his increasing inheritance—the gift of love, the desire for freer life, the power of work for those

aims that transcend mundanely utilitarian needs. The Holy Ghost has never slept: He is still inspiration to conflict, enemy of adaptation and trimming." Beauty shines most brilliantly wherever the energy of life is best proclaimed. Life's best manifestations lie in the generation of new life, with its steady augmentation, through ebb and flow, of quantity and quality. Nowhere in nature is the wonder of beauty greater than in the service of the self to unborn selves, who in their turn shall shine and manifest the deathless light. "The beauty of the garden lies in the flowers' desire for racial service"; it comes of the "deep-moving, unconscious effort to give utterance to the highest duty of life."

But Dr MacDonald is no weak sentimentalist. He speaks with plainness and power of what he calls the "glaring prostitution" in many human lives of this gift—this "predominant passion"—which he rightly calls "sublime," He wisely reminds his readers that "the more uplifted is any particular attribute of life, the deeper and more disastrous will be its fall." And while he sees that "the whole kindliness of the Earth's strong grain, warm roots, and gracious fruits depends on the dominance of her passion," he sees also the other aspect of the truth, which is less commonly presented, and of which he finds a symbol in the flowers of the field. Of the daisy and its fellow-flowers he writes: "How have the long white florets of its aureole learned their gift of service, whereby, in renouncing their privilege to carry anthers and pollen for the perfecting of their seeds, they have gained power of service to become manifest in increase of beauty? How has the daisy's cousin, the blue cornflower, learned an even greater serviceableness and beauty in her blue outer florets? These are quite sterile. but give the conspicuous beauty to the flower rather than the lilac-hued central florets which are creationally perfect. The large blue trumpets proclaim the inherent dignity of service; and the surrender of personal privilege to make such service possible shines forth in beauty."

The dynamic power of the book, in respect to the education of the child and the uplifting of the men and women who help to make childhood's environment, may be said to centre in the writer's conviction that "all man's sin and suffering have come through false restriction, as distinguished from right discipline, of the vis insita, the inborn fire of life." The author is often bold in affirmation, but his own inspiring faith makes a doubly provocative appeal through his laughing scorn for those comfortable selfishnesses which find a mouthpiece in shallowness and glibness. It is characteristic that he quotes with keen appreciation the story of Talleyrand's reply when some one asked him how best the New Religion, which was to supersede Christianity, could be fairly started and then kept going. "That's easily done," Talleyrand replied. "You, as the leader, need only be crucified for your faith; and then," he added, "rise again from the dead."

Dr Greville MacDonald has written an inspiring book, in which science and poetry are at one.

ANNIE MATHESON.

The Two Religions of Israel: with a Re-examination of the Prophetic Narratives and Utterances.—By the Rev. T. K. Cheyne, Litt.D. —London: A. & C. Black, 1911.—Pp. xii+428.

This book, though it is not, at first sight, apparent from the title, is a further instalment of Dr Cheyne's contributions to the "North Arabian" theory of the history of Israel, and it takes us down from the beginnings of Israel's national life to the close of the ministry of the pre-Exilic prophets. Undismayed by criticism, Dr Cheyne pursues the even tenour of his way, regardless whether he stands alone or whether his followers be few or many, and, should his life be spared—which all his admirers, i.e. all scholars and not only those whose studies specially include those to which he has devoted his life, will devoutly hope—he promises us yet a further volume which shall carry the consideration of the fortunes of Israel's religious life down to a still later period.

As regards the "North Arabian" theory, Dr Chevne confesses himself a disciple of Winckler, who stands practically alone among German scholars, though he pursues the theory on lines of his own. Once again we are told that the results of the application of "a keen, critical investigation" to the Old Testament "prove" the existence of a hitherto unsuspected Land of Muzri or Mizrim in North Arabia with which all the fortunes of Israel were bound up. From this country, and not from Egypt (all references to "Mizraim" are to be read "Mizrim"), the tribes and clans of Israel entered Canaan, and here too was situated the "Babel," and not in the historic city of Babylon, to which they, or some of them, were deported. Here too is found the kingdom of Asshur or Ashhur, and not in Assyria, which was the mighty foe of Israel in the ninth and eighth centuries B.C. Can North Arabia bear the weight of these three powers thus dumped down in its midst? The empire of the Hittites is only now revealing its secrets as a great power in Asia Minor. Where can a place be found in the almost desert regions of North Arabia for one. not to say three, further powers capable of exercising the influence on Israel which Mizrim, or Mizraim, Ashhur, and Babel undoubtedly did? To state the problem in this way seems almost sufficient to refute it. And when we find it supported only by the most arbitrary alterations of the text of the Old Testament, we pause ere we follow the author in his daring emendations.

No one will dispute the coexistence and conflict of two religions on the soil of Israel, a lower and a higher, throughout its historic course; but when, instead of being associated with the surviving relics of animism, and a syncretism of the worship of Yahweh with the worship of the gods of Canaan, the lower religion is made to consist in the worship of a god Yerahmeel, belonging to an Ishmaelite people of the same name, who is further equated with Baal, again we feel compelled to draw rein. Yerahmeel is barely found in the Old Testament as we have been accustomed to read it, but in the "emended" text he, god and people, is found everywhere.

Yerahmeel, says Dr Cheyne, is the older god, Yahweh the younger; both were originally gods of the thunder and the volcano. The earlier prophets, more like dervishes or medicine-men (this is quite correct), were worshippers of Yerahmeel, and the ritual and sacrifices belonged to his religion, together with the "nationalist" idea that he was bound to support Israel no matter what she did; but the people in worshipping Yerahmeel thought they were worshipping Yahweh, who was the real national god, and indeed sometimes worshipped him as Yahweh-Yerahmeel. It was the function of the higher prophets, who gradually emerged, to disabuse their minds and to exhibit Yahweh as a god who cared for righteousness above all things, and must punish iniquity even in his own people. Thus the true Yahweh prophets were pessimists, as contrasted with the optimism of the Yerahmeel prophets. Finally Yerahmeel, when Yahweh has become "the god of the whole earth," when, i.e., monotheism has emerged and conquered monolatry (or, as perhaps Dr Cheyne would say, "duolatry"), reappears, on the one hand as the archangel Michael, and on the other hand as Belial, or Beliar, which is really Yarbel, i.e. Yerahmeel-Baal.

After an introduction of sixty-six pages, in which Dr Cheyne summarises his results and conclusions, he occupies the rest of the book with a detailed exposition of his theories and the application of his "keen, critical method" under the sectional headings: Moses, Balaam, Samuel, Elijah, and Elisha, the mythical or quasi-mythical heroes of Israelitish story-tellers; and these are followed by a section each for the writing prophets from

Amos to Zephaniah in chronological order.

Of course there is a very great deal in Dr Cheyne's studies of the progress of religion in Israel with which every student of comparative religion in the present day will agree; it is to their association with untenable theories as to Yerahmeel, Mizrim, Ashhur, and Babel that we object. That Samuel, Elijah, and Elisha were, like Moses, idealised portraits of a later age is highly probable, but that their prototypes never existed except in the imagination of their authors is to attribute too much to that imagination. Balaam, we are told, is the picture of a true "North Arabian" magician, and is, at the same time, the idealised portrait of a truly Godpossessed man. Amos, Dr Cheyne speaks of as "a second and more historical Elijah," and he, like all the writing prophets, fulminates against Yerahmeel, though he is himself a Yerahmeelite, or North Arabian, by birth. A large section is devoted to Isaiah, whose genuine writings are explained from the new point of view, and some remarkable results are obtained both in these and in such non-Isaian prophecies as chapters xviii., xix., xxi., and xxiii. For example, the "pleasant pictures" and "ships of Tarshish" of chapter ii. become "castles of Ashtar" and "mansions of Yarham," i.e. Yerahmeel and his consort; and chapter xix. has, of course, nothing to do with Egypt; the altar and the massebah spoken of are at Ashhur-Yarham, the capital city of the king of Mizrim. In chapter xxiii. Sor and Sidon are not Tyre and Sidon; Yam is not "the sea," but a

shortened form of Yaman, and all are Ishmaelite, i.e. Yerahmeelite, localities in Mizrim. In the section devoted to Jeremiah it is curious to notice that whereas the earliest "Higher Critics" (e.g. Dr Colenso, etc.) would have that prophet to have been one of the Deuteronomists, and the author of a considerable part of that book, our latest critic makes him out to be their strenuous and impassioned opponent, and quotes Jer. viii. 8 f. in support of this. "The fault of these persons in the eyes of Jeremiah was that they had no recourse to the perennial fountain of prophetic revelation, and taught the people from a written legal compendium, i.e. probably from a primitive form of Deuteronomy" (pp. 53 and 386).

It is impossible, in this short notice, to follow Dr Cheyne's "emendations" and consequent exeges in detail, but it will be seen that, if they are to be accepted, the whole of the Old Testament needs to be rewritten and reread, and our whole point of view readjusted to new and hitherto undreamt-of conditions. It is possible, but far from probable, that the

scholarship of the next few years will endorse this position.

With all that Dr Cheyne says as to primitive religion, the animistic tree- and pillar-cult, and such things, we are in hearty agreement. He has been to school with the anthropologists to good effect; but we note that the very opening words of the book take the form of a highly controversial statement. "Magic and religion," says Dr Cheyne, "so far as we can see, began together; sorcerer and priest had a common origin." As all students know, Dr Frazer holds that "religion" is later than "magic," and began through the despair of it. A more tenable hypothesis than either is that both magic and religion were the inevitable outcome of the animistic outlook upon nature. Primitive man had to deal with both friendly and unfriendly spirits, and magic is of two kinds. By sympathetic magic he bent, or at least thought he bent, the friendly spirits to his will; by the so-called black magic he overcame the machinations of the unfriendly spirits, and when this failed, as it often did, the sorcerer naturally developed into the priest; incantations passed into prayer and sacrifice.

This book will not appeal to the ordinary reader—it is not meant for him; to the student who knows something of Hebrew it is a delight for its very ingenuity and surprises; and in bringing this notice to a conclusion we can only again pay our tribute of respect and admiration to the veteran scholar who was the pioneer of the Higher Criticism in England, and who first taught us to investigate the problems of the Old Testament divested of the incrustations of a hoary traditionalism. We may regret that his later studies, like some of the rivers of Central Asia, seem destined to lose themselves in the unfruitful desert, but his patient toil and unwearied industry will earn their sure, though perhaps not their expected, reward.

H. J. DUKINFIELD ASTLEY.

EAST RUDHAM VICARAGE, KING'S LYNN.

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THE

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THE CHRISTIAN IDEA OF GOD. A PLEA FOR SIMPLICITY.

SIR OLIVER LODGE.

Investigation is laborious and unexciting; it takes years, and progress is slow; but in all regions of knowledge it is the method which in the long run has led towards truth; it is the method by which what we feel to be solid and substantial progress has always been made. In many departments of human knowledge this fact is admitted—though men of science have had to fight hard for their method before getting it generally recognised. In some departments it is still contested, and the arguments of Bacon in favour of free experimental inquiry are applicable to those subjects which are claimed as superior to scientific test.

If it be objected that not by such means is truth in religious matters ascertained, if it be held that we must walk by faith, not by sight, and that never by searching will man find out any of the secrets of God, I do not care to contest the objection, though I disagree with its negative portion. That no amount of searching will ever enable us to find out the Almighty to perfection is manifestly true; that secrets may be revealed to inspired "babes" which are hidden from the wise and prudent is likewise certain; but that no secret

things of God can be brought to light by patient examination and inquiry into facts is false, for you cannot parcel out truth into that which is divine and that which is not divine; the truths of science were as much God's secrets as any other, and they have yielded up their mystery to precisely the process which is called in question.

We are part of the Universe, our senses have been evolved in and by it; it follows that they are harmonious with it and that the way it appeals to our senses is a true way; though their obvious limitation entitles us to expect from time to time fresh discoveries of surprising and fundamental novelty and a growing perception of tracts beyond our ancient ken.

Some critics there are, however, who, calling themselves scientific, have made up their minds in a negative direction and a contrary sense. These are impressed not only with the genuineness of the truth afforded us through our senses and perceptions, but with its completeness; they appear to think that the main lines of research have already been mapped out or laid down, they will not believe that regions other than those to which they are accustomed can be open to scientific exploration; especially they imagine that in the so-called religious domain there can be no guides except preconception and prejudice. Accordingly, they appear to disbelieve that anyone can be conscientiously taking trouble to grope his way by patient inquiry, with the aid of such clues as are available; and in order to contradict the results of such inquiry they fall into the habit of doing that of which they accuse the workers,-they appeal to sentiment and They talk freely about what they believe, presumption. what they hope for, what they desire, what they expect; as if they thought that their opinions and wishes were of importance in determining actuality, that their desires exerted an influence over fate, that they could decide what was really true and what was not. They are guided by emotion and prejudice; they do not seek knowledge. Doubtless they regard knowledge on certain topics as inaccessible, so they are

positive and self-satisfied and opinionated and quite sure. They pride themselves on their hard-headed scepticism and robust common-sense; while the truth is that they have bound themselves into a narrow cell by walls of sentiment, and have thus excluded whole regions of human experience from their purview.

It so happens that I have been engaged for over forty years in mathematical and physical science, and for more than half that period in exploration into unusual psychical development, as opportunity arose; and I have thus been led to certain tentative conclusions respecting permissible ways of regarding the universe.

First, I have learned to regard the universe as a concrete and full-bodied reality, with parts accessible and intelligible to us, all of it capable of being understood and investigated by the human mind, not as an abstraction or dreamlike entity whose appearances are deceptive. Our senses do not deceive us; their testimony is true as far as it goes. I have learned to believe in Intelligibility.

Next, that everything, every single thing, has many aspects. Even such a thing as water, for instance. Water, regarded by the chemist, is an assemblage or aggregate of complex molecules; regarded by the meteorologist and physiographer, it is an element of singular and vitally important properties; every poet has treated of some aspect of beauty exhibited by this common substance; while to the citizen it is an ordinary need of daily life. All the aspects together do not exhaust the subject, but each of them is real. The properties of matter of which our senses tell us, or enable us to inquire into in laboratories, are true properties, real and true. They are not the whole truth, a great deal more is known about them by men of science, but the more complex truths do not make the simpler ones false. Moreover we must admit that the whole truth about the simplest thing is assuredly beyond us; the Thing in itself is related to the whole universe, and in its fulness is incomprehensible.

Furthermore, I have learned that while positive assertions on any given subject are often true, error creeps in when simple aspects are denied in order to emphasise the more complex, or vice versa. A trigonometrical sine, for instance, may be expressed in terms of imaginary exponentials in a way familiar to all mathematical students; also as an infinite series of fractions with increasing factorials in the denominators; also in a number of other true and legitimate and useful ways; but the simple geometrical definition, by aid of the chord of a circle or the string of a bow, survives them all, and is true too.

So it is, I venture to say, with the concept God.

It can be regarded from some absolute and transcendental standpoint which humanity can only pretend to attain to. It can be regarded as the highest and best idea which the human mind has as yet been able to form. It can be regarded as dominating and including all existence, and as synonymous with all existence when that is made sufficiently comprehensive. All these views are legitimate, but they are not final or complete. God can also be represented by some of the attributes of humanity, and can be depicted as a powerful and loving Friend with whom our spirits may commune at every hour of the day, one whose patience and wisdom and long-suffering and beneficence are never exhausted. He can, in fact, be regarded as displayed to us, in such fashion as we can make use of, in the person of an incarnate Being who came for the express purpose of revealing to man such attributes of deity as would otherwise have been missed.

The images are not mutually exclusive, they may all be in some sort true. None of them is complete. They are all aspects—partly true and partly false as conceived by any individual, but capable of being expressed so as to be, as far as they go, true.

Undoubtedly the Christian idea of God is the simple one. Overpoweringly and appallingly simple is the notion presented to us by the orthodox Christian Churches:—

A babe born of poor parents, born in a stable among

cattle because there was no room for them in the village inn—no room for them in the inn—what a master touch! Revealed to shepherds. Religious people inattentive. Royalty ignorant, or bent on massacre. A glimmering perception, according to one noble legend, attained in the Far East—where also similar occurrences have been narrated. Then the child growing into a peasant youth, brought up to a trade. At length a few years of itinerant preaching; flashes of miraculous power and insight. And then a swift end: set upon by the religious people; his followers overawed and scattered, himself tried as a blasphemer, flogged, and finally tortured to death.

Simplicity most thorough, and most strange! In itself it is not unique; such occurrences seem inevitable to highest humanity in an unregenerate world; but who, without inspiration, would see in them a revelation of the nature of God? The life of Buddha, the life of Joan of Arc, are not thus regarded. Yet the Christian revelation is clear enough and true enough if our eyes are open, and if we care to read and accept the simple record which, whatever its historical value, is all that has been handed down to us.

Messiahs, that the ancient world was expectant of a Divine Incarnation. True enough. But what then? We need not be afraid of an idea because it has several times striven to make itself appreciated. It is foolish to decline a revelation because it has been more than once offered to humanity. Every great revelation is likely to have been foreshadowed in more or less imperfect forms, so as to prepare our minds and make ready the way for complete perception hereafter. It is probable that the human race is quite incompetent to receive a really great idea the first time it is offered. There must be many failures to effect an entrance before the final success, many struggles to overcome natural obstacles and submerge the stony products of human stolidity. Lapse of time for general progress is necessary before anything great can be

permanently accomplished, and repeated attempts are necessary; but the tide of general progress is rising, all the time.

So it was with the idea of the Messiah which was abroad in the land, and had been for centuries, before Christ's coming; and never has he been really recognised by more than a few. Dare we not say that he is more truly recognised now than in any previous age in the history of the Church—except perhaps the very earliest? And I doubt if we need make that exception.

The idea of his Messiahship gradually dawned upon him, and he made no mistake as to his mission:—

The word which ye hear is not mine, but the Father's who sent me.

As the Father gave me commandment, even so I do.

The words which I say unto you I speak not of myself; the Father which dwelleth in me, he doeth the works.

The Father is greater than I.

But, for all that,

He that hath seen me hath seen the Father.

Yes, truly, Christ was a planetary manifestation of Deity, a revelation to the human race, the highest and simplest it has yet had; a revelation in the only form accessible to man, a revelation in the full-bodied form of humanity.

Little conception had they in those days of the whole universe as we know it now. The earth was the whole world to them, and that which revealed God to the earth was naturally regarded as the whole Cosmic Deity. Yet it was a truly divine Incarnation.

What I have to say about incarnation in general, and about the incarnation of the Christ spirit in the form of Jesus of Nazareth in particular, I have written in a recent book called *Reason and Belief*. I repeat none of that. What concerns us now is the idea of God which he came to show.

A deity of some kind is common to every branch of the human race. It seems to be possessed by every savage, over-

awed as he necessarily is by the forces of nature. Caprice, jealousy, openness to flattery and rewards, are likewise parts of early theology. Then in the gods of Olympus-that poetic conception which rose to such heights and fell to such depths at different epochs in the ancient world—the attributes of power and beauty were specially emphasised. Power is common to all deities, and favouritism in its use seems also a natural supposition to early tribes; but the element of Beauty, as a divine attribute, we in these islands, save for the poets, have largely lost or forgotten-to our great detriment. In Jehovah, however, the Hebrew race rose to a conception of divine Righteousness which we have assimilated and permanently retained; and upon that foundation Christianity was grafted. It was to a race who had risen thus far-a race with a genius for theology—that Christian revelation came. It was rendered possible, though only just possible, by the stage attained. Simple and unknown folk were ready to receive it, or, at least, were willing to take the first steps to learn.

The power, the righteousness, and other worthy attributes belonging to Jehovah, were known of old. The Christian conception takes them for granted, and concentrates attention on the pity, the love, the friendliness, the compassion, the earnest desire to help mankind—attributes which, though they had occasionally been caught a glimpse of by one or another of the great seers of old, had not yet been thrown into concrete form.

People sometimes seek to deny such attributes as are connoted by the word "Personality" in the Godhead—they say it is a human conception. Certainly it is a human conception; it is through humanity that it has been revealed. Why seek to deny it? God transcends personality, objectors say. By all means: transcends all our conceptions infinitely, transcends every revelation which has ever been vouchsafed; but the revelations are true as far as they go, for all that.

Let us not befog ourselves by attempting impossible conceptions to such an extent that we lose the simple and manifest reality. No conception that we can make is too high, too good, too worthy. It is easy to imagine ourselves mistaken, but never because ideas are too high or too good. It were preposterous to imagine an over-lofty conception in a creature. Reality is always found to exceed our clear conception of it; never once in science has it permanently fallen short. No conception is too great or too high. But also no devout conception is too simple, too lowly, too childlike to have an element—some grain—of vital truth stored away, a mustard seed ready to germinate and bud, a leaven which may permeate the whole mass.

Human Immortality. It is possible to think of that rather simply; and, on the other hand, it is possible to confuse ourselves with tortuous thoughts till it seems unreal and impossible. It is part of the problem of personality and individuality; for the question of how far these are dependent on the bodily organism, or whether they can exist without it, is a scientific question. It is open to research. And yet it is connected with Christianity; for undoubtedly the Christian idea of God involves a belief in human immortality. If per impossibile this latter could be authoritatively denied, a paralysing blow would have been struck at the Christian idea. On the other hand, if by scientific investigation the persistence of individual memory and character were proved, a great step in the direction of orthodox theology would have been taken.

The modern superstition about the universe is that, being suffused with law and order, it contains nothing personal, nothing indeterminate, nothing unforeseen; that there is no room for the free activity of intelligent beings, that everything is mechanically determined; so that given the velocity and acceleration and position of every atom at any instant, the whole future could be unravelled by sufficient mathematical power.

The doctrine of Uniformity and Determinism is supposed to be based upon experience. But experience includes experience of the actions of human beings; and some of them certainly appear to be of a capricious and undetermined character. Or without considering human beings, watch the orbits of a group of flies as they play; they are manifestly not controlled completely by mechanical laws as are the motions of the planets. The simplest view of their activity is that it is self-determined, that they are flying about at their own will, and turning when and where they choose. The conservation of energy has nothing to say against it. Here we see free-will in its simplest form. To suppose anything else in such a case, to suppose that every twist could have been predicted through all eternity, is to introduce præternatural complexity, and is quite unnecessary.

Why not assume, what is manifestly the truth, that freewill exists and has to be reckoned with, that the universe is not a machine subject to outside forces, but a living organism with initiations of its own; and that the laws which govern it, though they include mechanical and physical and chemical laws, are not limited to those, but involve other and higher abstractions, which may perhaps some day be formulated, for life and mind and spirit?

If it be said that free-will can be granted to deity but to nothing lower, inasmuch as the Deity must be aware of all that is going to happen, I reply that you are now making a hypothesis of a complicated kind, and going beyond knowledge into speculation. But if still the speculation appears reasonable, that only the Deity can be endowed with free-will, it merely opens the question, What shall be included in that term? If freedom is the characteristic mark of deity, then those are justified who have taught that every fragment of mind and will is a contributory element in the essence of the Divine Being.

How, then, can we conceive of deity? The analogy of the human body and its relation to the white corpuscles in its blood is instructive. Each corpuscle is a living creature endowed with the powers of locomotion, of assimilation, and, under certain conditions now being inquired into, of reproduction by fission. The health and polity of the body are largely dependent on the activity of these phagocytes. They are to us extremely important; they are an essential part of our being.

But now suppose one of these corpuscles endowed (as in a parable) with intelligence—what conception of the universe will it be able to form? It may examine its surroundings, discourse of the vessels through which it passes, of the adventures it encounters; and if philosophically minded, it may speculate on a being of which perhaps it and all its like form a part—an immanent deity, whose constituents they are, a being which includes them and includes all else which they know or can imagine—a being to whose existence they contribute, and whose purposes they serve or share. So far they could speculate, and so far they would be right. But if they proceeded further, and entered on negations, if they surmised that that immanent aspect of the universe in which they lived and moved and had their being was the sole and only aspect, if they surmised that there was no personality, no feeling, no locomotion, no mind, no purpose, apart from them and their kind, they would greatly err. What conception could they ever form of the manifold interests and activities of man? Still less of the universe known to man, of which he himself forms so trivial a portion.

All analogies fail at some point, but they are a help nevertheless, and this analogy will bear pressing rather far. We ourselves are a part of the agencies for good or evil; we have the power to help or to hinder, to mend or to mar, within the scope of our activity. Our help is asked for; lowly as we are it is really wanted, on the earth here and now, just as much wanted as our body needs the help of its lowly white corpuscles—to contribute to health, to attack disease, to maintain the normal and healthy life of the organism. We are the

white corpuscles of the cosmos, we do serve and form part of an immanent Deity.

Truly it is no easy service to which we are called; something of the wisdom of the serpent must enter into our activities; sanity and moral dignity and sound sense must govern our proceedings; all our powers must be called out and there must be no sluggishness. Impulses, even good impulses, alone are not sufficient; every faculty of the human brain must be exerted, and we must be continually on guard against the flabbiness of mere good intentions.

Our activity and service are thus an integral part of the Divine Existence, which likewise includes that of all the perceptible universe. But to suppose that this exhausts the matter, and that the Deity has no transcendent Existence of which we can form no idea,—to suppose that what happens is not the result of his dominant and controlling Personality, is to step beyond legitimate inference, and to treat appearance as exhaustive of reality.

Always mistrust negations. They commonly signify blindness and prejudice—always except when thoroughly established and carefully formulated in the light of actual experience or mathematical proof. And even then, be ready to admit the possibility of higher generalisations which may uproot them. They are only safe when thrown into the form of a positive assertion.

The impossibility of squaring the circle is not really a negative proposition, except in form. It is safer and more convincing when thrown into the positive and definite form that the ratio of area to diameter is incommensurable. That statement is perfectly clear and legitimate; and the illustration may be used as a parable. A positive form should be demanded of every comprehensive denial; and whatever cannot be thrown into positive form, it is wise to mistrust. Its promulgator is probably stepping out of bounds, into the cheap and easy region of negative speculation. He is like a rationalistic microbe denying the existence of a human being.

I have urged that the simple aspect of things is to be considered and not despised; but, for the majority of people, is not the tendency the other way? Are they not too much given to suppose the universe limited to the simplicity of their first and every-day conception of it? The stockbroker has his idea of the totality of things; the navvy has his. Students of mathematical physics are liable to think of it as a determinate assemblage of atoms and ether with no room for spiritual entities—no room, as my brilliant teacher, W. K. Clifford, expressed it, no room for ghosts.

Biological students are apt to think of life as a physicochemical process of protoplasmic structure and cell organisation, with consciousness as an epiphenomenon. They watch the lowly stages of animal organisms, and hope to imitate their behaviour by judicious treatment of inorganic materials. By all means let them try; the effort is entirely legitimate, and not unhopeful. That which has come into being in the past may come into being under observation in the present, and the intelligence and co-operation of man may help. Why not? The material vehicle would thus have been provided for some incipient phase of life. But would that exhaust the treatment of the nature of life and mind and will, and reduce them to simple atomic mechanism and dynamics? Not a whit. The real nature of these things would remain an unanswered question.

During the past century progress has lain chiefly in the domain of the mechanical and material. The progress has been admirable, and has led to natural rejoicing and legitimate pride. It has also led to a supposition that all possible scientific advance lies in this same direction, or even that all the great fundamental discoveries have now been made! Discovery proceeds by stages, and enthusiasm at the acquisition of a step or a landing-place obscures for a time our perception of the flight of stairs immediately ahead; but it is rational to take a more comprehensive view.

Part of our experience is the connection of spirit with

matter. We are conscious of our own identity, our own mind and purpose and will: we are also conscious of the matter in which it is at present incarnate and manifested. Let us use these experiences and learn from them. Incarnation is a fact; we are not matter, yet we utilise it. Through the mechanism of the brain we can influence the material world; we are in it, but not of it; we transcend it by our consciousness. The body is our machine, our instrument, our vehicle of manifestation; and through it we can achieve results in the material sphere. Why seek to deny either the spiritual or the material? Both are real, both are true. In some higher mind, perhaps, they may be unified: meanwhile we do not possess this higher mind. Scientific progress is made by accepting realities and learning from them; the rest is speculation. It is not likely that we are the only intelligent beings in the universe. There may be many higher grades, up to the Divine, just as there are lower grades down to the amœba. Nor need all these grades of intelligence be clothed in matter or inhabit the surface of a planet. That is the kind of existence with which we are now familiar, truly, and anything beyond that is for the most part supersensuous; but our senses are confessedly limited, and if there is any truth in the doctrine of human immortality the existence of myriads of departed individuals must be assumed, on what has been called "the other side."

But how are we to get evidence in favour of such an apparently gratuitous hypothesis? Well, speaking for myself and with full and cautious responsibility, I have to state that as an outcome of my investigation into psychical matters I have at length and quite gradually become convinced, after more than twenty years of study, not only that persistent individual existence is a fact, but that occasional communication across the chasm—with difficulty and under definite conditions—is possible.

This is not a subject on which one comes lightly and easily to a conclusion, nor can the evidence be explained except to those who will give to it time and careful study; but clearly the conclusion is either folly and self-deception, or it is a truth of the utmost importance to humanity—and of importance to us in connection with our present subject. For it is a conclusion which cannot stand alone. Mistaken or true, it affords a foothold for a whole range of other thoughts, other conclusions, other ideas: false and misleading if the foothold is insecure, worthy of attention if the foothold is sound. Let posterity judge.

Meanwhile it is a subject that attracts cranks and charlatans. Gratuitous opinions are freely expressed on both sides. I call upon the educated of the younger generation to refrain from accepting assertions without severe scrutiny, and, above all, to keep an open mind.

If departed human beings can communicate with us, can advise us and help us, can have any influence on our actions,—then clearly the doors are open to a wealth of spiritual control beyond what we have yet imagined.

The region of the miraculous, it is called, and the bare possibility of its existence has been hastily and illegitimately denied. But so long as we do not imagine it to be a region denuded of a law and order of its own, akin to the law and order of the psychological realm, our denial has no foundation. The existence of such a region may be established by experience; its non-existence cannot be established, for non-experience of it might merely mean that owing to deficiencies of our sense organs it was beyond our ken. In judging of what are called miracles we must be guided by historical evidence and literary criticism. We need not urge a priori objections to them on scientific grounds. They need be no more impossible, no more lawless, than the interference of a human being would seem to a colony of ants or bees.

The Christian idea of God certainly has involved, and presumably always will involve, an element of the miraculous,—a flooding of human life with influences which lie outside it, a controlling of human destiny by higher and beneficent

agencies. By evil agencies too—yes, the influences are not all one-sided; but the Christian faith is that the good are the stronger. Experience has shown many a saint, however tormented by evil, that appeal to the powers of good can result in ultimate victory. Let us not reject experience on the ground of dogmatic assertion and baseless speculation.

Historical records tell us of a Divine Incarnation. We may consider it freely on historical grounds. We are not debarred from contemplating such a thing by anything that science has to say to the contrary. Science does not speak directly on the subject. If the historical evidence is good we may credit it, just as we may credit the hypothesis of survival if the present-day evidence is good. It sounds too simple and popular an explanation-too much like the kind of ideas suited to the unsophisticated man and the infancy of the race. True; but has it not happened often in the history of science that reality has been found simpler than our attempted conception of it? Electricity long ago was often treated as a fluid; and a little time ago it was customary to jeer at the expression-legitimate in the mouth of Franklin, for instance, but now outgrown, as it appeared. And yet what else is the crowd of mobile electrons postulated by the very latest theory in a metal? Surely it is in some sense a fluid, though not a material one? The guess was not so far wrong after all. Meanwhile we learned to treat it by mathematical devices, vector potential, and other recondite methods. With great veneration I speak of the mathematical physicists of the past century. They have been almost superhuman in power, and have attained extraordinary results, but in time the progress of discovery will enable mankind to apprehend all these things more simply. Progress lies in simple investigation as well as in speculation and thought up to the limits of human power; and when things are really understood they are perceived to be fairly simple after all.

So it seems likely to be with a future state, or our own permanent existence; it has been thought of and spoken of as if it were altogether transcendental—something beyond space and time (as it may be), something outside and beyond all conception. But it is not necessarily so at all; it is a question of fact; it is open to investigation. I find part of it turning out quite reasonably simple; not easy to grasp or express. for lack of experience and language—that is true,—but not by any means conveying a feeling of immediate vast difference and change. Something much more like terrestrial existence, at least on one aspect of it, than we had imagined. Not as a rule associated with matter; no, but perhaps associated with ether—an ethereal body instead of a material one; certainly a body, or mode of manifestation, of some kind. It appears to be a state which leaves personality and character and intelligence much where it was. No sudden jump into something supernal, but steady and continued progress; with many activities and interests beyond our present ken, but with a surviving terrestrial aspect, occasionally accessible, and showing interest in the doings of those on earth, together with great desire to help and to encourage all efforts for the welfare of the race. We need not search after something so far removed from humanity as to be unintelligible.

So likewise with the idea of God.

No matter how complex and transcendentally vast the Reality must be, the Christian conception of God is humanly simple. It appeals to the man in the street; it appeals to the unlettered and ignorant; it appeals to "babes."

That is the way with the greatest things. The sun is the centre of the solar system, a glorious object full of mystery and unknown forces, but the sunshine is a friendly and homely thing, which shines in at a cottage window, touches common objects with radiance, and conduces to comfort—yes, conduces to the comfort of a cat.

The sunshine is not the sun, but it is the human and terrestrial aspect of the sun; it is that which matters in daily life. It is independent of study and discovery; it is given us by direct experience, and for ordinary life it suffices.

Thus would I represent the Christian conception of God. Christ is the human and practical and workaday aspect. Christ is the sunshine—that fraction of transcendental Cosmic Deity which suffices for the earth. Jesus of Nazareth is plainly a terrestrial heritage. His advent is the glory, his reception the shame, of the human race.

Once more, then. Although there may be undue simplification of the complex, there is also an undue complication of the simple; it is easy to invent unnecessary problems, to manufacture gratuitous difficulties, to lose our way in a humanly constructed and quite undivine fog. But the way is really simple, and when the fog lifts and the sunshine appears, all becomes clear and we proceed without effort on our way: the wayfaring man, though a fool, need not err therein. The way, the truth, and the life are all one. Reality is always simple; it is concrete and real and expressible. Our customary view of the commonest objects is not indeed the last word, nay, rather, it is the first word, as to their nature; but it is a true word as far as it goes. Analysing a liquid into a congeries of discrete atoms does not destroy or weaken or interfere with its property or fluidity. Analysing an atom into electrons does not destroy the atom. Reducing matter to electricity, or to any other ethereal substratum, does not alter the known and familiarly utilised properties of a bit of wood or iron or glass, in the least; no, nor of a bit of bone or feather or flesh. Study may superadd properties imperceptible to the plain man, but the plain man's concrete and simple view serves for ordinary purposes of daily life.

And God's view, strange to say, must be more akin to that of the plain man than to that of the philosopher or statistician. That is how it comes that children are near the kingdom of heaven. It is not likely that God really makes abstractions and "geometrises." All those higher and elaborate modes of expression are human counters; and the difficulties of dealing with them are human too. Only in early stages do things

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require superhuman power for their apprehension; they are easy to grasp when they are really understood. They come out then into daily life; they are not then matters of intellectual strain; they can appeal to our sense of beauty; they can affect us with emotion and love and appreciation and joy; they can enter into poetry and music, and constitute the subject-matter of art of all kinds. The range of art and of enjoyment must increase infinitely with perfect knowledge. This is the atmosphere of God: "Where dwells enjoyment, there is he." We are struggling upwards into that atmosphere slowly and laboriously. The struggle is human, and for us quite necessary, but the mountain top is serene and pure and lovely, and its beauty is in nowise enhanced by the efforts of the exhausted climber, as he slowly wins his way thither.

Yet the effort itself is of value. The climber, too, is part of the scheme, and his upward trend may be growth and gain to the whole. Do not let us think that the universe is stagnant and fixed and settled and dull, and that all its appearance of "going on" is illusion and deception. I would even venture to urge that, since the granting of free-will, there must be, in some sense or other, a real element of contingency,—that there is no dulness about it, but a constant and aspiring effort.

Trust our experience in this also. The universe is a flux, it is a becoming, it is a progress. Evolution is a reality. True and not imaginary progress is possible. Effort is not a sham. Existence is a true adventure. There is a real risk.

There was a real risk about creation—directly it went beyond the inert and mechanical. The granting of choice and free-will involved a risk. Thenceforward things could go wrong. They might be kept right by main force, but that would not be playing the game, that would not be loyalty to the conditions.

As William James says: A football team desire to get a ball to a certain spot, but that is not all they desire; they wish to do it under certain conditions and overcome inherent difficulties—else might they get up in the night and put it there.

So also we may say, Good is the end and aim of the Divine Being; but not without conditions. Not by compulsion. Perfection as of machinery would be too dull and low an achievement—something much higher is sought. The creation of free creatures who, in so far as they go right, do so because they will, not because they must—that was the Divine problem, and it is the highest of which we have any conception.

Yes, there was a real risk in making a human race on this planet. Ultimate good was not guaranteed. Some parts of the universe must be far better than this, but some may be worse. Some planets may comparatively fail. The power of evil may here and there get the upper hand.

This planet is surely not going to fail. Its destinies have been more and more entrusted to us. For millions of years it laboured, and now it has produced a human race—a latecomer to the planet, only recently arrived, only partly civilised as yet. But already it has produced Plato and Newton and Shakespeare; yes, and it has been the dwelling-place of Christ. Surely it is going to succeed, and in good time to be the theatre of such a magnificent development of human energy and power and joy as to compensate, and more than compensate, for all the pain and suffering, all the blood and tears, which have gone to prepare the way.

The struggle is a real one. The effort is not confined to humanity alone: according to the Christian conception God has shared in it. God so loved the world that he gave—we know the text. The earth's case was not hopeless; the world was bad, but it could be redeemed; and the redemption was worth the painful effort which then was undergone, and which the disciples of the Cross have since in their measure shared. Ay, that is the Christian conception; not of a God apart from his creatures, looking on, taking no personal interest in their behaviour, sitting aloof only to judge them; but one who anxiously takes measures for their betterment, takes trouble, takes pains—a pregnant phrase, takes pains,—one who suffers when they go wrong, one who feels painfully the

miseries and wrongdoings and sins and cruelties of the creatures whom he has endowed with free-will; one who actively enters into the storm and the conflict; one who actually took flesh and dwelt among us, to save us from the slough into which we might have fallen, to show us what the beauty and dignity of man might be.

Well, it is a great idea, a great and simple idea, so simple as to be incredible to some minds. It has been hidden from many of the wise and prudent; it has been revealed to babes.

To sum up: Let us not be discouraged by simplicity. Real things are simple. Human conceptions are not altogether misleading. Our view of the universe is a partial one but is not an untrue one. Our knowledge of the conditions of existence is not altogether false—only inadequate. The Christian idea of God is a genuine representation of reality.

Nor let us imagine that existence hereafter, removed from these atoms of matter which now both confuse and manifest it, will be something so wholly remote and different as to be unimaginable; but let us learn by the testimony of experience—either our own or that of others—that those who have been, still are; that they care for us and help us; that they, too, are progressing and learning and working and hoping; that there are grades of existence, stretching upward and upward to all eternity; and that God himself, through his agents and messengers, is continually striving and working and planning, so as to bring this creation of his through its preparatory labour and pain, and lead it on to an existence higher and better than anything we have ever known.

OLIVER LODGE.

THE KINGDOM OF THE LITTLE CHILD.

J. W. MARRIOTT.

The period of childhood is full of strange paradoxes: for in it are united all the greatest and smallest things in life. It is a time of laughable foolishness and amazing wisdom, of ridiculous fears and incomparable heroism. Never can hopes grow with such startling rapidity, reaching to heaven in a single night like the beans of the fairy story; and never is despair so black and bottomless as in childhood. This epoch of puny weakness and physical littleness is the age of perpetual miracle. Never was the world so vast, so wonderful, so audaciously impossible and so splendidly true. There were giants in those days.

In reading the "Lives" of the great, one cannot help noticing how they delight to record the trivialities of childhood, and with what faithful care they describe their earliest years, adding incident after incident, as if reluctant to abandon so happy a theme. Witness, for instance, Ruskin's Præterita, Rousseau's Confessions, or even Scott's short autobiography, and note with what affection these men regard the "childish things." St Paul boasted that his manhood had broken away from the language, the thoughts, the emotions of childhood, and he registered this declaration as an illustration of progress. But his Master, with deeper insight, realised the unutterable preciousness of the childish universe and insisted that the child's attitude is the sole condition of seeing the Kingdom.

But we wish to look at this subject from an entirely new

point of view in the present essay. It is customary to study childhood for the first traces of the great man. We wish to reverse this, and to study the great man for traces of the child: not contemplating the poems of the infant Goethe or Coleridge, with their precocity and genius, but the mature poets with their childlike inspiration and simplicity. For great men are children all their lives. They cannot grow up; they cannot age; they share with the gods an immortal and triumphant youthfulness. We would repeat that great men are children in the deepest and most literal sense, and the qualities which make Plato immortal are just those which most of us lose in the stupid and exasperating process of growing-up.

Genius has been defined as the power to become a child at will, and certainly many of our greatest literary men retained all the essential characteristics of childhood throughout their lives. Dickens, for example, saw everything from a child's point of view. Perhaps that is the reason he can move the heart so easily to laughter and tears. He walked along streets filled with Swivellers, Crunchers, Micawbers, Pecksniffs, Crummles, Bumbles-not men merely, but deathless characters who live and move eternally in a wild mythological world. In reading of Bumble, or Bill Sikes, or Murdstone, one is confronted with the frightful personages we have never known since we were seven; but we realised their existence before that age. To Dickens, everything was alive. The house was "squeezed" between two others; or it had run up a court and got lost; or the road fled down a hill and half way up the other side, where it stopped tired out. All this is, in the highest sense, childlike; and Dickens confessed it was good to be a child, ". . . . and never better than at Christmas." Throughout his life he played charades and blindman's buff with childlike clamour and enthusiasm.

Was not Shelley a child in his divine carelessness, his swift obedience to instinct, his contempt for conventionality, his playfulness and Homeric laughter? Did not Kingsley boast that he was always a child? With childlike abandonment he exerted all his energies in whatever he was doing, whether preaching, fishing, writing, agitating, collecting plants, seeking fossils, or romping with his children under the fir-trees at Eversley. And what incident is more delightful than the story of how once, after dining with tedious and solemn persons, he threw off his clerical coat and raced a doctor in climbing a tree! Rossetti, as an artist, was childlike. People marvel at this "prodigy" enjoying Hamlet at the age of five, but Rossetti was never much older. He was a child—perhaps a wayward and spoilt child—until the genius failed him. Emerson's essays leap from topic to topic with a childish, almost simian vivacity; and Voltaire is versatile and candid as "l'enfant terrible." Indeed, this is almost a description of his genius.

But R. L. Stevenson is the supreme instance of one who was a schoolboy all his life-a schoolboy in his sublime inconsequence, his spontaneity, his love of the dramatic and theatrical, his appetite for bloodthirsty adventure, his Bohemian carelessness and devil-may-care recklessness; above all, in his exhilarating and contagious enthusiasm. We like to think of him at the age of thirty playing with tin soldiers, and at thirty-six composing music for the tinwhistle. "There's no sense in the grown-up business," he said. And do we not all feel it to be true? The feverish haste, the planned conformity, the deliberate suppression of instinct by a systematically programmed existence-all these in the barrenness and weariness take possession of us as we become adult. Conformity strangles the soul, and whatever qualities as children we shared with the greatest of mortals are lost in growing-up. "When I was a child I spake as a child, I felt as a child, I thought as a child: but when I became a man (alas!) I put away childish things."

Most people know how dream after dream is shattered as we grow up. Perhaps the first serious perception of it comes when we are told there is no Father Christmas. We remember just how we felt after that discovery. Things grew blank and meaningless. There was a chilling sense of poverty, or, worse still, a catastrophic sense of bankruptcy. Heaven was empty, the sky shrank; the beneficent Father Christmas faded out of sight. It was a child's first encounter with the spirit of Atheism. The world was a meaner place than we had thought; and in the first disillusionment we are putting away childish things.

Then the process of growing-up continues apace, and a melancholy business it is! Fairies, elves, sprites, gnomes, heroes, dragons,—all the world of Magic disappears into the blank inanity. Witches straddle their brooms and sail screaming out of sight for ever. The "frightful fiend" terrifies us no more. All the host of supernatural beings vanish into grey twilight. It seems a process of decolorising, of fading into the commonplace. When we were children all men were giants, but as we grew taller the giants dwarfed into ordinariness, and ogres' palaces shrank into rented mansions. It is a disheartening experience which pauperises everything else. Men of practicality and common-sense laugh indulgently at youthful dreams and the "rosy light" of boyhood; but is an inestimable spiritual loss to blot out one entire world, and to bemean and sterilise another?

But we will venture to assert quite confidently, mad though it may seem, that the business man is wrong and the child is right after all: hence the fact that great men remain children. To grow up is not to be disillusioned; it is to be deceived. The change is in the person. Familiarity begins to blind him to the nature of things: he is growing accustomed to miracles; he is losing the divine gift of wonder; he deceives himself and the truth is not in him.

For what, after all, are the qualities of the child? We have already casually mentioned several—the enthusiasm, earnestness, exuberance, inconsequence, originality, terrible candour, and delightful unexpectedness (the "subliminal uprush" of F. W. Myers)—all of which distinguish the most notable geniuses of the past.

"What is a hill, father?" asks a boy. "A hill, my child,

country." "Oh!" said the boy, "I thought it was a field with its back up!" And is not the boy more accurate? The father's answer was correct, faultless, null; but the boy's definition threw out a clear image of the subject and conveyed an impression of creative energy. Similarly a little girl explained the idea of mineral waters to a companion: "It tastes like—when your foot's asleep!" she said, and we contend that the description is more effective than the scientist's orthodox exposition. There are thousands of anecdotes illustrating this genius which is found alike in children and great men. They confound our schemes of ethics; they annihilate our philosophy. What is a theologian who preaches Divine Omnipotence to say to the youngster of five who asks, "Could God tie a knot which He couldn't untie?"

But we will proceed to mention three or four qualities which are essential constituents of the child-nature, and which are lost in the dismal self-deceptions of "practical commonsense." We contend throughout that the grown-up is not only impoverished, he is disastrously deceived.

The sense of fear is very intense in childhood, and whatever else may be said, it certainly made life tremendous. Every dark room contained spirits bigger and blacker than those of any goblin tale. A lonely child dreams of more hells than Swedenborg and more hideous than the Infernos of Virgil and Dante. But wholesome fears perish as we grow older, and half the adventures of life disappear with them. Children tremble because the air is filled with battalions of devils, and it is a healthy dread. But the modern adult fears because the air is filled with germs! We have invented policemen to prevent adventures. We have lighted the streets to prevent more adventures. We have vaguely renounced all theological doctrines which suggest danger. Then we complain that the romantic thrill has gone out of life! Mr H. G. Wells, in The Time Machine, prophesies that all sense of fear will ultimately evaporate from the human race. We fervently

hope this is untrue. There is a certain ecstasy in fear, a delirious excitement in danger; and to a child, life is a perpetual adventure. In those days when great fears pounced upon us from dark corners, when certain words of horror almost drank up our senses, then, indeed, life was tremendous and heroism sprang up to conquer fears. But now we listen daily to complaints about the tastelessness and insipidity of existence. There is no danger to-day-except from microbes, and adventure fades with loss of fear. Modern life is dreary and unromantic, because we have all grown up. But who, after all, is more likely to appreciate the thrill of adventure? the adult preaching bacteriological foes and vegetarianism the only way of salvation; or the schoolboy playing Robinson Crusoe on a desert island in his father's garden, or sitting on his toy-box with hair on end surrounded by imaginary pirates under the "Jolly Roger" and singing lustily:

> "Fifteen men on the dead man's chest, Yo! ho! ho! and a bottle of rum!"

In the days when men were children and could love a thing passionately enough to fight for it, there was no lack of danger, and there was no day uninteresting. But we have put away childish things.

Hero-worship also declines with advancing years, and the mature person is wont to smile indulgently at a youth's love of the heroic.

When a child is taught to disbelieve in fairy stories and giant-slaying he does not merely lose faith in giants; he loses faith in the hero who slew them. Children kill giants daily, but the sagacious adult kills Jack! Heroism fades as commonsense grows upon us. The knights who destroyed dragons are exiled from our dreams. King Arthur has sailed beyond our ken. The idyllic days are childish fancies, and nothing is more devastating to the heart than the discovery that human heroes are false or failing. Romance fades with the hero; life ceases to be an Iliad, a glorious crusade. Growing-up is a transition from epic poetry to the most prosaic prose.

But the child is not altogether wrong. Our faith in the heroic is never quite extinguished. In every heart there slumbers a dream of an epic hour. A child and a poet both know that behind the grocer's apron and the farmer's smock there beats a heart capable of a splendid martyrdom. In every navvy is a spark of the divine fire; in every casual labourer there is something unutterably sacred. This is half the meaning of democracy—that the hero is disguised and walks unknown in every street. All the world's genius in art is an impotent endeavour to interpret and express the inspired dreams of Mr Smith, the soul-stirring emotions of Mr Brown, the mystic exaltation of Mr Green, and the mingled comedy and tragedy which make Mr Robinson!

Every man is a Romeo at some time in his life, and so long as human love survives the meanest heart is capable of the highest heroism. The Christian religion teaches persistently the supreme value of the ordinary man. We saw a dull, cloddish-looking farm labourer, apparently incapable of high thought or deep feeling. We saw a blue flash in his eyes and knew he was in contact with the world's great dynamo: he was in love. Like electric wires he looked dull and harmless, but electric wires carry lightning and death. No man in his soul is commonplace, though he may disguise it from his fellows. The young child knows this instinctively and worships heroism. To destroy a child's faith in the hero is not mere iconoclasm; it is the utterance of a lie that paralyses and kills.

The joy of life is known to children best—a leaping and exultant delight in the mere fact of being alive. We find this same spirit in the works of Browning and Walt Whitman, in all the optimists from Isaiah to Shelley. Children dance with bounding joy, and one is reminded of the primeval revelry when the morning stars sang together and the sons of God shouted for joy. Children romp with inexhaustible energy, for the sheer joy of consciousness. They like things repeated endlessly. "Do it again; do it again," they cry. But

the grown-up is bored after the first time. Mr Chesterton somewhere suggests that in this blazing universe, with its clouds and flames, the great Creator watches the panorama of a day or the pageant of the seasons, and shouts "Do it again" to the rolling earth and reeling stars. God is eternally young, and hence loves repetitions untiringly. "There is a theatrical encore every time a bird lays an egg." And how one despises those empty-headed, empty-hearted snobs who gape in weariness at the monotony of the skies, who endure the earth and tolerate the stars, whose motto is nil admirari, whose brows are branded with the curse of ennui. They have lost the childlike and godlike sense of elemental joy.

The sky is silent, not in blank featurelessness, not in the silence where an "Infinite Invalid" watches over a dying world; not even in speechless wrath or in unspeakable love. It is more than this. The silence of the cosmos is intense and dramatic. It is "laughter too loud to be heard." This is guessed and felt by every child who kicks up his heels and dances for the joy of being alive.

The bewilderment at the presence of evil which all children display is saner than the adult's frame of mind in such moments. The grown-up person tries to explain evil. He says it is an inevitable condition of limited being; it is necessary to reveal the existence of good; it is a disciplinary experience sent upon us to quicken our best faculties; it is a test of character, a day of personal judgment. He quotes Leibniz, Pope, Tennyson, St Paul, St Thomas à Kempis. He sometimes smashes up his own pet theories and seeks refuge in the agnostic epicureanism of Omar Khayyám. He will alter the scheme of the universe to harmonise with his changing moods.

But the child does not try to explain. He is frankly perplexed. He has encountered a mystery, a perplexity, an anomaly. The study of a child's face on his first encounter with evil is a lesson difficult to forget. And yet, after all our controversy, is not the child the wisest among us? Many

things have been hidden from the wise and prudent and revealed unto babes; and among those divine revelations to childhood surely this is not the least—to forgo arguments in the presence of sorrow and irrevocable wrong. Here, again, the great man is instinctively at one with the child.

And lastly, we will mention the startling strangeness of the world as a perception of childhood to which adults have blinded their vision. People are accustomed to praise the perfection and loveliness of the earth, the recurrent natural laws, or the beauty of material things. But the one most prominent quality of everything is its staggering queerness. This sense of amazement is lost as we grow up, and middleage complains that life is stale and profitless. But a child and a poet are in a state of perpetual astonishment. Wonder is the basis of worship, and the recognition that our world is strange is the last high summit of philosophy. It is pathetic to hear men complain that life is dull when they are clinging to a flying planet by the soles of their feet, and travelling eighteen miles a second. The obvious facts are wilder than any fiction. For instance, poets use their imaginations to describe stars. They are compared to flowers in the fields of heaven, jewels scattered by angels, or even gods and goddesses. Milton refers to the lamps with their everlasting oil. Tennyson describes the Pleiades as fire-flies tangled in a web of light. Hugo describes Jupiter as a luminous wound. Meredith suggests that stars are the coffin nails of the universe, and Longfellow in a terrible passage describes the famine when the very air was hungry and the stars glared like eyes of famished wolves. But when poetic fancy has strained its similes to the uttermost, ask the first man you meet what stars really are. He tells you something which shrivels poetic imagery into insignificance. He tells you something which stuns and bewilders. He tells you that the stars are worlds, and suns bigger and fiercer than our own! It is the thing which everybody knows that is so startling and extravagant. While we bewail the drudgery of a treadmill existence in a

disillusioned world, the very clouds defy us with monstrous shapes and violent colours; and the flowers beneath our feet rebuke us silently. We have made the streets monotonous and sordid, but the sky above is stained with crimson and gold. There is a gorgeous picture in a December sunset. There is a romance in blue and saffron over the grimiest town in Lancashire. The potteries are gilded with refined gold, and strange sky-seas of vivid green and peacock blue are the background of many a dingy factory. Men have erected huge and ugly buildings; but this must not lead us to think God has made a huge and ugly universe. Man has made the one dark blot on a world of voluptuous colouring. In fairy tales there was nothing more glorious than a crimson rose with its magic of absorbed fire. In dreams there is nothing more elfish than the world in which we live. It is we who are in Wonderland, and we who are on the wrong side of the looking-glass. It is we who live among miraclesand the grown-up is rather tired of them. Nevertheless if a rational philosopher wishes to abolish the incredible world he must begin by removing the earth.

To him who has eyes to see, life is full of mingled splendour and gargoyle. There is absolutely no spot bereft of significance, no circumstance devoid of interest. The only desert and wasted place is in the brain of an unfortunate Byron or Schopenhauer who has put away childish wonders. When Wordsworth wrote about "the light of common day" he allowed himself to drivel like a blinded adult: for a poet such a phrase is blasphemy. Every dawn is as wonderful as a resurrection; every sunset is as portentous as the *Dies Iræ*. The thought of one's own personality is as overmasteringly queer as the thought of God Almighty. The Incarnation is as incredible as the birth of a babe.

One might continue long in this vein, but to one who has lost this sense of wonder the words will be meaningless enough. A child always perceives the strangeness of everything, and wanders daily in elfland. A man does not appreciate the

greenness of English grass till he has been to a continent where everything is brown. The visitors to our country cannot refrain from exclaiming at this primary quality of which the residents are quite oblivious. We cannot observe the familiar; we cannot see our own homes till after a long absence; we cannot perceive the obvious queerness of the earth when we are used to it. Children are visitors who see things as they are. Have we not all seen a baby stare at a horse? And could we see it as it really is-a tamed dragon on four limbs, bestridden by another biforked creature in clothes-should we not stare in blank bewilderment? Surely, too, half our animals were made for a joke-the kangaroo, elephant, stork, giraffe. All are wild in outline, pantomimic in motion.

But the extraordinary things are not necessarily the exceptional. The most curious things are not in museums. It is the accustomed thing which is prodigious—the changing moon and changeless sun, the cosmic "pots and pans," so to speak. Could we but get a childish glimpse of things, and see them as they are, we should be bewildered at the sight of a tree with its one leg and its thousand tormented arms. Let anyone stare at an oak for ten minutes, and it will become unbearably grotesque; he will begin to understand why primitive races worshipped them, and he will understand with a lucidity that all the explanations of Dr Frazer and his folklore students seem to lack. What elemental passion would be kindled if we saw the weird stuff called "fire" for the first time? Max Beerbohm wrote an arresting essay on Fire; for he succeeded in revealing again to blinded mortals its weird nature and startling primary qualities. Water is miraculous and under a wizard's spell. Everything is bewitched. Sometimes in moments of bewilderment we discover afresh how inexplicably strange is every object under the sun, and the floor of the mind begins to give way. To a visitor from some remote planet all the common actions of life would be outrageously comic-walking, talking, eating, laughing, weeping,

breathing, sleeping. From birth to death life is a rollicking extravaganza, an hilarious comedy to those who have eyes to see. Is walking, for instance, a commonplace movement? Imagine a machine—some wild outlandish motor—which progresses as we do, on two mechanical legs. The thing is ludicrous. But we live in wonderland with eyes unopened. We dwell in a cosmos of flame and fantasm, of elements blazing and bizarre. To perceive this fundamental fact is pure sanity, such as a child's or a poet's. To say that life is dull is dreary madness. We are insisting that life is crammed with interest, and children know it. To grow up is to be miserably and tragically deceived.

Man has eclipsed his world, but he has not hidden realities from the eternal childhood. The streets are filled with fair forms a thousand times more wonderful than any statuary. Jupiter, Mercury, Minerva, Atalanta are disguised in the ugliness of clothing. The foot is beautiful, but the boot is ugly. "The body is more than raiment." This is a parable of our age; we have covered the glory of man with rags of routine and bags of nonentity. Man is

"The glory, jest, and riddle of the earth,"

and to realise this is poetry, philosophy, sanity. Wilder than any monster, more cruel than any ogre, at once devil and god, is the first and last man we see. In everyone is hidden the whole of Humanity, mixed like the hell-broth of Macbeth's witches. Every man is a multitude whom no man can number. In Shakespeare, for instance, are buried all the speculativeness of Hamlet, the passion of Romeo, the fortitude of Prospero, the pride of Coriolanus, the wit of Touchstone, the misanthropy of Timon, the braggadocio of Falstaff. In Dickens' heart are all his heroes and all his villains in continual uproar. In every man we meet is something fiercer than the sun, fairer than the moon, more terrible than an army with banners. In every navvy and duke, in every king and candlestick-maker, is something which strikes the roof of heaven and the lowest dungeon of hell. Men are wonderful

beyond all speech—at once the best and worst of created beings; and a child shows this by his instinctive awe of a man. But an employer does not know this. A man is merely a unit in the industrial system, a cog of a wheel in the commercial machine. He calls him a "hand," and it is only the hand he cares about. But after all, who is right—literally and sanely right? In the hour of revolution or in the day of judgment the employer's deception would be written in letters of fire and blood.

Are we not impoverished by losing these childish qualities—the fears which make life tremendous, the heroism which makes each day an epic poem, the joy of which is richer than wealth, the wonder which is the priceless heritage of youth, dark wines from the vintage of God? The grown-up, who has lost these things, suffers the worst kind of poverty. The whole catastrophe of this barren age is that we have grown up; we have lost faith and vision; we have lost the priceless things which are unseen and eternal. Scrooge grew up and his heart became old with avarice; but after his night with the spirits he declared that he felt like a schoolboy. He became as a little child and entered the Kingdom of Heaven.

We are compelled to leave the subject but half said. There are other qualities shared only by great men and children, which would repay considerate thought. When we abandoned childish things did we not deceive ourselves—those mysteries which made us divinely happy, the fun of everything which made sight a luxurious fairy-revel, when every whisper was a dramatic secret, and every shout a call to arms and victory? Did we not put away the sublimest qualities with our playthings? Can we watch a flower turn before our eyes into a pumpkin and then say it is monstrous for a pumpkin to change into a coach? It is our world which is full of miracle and monstrosity, and at one time we knew it. The man who is not amazed by simply walking down the lane knows nothing at all of greatness. The man who is bored by the emptiness of existence

has lost the incalculable virtues of the child. But the great man never loses them. He is always a child. Whom the gods love die young—because they can never grow old. Stevenson died young at forty-four, but he would have been young at eighty-four. This is three-fourths of the meaning of Christianity. For to embrace a religion is not to swallow dislocated dogmas; it is to be filled with new emotional qualities, to be quickened into new life; to be born again; to become once more a little child. In the deep night of nescience one hears again the pathetic question of Nicodemus: "How can a man be born again when he is old?"

The Founder of Christianity has placed a halo upon childhood, yet He Himself was essentially childlike. His impatient sweeping away of formulæ and rigid regulations is sufficient to show that He knew that these things stifle the soul; He knew that the impulse of the heart matters infinitely more than any ritual, however unexceptionable. Oscar Wilde has claimed Christ as the Prince of romanticists, the greatest artist of life. It is very true. For the child-spirit is the source and sustenance of everything great.

But when men's civilisation has blinded our vision, and we think upon the solar system as some tiny back street in some suburban constellation, when the rosy hues have been choked by factory smoke, when the bank blocks out the heavens and the stars, then indeed we are grown up. A child is always in touch with elementals—like an artist. A child's opinion is always a direct inspiration—like a poet's.

Childhood is the elixir of life. But the grown-up soul suggests the Sahara and death. "Except ye become as little children, ye shall all likewise perish."

J. W. MARRIOTT.

MANCHESTER.

THE MYTHICAL COLLAPSE OF HISTORICAL CHRISTIANITY.

PROFESSOR BENJAMIN W. BACON.

Readers of the Hibbert Journal have recently been informed by the Rev. K. C. Anderson, D.D., of Dundee, Scotland, of "The Collapse of Liberal Christianity." This fact, in the language of newspaper reporters, is "important if true." But let not those who were reading in a contrary sense such momentous signs of the times as the Modernist movement, extension of the voluntary principle in church support, church federation, and the new impetus in religious education, be suddenly dismayed. Dr Anderson knows a better foundation for the religion of Christ than mere records of the past can give. A second article entitled "Whitherward?—A Question for the Hibbert Criticism," by the same author, appears in the Hibbert for January 1911 (ix. 2). This second article aims, according to the editor, to show—

that the Higher Criticism has proved entirely destructive of the historic basis of the Gospels; but this result, though fatal to Liberal Christianity, only serves to free the religion of Christ for a deeper and fuller spiritual expression than it has received heretofore.

The argument is more startling than novel. Cerinthus and the Docetic gnostics of the second century distinguished similarly between the æonian Christ and the historic Jesus, regarding the latter as religiously a quantité négligeable. Mr Roberts of Bradford with his demand that we choose either "Jesus or Christ?", and Dr Anderson with his prompt re-

¹ Hibbert Journal, viii. 2 (January 1910).

sponse, "Yes, by all means, let us keep the Christ-idea, and repudiate the Jesus of history," remind us strongly of Cerinthus and the Docetists. But wild-goose chases after the genealogy of religious ideas are not at present to our mind. Yield as we must to the soft impeachment of using the methods of the higher criticism, we have not learned, with Jensen, to take flying leaps over the centuries whenever our fancy is caught by a resemblance in ideas. It is altogether possible that it has never occurred either to Mr Roberts or to Dr Anderson that they are asking the Church to expose again to the chances of war the ground so hardly won in the first centuries of its existence. Yet, consciously or unconsciously, such is the fact. The great theological battles of the first three centuries through which the Church at last determined its doctrine of the person of Christ were fought on this very ground. Its ultimate careful adjustment of the Semitic to the Arvan element of its doctrine, its Gospel of Jesus to its Gospel about Jesus, the contribution of the Galilean companions of Jesus to the contribution of Paul the Hellenistic theologian, were in substance the outcome of its refusal to be forced upon either horn of this same dilemma—the historic Jesus, or the æonian Christ. Conscious that its strength consisted not in the revamping of outworn mythologies, but in the giving substance to the instinctive aspirations of older faiths in the new message of historic fact-a "Logos made flesh" that "tabernacled among us "-primitive Christianity triumphed over mystery-cults without, and over gnostic Docetism within. "Liberal Christianity" in our own day may be forced to fight these ancient battles over again; but at least it will prove its right to be called "Christianity" by still refusing to surrender either the historic or the mystical element of its faith.1

¹ With the assertions and proposals of the modern Docetists compare the description by Bishop B. F. Westcott of the purpose of the author of First John in his Commentary on *The Epistles of St John* (ed. 3, 1892), pp. xxxiv-xxxviii, and Moffatt, *Hist. N.T.*², p. 32, note 1, on the rise of Gospel composition as a defence against Docetism.

But the immediate springs of Dr Anderson's wisdom are apparently less distant. Coincidently with the appearance of his first article in England, a remarkable public discussion was being held in Berlin, followed by others in Bremen, Marburg, and other centres, between representatives of the materialistic monism of Haeckel in alliance with representatives of the idealistic monism of E. von Hartmann on the one side, and representatives of the scholarship and devotion of the Church on the other. The principal representative of the idealistic monists was Arthur Drews, professor of philosophy in Karlsruhe technical high school, whose position we will state in the words of another:—

In closing the debate, (Drews) formulated two questions which, in his opinion, were fundamental to the whole controversy: What is the secret of Christianity's origin in the light of which it can be revitalised for modern times? and, What can Christ be to us to-day? The last question is answered simply, "As a purely historical personality, nothing"; and regarding the first, not only is the significance of myth central for an explanation of the rise of Christianity, but for its modern revitalisation as well. Not the historical Jesus, but Christ as an idea, as an idea of the divine humanity, is the ground of a new religion. "When we can and will no longer believe on accidental personalities, we can and must believe on ideas."

Here are two distinct propositions, one historical, the other philosophical, which coincide exactly with Dr Anderson's. (1) Application by the "liberals" of the methods of scientific historical criticism has reduced the historical basis of Christianity to nothing, or at least to a religiously valueless remainder. (2) The lesson of its actual origin and of true philosophy is that effective religion must be built upon the emotions and aspirations of humanity which found their first instinctive expression in mythology, and not upon history. It may be assumed that Drews and his school (if he has one) intend to leave abundant room for the psychology and philosophy of religion to reinterpret the ideas of mythology in progressively rationalised form.

¹ See the admirable summary by Professor S. J. Case of Chicago in Am. Journ. of Theol., xv. 1 (January 1911). He cites Drews' utterances from Berliner Religiongespräch, 94 f., and Christusmythe, p. xi.

The leading opponent of Drews was the distinguished New Testament scholar, Professor von Soden of Berlin, who in his reply, Hat Jesus gelebt?, expressly limits himself to the historical aspect of the question, disregarding the monistic contention that ideas rather than facts should form the basis of religion, and showing from the earliest sources, both pagan and Christian, the strength of the liberal Christian's view as to the historical origin of the faith, and the weakness of the recent attempts to account for it apart from the existence of Jesus or Paul. As regards Dr Anderson's judgment on the question which of these two groups-liberal historical critics or pantheistic monists—can more justly claim to have secured results by rigidly scientific methods, we may reasonably ask those who have not time or patience to compare, e.g., the historical criticism of W. B. Smith 2 with that of J. Weiss 3 or Ad. Jülicher,4 to read Weinel's brief exposition of what constitutes scientific method in this field, under the title Ist das 'liberale' Jesusbild widerlegt? Eine Antwort an seine 'positiven' und seine radikalen Gegner mit besonderer Rücksicht auf A. Drews' 'Die Christusmythe.' 5

Dr Anderson, as we have seen, accepts at all events the constructive theory of Drews, that the mere Christ-idea, originally a product of the eclectic mythology of the early Empire, affords the only true basis for the Christianity of the future.

¹ Berlin, 1910.

² Smith's principal contribution to the present controversy is his *Vorchristliche Jesus*, Giessen, 1906, the main reliance of Drews in the field of New Testament criticism. Contributions by the same author may be found in the *Journal of Bib. Lit.*, 1901, pp. 1–21, 129–157, and 1902, pp. 117–169; also in the Hibbert Journal, i. 2 (1903), pp. 308–334, and in *Amer. Journ. of Theol.*, 1903, pp. 452–485 and 662–688.

³ Jesus von Nazareth, Mythus oder Geschichte? Eine Auseinandersetzung mit Kalthoff, Drews, Jensen, 1910. It is needless to cite the previous works of this well-known New Testament critic.

⁴ Hat Jesus gelebt? Marburg, 1910. Professor Jülicher's scientific works in New Testament criticism are known to every New Testament scholar the world over, and need not be cited.

⁵ Tübingen, 1910.

In Europe the Drevidian mythological theology seems to have won at least one other convert besides Dr Anderson. It is Drews' enthusiastic fellow-townsman, Arthur Böhtlingk.¹ Whether Dr Paul Carus, editor of *The Monist* and its satellites in Chicago, entertains similar theological ideas, those must tell who are better acquainted than we with the thousand or more publications to which he confesses.² It is possible that America has even now a new Marcion in its midst. If so, we must be content to see history repeat itself, waiting in patience, not unrelieved by hope, for the world's ultimate choice between a religion built on comparative mythology and a religion built on historic fact.

Meantime we may turn our attention, first, to the historical propositions of belligerent Monism; for the really new element in the controversy is Drews' attempt to account for the rise of Christianity without a historical Jesus; and this attempt is not without supporters of distinction, chief among whom must be reckoned Professor P. Jensen of Marburg, the well-known Assyriologist and decipherer of cuneiform inscriptions.

In 1906 Jensen had published a gigantic volume entitled Das Gilgamesch-Epos in der Weltliteratur. Herein, as a kind of literary receiver for the Babylonian bankers of several millenniums ago, Jensen made out a bill of indebtedness, with compound interest, against the entire literature of the world in favour of the Babylonian myth of the friendship of Gilgamesch and Eabani. If judgment be confessed, New Testament literature must go into bankruptcy like the rest. An itemised bill was called for, however, and Jensen particularised in 1909 in the pamphlet entitled Moses, Jesus, Paulus: drei Varianten

¹ A pamphlet of fifteen pages, entitled Zur Aufhellung der Christusmythologie (Frankfurt, 1910), covers all our acquaintance with Böhtlingk.

² In reply to a review of one of these by the present writer pointing out a series of inaccuracies, Dr Carus presents voluminous explanations and a counter-attack, offering the columns of his own publication *The Open Court* for reply. We do not require so much space. A footnote here will suffice. We refer Dr Carus to a well-known saying of Josh. Billings: "It's better to be ignorant about a few things than to know such a terrible lot of things that ain't so."

des babylonischen Gottmenschen Gilgamesch. His distinguished colleague Jülicher having pointed out that Jensen, as a biblical critic, was as conspicuous a failure as Jensen the decipherer of cuneiform tablets had been a conspicuous success, Jensen undertook to vindicate his doubted powers in a pamphlet entitled Hat der Jesus der Evangelien wirklich gelebt? It is with this, accordingly, that we have now to deal. Jensen protests indeed, in this latest effort, against being classed with those who deny outright the existence of a historical Jesus, but still maintains that Paul's letters, as well as the Gospels, are wholly imitations of the Babylonian legend, that we know nothing, "or at least as good as nothing," about the "alleged founder of Christianity," while in our cathedrals, churches, and homes "we serve a Babylonian god."

Of this truly remarkable excursus in New Testament criticism we would gladly say more, but are limited by space considerations to two examples, selected not because of their otherwise exceptional character, but because they are made fundamental to the entire structure.

The documents strictly contemporary 2 with the beginnings of Christianity are limited by the most severely historical criticism to the greater Epistles of Paul, and the elements of Acts xvi.—xxviii. known as the "We" or Travel document, because written in the first person, and having the form of a diary kept by a companion of Paul on his later journeys. Such traces of the life and teaching of Jesus as are presupposed by these two documents are not referable to any writing that has come down to us, although judges so good as Harnack 3 and Pfleiderer 4 find evidence in 1 Cor. i. 19–21 of acquaintance with the primitive collection of the Precepts of Jesus underlying our Matthew and Luke in the parts not drawn from Mark, and designated Q by critics. The Gilgamesch theory,

¹ Frankfurt, 1910.

² On the use of this term see the note on p. 7 of Moffatt's Historical New Testament (1901²), taken from Prescott's Conquest of Peru.

³ Sprüche und Reden Jesu, Exkurs. i. p. 210, note 1.

⁴ Urchristenthum, i.², p. 435 f

of course, requires that at least the strictly contemporary documents be set aside, which Jensen accomplishes in the following manner:

Mk. xi. 13 and 22 ff.: Jesus comes to a fig-tree in the hope of finding fruit on it, and thereafter speaks words concerning the omnipotence of faith.

Mk. xii. 1 ff.: a parable of the vineyard; the parable of the rejection of some and choosing of others (according to Matt. at least, of the Jews as against the Gentiles).

Mk. xii. 13 ff.: on the payment of the tribute (κῆνσος).

Mk, xii. 18 ff.; on the law of love. Mk. xiii.: on the Day of judgment.

Mk.xiv.: Passoverand Lord's supper, with sayings on eating the bread and drinking the wine.

Rom. i. 13; viii. 39: Paul states that he has often wished to come to the Romans to obtain among them "some fruit," and speaks thereafter about justification and salvation by faith alone.

Rom. ix. 11: on the preliminary rejection of the Jews and choosing of the Gentiles.

Rom. xiii. 6 f.: on the payment of tribute (φόρος; so Lk.).

Rom. xiii. 8 ff.: on the law of love. Rom. xiii. 11 ff.: on the Day of judgment.

Rom. xiv.: on religious scruples about eating and drinking, etc.

(N.B. ver. 6 on account of the gospel account of the Lord's supper, and ver. 23 on account of 1 Cor. ii. 29 in an excursus regarding the Lord's supper.)

This table is supposed to furnish evidence of a literary relationship between Romans and Mark. Not, however, of the simple kind very generally recognised by New Testament critics, in the influence exerted by Paul, particularly in Romans, upon the Roman compiler of our second gospel.\(^1\) No, the relation is not with our Mark, but with some unknown gospel anterior to both Mark and Luke, and in character somewhere between the two. Similar alleged resemblances of 1 Thessalonians to Matthew and Luke, and of 1 Corinthians to Luke, establish, according to Jensen, a very surprising result:—not that the evangelic writings are alike dependent on more or less kindred forms of a common tradition, but that Romans is constructed upon the fragment

¹ On this point cf. section 7, entitled "The Paulinism of Mark," in the present writer's recent commentary, Beginnings of Gospel Story, Yale University Press, 1909, pp. xxvii. f.

of a lost gospel, and the other great Pauline Epistles, alleged to show similarities of structure, have a similar origin! Moreover, it being generally admitted that Mark, the oldest of our extant Gospels, cannot be earlier than 70 A.D., whereas Paul cannot have been then living, these employments (?) of evangelic material "of Lukan type" prove the Epistles to be unauthentic.¹

The greater Pauline Epistles being thus happily disposed of, what of the Travel document? Nothing is easier. The Diarist writes (Acts xxviii. 9) that after the healing of Publius, the chief (πρῶτος)² man of the island (Malta), "the rest also (καὶ οἱ λοιποί) which had diseases in the island came and were cured " (or "treated," ἐθεραπεύοντο). Manifest absurdity! Malta has an area of 250 square kilometres, and is likely to have been well populated, etc. etc. Could any eyewitness indulge in such exaggeration? But worse things are found. The Diarist pretends to have suffered his shipwreck in the "Sea of Adria" (xxvii. 27). "Ein grober Fehler," exclaims Jensen. It is at once apparent (notwithstanding the minute verifications of Smith's Voyage and Shipwreck of St Paul, and the superabundant confirmation of geographers such as Sir William Ramsay) that he is confusing Malta (Μελιτη, Μελιτηνη) with the island now known as Meleda, off the coast of Dalmatia. For is not this alone "in the sea of Adria"?—to which the answer is, Yes, if one confines his investigation to the modern atlas. But if he consults such a recognised authority as Cheyne's Encyclopædia Biblica, under the titles "Adria" and "Melita," he will discover (1) that the Diarist correctly describes his voyage in the termin-

¹ If any reader thinks it impossible that a scientist of Jensen's standing could be guilty of such a farrago of nonsense, we beg that he will verify the above condensation of Jensen's argument from pp. 9–13 of *Hat der Jesus der Evangelien wirklich gelebt*? If he thinks the selection does injustice to Jensen's logic, let him compare the argument against Galatians on p. 14, based on the allegation that the statement that the author had received his "gospel" from the risen Christ is a "gewaltige Übertreibung." Does Jensen actually take the meaning of the word to be the story of Jesus' life?

² The title has inscriptional attestation.

ology of ancient geography (Pausanias, v. 25, 3; viii. 54, 3; Procopius, Br. i. 14; Ptolemy, and Strabo), and (2) the following, concerning Jensen's argument:—

The view (first found, but without arguments, in Const. Porphyr., De Admin. Imp., 36) that the Melita of Acts is the island now called Meleda, off the Dalmatian coast, possesses now (1902) merely historical interest.

The reader's pardon must be asked for delay upon this kind of historical criticism; but it must be remembered that Jensen's is a name to conjure with—in Assyriology. One might almost call it the only name known in circles of Oriental science to which the deniers of the historicity of Jesus can appeal. Those who have made life-long application of the severest canons of historical criticism to early Christian documents are ruled out of court, on the ground that their very occupation with the New Testament proves them to be "Theologen"; and if "Theologen," then of course incapable of giving "scientific" testimony; bigots at least, if not Jesuits in disguise.

It is not credible that such "criticism" as this can pass as scientific among those whose occupation is with the mythology of ancient Babylonia. True, they have not been forced like the biblical "higher critics" to measure every assertion under perpetual scrutiny from Argus-eyed opponents, jealous to the degree almost of fanaticism of every encroachment on accepted views. Yet Jensen, among the Assyriologists must cut a very different figure from Jensen among biblical critics; for, on the material before us, there is but one verdict to be pronounced. We cannot entertain a doubt of its endorsement at the hands of any scholar who knows what historical criticism is. Jensen's New Testament criticism is elaborate bosh.

Besides their cuneiform expert, the followers of Drew have two or three other authorities to whom they appeal in calling for the appointment of a receiver to wind up the affairs of "liberal Christianity." These eminent explorers in the virgin field of Christian origins consist of the late socialistic ex-pastor Kalthoff in Bremen, a man of both heart and culture, whose sympathetic nature revolted from the narrow individualism of current evangelistic orthodoxy, and who rightly attributes a different spirit to primitive Christianity. Kalthoff, unfortunately, knew no better refuge from the conception of Christianity as an effort to save individual souls (beginning with one's own) than the antiquated ultra-scepticism of Bruno Bauer, who had maintained that Christianity arose as a purely collective movement of the masses in Rome, cir. 120 A.D., combining Jewish messianism with Stoic philosophy in the forms of mythology.1 Bauer is the real author of the doctrine that true religion cannot be conditioned upon belief in the special activity of a historical personality. But his theory of the origin of Christianity was stillborn.2 At the close of the last century efforts were made by a very small group of scholars, of whom the only important survivor is the veteran Steck in Bern, to free this theory of its most extravagant absurdities, and galvanise it into temporary activity. A trace of this ultra-criticism will long remain embedded among the works of English scholarship in the articles "Paul" (in part) and "Romans" by van Manen, a representative of this school. The two articles stand out in Cheyne's Encyclopædia Biblica as among the few evidences of generous weakness in an otherwise magnificent monument of biblical science.

We may leave to others the task of quenching the last sparks of resistance, and removing the dead from this old

¹ Kalthoff's socialistic followers such as Kautsky (*Ursprung d. Christenthums*, 1908) take a far more reasonable position. M. Maurenbrecher in particular, in his *Von Nazareth nach Golgotha* (1909), shows real historical method and sympathetic insight.

² See his Kritik der evangelischen Geschichte des Johannes (1840), in which he showed the unhistorical character of the Johannine portraits, his Kritik der evangelischen Geschichte der Synoptiker, 3 vols. (1841–42), and Kritik der Evangelien und Geschichte ihres Ursprungs (1850–51), in which he adopted the now dominant view of Weisse and Wilke regarding the dependence of Matthew and Luke on Mark for the purpose of showing the narrative fictitious, and his Kritik der paulinischen Briefe (1850), and Christus und die Cesaren. Der Ursprung des Christenthums aus dem Römischen Griechenthum (1877), in which he extended his extreme scepticism to cover even the life and letters of Paul.

battlefield. When reputable scholars such as Zahn,¹ Gloel,² Clemen,³ Knowling,⁴ and others had at last been goaded into an answer, no further room was left for the theory of a Christianity originating in Rome in the period of Trajan. But with the two more recent guides of idealistic monism in its quest of the unhistorical Jesus we must deal briefly, reserving refutation, if it shall seem necessary, for a later paragraph. These guides are William Benjamin Smith, a professor, formerly of mathematics, now of philosophy in Tulane University, Louisiana, who occupies his spare moments with "biblical criticism"; and John Mackinnon Robertson, M.P., essayist in English Literature, and advocate and historian of "freethought."

With the biblical researches of Professor Smith⁵ we have familiarised ourselves minutely, and still have confidence in Professor Smith's mathematics, remembering that even Sir Isaac Newton once wrote a Commentary on the Prophet Daniel.

The works of Robertson in this field 6 have unfortunately been overlooked in university libraries, so that we have been obliged to acquaint ourselves at second hand with his interesting theory that Jesus of the Gospels was only the perpetuation of an old Ephraimitish sun-god, Joshua. From such knowledge as we have, however, it seems safe to say that, as authorities in the history of Semitic religion, a Smith and a Robertson together will hardly equal a single Robertson-Smith.

The truth of the matter is simply that theorists such as

¹ Zts. f. k. Wiss. u. L., 1889, and Introd. to N.T., section 9.

² Jüngste Kritik d. Gal., 1890.

³ Einheitlichkeit der paul. Hauptbriefe, 1894, and Paulus, 1904.

⁴ Witness of the Epistles, 1892. For a brief statement of the present writer's personal reasons for rejecting the views of B. Bauer, Loman, Steck, and van Manen, see the Commentary on Galatians by B. W. Bacon; Macmillan, 1909.

⁵ See his three articles on Romans in Journ. of Bibl. Lit. for 1901 (part i., pp. 1-21; ii., pp. 129-157), and 1902 (part ii., pp. 117-169). Also Hibbert Journal, I. 2 (1903), pp. 308-334; and Am. Journ. of Theol., 1903, pp. 452-485 and 662-688. The general argument for his theory appeared in 1906 in German under the title Der Vorchristliche Jesus. See below.

⁶ Christianity and Mythology (1900); A Short History of Christianity (1902); and Pagan Christs, Studies in Comparative Hierology (1903).

Drews are just awakening to the great and enlightening discoveries of life-long New Testament scholars in the fields of historical and documentary criticism and comparative mythology. They naturally hasten to apply what they take to be established results in the interest of religious theories of their own. Study of Græco-Roman types of religious syncretism under the forms of religious mythology and philosophy is as old as Eusebius' Preparatio Evangelica, and may be as orthodox as Lightfoot's Seneca and St Paul, It has never been denied that Christianity, in order to express its religious ideas at all, was obliged to make use of the thoughtforms of its time. The special characteristic of "liberal Christianity" in our own age is that it has learned from Assyriologists, including Jensen, Vollers, and Winckler, as well as Zimmern 1 and Jeremias,2 from classic Hellenists like Percy Gardner,3 and from masters of comparative mythology like Frazer,4 more than was ever known before of the influences of Babylonian, Persian, and Hellenistic religious thought upon later Judaism; and even in the case of the last-named, directly upon primitive Christianity. It has not committed the historical blunder of confounding this process of absorption and assimilation so easily discoverable in both Judaism and Christianity with the mere eclecticism of the Gnostics; but it has gladly developed a Religionsgeschichtliche Schule, led by men of the type of Pfleiderer, Gunkel, Bousset, Brückner, Brückner Clemen,9 whose express object has been to determine by

² Babylonisches im neuen Testament, 1905.

4 Golden Bough, 1900, and Adonis, Attis, Osiris, 1906.

7 Religion des Judenthums, 1903.

¹ Zum Streit um "Die Christusmythe" (1910), a recall of the pan-Babylonians to sobriety, and exhibition of the Babylonian material.

³ Exploratio Evangelica, 1899, and Historic View of the N.T., 1901.

⁵ Das Christusbild des urchristlichen Glaubens in religionsgeschichtlicher Beleuchtung (1903).

⁶ Zum religionsgeschichtlichen Verständniss des neuen Testaments, 1903.

⁸ Der sterbende und auferstehende Gottheiland in den orientalischen Religionen und ihr Verhältniss zum Christenthum (1908).

⁹ Religionsgeschichtliche Erklärung des neuen Testaments (1909).

the most scientific methods the precise degree to which Oriental and Hellenistic religious thought, as embodied in contemporary mythologies and mystery-cults, has contributed to the development of our theology. It is a question of more or less, not to be decided by sweeping dilettante generalisations, but by careful, accurate research, and through the nice discriminations of the trained expert. On the one hand, it is certain that Christianity availed itself of these late Jewish and Hellenistic forms of religious thought. Peter and Paul would have had no religion to preach if they had not sought to give teleological interpretation to their experience of Jesus. Peter and those who had "companied with Jesus" could resort to nothing else than a doctrine of apotheosis to express their sense of the significance of the career they had witnessed. The transcendentalising process undergone in their time by the Jewish messianic idea under Persian and Hellenistic influence made it inevitable that their message should take the form "God hath made him both Lord and Christ." For Paul, with his Hellenistic culture and purely inward religious experience, it may have been equally inevitable that his interpretation of "the things concerning Jesus" should take the form of an incarnation doctrine. To admit this is to admit that mythology has entered into gospel story. At the beginning and end, where the effort is to deal with the question of the Whence? and the Whither? of the sublime personality described, our gospels are deeply marked by the attempt to combine the Petrine and the Pauline types of teleological speculation. The vertebral structure of the story, on the other hand, is relatively unaffected by it, save at the point where the fate of Jesus as "the Christ" is predictively anticipated (Mark viii. 27; ix. 13). To talk of the story of Jesus' career as outlined in Acts x. 37-39, and developed with more or less of legendary embellishment in Mark i. 14-xv. 39 as "mythical," is to display a fundamental ignorance of the distinction between "myth" and "legend." We cannot assume the absence of either myth

or legend from the gospels. We should be wiser not to desire it. But to deal with these factors we at least need scholars who know the difference between the two.

In the absence of a developed psychology and philosophy of religion, there is no other vehicle than mythology by which men can convey, or even frame, their religious conceptions. We cannot agree with Moffatt that:—

Certainly the primary question in regard to early Christianity is not what the early Christians believed about Jesus, but what Jesus himself believed. His faith, not faith in him, forms the spring of his religion as a historical force.¹

On the contrary, Christianity, since the time it became a religion, became of necessity and primarily a doctrine of the person of Christ. Its message was first and foremost a message as to human duty and destiny, interpreted in the light of that historical career. As Hegel has expressed it:—

The teaching of Jesus, taken by itself, belongs to the world of ordinary figurative ideas only, and has to do with the inner feeling and disposition; it is supplemented by the representation of the divine idea in his life and fate.²

If the study of comparative mythology and the history of religious ideas can show wherein the primitive forms adopted to express the significance of this career of Jesus to humanity as a whole are untrue to historical fact—if the late Jewish conception of an apotheosised Messiah and the Hellenistic conception of a Divine Saviour who Dies and Rises again were inadequate or misleading, as in some degree they inevitably must be, then welcome the searching yet sympathetic analysis which in a historical appreciation of the meaning and value of this "mythological" interpretation paves the way for a more rational view. It will be the forerunner of a more philosophic estimate of the life and death of Jesus considered in their representative significance. This, and not a mere iconoclastic crusade against an obsolete type of teleology

¹ Historical N.T., ² p. 9. For this very one-sided view of the religion of the early Christians "as a historical force" Moffatt refers to Meyer, Die moderne Forschung ü. d. Geschichte des Urc., 1898, p. 1 f.

² Philosophy of Religion, vol. iii. p. 85, Eng. trans.

is the function of "Religionsgechichte," as it is understood by those who are its serious devotees.1

On the other hand, it is just the true masters in the field of comparative mythology who are most disdainful of the present attempt to use it as a means of explaining away the central element of gospel story. Frazer's illuminating book Adonis, Attis, Osiris (1906) is one of those to which Drews resorts with especial delight for ammunition to use against "die Theologen." The following is an extract from the work which he has not seen fit to adopt:—

The historical reality both of Buddha and Christ has sometimes been doubted or denied. It would be just as reasonable to question the historical existence of Alexander the Great and Charlemagne, on account of the legends which have gathered round them. The great religious movements which have stirred humanity to its depths and altered the beliefs of nations spring ultimately from the conscious and deliberate efforts of extraordinary minds, not from the blind, unconscious co-operation of the multitude. The attempt to explain history without the influence of great men may flatter the vanity of the vulgar, but it will find no favour with the philosophic historian.²

It is just the utter absence of the historic sense which condemns such efforts as those we are now witnessing as pseudocriticism. And it is characteristic of the school of Drews that among all to whom they appeal for the settlement of a question purely and simply historical, there is not so much as one historian of even third-rate authority.

Where, then, must the appeal be made? If to a secular historian such as Mommsen, the pretension that historical criticism has tended not to clarify but to evaporate the figure of the historical Jesus will be instantly swept out of court. If it be made to scholars like Harnack, who have made it the business of their lives to differentiate legend from fact in the records of the Church, or to men like Wellhausen, whose methods of documentary analysis and historico-critical reconstruction applied to biblical material have formed the model

¹ As respects the appreciation of this by representative Liberals, see, e.g., J. Estlin Carpenter, The Development of Liberal Theology in England, 1910 (address at Berlin Congress), p. 19.

² Adonis, Attis, Osiris, p. 202, note.

for students of secular history, and who are not open to the suspicion of traditionalism or orthodox prejudice, the verdict will be still more emphatic. Clearly we must deal with the arguments themselves on which the pretension is based.

It is both inappropriate and needless that we should here deal in detail with Professor Smith's arguments for a "pre-Christian Jesus," for they have been exposed in the full measure of their absurdity by abler pens.2 Suffice it that his argument from the use of the phrase "the things concerning Jesus" (τὰ περὶ τοῦ Ἰησοῦ) in Acts xviii. 25, ignores the point of view of the narrator, who in Luke iii. 18 speaks of John the Baptist as "preaching the gospel" to the people (εὐηγγελίζετο τον λαόν). Το "Luke" this is no anachronism, for while "the disciples of John" at Ephesus and elsewhere are differentiated from Christians by lack of the Pentecostal gifts, they are not classed with the heretical sects whose origin is traced in Acts viii. 23 to Simon Magus.4 From the time when, as Paul has it, God "preached the gospel beforehand unto Abraham," the "people," to "Luke," have been under the divine instruction. lacking only "after the baptism which John preached" the announcement of the bare fact of the resurrection in Jesus and the gift of the Spirit (cf. Acts xxvi. 5-7). The question for us to consider, then, is not a question of fact, but of the conception of "Luke." His notion of the Johannine disciples of Alexandria and Ephesus, affected as it probably was by the similarity of the messianism and eschatology of the sect in his

¹ Such was the testimony given personally to the present writer by the late Professor Bourne of the chair of American History at Yale.

² See von Soden, Hat Jesus gelebt? 1910, with Jülicher's pamphlet of the same date and title. Fuller treatment is given by J. Weiss, Jesus von Nazareth, Mythus oder Geschichte, 1910; while Weinel, Ist dus 'liberale' Jesusbild widerlegt? (1910) answers Dr Anderson's "question for the higher critics" with an excellent differentiation of scientific methods and results from pseudocriticism.

³ These sectaries are referred to several times in the Gospels and are very likely to be identified with the "hemerobaptists" of the second century. See Baldensperger, *Prolog des vierten Evangeliums*, 1898.

⁴ Smith (p. 11) misunderstands the prediction: εἰς γὰρ χολὴν πικρίας καὶ σύνδεσμον ἀδικίας ὁρῶ σε ὄντα; cf. Dt. xxix, 18; Is. lviii. 6; Heb. xii. 15.

time (cir. 100 A.D.) to Christian beliefs,¹ is that they are "instructed in the way of the Lord" (Acts xviii. 25), including "the things concerning Jesus" so far as these are implied in the "baptism of repentance unto remission of sins" (Acts xviii. 25; cf. Luke iii. 3–14). But as soon as we ask the primary question what does "Luke" mean by the phrase in Acts xviii. 25, it becomes apparent that he need be thinking of nothing more than the "gospel" of the Baptist (Luke iii. 18; Acts xiii. 25), plus a report of the resurrection,² for which Apollos need not be supposed dependent on those who knew about Pentecost. The inferences of Professor Smith dissolve, then, into thin air.

If a really historical exegesis makes such short work of our critic's argument from Acts, his supplementary "evidence" from the statements of Hippolytus and Epiphanius (!) for the pre-Christian worship of Jesus are still more fatal to his own reputation for historical judgment. From Hegesippus 3 down the fathers, including Epiphanius, the notorious blunderer of the latter half of the fourth century, seek to connect the Gnostic heresies of their own time with pre-Christian sects, Jewish and Gentile. Hippolytus may well be right in tracing the Naassenes, or Ophites, of his own time (cir. 225 A.D.) to such a Jewish or semi-Jewish sect; but to adduce the use by Christian Naassenes in 200 A.D. of a hymn employing the name of Jesus as evidence of their worship of a divinity of this name in pre-Christian times, is enough of itself to make one doubt the sanity of the reasoner. The doubt is strengthened when we find him in the next breath bringing forward as equal or stronger "evidence" an exorcism "in the

¹ Cf. Mk. vi. 14; ix. 13; xv. 35; Jn. i. 8, 19-21; and see Baldensperger, op. cit.

² Cf. Acts xvii. 18, 31, with Rom. i. 4, as showing primitive ideas of the "gospel."

⁸ Eusebius, H.E., iv. xxii. 6.

⁴ Hippolytus, *Philos.*, v. 10. As Case (op. cit. p. 27) remarks: "That the main line of Judaism contained syncretistic elements is now generally recognised, but the perpetual and widespread existence of secret polytheistic cults among the Jews is not supported by any substantial evidence."

name of Jesus the god of the Hebrews" from a magic papyrus admitted to be not earlier than the fourth century A.D.!

To pursue this type of "criticism" into the realm of the external evidence for New Testament writings would be only to magnify tenfold the proof of its author's lack of sanity. Let the reader who has patience take up chapter v. of Der Vorchristliche Jesus, in which the author occupies ninety-one pages, or nearly half the book, in the attempt to prove that so far as Romans is concerned the century from 60 to 160 A.D. is "a Century of Silence"! Leaving out of account our author's ignoring of the interrelation of Romans with the other Pauline and deutero-Pauline epistles-some of which are explicitly quoted by Clement (95 A.D.), Polycarp, and Ignatius (110-117 A.D.), in addressing the churches at Corinth, Philippi, Ephesus, etc., as written by Paul to these very churches, and all of which, except the Pastoral Epistles, were constituted the canonical "Apostolos" of the Marcionite churches in 140-150 A.D.—leaving also out of account his neglect of the relation of the Pauline to the Johannine literature, his shifts to explain away the use of Romans in Hebrews, 1 Peter, James, Clement, Ignatius, Polycarp, are something which the methodical student of the patient science of literary relationship 1 must see with his own eyes to think credible.

But the question still remains, How can the resort of reputable scholars like Drews and Jensen to "criticism" and "authorities" of this type be accounted for? The answer to it will teach us more than can possibly be learned from the pseudo-criticism itself. A clue may be found in the even more unscientific procedure of the chief representative of the materialistic branch of monism, and president of the Monistenbund, the eminent zoologist Haeckel, who, for his arguments against Christian beliefs in his well-known Riddle of the

As an example of scientific method in this field we commend, against the wild extravagances of ultra-conservatism on the one side, and ultra-criticism on the other, The New Testament in the Apostolic Fathers, by a Committee of the Oxford Society of Historical Theology, Clarendon Press, 1905.

Universe, resorted not to any one of the scores of reputable scholars who would have furnished him with abundant ammunition for his purpose, but to a source so low and scurrilous as to be not only unknown to scholars, but almost untraceable. Why will a reputable scientist, wandering in fields to him unknown in search of weapons against "die Theologen," pick up the first club or clod that comes to hand, satisfied with data and arguments that he would disdain to employ in his own field? To ask the question is to answer it. The theologian is supposed to be "unscientific," because theology as a whole has so long resisted the application of scientific methods within what it counted its domain. And because this fact is notorious, the veriest rubbish, if only circulated under the name of a "scientist," is accepted by the masses as effective in this field. The remedy is not a matter of a few weeks or months. It need hardly be added that it will not be found in falling back upon the ancient strongholds of dogmatic authority, after the example so conspicuously set by the Vatican. No authority can hope to deal with the present situation save that of the expert. No satisfying answer can be given to the declaration that "the Higher Criticism has proved entirely destructive of the historical basis of the Gospels," compelling the religion of Christ to build henceforth on the "idea of the Christ" as the quintessence of comparative mythology, save the answer which the scientific biblical critic and the scientific student of Religionsgeschichte is prepared to give.

Such scholarship is far from admitting the "collapse of liberal Christianity," unless one take as representative of "liberal Christianity" the wretched travesty which Schnehen stigmatises as "Jesus-worship." If such be the definition, if the "liberal's" only real object has been to remove all superhuman traits from the object of Christian worship, leaving the worshipper prostrate before an empty shrine, or even transferring the faith and obedience due to the Father in heaven to a human being however lovable and worthy, then

¹ See W. v. Schnehen, Der moderne Jesuskultus, 1909.

"liberal Christianity" may collapse with small regret. The well-worn anecdotes about the helplessness of the "new theologian" in face of dying Magdalens or repentant prodigals, until he has returned to the formulæ of a mediæval doctrine of the Atonement, will retain all their pristine force and point. But such has not been our understanding of "liberal Christianity." We have understood the "liberal" scholar to have been as much concerned with the teleological as with the mechanical aspect of the universe; as much concerned with those primitive attempts to explain the significance of Jesus' personality and experience which find expression in the apotheosis doctrine of Peter and the incarnation doctrine of Paul, as with the restoration of a strictly historical portrait of the Galilean Teacher and Worker for the Kingdom of God. We had supposed that the liberalism of Schleiermacher, with its emphasis on present inward experience, the liberalism of Ritschl, with its emphasis upon a historic record to be critically analysed, sifted, and philosophically interpreted in the light of universal experience, and finally the liberalism of the religionsgeschichtliche Schule, with its study of "the Christ idea" as applied by men of the time under the conditions of the time to explain inward experience and outward fact, were so many factors of a catholic "liberal Christianity," which, so far from being in danger of collapse, is advancing to-day by great strides toward the place of leadership and authority in modern religious life.

If the critical historian cannot receive an unrestricted welcome to the New Testament record for fear that the figure of Jesus will be reduced to the proportions of a simple, normal man, a Galilean peasant, unique only representatively and by virtue of his historical position, and that thus somehow his personality is going to cease to be a manifestation of God in man, and lose its power of leading humanity toward the social ideal—if the student of comparative religion is to be forbidden to treat as mythological any element of the Christologies by which successive generations of believers have sought to

express their sense of the significance and value of Jesus' life, then we already have ceased to have a "liberal" Christianity, for there will not be freedom. But liberal Christianity, as we understand the term, is but beginning its career, and already rejoices as a strong man to run its course. It is absolutely fearless of the corrosion of historical criticism; for it knows that the more truly human the Jesus it reveals, the greater his value to right religious apprehension. With the great opponent of Docetism of the beginning of the second century, it interprets faith in Jesus as the trust of one that "believeth not in me, but in Him that sent me." It welcomes all sympathetic study of pre-philosophic attempts to express the eternal significance of Jesus' person and work, because conscious of its absolute freedom to employ newer and more philosophic forms in reinterpreting the unchangeable historic fact.

If, then, we of the higher critics differ toto cælo from Dr Anderson's estimate of our work of historical research in its bearing and results, this is not because unavowedly, or perhaps unconsciously, we still retain the prejudice of "orthodox" traditionalism against the recognition of legendary elements in gospel story. Why should we? Legend is to us but history in the making, the embroidered robe of traditional fact, the undisciplined first effort of the historic sense to differentiate among past characters and events the permanently significant from the commonplace. Our business is to interpret legend, not to cast it out. Neither is the difference due to any failure on our part in respect to scientific method, whether in laxity or in too drastic application of critical tests. The methods and results of "liberal" New Testament critics may fearlessly challenge comparison with the most rigorously scientific in any field of secular history. We differ from this pessimistic estimate of the result because of the faith that is in us, the belief-paradoxical as it may seem—that a truly historic view of the New Testament, as regards the vital significance of its chief events and characters,

¹ Jn. xii. 44

is more practicable now than in the Apostolic age itself. The question does not concern itself with petty details. We are concerned with the essence of Jesus' message and the permanent significance of his personality and work. Our results are open to any criticism that is scientific; but we have yet to hear of any such to dispute the great result. As Teacher and Leader of humanity toward the ideal of a brotherhood of the race under the fatherhood of God the figure of Jesus of Nazareth still dominates all the records of the past.

And if we also differ no less widely from Dr Anderson and all his predecessors of the school of Bruno Bauer, von Hartmann, and Drews in their constructive programme, this is not because we are blind bigots, incapable of understanding the true significance and value of myth. The debt, as we have shown, is all on the other side. Leaders of the religionsgeschichtliche Schule would be justified in saying of Drews' representations, in comparison with their own: What is true is not new; what is new is not true. We have no prejudice whatever against recognition of the mythological element in the New Testament. Why should we? Myth is but philosophy in the making. We cannot conceive any other vehicle of thought or speech through which the preachers of the new religion could give utterance to their undisciplined sense of the teleological significance of what they themselves had witnessed. To what else could they resort if not the transcendentalised messianism of Peter and the Hellenistic incarnation doctrine of Paul. Our difference from the monistic idealists lies not in any unwillingness to recognise the sources and character of these primitive speculations, or to reinterpret the data from the standpoint of modern psychology and philosophy of religion, but in the fact that we have some appreciation of the facts of history as well,1 and therefore recognise that neither in the Apostolic age nor to-day could

¹ Cf. J. Estlin Carpenter, "The philosophy of religion must never cut itself adrift from its historical development," op. cit., p. 19.

Christianity be successful if speculation and fact were inverted in relative importance.

Reaction from the too exclusive dependence of Paul on individual spiritual experience as the basis of religion led in the sub-apostolic age to Synoptic literature, based on the Petrine reminiscences of Jesus' life, and the Matthæan summary of his precepts. The next generation, confronted with ultra-Pauline, Gnostic, Docetism, attempted a combination of the transcendental with the historical point of view in the Gospel and Epistles attributed to John. The instinct was absolutely sound, and the process itself only parallels the progress of modern "liberal" theology in its search for objectivity from Schleiermacher through Ritschl down to Eucken and Wobbermin. The significance of myth was not central but subsidiary in the victory of Christianity over the ancient world. On this point the verdict of scientific historical criticism is decisive. Its revitalisation for modern times will not contradict the past. It will spring neither from the dogma of the traditionalists, nor from the vague eclecticism of the advocates of "the Christ-idea," but from the combined efforts of historians and philosophers, progressively redelineating the historic Jesus in the permanently significant elements of his life and work, progressively reinterpreting Christian experience in past and present as a "representation of the divine idea."

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"MAGIC"—A CONTRIBUTION TO THE STUDY OF GOETHE'S FAUST.

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THE theme of Goethe's Faust announced in the Prologue in Heaven involves the same confident optimism that breathes through all Browning's work and that takes systematic form in various philosophies. What it amounts to is that what we call "evil" is only relatively evil, being an essential incident or factor in the evolution of what we call "good." In the spiritual world all movement, that is effort, implies an obscure consciousness of a goal and a correspondingly obscure knowledge of the way. This vague sense for the path, however, not only does not exclude, but positively involves waywardness and uncertainty in the line of progress; but for all that it determines a certain resultant direction—and that the right one. Without what we call "evil" man would neither err nor strive. Plato's Socrates in the Apology compares himself to a gadfly that stings the noble but sluggish Athenian steed to activity. And though it seems a far cry from Socrates to Mephistopheles—the spirit of "negation," the spirit that always aims at destruction, but always accomplishes construction,—yet Mephistopheles is really doing against his will very much what Socrates did on purpose; and so he takes his place amongst the sons of God, and plays his part in a purpose that he cannot measure. purpose he always serves even while attempting to thwart it. Of all this he is himself half-conscious, but the limitations of his cynical mind bring their own consolations to

him. Even at the last, when he is finally defeated, he does not much mind, for to him the purposes of God are very nearly as futile when accomplished as when thwarted. In fact, the position of Mephistopheles is precisely that of a certain pessimist I had the honour of knowing. He maintained that, after all, each man "must work out his own salvation" in submission to the *Unbewusst*. I objected that, according to his philosophy, he should rather have said "his own damnation"; to which he retorted, "Precisely, precisely. The terms are synonymous." But though Mephistopheles is not very seriously dismayed, we are to understand that he is definitely defeated. All his attempts to damn Faust have simply marked successive steps in the process of his salvation.

Now, whether the poem as a whole worthily embodies the promise of the Prologue in Heaven, and whether the catastrophe is adequate, may well be questioned. The unworthiness of many of Faust's undertakings in the Second Part and the unredeemed meanness of his grudge against Baucis and Philemon, simply because they are happy independently of anything he has done for them, make the task of defending the adequacy and the consistency of the working out of the central conception of the poem a difficult one; and many readers will think they discover in the whole work a reflection of a certain want of conclusiveness and definite progress that may be amply illustrated from other writings of Goethe's. Externally, no doubt, there is progress in Faust; Mephistopheles gradually falls into a more and more subordinate position; Faust rises to supremacy, and reduces the spirit on whom he was at first dependent to the position of a mere mischievous underling who perpetually introduces blemishes into the beneficent work and exaggerates the malevolence of the evil projects entrusted to him. But it is not easy to discover any corresponding evolution of Faust's own spirit. We hear something from Goethe, and a great deal more from his commentators, of the gradual Läuterung of Faust's character; but from an ethical point of view it is exceedingly

difficult to trace the process. Indeed, it is Klarheit, that is to say not "purification" but "clarification," which seems to underlie Goethe's conception of Läuterung. To pass from Trübe to Klarheit is, at bottom, his idea of salvation. That Goethe was not incapable of a more ethical conception of true internal development, springing out of reaction between character and environment, is shown by the splendid contrast of Gretchen to Faust. Indirectly she has caused her brother's death; directly, though unwittingly, her mother's; and in her despairing anguish she has drowned her child. But at the end, the naïvely vain and pleasure-loving girl-who resents her mother's severe and wholesome control, who runs for sympathy to her disreputable neighbour, and seeks an escape into an ideal world by endowing a vulgar and insolent seducer with all attributes of spiritual greatness—has become the heroine who refuses deliverance, when it is brought to her not in love but in pity, and who renounces all that her dreams have demanded when it is offered her as a mere dole. Renouncing all earthly hopes and facing the worst that the earthly judge and executioner can do, she appeals to the heavenly court—and is acquitted.2

But whatever may be the ultimate verdict—should the jury ever agree upon one—in this matter, it seems sufficiently clear that the earliest stratum 3 of Faust is not really dominated

³ See the tabulation of the constituents of this "first stratum" at the end of this article.

¹ Läuterung means "refining," "rectification," and "defecation," as well as "purification." Thus the purging away of disturbing and alien elements, and the bringing of obscure drifts and demands of nature to clear consciousness and fruition, is apparently the fundamental meaning of Faust's Läuterung.

² Execution for infanticide appeared to Goethe and his circle to be a hideous act of barbarity. It is to this, not to Gretchen's betrayal and desertion, that we must apply the cynical "she is not the first" of Mephistopheles, and the indignant retort of Faust: "Not the first!... Heart of man cannot conceive how the death-agony of that first one should fall short of expiation for the guilt of all the rest in the eyes of the Ever-pardoning." Faust's indignation against the social crime of the execution and his pity for its victim are quite sincere; but they are almost impersonal. His connection with the tragedy and his responsibility for it are, in his own sight, strictly limited.

by the conception of the Prologue in Heaven at all, however we interpret the latter. Mephistopheles, as he appears in this first stratum, is not "the spirit that negates." He represents some other conception, and stands in quite other relations. Kuno Fischer, in his critical study of Faust, insists upon the close connection, in this early stratum of Faust, between Mephistopheles and the Erdgeist that answers Faust's conjuration in the opening scene. His conclusions have been hotly disputed by Professor Minor of Vienna; but in my opinion they remain, and must remain, unshaken. Faust vearns for an inner comprehension of Nature's secrets and a sense of oneness with her life which shall transcend both the intellectual and the sensuous sphere, by uniting all that they promise and yet refuse to give, in one consummate rapture of all-embracing fellowship of life. And the Earth-spirit, while appearing to grant it to him in all its fullness, yet accompanies it with a loathsome limitation in the shape of the companionship of Mephistopheles (lines 3217-3250, Wald und Höhle3). What, then, is Mephistopheles? We shall know when we understand the exact nature of Faust's demand. Essentially it is to be emancipated from the limitations of human nature. He is to know more than man can know, to feel more than man can feel, to become an elevated spirit and share the inmost life of nature, and yet to remain a man. He is to draw into his life and experience all incompatible and contradictory possibilities, and yet they are not to neutralise each other! (354-597, 602-605, 1770-1867). He is like the child who considers that impossibility is an arbitrary imposition of grown-up people and does not exist in the nature of things. The child thinks that he has to go without the things he longs for, not because he cannot, but because he must not have them. But, in truth, if external prohibitions

¹ Goethe's Faust, von Kuno Fischer, Stuttgart, 1893.

² Goethe's Faust, von J. Minor, Stuttgart, 1901.

³ The numeration of the lines, throughout, is that of Schröer and others, which runs continuously from the first line of the Zueignung, so that Faust's opening monologue begins with line 354.

were removed internal incompatibilities would at once assert themselves. Now it is the mocking reassertion of this internal and intrinsic limitation, when all external limits have been removed, that Mephistopheles represents. Faust may have everything that can be had, but Mephistopheles is perpetually there to remind him of the limits that are imposed from within, so far more "deeply inherent" that any that are imposed from without.

And this brings me to my proper subject—the inner meaning of "magic" in this connection. It is well known that Goethe dabbled in alchemy and magic in his early life, and that his interest was not merely antiquarian or literary. He probably had visions, not unlike those of his own Faust, of getting to the vital centre of things and grasping all knowledge and experience from a single unified point of view. Now this is closely analogous to the efforts of the Neoplatonists. From Plato himself, through the Neoplatonists and their Oriental disciples, such as Averroes, wherever the mystic and the intellectual trends are both strongly present, there has reigned a belief that by a proper course of moral and intellectual training man may at length realise a self-identification with God, or with the universe, which shall enable him to look down on the whole creation from the divine or universal point of view, having first climbed up the ladder of human discipline and effort. And the tendency has always been present to shorten the way by discovering some secret and mysterious path, by evoking the aid of spirits, by getting command of constraining formulæ, and apprehending inner principles that do not lie on the patent path of human thought, observation, and experiment. Hence the prominence of magic in some of the Neoplatonic schools.

Knowledge, however, may be sought with the hope of approximating not to the divine knowledge, but to the divine power. As a man may think that severe intellectual and moral discipline offer too long and too laborious a path to the height of insight, so he may think that the open way of study

and application does not lead quickly enough to power. And in this latter case power may be desired for purposes far other than those that would draw the adept into oneness of vision with the Deity. Thus we may have a white magic that seeks to shorten the way to divine insight, and a black magic that seeks to constrain the powers of nature to purposes unsanctioned by God, and to reach licit or illicit ends by means that the innocent can never know. The attempt to find short cuts, and to despise the beaten tracks, is common to both forms of magic, and the white may easily degenerate into the black art. Hence the shuddering sense of horror with which magic may be contemplated; and hence too its fundamental impotence. It may not be wholly illusory, but, seeing that it is a defiance of God, it must, in the last resort, be futile; for it cannot bring a man to any ultimate fruition, though it may gain its apparent and immediate goal.

Now I think it is fairly clear that Goethe in the first stratum of Faust was drawing upon his own experience of the passion for more intimate knowledge and a fuller and more varied experience than can be gained by ordinary means of study and opportunities of life, and that he regards it in the light of the conviction that subsequently came to him that whatever degree of intimacy with the inner life of nature is granted to man must be reached along the path of study, experience, and even self-limitation, which knows of no short cut, and in which everything must come in its own place, after its own antecedents, and with the recognition of its own implications. Imagination may, it is true, transcend the limits of experience; but experience itself cannot be allembracing.1 The man who desires to have an experience which he has not earned, and having had it to fling it aside without recognising its implications and commitments, is attempting to range things out of their God-appointed order. He tears them bleeding out of their organic context, and therefore fundamentally he never has them at all. Thus

¹ See line 1789 and its context.

magic, in its combined power and futility, is the symbol of wilfulness and recklessness in the whole sphere of moral action. Eve's transgression, as expounded by Anselm, may be taken as at once the typical sin and the typical illustration of the analogy of all sin with magic. Eve was right in wishing to become as God, knowing good from evil; but she was wrong in wishing to reach this state before God wished that she should.¹ Thus (we may put it) eating the apple secured to her, out of its due context and therefore with a taint, that which she would have secured, in due course, innocently, and would have enjoyed sweetly, had she followed the path prescribed by God.

Magic differs from other sin only in that it breaks through the appointed limits that God has laid down externally, as well as those that he has enjoined internally. In seeming to enlarge liberty, however, it only accentuates the fact that to defy God's order is to pollute his gifts and empty them of their true beauty. Mephistopheles, then, as the emissary of the constrained and conjured Earth-spirit, enables Faust to overcome all difficulties of time and space, and to remove all external limitations, to the utmost power of magic, and yet perpetually and mockingly reminds him that he has gained nothing, because the real limitations are internal and inherent. Faust wishes for the most intimate union with Gretchen, torn out of its context both antecedent and consequent. But it is just the innocence and naïvety of her character that charm him, so these must not be sullied, nor must he be haunted himself by compunction or a sense of the incompatibility between the thing he seeks and the thing he wants. Externally the irreconcilable conditions involved are secured by magic aid, but the deeper irreconcilabilities remain. Should a touch of true honour enter the seducer's heart, the whole "magic" project of wrenching things out of their moral context would become loathsome to him. In his conventional honour he is not shocked at betraving Margarethe, but is indignant when he is asked to

¹ De casu diaboli, chap. iv.

give a false certificate of burial for the late Herr Schwerdtlein! He is distinctly annoyed, and is driven to a sophistical defence, when Mephistopheles insists that his avowal of "eternal" love for Gretchen was what we should now describe as a "terminological inexactitude." Though Faust may sometimes complain that Mephistopheles makes, or refuses to remove, difficulties, the real contradictions are inherent in his own demands. He wishes to have something which cannot be what it is if he has it, and himself to be what he cannot be if he gets it. Mephistopheles takes a mischievous delight in at once developing and insisting on these inherent contradictions which render the removal of all external obstructions futile.

The frivolous scenes in the Witch's Kitchen and Auerbach's Cellar demonstrate the same thing on a lower plane. Faust, thought-weary and convinced of the futility of thought, feels that he has sacrificed all earthly pleasures for nothing. has led the life of an ascetic and has got nothing for it. he wishes both to reach the goal of the student, that evades his grasp, and also to realise the coarser delights of the man unvisited by intellectual aspiration. He wants to be old and young at once. Mephistopheles sarcastically indicates to him the only way of attaining this result-fresh air and exercise. Let him take, so to speak, a "small holding," and work all day on the soil, and then an elastic sense of contact with nature and of youthful vigour will add itself to his mature wisdom gathered in the study. Faust indignantly rejects the counsel. He wants a shorter way, a rejuvenating draught. Very well—to the Witch's Kitchen, then. This can only be attained by a coarse and vulgar magic, which offends Faust's taste. But he has rejected the fresher and more wholesome way; and this is all that is left. So he drinks the devil's draught and becomes young as well as old, and at once joins a party of uproarious students at their drinking bout; only to discover that just because he is old and learned it is not in the least exhilarating to fling a glass of wine over your neighbour's head and make up by boisterousness for what is lacking in wit.

But the culminating horror is in the Garden Scene, where Gretchen, though insensible to Faust's baseness, is uneasy on the point of his orthodoxy. Faust quiets her scruples in that magnificent hymn, the impassioned expression of a sense of the divine glory of nature and of life that can force itself into no creed and can coin no names for the realities it feels. And then straightway he bids Gretchen not to trouble herself about things too high for her, but to return to the matter in hand—for which purpose he gives her the phial, a few drops of which will secure the soundness of her mother's sleep and so enable her to admit her lover. "Grell," indeed (to use the German word), is the horror of the contrast. Here the defiant and mutinous spirit of "magic" attains its supreme conquest, and proclaims its infernal impotence.

Did Goethe mean all this? Did he at least feel it? Was he guided by the sheer instinct of genius to build "better than he knew," or even felt? It is difficult to judge; for to the English reader (especially if he is of Puritan antecedents) there is something very baffling in Goethe's conception of morality as consisting merely in systematic self-expression, leading at last to a self-realisation in which the Trübe has become Klarheit. It is difficult to maintain the language of ethics while regarding Gretchen as a mere incident in the self-development of Faust, even if the echo of that incident mingles again with the harmony - in intention at least heavenly-of the close. "Das Ewig-Weibliche" hardly comes to its own even if there be added to its utility as an earthly episode its further subservience to the higher spiritual development of "das Ewig-Männliche." But at least we may acquit Goethe of having deliberately conceived the Gretchen passages as part of the experiences of "a good man," always conscious of the right direction even in his worst aberrations, and always striving even when he erred; for the whole unrivalled pathos of Margarethe's story (which wakes compunction but no remorse in the bosom of her betrayer) belongs to the earliest stratum of the poem, the motive of which is entirely different.

This motive is best revealed in the soliloquy of Mephistopheles (lines 1851–1867), in which, if I rightly interpret him, he declares that it is his rôle first to encourage the disgust which Faust has conceived for the legitimate path by which man may approach his higher spiritual goal, and cultivate in him the taste for "Blend" und Zauberwerke"; and then to stimulate the impatience which makes him miss, even while he is seeking them, the lower satisfactions of earth also. Thus by leading him through a series of flat and frivolous adventures he will land him—when he has renounced the higher and missed the lower prizes of life—in a cynical pessimism which is itself damnation.

"Und hätt' er sich auch nicht dem Teufel übergeben, Er müsste doch zu Grunde gehn!"

Though Goethe seems either to have forgotten or chosen to ignore all this, when he fitted the early stratum into the framework of the Prologue in Heaven, it is difficult to believe that he did not both feel and mean it when the original scenes rose in his mind. At any rate it is there, whether it was Goethe's moral sense, or his genius annulling his want of moral sense, that put it there.

PHILIP H. WICKSTEED.

1 "Verachte nur Vernunft und Wissenschaft, Des Menschen allerhöchste Kraft,"

Schedule of the Passages constituting the First Stratum of "Faust."

The first stratum of Faust can be separated out, on secure documentary evidence, by a comparison of the recently published Urfaust, a transcript of Goethe's early MS. which shows the stage which the poem had reached in 1775, and the Fragment published in 1790. Some of the scenes contained in the Urfaust appeared unaltered in the Fragment, others were extensively changed, and yet others omitted—ultimately to reappear, either in their original form or modified, in the completed Part I. of 1808. But there is also much in the Fragment that was not in the Urfaust, so that the two must be combined if we are to take a full survey of what is here called the "first stratum." The order of the scenes both in the Fragment and the Urfaust

differs from that finally adopted, and in one case the order in the *Fragment* differs from that in the *Urfaust*; but in one way or another the whole material (with one trifling exception) of both is incorporated in the completed work, where it is represented by the following passages, taken in the order of the *Fragment*, for all that it includes, and in that of the *Urfaust* for the rest.

| Lines | 354- 597. | " Habe nun | | | zu besprechen," |
|-------|------------|----------------|-------|--|----------------------|
| 22 | 602-605. | "Wie nur | | | Regenwürmer findet!" |
| 99 | 1770-3216. | " Und was | | | an mir find't." |
| 12 | 3374-3586. | "Meine Ruh is | t hin | | ach war so lieb!" |
| 99 | 3217-3373. | " Erhabner Gei | ist | | verzweifelt." |
| 25 | 3587-3619. | "Ach neige | | | meiner Noth!" |
| | 3776-3834. | "Wie anders | | | Euer Fläschchen!" |
| ** | 3620-3645. | "Wenn ich | | | Lügner heissen." |
| •• | | "Wie von dem | | | bisschen Rammelei." |
| The p | - | "Im Elend | | | Auf und davon!" |
| | | | | | Heinrich! Heinrich!" |

MAETERLINCK'S PHILOSOPHY OF LIFE.

PROFESSOR JOHN DEWEY.

"AT the present time, nothing is more striking than the disarray which troubles our instincts and sentiments, and even our ideas, as soon as it is a matter of the intervention of the unknown or of mystery in the really serious events of our life. We find in this disarray some sentiments that do not correspond any longer to living, precise, and accepted ideas—such as those that refer to the existence of a well-defined God, more or less anthropomorphic, attentive, personal, and providential. find there sentiments that are still half ideas, such as those that refer to fatality, to destiny, to the justice of things. also find some ideas that are on their way to becoming sentiments—such as those that refer to the genius of the species, the laws of evolution and selection, the will of the race, etc. We find there also some ideas that are merely ideas, and that are too uncertain, too sparse for us to foresee the moment when they will be transformed into sentiments, and have, accordingly, a serious influence on our manner of acting, of accepting life, and of being happy or unhappy."

Maeterlinck employs the words I have quoted to point out the embarrassment under which poets and dramatists at present labour. The words serve equally well to denote the present state of philosophy. The intellectual revolution described in the last four centuries is too vast to have made itself at home in our daily imaginations, and too recent to have generated appropriate feelings. Apart from a subsoil of such images and feelings any philosophy is barren. Science has neutralised the soil from which sprang the earlier philosophies of the race; with the destruction of supernaturalism, materialism, which was only an anti-supernaturalism, has lost its support. The bounded and complacent Epicurean naturalism of the past has been rendered impossible by the perception that the nature in which our frail lives are set is infinite in extent and duration, and that our being is the culminating and precarious pinnacle of a series of struggles.

In a situation in which, as Maeterlinck says, our sentiments are no longer attached to ideas that are sincerely accepted, and our ideas have not yet sublimated themselves into sentiments that have a decisive influence on our behaviour and our weal and woe, the meditations of a writer who is primarily an artist and secondarily a philosopher have unusual significance for those interested in philosophy—especially if the artist be as lucid and as truthful as Maeterlinck. Art, especially dramatic art, is sympathetic and flexible. It secures unity, the degree of harmony necessary to its career, through interplay of diversified individual elements. Subordination and logical unity are effected by admitting each element to its just rôle in a developing movement. Where art is dramatic, philosophy is schematic, and its depiction of unity correspondingly inflexible and exclusive. At times when philosophy has reflected beliefs and images that were themselves uniform and compact, a rigid logic was natural and its hardness and restrictions were not felt. But when the sentiments that lead to action are divided from general ideas about the world, and these ideas are themselves faltering, literature foreshadows and augments ideas that only later can be coherently articulated. The most characteristic philosophic ideas of this generation are to be found, not in philosophy, but in art. In Maeterlinck especially we find a power of transmuting abstract ideas into feelings which gives unusual clarity and body to his presentiments of future philosophy. For Maeterlinck has so worked his philosophy into his art

that one does not have to torture the art in order to discover the philosophy. With infinite frankness and amiability he has taken us into his confidence. "It is necessary," he tells us, "to form a general idea of the world. All our moral life, all our human life, supports itself by such a conception." And, again, he says that "the tissue of the daily life, the surface occupied by special goods and evils, has its identity in, and is lighted or made sombre by, the dominant idea of the generation that unrolls it. Whatever its form or its disguise, this idea always reduces itself on last analysis to a certain conception of the universe. Individual and public calamities have only a passing influence on the happiness and unhappiness of men unless they modify, with respect to their gods, infinity, the unknown and the economy of the world, the general ideas that enlighten and nourish men." It is not necessary to say that a man who expresses so simply his sense of the importance of general ideas chooses thereby consciously to enroll himself among philosophers.

What are the general ideas dominating the present age, "ideas as yet purely ideas, uncertain and sparse," and yet ideas that Maeterlinck endeavours to focus, to fund, and to transform into living sentiments? According to Maeterlinck, an idea concerning the unknown, a certain way of envisaging the mystery that bathes our life and our consciousness, is the leading general idea of a time. "Men," says Maeterlinck, "excel more or less, go farther or less far, higher or lower, in what they know, in proportion to the respect they have for what they do not know, in proportion to the amplitude their imagination and intelligence is able to give the totality of forces they cannot know. The consciousness of the unknown in which we live is what confers on our life a meaning it would not have if we enclosed ourselves in what we know, or if we believed too readily that what we know is more important than what we still ignore."

This doctrine constitutes, I suppose, the essence of what is termed the mysticism of Maeterlinck. But Maeterlinck

represents a manner of mysticism—if so label it we must—which is unique in history: a naturalistic, yes, if you will, a materialistic, mysticism. I know no writer of our own day who accepts more frankly, who welcomes more bravely than Maeterlinck, all the methods and results of the natural sciences, and without discount, and without evasion. I know of no other writer who maintains such a vivid, intimate, and persisting sense of the change wrought, and wrought for the better, in our inmost moral being by that development of naturalistic intelligence we call science.

Almost without exception, those philosophers who are conventionally known as mystics have used the gradual shadings off of our life into an impenetrable beyond as a motif for abasing man, insulting reason, and belittling nature. They have deduced from the shortness of the tether of intelligence, in contrast with the long reaches of the unknown, the need of some private, secret, and illicit mode of union with the eternal powers. But Maeterlinck tells us that the mysteries which were accepted by the ages that preceded intelligent and free inquiry were artificial mysteries, and that these mysteries must be "stripped of all that our errors, our fears, and our lies have added to them." The older notions of the infinite were not fruitful because they were born of ignorance, that is, of impotence and fear. "The thought of the unknowable and the infinite becomes truly salutary only when it is the unexpected recompense of the intelligence that has given itself loyally and unreservedly to the study of the knowable and the finite. There is a notable difference between the mystery which comes before our ignorance and the mystery which comes after what we have learned." "Rarely," says Maeterlinck, "does a mystery disappear; ordinarily it only changes its place. But it is often very important, very desirable, that it manage to change its place. From a certain point of view, all the progress of human thought reduces itself to two or three changes of this kind—to have dislodged two or three mysteries from the place where they did harm

in order to transport them where they become harmless, where they can do good. Sometimes it is enough, without a mystery changing its place, if we can succeed in giving it another name. That which was called 'the gods' is now called 'life.' And if life is just as inexplicable as the gods, we have at least gained this, that in the name of life no one has authority to speak, nor right to do harm."

And again he says that although the contents of the sealed vials of the world remain obscure, "there is gain in the fact that the inscriptions we write upon them to-day convey less menace to us, so that we are able to approach them and touch them, to lay our ears close to them, and to listen with wholesome curiosity." "We have had for a long time a pride, stupid enough, in believing ourselves to be miraculous beings, unique and marvellously accidental in our setting in nature, probably fallen from another world, without any sure attachments to the rest of life, and, in any case, endowed with an isolated, incomparable, monstrous faculty. It is much preferable not to be such prodigies, for we have learned that prodigies do not fail to disappear in the normal evolution of nature. is much more consoling to observe that we follow the same route as the soul of this great world; that we have the same intentions, the same hopes, the same tests, and almost—except for our dream of justice and pity, which is our own specific work—the same feelings " "This is why our attitude in the face of the mystery of these forces is changed. It is no longer that of fear, but of courage. It is no longer the kneeling of a slave before his master, but it permits the look of equal to equal, for we carry within ourselves the equal of the most profound and the greatest mysteries." And again he says that "the most immeasurable gods never put to men questions like those that are put without respite to us by that which their adorers called nothing, but which in reality is nature. Those gods reigned in a dead space, without events and without images, and hence without points of reference for our imaginations, and having on our thoughts and feelings only a static

and immobile influence. Hence the sense of the infinite, which is the source of all higher activity, atrophied in us. As soon as our intelligence is not imperiously invoked to the extremity of its own powers by some new fact—and there are hardly any new facts in the reign of the gods—it falls asleep, is contracted and effaced, and wastes away. Not at the time when the Hindoo, Hebrew, or Christian theology flourished; not in the days when Greek and German metaphysic employed all the forces of human genius, was our representation of the universe animated, fertilised, and reinforced by assistance as unforeseen, as charged with mystery, as energetic, as real as now. Of old, we conversed with our weak logic or our disordered imagination with respect to the enigma; at present, coming out of our too subjective residence, we attempt to enter into relation with the enigma itself."

I do not feel competent to paraphrase these sayings, but it is not false to their spirit to say that if we take any of the great works in which the past endeavoured to document the infinite mystery (as the Divine Comedy of Dante), we see that its harshness, its violence, its narrowness are all its own, and that its beauty, its power to pacify passion and to nourish sentiment, are borrowed from our own more just perspective, and that they flow from the inexhaustible stock of ordinary life that all ages possess in common. The supernatural and metaphysical infinities of the past were blank spaces that furnished no points of contact for reflection, no food for imagination. They were segregated and remote infinities; they did not enter life at every point, but at a few arbitrarily selected points, while the infinity of natural event and energy enter into our lives equally at all points. We fail to note the contracted and finite scale to which the professed infinite was actually reduced because we add generous reaches to the singularly limited conceptions about the unknown that belonged to those who, by a strange illusion, we imagine more sensitive to it than ourselves. Even religions have largely been recipes for dealing with the inexplicable so as to put us

on our guard against it, or to render us immune against its contagion; they have been devices for changing awe into familiarity, or else of segregating mystery once for all, so that by some recurrent act of conventional respect the bulk of our daily lives may be secured against its intrusion.

It is not, I think, sufficiently noted that most of the earlier dramas of Maeterlinck, instead of interpreting the general idea of the world appropriate to this generation—that is to say, reflecting his own philosophy—set forth a metaphysic that is mediæval and feudal. Vows, prayers, violent struggle, silent submission, loyal ignorance, fated love and fatal fear lend a troubling beauty to the scene, but intelligence, questioning, truthful, bold, that "flame," as he somewhere calls it, "confined and frail, but precise, exclusive, invincible as the blowpipe," did not act. The force of an external destiny works out its will upon an erring ignorant humanity, but no one has the thought of conquering this force by questioning it in order to co-operate with it.

The latter thought is the general conception that rules, however inarticulately, the life of to-day. When this conception of the accord of intelligence with the unknown forces becomes articulate, the new drama will, Maeterlinck tells us, be born, "a theatre of peace and of beauty without tears," for a "truly illumined consciousness has passions and desires infinitely less exacting, infinitely more pacific, more salutary, more abstract, and more generous than an unillumined consciousness."

The philosophy of our century discovers many and diverse attitudes taken toward the stripping off from nature by science of animistic intention and providence. It shows reluctant submission, pathetic and backward glancing wistfulness. It shows, too, strange insensitiveness to the profundity, the revolutionary character of this change. It shows elaborate devices to escape from the obvious impact of the movement of knowledge by proving, through an examination of the possibility and grounds of knowledge, that the facts gleaned

by knowledge make no difference to our traditional view of the world, because, after all, everything is consciousness. It shows evasions, flight, and refuge in some special fortress of super-empirical and unnatural knowledge, or of transcendental, over-individual will. Maeterlinck is not unique in truthful facing of the situation, but he is unique, I think, in the quality of inspired hope with which he welcomes the transformation; in the simplicity of his feeling that the idealism of man in his willingness to doubt, his courage to inquire, and his impulse—not to be denied—to kindness and justice, presents a fuller and richer idealism than the mythical and romantic idealisations of nature which have formed the substance of the dominant philosophies of the past. To this statement of the fundamental and primary principle of his thought it remains to add two derived principles.

It is suggestive of the subterranean and devious paths by which in times of intellectual transition a new consensus of belief and unity of outlook are reached that one so aloof as is Maeterlinck from the technical philosophies of to-day should be concerned with the problem of the relation of instinct to consciousness, of passion and affection to deliberate reflective thought, and that he should have arrived at conclusions analogous to those which in the last decade have been formulated in the newest philosophic isms of the day. There are, he constantly tells us, two modes of intelligence: the intelligence of the species unconsciously recording and carrying the past history of the globe, and now unconsciously groping its way onward into a future; and the intelligence of the individual, conscious, deliberate, and reflective. Intellectual and moral sanity, happiness, depend upon the balance of these two forms. He might have used the words of Bergson: "Instinct finds, but does not search; reason searches, but cannot find"; adding, that since what we find is meaningless save as measured by searching, instinct and passion must be elevated into reason; while reason, in order to attain, must revert into unconscious attitude and vital impulse.

Simply the exigencies of language lead us, says Maeterlinck, "to separate the thoughts of our brain from the passions and sentiments of our heart. Men imagine that passions, even the most generous, veil and trouble the clarity of thought. But when passion lessens and intelligence is clear, it has nothing to do; it functions in the void; it has no object." We have no claim to say we understand anything till it is impossible for us not to conform our lives to that thing, till, in short, it has become incorporate in our being, and reflective consciousness has passed into an enlarged and clarified instinct. Our thought is indeed the invincible flame of the blowpipe, but it is futile and lawless save as it plays upon the stuff of our impulses and passions to purge their dross, so as to leave the noble metal of character in just action. Morality, he says, even in its most limited sense, is the "logical and inevitable subordination of things to the accomplishing of a general mission"; the part of conscious reason is to ensure the logical subordination, but instinct, the groping of universal nature within us, alone furnishes the general mission. Thought, he says, again, is never an exact picture of the conditions that produce it, but is the shadow of a struggle, like that of Jacob with the angel. Here, again, Maeterlinck may be a mystic, but a mystic of the intelligence, not of the obscuration that fears intelligence.

Compare the two following passages. First is the pæan of reflection, of conscious inquiry and conscious statement: "The invincible duty of a being is to be read in its distinguishing organs, those to which others are subordinated. It is written in our eyes, our ears, our nerves, our marrow, every lobe of our brain, in the nervous system, that man exists in order to transform all that we absorb of earthly things into a particular energy of a quality unique on this globe. I know of no other creature that has been fashioned to produce this strange fluid which we call thought, intelligence, understanding. Flame, heat, light, even life and instinct, more subtle than life, and most of the intangible energies that crowned the world before

our coming, have paled in contact with the new effluence. Sometime, perhaps, it will reign in plenitude of power; meanwhile our only care is to give it all that it asks of us, to sacrifice for it whatever might retard its development. Let us nourish the flame on our feelings and passions, on all that we see and touch, on its own essence, that is, on the meaning it derives from the discoveries, experience, and observation that result from its every movement."

Compare with this glorification, which no rationalist, no intellectualist has ever exceeded, the following words, and the whole thought of Maeterlinek, in however bare outline. is before us: "We wrongly believe that because the harvest of life passes along the road of intelligence it has been gathered upon this road. Reason, which is the elder child of our intelligence, after having opened the subterranean doors behind which the vital and instinctive forces of our being sleep imprisoned, ought to seat itself on the threshold of our moral life. It waits there, lamp in hand, and its sole presence renders the threshold inaccessible to that which is not conformable to the nature of light. Beyond, in regions where its rays do not penetrate, the life of obscurity continues. Reason is not troubled thereby, rather it is rejoiced. It knows that in the eyes of the God which it desires, nothing-dream, thought, or act—that has not crossed its arcade of light can add or take away from the ideal being it forms. The duty of the flame is to be as clear, as extended as possible, and not to abandon its post. It does not hesitate even when nothing happens save the stir of lower instincts and of shades. But it happens that among the captives that wake, some more radiant than itself approach the entrance. They spread a light more immaterial, more diffuse, more incomprehensible than that of the firm and definite flame its hand protects. These forces are those of love, of unexplained good (or others even more infinite and mysterious), that demand passage. What is reason to do? If she is seated upon the threshold when she has not earned the right to be there, not having had

the courage to learn that she is not alone in the world, she is troubled, she is afraid, she closes the doors—and if ever again she resolves to reopen them, she finds only a handful of dry ashes by the sombre steps. But if reason does not tremble (because, by all that it has not been able to learn, it has nevertheless learned that no light is dangerous, and that in the life of reason one can risk reason itself for greater clarity) ineffable exchanges take place, from lamp to lamp, upon the threshold. Drops of an unknown oil are mixed with the oil of human wisdom; and when the white strangers will have passed, the flame of reason's lamp will rise higher, more mighty and more pure, between the columns of a porch that has grown."

A third phase of Maeterlinck's thought I may term his invincible sense of the democracy of life and its experiences. All of our experiences, all the experiences of all men, are equally penetrated by the genuine and the infinite energies of nature. If we still call some hours and some men heroic, noble, sublime, and others trivial, menial; if we still think and designate in terms of superiority and inferiority, it is because the ignorance of feudalism and the romance of mythology still weigh us down. Every step forward in intelligence leads us to recognition of the equable and the common. In his own words:—

"The further we travel on the paths of existence, the more we believe in the truth, beauty, and depth of the humblest and most ordinary events of life. We learn to admire them just because they are so general, so uniform, so ordinary. We seek and we expect the extraordinary less and less, for we are beginning to recognise that the infantile demands of our own ignorance and vanity are the most extraordinary things in the vast peaceable and monotonous movement of nature. We do not any longer require hours in which strange and marvellous events occur, for marvellous events occur only to those who have not yet got confidence in themselves and in life. We are finally convinced that we can find the equivalent of heroism and of all that constitutes

the sublime and the exceptional in the eyes of the feeble, the ignorant, and the anxious, in existence bravely and completely accepted. . . ."

Again, he says of Emerson (and it is a grateful thought that Maeterlinck has learned so much of Emerson): "For many the hour has come when they have grievous need of new explanations. Heroic hours are less apparent, those of abnegation have not returned. There remains for us only daily life, and yet we cannot live without greatness. Emerson has given an almost acceptable sense to this daily life that has no more its traditional horizons; he perhaps has been able to show us that it is strange, deep, and grand enough to have need of no other goal than itself. . . . We should live, all we who traverse the days and the years, without actions, without thoughts, without light, because our life, notwithstanding everything, is incomprehensible and divine. We should live because no one has the right to withdraw himself from the spiritual issues of commonplace deeds. Emerson is the sage of ordinary days, and ordinary days are in sum the substance of our being."

Again, "Is it not an ancient error to suppose that when a violent passion possesses us we live our truest lives? I have come to believe that an old man seated in his armchair, waiting patiently with his light beside him, giving an unconscious ear to all the eternal laws that reign through his house, interpreting, without comprehending, the silence of doors and windows, and the quickening voice of the light, submitting with bent head to the presence of his soul and his destiny: an old man who is not aware that all the powers of this world, like so many servants, are mingling and keeping vigil in his room, who does not suspect that the sun itself suspends in space the little table on which he leans, and that every star in heaven and every fibre of the soul are concerned in the closing of an evelid or the upspringing of a thought—I have come to believe that this old man, motionless as he is, yet lives in reality a deeper, more human and more universal life

than the lover who strangles his mistress, the captain who conquers in battle, or the husband who avenges his 'honour'."

This equality, that is, this equable quality of experiences, underlies also all our conventional social distinctions. thinker represents, indeed, individual intelligence, but the masses represent the enduring and pervasive intelligence of the race, more deeply seated in the past, more patiently and courageously engendering the future. "Men that do not think guard the hearth of the tribune; the others carry the torches about; and when the torch begins to waver in a rarefied air, it is wise to come back to the hearth. This hearth does not seem to change its place, but that is because it advances with the world itself, and its little flame marks the real hour of humanity. In truth, the thinker continues to think justly only when he does not lose contact with those who do not think. Every thought that passes with disdain over the great dumb group, every thought that does not recognise a thousand sisters, a thousand brothers asleep in the group, is usually only an accursed and sterile dream."

There is something almost comical in the fancy of Nietzsche that he represents a transvaluation of the conventional values of the past. In spite of the noise of revolution in which he clothed himself, he repeats only the traditional ethics of the race. No matter what some of the professed codes of morals have professedly taught, the admirations and the efforts of men in the past have always centred about a contrast of superior and inferior, of over-men and under-men, of force and feebleness, of the exceptional and the ordinary. The admirations and the efforts of men have clung to these distinctions, because men isolating their individualities from their birth and destiny in nature inevitably have thought in egoistic terms, in terms of the exceptional and the extraordinary; and as were men's ideas, so were their admirations and their attempts. It has long been said that all men are equal in the presence of death; it was perhaps reserved for Emerson and for Maeterlinck to perceive that all men and all experiences are equal in Vol. X .- No. 4.

the presence of life, and because of the presence in that life of nature that is uniform and equable in all its diversities. When one has transmuted the abstract ideas of science into working sentiments, the distinctions of higher and lower, of transcendental and empirical, of the great and the little, the heroic and the ordinary remain, as Maeterlinck has said, the only extraordinary and miraculous things—that is, the only infantile and foolish things. Emerson, Walt Whitman, and Maeterlinck are thus far, perhaps, the only men who have been habitually, and, as it were, instinctively, aware that democracy is neither a form of government nor a social expediency, but a metaphysic of the relation of man and his experience to nature: among these Maeterlinck has at least the advantage of greater illumination by the progress of natural science.

These three ideas seem to me, then, to form the substance of that general idea of the world which Maeterlinck tells us is the most significant thing about a man, or a generation, or a people. The natural kinship of man's intellectual and moral life with nature, naturalistically reported and accepted; the mutual interpretation of unconscious instinct, blind passion, and conscious luminous reason; the unfathomable and equable character of our immediate, ordinary, commonplace experiences, so that our experience has no goal save itself-these ideas define his interpretation of life. I shall not pause to inquire whether ideas so restrained, so parsimonious, in comparison with the elaborate systems of historic philosophy, can be truly said to form a philosophy. At least they present one embodied, authentic instance in which the troubled disarray of idea and of sentiment has vanished; one case in which whole ideas, not half ideas, have been transformed into attitudes of mind and character having a serious influence upon our way of acting, of accepting life, of conceiving happiness. And only out of such transformed ideas can there emerge an enduring philosophy in the future.

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THE CRIMINAL, THE CRIMINOLOGIST, AND THE PUBLIC.

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ONE often hears people saying, when they are discussing the misdeeds of some miserable outcast, and, after a comfortable dinner, shaking their heads over his hardships, that if we were in his place we would in all probability do the same thing. It would just be as reasonable to say that if he were in our place he would do the things we do. There are thousands of poor, hardworking, miserable men and women in this country, but in spite of the strain to which they are subjected they do not steal. They behave a great deal better than some of those who write about them. The truth is, not that each of us would do what any other would do in given circumstances, but that many of us, being what we are and where we are, have actually, at one time or another, committed crimes not differing in essence from those punishable by law, and actually punished when the transgressor is caught. Take the common offence of stealing apples. Half a dozen boys may set out with this purpose, and yet the boys all differ in character, in appearance, in social condition. If they are caught their offence will be looked on as a venial one, and they will be treated mercifully, especially if their people are rather well-todo; for it is a less heinous thing in the eyes of many for a man with plenty to add to his store, than for a man with little to supplement what he has. Occasionally, even yet, boys are

sent to prison or to some other new-fangled abomination which, without the name of prison, has its essential defects; but that is only when the judge is rather more logical than his neighbours who also believe in punishment—for people whom they do not know.

Take any other kind of theft, and the same thing is seen. Those who are engaged in its commission are as different one from another as the boys who rob an orchard. That if they continue to steal they will acquire characters in common is highly probable. No matter what a man's occupation, business, or pleasure may be, in its pursuit he cannot help developing resemblances to others who share it with him; but criminals are no more like each other than judges are, or policemen, or doctors; and at the beginning of their career, if we made the lawyer in embryo and the criminal in embryo change clothes and places, he would be a bold man indeed who would undertake to sort them out in their proper classes. General statements about the criminal are like all general statements about men in respect that they do not carry very far towards determining the proper treatment of anyone. It is the differences between men that are of importance when you come to deal with them. Every mother knows that she cannot treat all her children alike: that the attitude she adopts towards one may not be suitable when she has to deal with another; and in so far as people fail to recognise this, they make a muddle of things. The practice of adding up certain qualities pertaining to different men, working out an average, and assuming that on this average they can be dealt with, is at the root of much of the failure resulting from our attempts to deal with the criminal.

When a concrete case is stated in which it is shown that the machine can only do harm, the question is asked: "But isn't that an exception?" The fact is that nearly all cases are exceptional in relation to a system founded on averages. An average is an abstraction and a man is not. It saves trouble to those who do not want to take trouble; it makes things easier for men in position, but it ensures serious loss in working. Now and then people are startled by some crime, the tale of which strikes their imagination. Somebody is killed in an out-of-the-way manner, and the method attracts attention and comment; but the criminal cannot be judged merely by his act. Wicked men have on occasion behaved with unexpected kindness, and good men have shocked their friends by some act of wickedness.

It frequently happens that in the opinion of his relatives the criminal is not a bad man. Sometimes they know so much of the other side of his character that they cannot believe him guilty of the crime he has committed. The officials, on the other hand, only know him because of the evil he has done. If his friends start with a prejudice in his favour, it is equally true that the officials start with a stronger prejudice against him, and with a less extensive knowledge of his antecedents. This is of no consequence so long as we are only concerned to punish crime, for it is the business of the Court to determine whether the prisoner committed the crime charged against him. When that has been settled, it is for the judge to pass sentence on the man of whom he knows nothing further than that he has done something which the law condemns. Of course, if we really intended to cure the person of his tendency to transgress, or to seek compensation from him for the mischief he has done, it would be necessary to know something about him, and we would not have the absurd exhibitions which are afforded by our Courts.

It is a common thing to hear a learned judge, in passing sentence, tell the public that the prisoner has been convicted so many times; that he has had sentences ranging from months of imprisonment to years of penal servitude; and that he must go to penal servitude again. Everybody is convinced that the man is a blackguard; and very probably he is, for he cannot undergo the experiences that have been his, and become or remain a useful citizen. But nobody seems to be equally struck with the fact that the judge in effect has been

saying that he or his brothers have had numerous opportunities of dealing with the wrong-doer; that as a result of their way of dealing with him he has not become better, and that they are going to continue to deal with him in the same way. They must administer the law; but, if one may judge from reported utterances, they sometimes make remarks about laws they administer which are not of the nature of approbation, and their administration of these laws is at times peculiar.

In dealing with the criminal it seems to be assumed that he is to blame entirely for his failure to respond to our treatment of him. My own opinion is that whether in the case of a doctor treating a patient, or of an official treating a prisoner, if the person dealt with is not improved the fault must lie with those who take his care in hand. This is not to question their intelligence or their sincerity in the slightest degree. What they are doing may be quite suitable if they had other people to deal with; that is a speculative point: that it has failed to do what it was intended to do is the fact; and as you cannot make patients or prisoners to suit the theories of those who treat them, the only practical way is to make the treatment suit those who undergo it.

It is generally admitted that the prison is not a reformatory institution, and it is sometimes forgotten that it never was intended to be so except incidentally. It is a place for the detention and punishment of prisoners. That they are effectively shut off from the community and are hurt thereby, experience has shown. If punishment is to be disregarded and reformation is to be the end, it cannot be expected that the prisoner or the prison authorities will be of much use for the purpose, their functions having been quite different; but if it is desired to help men to cease from offending and to guide them into better ways, it will be necessary in each case to learn something about the man's antecedents. Under present conditions he is sent to prison and put through the machinery. There is no possibility of forming anything like

a reliable estimate of his conduct outside from his behaviour in prison, the conditions being so widely different.

Years ago I suggested that instead of keeping a staff to make men do work and undergo treatment that could be of no use to anybody, it should be set to gain information that might be used to prevent the commission of crime. If every person brought to prison for the first time were asked to tell his own story, to give his opinion as to the causes of his fall and as to the means which might be adopted in order to restore him to the ranks of the law-abiding, a great deal of light would be thrown on problems which are not so complex as some people imagine. Prisoners are no greater liars than officials. They tell the truth when it suits them, and they don't waste falsehoods. If they tell more lies than some others, it is because they have more occasion to do so, since they have reason to fear that whatever they say will be used to their disadvantage. Many of them have suffered from the attentions of the people who mean well, and whose muddling would long ago have raised a protest but for the respect which is given to good intentions. The statements made might be checked outside the prison. We might learn in this way what had been done for the prisoner by his friends and what had been done to the prisoner by the authorities; and information under both heads would be of value. There are many people who could quite well control their offending relative if they were helped to do so instead of being encouraged to cast him out-that being the only way at present open to them to save themselves and to place him under authority. It would also be found that, thanks to our summary method of dealing with people who are too poor and too ignorant to kick effectively-thanks to the narrow scope of official inquiries,-many suffer serious injustices.

No matter what the laws may be, it seems likely that there will always be some people who will break them; which is just to say that it is difficult to imagine a rule that is equally applicable to all people in all circumstances. In the midst

of plenty the covetous man may take what is not his. Though there be small provocation, the hot-tempered man may lift his hand against his neighbour. Under some circumstances the passions of some men may lead them into transgression. But there are conditions which are more favourable to right conduct than others; and though a man has trangressed once, there is no necessary presumption that he must transgress again. The reaction may be so great that he will consciously avoid the temptation to repeat his fault; or the conditions which led to it may be so altered as to render its recurrence improbable.

All habits are acquired gradually, and in many cases slowly. In the process they leave their mark on the lives of those who are subject to them. It is commonly assumed that bad habits are more easily acquired than good ones, but there is absolutely no justification for the assumption. In the circumstances in which they are placed it is more difficult for some men to do certain wrong things which they desire to do, than to refrain from doing them; but it is more easy for most of our citizens to transgress the law than to keep within it.1 The poorer a man is the more difficult it is for him to avoid transgression, even though he anxiously tries to do so. If he is destitute and able-bodied, in Scotland the law only permits him to starve; or, rather, it does not even permit that. For though he neither begs nor steals, he must starve somewhere; and as he cannot always keep awake, and it provides no shelter, though it forbids him to lie down in any enclosed place or in the street, it is impossible for him to avoid breaking the law. It is true that if he knows how to apply to certain charitable organisations he may have his destitution relieved, for he is not prevented from begging of them: but at the best it must be admitted that it is difficult for him to live within the law, and it is easy for him to contract

¹ If the majority of prisoners had half as good a position as those who set out to instruct them, there is good ground for the belief that they would as seldom offend against the law.

the habit of living by transgression. On the other hand, it is difficult for a man who is well known to yield to certain temptations even though he desires to do so. His reputation shields him from some, and association with his friends will prevent him from falling before others.

We are all liable to abandon certain habits and to acquire others as time goes on. Passions burn themselves out. Interests wane with the years, and are replaced or displaced by others. There are many who continue in a course of conduct long after they have ceased either to enjoy it or to be fit for it; but in ordinary circumstances one interest in life merges into another, and one habit is destroyed and replaced by another. The criminal habit persists because we make it difficult for those who have acquired it to give it up for anything else that might appeal to them. The desire to cast out the devil from them is often accompanied by a determination to substitute what they consider a worse devil. They will not turn over a new leaf in order to write the next page at the dictation of somebody else. They prefer to retain their individuality even though they go to hell or to prison for it, rather than accept Heaven and servitude at the hands of those who do not understand them.

A great gulf separates the criminal and many of those who would reform him. This is recognised by writers on the subject, but they do not seem to see that its presence prevents them from understanding the criminal quite as much as it hinders him from understanding them. The result is that many of the reformers are as far from knowing the man whom they seek to reform as he is from knowing them. The so-called scientific books are the worst examples of this ignorance. They convey an immense amount of information that is not of the slightest importance to anybody outside a statistical bureau. You can't put men into tables; you can only place their attributes there. One man may know another and be lamentably ignorant of the size or shape of either his head or his heels; and I take leave to doubt whether an

intimate and extensive knowledge of the outside of the heads of persons who have been convicted, implies any knowledge whatever of what is going on inside their heads. The question is not, What are you going to do with a number of people who have certain features in common? but, What do you know of this man who has offended, and what are you going to do with him?

In order to know anyone it is necessary to appreciate his standpoint. The training and experience that will enable a man to shine in one department may be a positive bar to his usefulness in another, and in business this is recognised; but there is a widespread habit of assuming that if a man has certain academic qualifications he is not only a learned man but a man whose learning enables him to understand those who are without it. There is no warrant in experience for this belief. To know books is one thing, to know men is another. Frequently there is little relationship between book knowledge and practical experience. Of late years there has been an attempt to found a science of criminology, and the methods adopted have been peculiar. It has resulted in the accumulation of a series of facts about men in prison, and of observations on them while there.

The criminologist is as well equipped for the study of the criminal as the zoologist is for the study of the beetle, and in each case the student may learn a great deal about his subject; but, after all, men are not beetles, and the difficulty is that it is not their attributes that are of importance—it is themselves. A man needs to be studied in position. He cannot be considered apart from his relationship to others, with any great degree of profit; and the training that makes the scientific man what he is, effectively prevents him from getting the standpoint of the person to whom he seeks to apply his methods. Crime is a social question, and the criminal is a member of society. His physical and mental characteristics may be noted with more or less accuracy, but their importance from the standpoint of social utility

will depend very greatly on the man's position in the community.

The position of the official is not one that enables him easily to obtain the confidence of the prisoner under his charge. He is there to administer certain rules and to subject the criminal to the operation of the System. On his success in doing this will depend his promotion. What his opinion of the System is, is not in question. On the whole he is better to have no opinion, or at least to express none that implies a knowledge greater than that of the inventors or heads of the System. His relationship to the criminal is that of a master, and not a sympathetic master at that. I do not mean to say that he need be severe, or that he may be wanting in compassion; but mildness and pity may exist without sympathy, and men as readily resent ignorant pity as ignorant brutality. They can stand treatment—hard or mild—from those who know them which they will resent from those who are over them. The opinion of the official regarding the criminal is of as much importance as the opinion of the criminal regarding him. In each case it may be valuable, but its value will depend on the knowledge on which it is founded.

The higher position a man holds officially, the fewer opportunities he has for knowing the men who are governed at his will. The warder comes most intimately in contact with the prisoner, and is likely to know most thoroughly the character of the man in so far as it is shown by his conduct while under the operation of the System; but he has neither time nor opportunity to know the man as a member of society. There can be no fellowship between them; that would ruin the System. The difference in their clothing marks the difference in their position. They are not meeting as man to man, but as wheels in a machine.

The chaplain sees another side of the prisoner. He will be able to tell how the man behaves when under his ministrations. Every chaplain knows that there are inducements for the prisoner to adopt a special attitude towards him, and every professional criminal knows what these are. In his view it is all a gain if he can make the chaplain believe that he is penitent; he will have his reward. "Bow down and worship, and all the kingdoms of the earth——"Well, not so much as that, but he may get something. For a man to be religious is one thing, for him to pretend to be religious in order to receive certain benefits is quite another; but so long as religious people appear to justify the belief that their main interest is, not so much to help people as to get them to adopt certain dogmas as necessarily antecedent to well-doing, this state of affairs will exist. We are told that God makes His sun to shine on the just and the unjust; in that respect He differs from many of His worshippers.

The doctor is also counted fair game, for he has it in his power to make modifications in diet and in the treatment of prisoners. In my own experience prisoners do not sham illnesses, though, like people outside, they sometimes appear to attach an undue importance to their ailments. People do not sham if there is nothing to gain by it, unless indeed they are insane; and it is the doctor's business to see that there is nothing to be gained by shamming. His life is not an enviable one, since it is spent in making prisoners physically more capable, in order that they may be sent out to be a nuisance to themselves and a burden to others in very many cases; and the knowledge that this could be avoided does not make his task any more agreeable. On the one hand, he has to act justly by those under his charge, and, while preventing them from taking an undue advantage of their physical or mental defects, to see that these are recognised; and on the other hand, he has to convince his superiors, not merely that he is acting in good faith, but that he knows what he is about. If these superiors are men of no experience in dealing with people of another social class from themselves, his task may not be an easy one. On the whole, he may find it to his personal advantage to have no conscience, but instead of it a consciousness that he is but a subordinate, and a firm and comforting belief in the wisdom that is implied by high position. It is true that this need not make for usefulness to the public, but in that respect it would fit in with the System.

The chaplain and the medical officer have had a professional training; that is necessary before they can be appointed to the posts they hold. They need not have had any social training or any experience in living and dealing with men and women of a rank in life from which most prisoners are drawn. The governor is appointed by the Powers above for reasons known to those who have the making of the appointment. No qualification is laid down for the post save that of being able to get it. It may be urged that the person that has the most influence among those who make the appointments need not, therefore, be best qualified to deal with men; but even if few men might be fit to fill the position of governor, any man may be able to occupy it, and the less he knows the less trouble he is likely to be to those under whom he acts. Of course, I do not for a moment suggest that the people who are in high positions are not fitted for them. They are my superiors, and I am not their judge. It would be as impertinent to praise them as it would be indiscreet to condemn them. I am not discussing the men but the System; and yet no system, however good, can be properly considered apart from the men who work it. The public do not know who are their servants, and many are doubtful as to whether public servants are not the masters of the public. There is a salutary rule in the service which prevents a man from making public anything that comes to his knowledge in his official capacity. This makes for the dignity of the service by preventing open discussion of the fitness of its members and the policy of their acts; whether it makes for the efficiency of the service from the standpoint of public utility is another question altogether. It might be wise, however, before accepting any official statement as final, to know something about the person who is responsible for framing it. The higher men are placed in the System, the more they are cut off by the nature of their work from personal contact with the prisoners placed under their rule; and if contact is absolutely necessary before you can begin to know a man, it will follow that they know less of the man than anybody. That need not hinder their opinions from carrying great weight, however, for it would be something of a slight for anyone to pass over them, or to neglect them in favour of a subordinate person, when seeking information as to the cause of failure in our institutions and suggestions for remedying the evil.

If a man would be a criminologist he had better leave criminals alone. There are books in abundance that tell about their height, their weight, the crimes they have committed, the evil heredity which is theirs, and the wonderful things they have said. They are very interesting, and in one way very amusing; they enable you to compile tables, and a scientific work is of no use without tables, for has not somebody said that science is measurement? They do not enable you to tell a thief when you see him, or the work of the detective department would be considerably lightened. As little do they enable you to form an opinion as to what you had better do with the thief when you have caught him. But although they are defective in these respects-although they provide no easy guide as to the treatment of Mr William Sikes or Lord Camlachie when you have convicted them of their misdeeds,—they furnish valuable data on which to reform men, not individually but by the hundred! It would be incredible, were it not for the fact that we are actually engaged in providing new institutions for the purpose of reforming men before we have made any inquiry as to the causes of failure in the old, and certainly before we have even begun to inquire into the character of the men whom they are to reform. All that it is necessary to know regarding them is that they have committed so many crimes! One thing is absolutely certain, and that is, that the new institutions will cost more than the

old. They will also provide employment for those who can get it—unless, indeed, the men who have been engaged in the System that has proved a failure are to be employed in the System which is to prove a success.

Already there are some people asking whether the criminal or the criminologist is likely to be the more expensive nuisance, and it is difficult to answer the question; but it will yet require to be faced. There is a great deal of talk about the break-up of the family, but men in institutions do not live together like members of a family; and to teach them to conform to the rule that exists there, is not to educate them to live outside. The most important thing about a prison is not that its inmates are comfortable or uncomfortable; it is that life there tends to destroy what sense of initiative they have and to teach them to submit their will to that of others. Their obedience makes for good government within the institution; and if they were to remain there, or to live under similar conditions, all their days, nothing could be urged against it. But if they are expected to take a place outside among men who must think and act for themselves, no worse training could be conceived. Our prisons were made uncomfortable enough in all conscience, but that did not keep those who had been there from repeating their misconduct. They have been made more comfortable in certain respects, and some of the reformatory institutions have offered an easier and a healthier existence to their inmates than they could have when they behaved well outside; but that has not led them to seek re-admission voluntarily, though many of them return involuntarily as a result of being caught at their former practices.

The main concern his fellow-citizens have with regard to the criminal is their own safety and comfort. So long as he is kept in prison (under whatever name it is called, prison it is while the man is made the slave of those over him) he does not trouble the community. Their worry begins when he gets out. If he is unemployed, whether from unwillingness to work or from inability to get it, he can only live on what he gets from others or on what he takes. As one of them has put it, it is more profitable to steal than to beg. In either case, there is a risk of being caught; but, whereas if you beg you are not likely to get anything from one person in ten, while each time you run the risk of arrest, if you steal you always get something and you are not always caught.

When a man is liberated he may be either set at large under the care and guardianship of someone, or he may be turned loose to do as he can or as he will. Hitherto convicts have been liberated on ticket-of-leave and the abuses of the system have been denounced and discussed for forty years. At last it has been decided that the convict need not report himself to the police, whom he regards as his natural enemies. It will be admitted that this indicates progress. It is not necessary to believe that the convict is right in his opinion of the police, but it ought to be apparent to anyone that men's actions are determined by their beliefs with regard to people and things about them. Even though the policeman were an angel, if the convict believed him to be an oppressor his action would be affected thereby. What we believe is of great consequence to us, but it is of very little consequence to him. Whether a new system will be any great improvement on the old will altogether depend on the view taken by the convict of those to whom he has to report himself. They will require not only to be well intentioned but to be something more. It is all very well for a man to have a good conscience—that concerns him: but what concerns others is that he should do the work he undertakes to do. In business a man who turns out bad work will not find his employer excuse him because he is very conscientious. Like Weir of Hermiston, it is not so much a Christian cook they want as a good dinner.

It is something—indeed, it is a great thing—to enlist in the work men and women who are prepared to assist in helping the criminal to adopt a new way of living, and it is to be hoped that such helpers will be sought out and encouraged;

but more needs to be done than to free the convict from the belief that unsympathetic eyes are upon him, before there is any guarantee that the public will not suffer from his misconduct.

Some proper provision will have to be made to enable him to support himself honestly. Find work for him and set somebody to see that he does it and that he does not break the law. This is exactly what is done in prison, under conditions unfavourable to the development in him of a spirit of self-respect and a habit of independence. If the power over criminals, and the pay, which are granted to prison officials, were given to persons outside prison, the public would be as well protected from the criminal as it is at present—to put it at the lowest; and the criminal, not being cut off from the healthy life of the community, though separated from his former companions and surroundings, instead of acquiring habits that will be useless to him at the expiry of his sentence might learn new habits which would tend to destroy the old.

You never know whether a man is reformed or not until he is set to live outside an institution, and the only guarantee of his reform is the acquisition of new interests and the formation of new friends. If any good is to be done at all, it must be by restricting liberty as little as possible. Because a man has done some bad things it need not be necessary to restrain him from doing the other things he has done which were not bad; and in my experience the only way to help a man has been to find out what he wanted to do and, provided it was not harmful to himself or others, to assist him to do it. To make a man obey you without question is a strange way of teaching him to act for himself. To induce him to follow your advice is one thing, but to force him to do what you tell him is quite another.

In most cases criminals are not as unreasonable as the persons who set out to instruct them. They follow their line of conduct because on the whole they think it is worth while, and they weigh chances and prospects as carefully as others.

In each case the plan is to find out why the person does the things to which objection is taken, and, having found out, to proceed to make it not worth his while. The conduct of many is astonishing, but that is just another way of saying that it is conduct that would not be followed by those who are astonished. There is always something behind it. If it be true that the longer a person is in an institution the more likely he is to acquire the habit of depending on others, and of waiting to be told what to do, it follows that the shorter time he is there the less risk there is of his losing his power of initiative. Again, if it is desirable in the interest of his fellowcitizens to place the criminal under care and guardianship until he has satisfied them, his neighbours, that he no longer requires the one or the other, then the sooner he is put in this position the better. Experience shows that reformatory institutions have not reformed their inmates into such a shape that they were the better fitted to take their place in the world. It is always the after-care that decides the matter; and, to put it in a Hibernian way, I suggest that the after-care should take place first.

If a man has to satisfy officials of his fitness to be discharged from a reformatory, he will play to the officials. What special qualifications they have for judging, Heaven only knows: all that they can say is that he behaves well, or otherwise under their care; and it is quite conceivable that a man may be soured by the belief that he is not being fairly treated by them, although they may have a clear conscience in the matter. I have seen a good many tough customers in my day, but I have never met anybody who was bad enough to justify his being permanently placed under the dominion of even the best of officials. In a reformatory men are shut off from the world, and are shut in with others who share their vices. They are not able to get away from their old associations and their old memories; the old desires are kept alive; and the new habits formed, even when they are not harmful, are developed in an atmosphere that is not favourable to good citizenship.

There can be no equality of treatment possible in an institution where the rules are the main concern of the officials; for, while all men are unequal, uniformity of treatment implies inequality of treatment. Each man will require to be treated as a man and without regard to others who have committed like crimes. Until this is realised and acted upon there is not much hope for him or for us. But there are vested interests in institutions, and these bar the way. It is difficult for any man to see that the work he does in the world may be useless work, and he is all too ready to assume that the institution in which he is interested and employed is necessary, even if it is not beneficial. In this part of the country there have actually been complaints on the part of the managers of several institutions that the magistrates were not sending people to them in sufficiently large numbers. These complaints could only spring from a belief in the necessity of the institutions—a belief apparently not shared by those against whom the complaints were directed, and a belief certainly not held by the friends of those who had been sent there; for if there is one thing more clear than another, it is that the ordinary citizen of the social class which is most largely represented in our institutions has no faith in them. The managers in question, or some of them, have explained that at anyrate the people were better there than in their own homes. Some of them, it is true, had homes that were a disgrace to modern civilisation; but that, while not to be left out of account, is really not the point, which is: If a person offends, what is the best you can do in order to secure that he will not offend again? Why not improve their homes?

In the case of young people, there are many who suffer from lack of care and attention, not because their parents are ill disposed, but because they are ill off; and it is something worse than false economy that causes us, when the young have offended, to pay somebody who has nothing but an official interest in them to look after them, instead of seeing that the burden of poverty which causes the want of care on the part of a parent should be lightened to the extent of enabling that parent to give the attention to her family which she would do if she were better off. It is a foolish proceeding to allow criminals to be made and then to devise elaborate machinery in order to unmake them; and it is not wise to establish reformatories before you know those whom you seek to reform. I suggest that before we start a new system of imprisonment we should use the opportunities we possess (first) to find out in each case why and how the criminal has gone wrong; 1 (second) to find out from himself and others what powers he has shown and the right things he has done; (third) to work from our knowledge of the good in him towards stimulating his conduct in that direction; (fourth) to find out what friends he has who are persons of good will, and to induce and encourage them to assist him to do well; and (fifth) to give power, and when necessary, pay, such as at present is given to officials in prison, to suitable guardians who would undertake the care, and give the attention required outside of prison, to a convicted person.

JAMES DEVON.

GLASGOW.

¹ The practice of passing sentence on a person immediately he has been convicted of a crime is breaking down. The placing of offenders on probation, for instance, is in one sense a postponement of sentence. They have to come before the Court when called upon within a fixed period, and if they behave well there may be no further sentence passed.

In other cases the judge hears a statement made on behalf of the prisoner which may, however, be as grotesquely one-sided as that made

against him.

Would there not be gain if even after conviction there was some delay before sentence, the interval being occupied in inviting and examining information regarding the offender? That there are many who would be willing to assist in this work, and some who would be prepared to help in the after-care of the offender, there can be no doubt.

Since this article was written I have had evidence of the fact that the

interest in some such reform is very widespread.

THE AMERICAN FAMILY.

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THE place which the family occupies as a social unit has, in the last fifty years, distinctly narrowed. The lessened worth of the family, as a social unit, may be interpreted by reference to the current doubt regarding the happiness which the family creates and conserves. For much doubt is expressed regarding the happiness of the American home. Ask, even at a wedding, the ordinary guest whether there are more happy than unhappy marriages, and the answer will likely be that the unhappy marriages exceed the happy ones. Whatever might prove to be the truth—if the truth it were possible to learn,—the simple fact that the belief is as it is, is significant. The belief or doubt of one individual regarding the happiness or unhappiness of the American home may be only a reflection of the personal conjugal condition of the one speaking. An answer, too, might be based more upon observation than upon experience. But I believe that the supposition is quite rife that the marriage which is distinctly happy is exceptional. I, for one, do not believe that the distinctly happy marriage is exceptional, but the supposition is so common as to awaken serious foreboding. It is commonly thought that the number of marriages which are disappointing in that they give more misery than was anticipated is greater than the number of those which give more blessedness.

The interpreter of social and domestic phenomena may

justly comment upon this condition by saying that such a conclusion belongs to the progress of all affairs human. Such a conclusion marks the movement from youth to age, from a noble and hopeful promise to imperfect fulfilment. The condition is not unique. What merchant gets the wealth he anticipated? What lawyer secures the practice which he believed was assured? What doctor is as useful to the community as he thought he would be? What minister serves the people as nobly as he anticipated? The promise of the dawn of life and of career is not usually made good in the afternoon. The condition, therefore, of marital unhappiness should not be charged up as a debt against the family, but rather should be interpreted as a condition of human character and service.

The moralist may also be permitted to say that happiness is no more the supreme purpose of the family than it is the supreme purpose of the individual. Epicureanism, however highly refined or broadly conceived, does not represent the final cause of the building of domestic altars. The enlargement and enrichment of personality, the proper training of children, the performance of the duty owed to general society in making contributions for its betterment, represent the causes of the foundation and of the continuance of the family far more important than is the happiness of the family. Therefore, even if the family has failed to secure happiness, it has not necessarily failed to secure advantages of far greater worth.

But the philosopher might be allowed to say that the home which is not happy is seldom able to make any worthy contribution to the social wealth of the community. It is not able, usually, to give a proper training to children. It also commonly serves to narrow and to deplete, to render acrid or bitter the personality of its older members. Happiness may be an unworthy purpose for the foundation and continuance of the home, but happiness seems to be a necessary condition for the home to secure results which are more precious than happiness. Happiness is the soil in which the flowers of the gentle ministry

of love, of self-sacrifice, of enriched and beautiful personality come to their sweetest blooming.

But I venture to believe that most homes are less unhappy than the current interpretation judges them to be. And I also believe that the number of homes which are unhappy is less large than commonly thought. Even if there be one divorce for some six marriages, as is the fact in the State of Indiana, in certain years, it is not to be forgotten that there are six marriages for only one divorce. Divorce is still exceptional. It is also to be borne in mind that reports of domestic happiness do not get into the newspapers. The reporter's pencil has no affinity for the happy home. The happy home is quiet and orderly. Certain types of domestic infelicity and irregularity are anything but quiet and orderly. They are blatant and hysterical. For them the reporter's pencil has a distinct and immediate affinity. The ideal of a happy home is, I believe, more constantly and more fully realised than are the ideals entertained in youth of obtaining wealth or fame or any other forms of what are called success. Have we a right to put on the home a unique and exceptional demand for the realisation of its dreams? For the home does not stand alone as a social institution. It is constituted by individuals. It bears the impress of their character. It is placed in the social order and environment; it is touched by this environment, invested by this order. It in turn helps to form the personalities which constitute and continue to maintain it, and it also in turn aids in the promotion of the social welfare. On the whole is it not true that the home is finer in sentiment, richer in noble feeling, more worthily self-contained and more nobly successful in securing the supreme ends of humanity, than are the single persons who form the home or who make the social relations which constitute its environment?

But although all this may be true, it is nevertheless also true that the home has in these last years suffered a decline as the source and centre of the best life. The causes of this decline, occurring in recent years, go back into

time not recent. The causes go back into the Protestant Reformation.

The Protestant Reformation was the greatest movement for individualism in human society which the world has ever known. It was not simply a religious movement; it was not a protest against ecclesiasticism, but, though the movement was aimed directly at ecclesiasticism, through ecclesiasticism it was a movement aimed at the freedom of the individual life. It was a protest against domination over the personal intellect or over the personal spiritual life. It resulted in the elevation of the individual heart and mind as against the sentiment and faith Universal and Catholic. It substituted the judgment of the individual for the judgment of a hierarchy. The Reformation and the Renaissance united to give a new spirit of liberty and of culture, and this spirit of liberty and culture touched individuals far more than institutions. Both the Renaissance and the Reformation have resulted in the elevation of the individual and the decline of the family as a social unit. The distribution of the Bible in the vernacular gave the German and the English people the most advanced opportunity in recent centuries of emphasising the right of private judgment and the responsibility of each man for his intellectual and moral character. The advent and the spread of the Puritan idea made the personality of each person outstanding. Bacon and the Cartesian philosophers emphasised the duty of each man to search out the truth for himself. In poem and tractate Milton pleaded for the liberty of the individual. Locke, indirectly through his sensational philosophy, and directly through his essays on government, placed the single man and not a dogmatic system as the centre of social and legal order. The French philosophers of the middle of the eighteenth century, and especially Rousseau, followed the earlier English metaphysicians in their tendency to elevate the individual above social institutions. Transferred to the new world, the individualism of the Renaissance and of the Reformation flowered into a political democracy, and a political democracy in turn developed a more intense form of individualism. The political principle upon which was waged the contest of the American colonies for independence — that government derives its just powers from the consent of the governed—was the development of the social principle of the supremacy of the individual. The assertion of the Declaration of Independence that all men are created equal was simply the application of a current French notion of the equality of individuals, as the assertion of the inalienable right of liberty was simply the application of a current English notion of individual freedom. This theory the French Revolution stretched to such a length that it broke into pieces. The American Revolution so conserved the theory that it built on it the State and social order.

It cannot for an instant be doubted that the advent and development of individualism have contributed to the decline of the home as a social unit and force. The historic progress and movement are evident, but the potency of other forces now existing, contributing to a similar result, is no less evident.

Education, in its lower and higher ranges, has come to be the dominant force in modern life. Through the public school and private, through the university and the college, either endowed from public funds or by private beneficence, are created the strongest forces affecting public opinion and happiness. The teacher of the public school represents the single remaining force of our age by which the State primarily seeks its own conservation. The State may, through various tests, determine what men shall, as lawyers, or as practitioners of medicine or of dentistry, be regarded as capable of caring for the important interests of the commonwealth. But the State makes no attempt to require a professional education of a certain number of citizens, yet the State does absolutely determine that every child shall, for a certain number of weeks of each year and for certain years of his life, attend the public school. The teacher, therefore, represents the most significant force of the civil power. But education, be it remembered, is

a matter in, of, and for the individual. The education of the primary school and of the university seeks to train the individual in that most important principle discovered or applied in the realm of education of the last fifty years, known as the elective principle. The elective principle is based simply and only upon the character of the individual. In education the family and the school exist for the individual; and it is only in other relations than educational that the individuals exist for the family and for the State. The presence, therefore, of education, as the most potent of all social forces, has resulted in the appreciation of individualism and in the depreciation of the family.

Modern life, too, has contributed toward a similar result through its enlargement. For modern life has vastly enlarged the sphere of the individual. Each individual is or may be a world-citizen. Wherever he lives, in hamlet or metropolis, in prairie village or in national capital, he may know the world. The newspaper each day offers him the news of Australia, Sweden, South Africa, and Brazil. His table is spread with food gathered from Texas, from the wheat-fields of the north-west, the orange groves of California, and the banana trees of the Tropics. The famines of India are of interest to him, and the revolutions in China or Turkey make direct appeals to his enthusiasms or indignations. These knowledges and conditions represent an increase of interest in things outside the home, and help to explain the decline of interest in things inside the home. But be it remembered that these interests are the interests of the individual. Such interests, thus organised and constituted, result in the narrowing of the home as a centre of life.

I do not doubt, moreover, that the greater independence of woman, constantly growing in the last fifty years, has resulted in a decline of interest on the part of women in the life of the family. The sphere of her activities has enlarged, and these activities themselves have become more significant. Seventy-five years ago the household and the schoolhouse were the two hemispheres in which women could fittingly work; to-day in almost every business and profession women are engaged. What she does not do is far easier to indicate that what she does attempt. The whole movement known as "Woman's Rights" is specially significant. This movement was, and is, in many ways nothing less than superb. In many respects it has on its side all the virtues and the veracities and the verities. But be it said clearly and emphatically it was, and is, a movement for and of individualism. It was, and is, a movement to give to the women of the family certain presumed rights and opportunities and to impose on them certain duties and obligations which the men of the family had formerly exercised or performed. I am not saying but that this movement is, on the whole, wise and good; but I do say that the movement has resulted in a prominence of individualism which has, at least indirectly, resulted in the subordination of the family.

To vet one more cause of the decline of the importance of the family in recent times I wish to allude. This cause I shall call a decline in the sense of social or conjugal duty. The sense of industrial duty has, I think, distinctly lessened in the last decade. The ordinary workman at the trade does not take that interest in his work which he formerly took. The æsthetic and ethical sense of doing his job well has suffered. A similar decline is evident in respect to the family. Both men and women are less inclined to regard marriage as a duty than in the earlier time. The single life is, for most people, and especially for men, easier than the married life. The married life, in the duties which it imposes on each member of the pair, who constitute this life, respecting the proper rearing of children, is a life of serious responsibilities. The joys of the life are magnified, made more rich and ennobling, but the obligations of the life are made correspondingly binding and serious. From the assuming of such obligations many persons conscientiously shrink. They prefer to offer their contribution to human force through the independent work of the office than through the dependent work of the home. The unwillingness, therefore, to assume certain duties, serious for the individual, serious for the home, and serious for society, represents a relative decline of the family.

By reason of these causes—the individualising force of the Protestant Reformation, enlarged education, the complexity of modern life, the lessening of the social or conjugal duty—the value of the family, as a social unit, has suffered a great decline. A man who wishes or works for the betterment of the race must sorrow over such a decline.

The position now occupied by the family is indeed far higher than that occupied by the Jewish family in the time of Christ, or by the Greek or Roman family in the first Christian century, but the position in the United States is lower than it has been in 250 years. In social, religious, ethical, and personal value it is still great, but the value is less great than it has been at any period.

The purpose is, therefore, made evident of the restoration of the family. In the securing of this purpose I wish to point out certain methods.

A stricter and more constant use should be made of what may be called the legal sanctions for the establishment of the family. These legal sanctions are of the simplest sort. They arise from the relation of the family to the social order. This social order has an interest in the establishment of each home. Therefore marriage is not to be regarded as an affair of simply two individuals. It has relation to society and to humanity. Publicity, therefore, should attend the solemnisation of every marriage. In order, furthermore, to give assurance of the fitness of marriage, its solemnisation should represent forethought and deliberation. It were well if not a day, as is the law in most States, but if at least a week should intervene between the legal authority giving his consent to the solemnisation of marriage and the solemnisation itself. Moreover, it were well to do away with what is now known as a common-law marriage. Such a recognition, in some instances, may result in the relief

of certain contracting parties, but, in general, the law creates more abuses than it relieves.

The family, also, should receive the support of what I shall call social distinction. Its members should determine that its place in the social order should be great. Knowing that the destruction of the family aids in the disintegration of the general social bond which constitutes society, its members should labour for its perpetuity. The home may be called, adopting the term of biology, the social cell. Society from this cell is created. Every part, therefore, should be made to maintain the integrity and to promote the progress of this primary social force. At this point, the will of the two members which essentially constitute the home has the greatest value. Every home may be maintained if the members will to maintain it. Any home may be destroyed if either of the two members will to destroy it.

The third support in the restoration of the home to its proper place and function is found in what may be called the domestic sanctions. These sanctions are constituted largely by the children of a marriage. The stress and strain to which the conjugal tie is subjected when that tie unites only a husband and a wife, is great. The stress and strain to which the conjugal tie is subjected when that tie unites, not only a husband and wife but also children, is yet greater than when it unites husband and wife only; but be it said with firmer emphasis that the strength of the tie itself is increased by far greater strength than is the stress and strain increased through the presence of children. If one should say that marriage is formed for the sake of children, it is also true to say that children are created for the sake of the perpetuity of the wedlock, out of which they spring.

Advancing civilisations are in peril of becoming declining social stages by reason of a diminished birth-rate. The diminished birth-rate obtaining in France and in early native stock of the United States is the cause of public lamentation. This diminished birth-rate is more conspicuous in

families of the Protestant than of the Roman Catholic faith. The blessing of the Roman Catholic priesthood upon a numerous progeny is more abounding than obtains among the adherents of the Protestant religion.

The lack of children among what are known as the educated classes is most evident. In the six classes of Harvard College from 1872 to 1877 inclusive, 634 members had at a recent date married. In 1902 the surviving children of these marriages numbered 1,262—that is to say, the members of the classes who have married, together with their wives. have just practically reproduced themselves; or when one considers that 28 per cent. of the members of these six classes are not married, it is evident that the educated people do not reproduce themselves. This condition obtaining in recent years at Harvard College was not unique, for at Wesleyan University, Connecticut, the average number of children to each marriage from 1833 to 1840 was 4.5. In the decade from 1841 to 1850 it was 3.3; in the decade from 1851 to 1860 it was 3.2, and in the decade from 1861 to 1870 it was 2.6. The average number of children for each graduate, not for each marriage, in this same decade was 2.4. For the four decades under review the number of children for each marriage was 3.4. The current lamentation regarding the small size of the better American family is in part reasonable and in part unreasonable. The American family should, under ordinary conditions, perpetuate or more than perpetuate itself. The ordinary family should also bear children, in order to secure not only its perpetuity but also its integrity. The number of children, however, born to a family is of less consequence than that there should be children born to the family. The personal responsibilities which parents assume in bringing children into the world are so great that they should not become fathers and mothers unless they are ready to bear these responsibilities willingly. It is also to be remembered that the highest happiness of the family in and for itself may be, to a degree, sacrificed under the power of the procreative impulse.

From the sanctions of religion, moreover, great help should be derived in the restoration of the family. For the family as an individual, religion possesses inherent worth. A marriage which is interpreted as having relation only to the two parties contracting it, is in dire peril of dissolution. Marriage which is interpreted as having relation not only to the two parties contracting it, but also to the social order, is in less peril of dissolution; but the marriage which is interpreted as having relationship not only to the two parties contracting it, and to the social order, but also to ultimate being, gives grounds for the strongest assurance of its permanence. From the earliest time religion has contributed to the growth from polygamy and polyandry into monogamy. In certain stages and at certain times the religious interpretation of marriage has been blind or ferocious. In India the religious interpretation has been the cause of hideous abuses; but, on the whole, religion has been the mightiest force making for the highest type of marriage.

It should be said that the Roman Catholic Church has, on the whole, accomplished far more for the perpetuity of the marriage rite and for the integrity of the family than has the Protestant. From that extreme view which the Reformed Confession adopted touching marriage as a civil rite, which became of peculiar significance in the United States, there should occur a vital and fundamental reaction. If the Protestant communicant is not prepared to affirm with the Catholic that marriage is a sacrament, he can, at least, grant that marriage is sacramental. For, as Pope Leo XIII., in an encyclical issued in 1880, said: "For Christ Our Lord raised matrimony to the dignity of a sacrament; and matrimony is the contract itself, provided only that it be lawfully made. In addition to which, matrimony is a sacrament for this reason. that it is a sacred sign conveying grace, and presenting an image of the mystic nuptials of Christ with the Church. But the form and figure of these is expressed by that bond of perfect unity by which man and wife are joined together, and

which is nothing else but matrimony itself. Therefore it is evident that every lawful marriage between Christians is in and by itself a sacrament; and nothing can be more opposed to truth than that the sacrament is but an ornamental addition, or a character imparted from without, which may be separated and disjoined from the contract at will."

It were well if such teaching in essence were adopted by members of the Protestant Churches.

But the help that is of abounding value and of lasting worth in the restoration of the family lies in the personal sanctions. By the personal sanctions are meant the relationship of the two persons who unite themselves in marriage. Whatever may be the worth of the other sanctions, legal, social, domestic, religious, the worth of this simple sanction is greater than the value of all others. The home that is founded on economic marriages, or upon marriages representing social functions and conveniences, or upon passion, is doomed to destruction. Marriages which, in a word, are based on love, give promise, and they alone give promise, of lasting permanence and of noble enrichment. Such domestic unions are spiritual. In them the element of sex is necessary, but from this element the consciousness of sex soon vanishes. Such domestic unions represent unity of heart and intellect, of will and of conscience. Such marriages, moreover, represent the primary element of equality; each member of the union is par inter pares. Out of such conditions of spiritual unity and equality permanence is assured. Marriage that is thus based upon love represents the highest state to which a man and woman can attain. Its felicity has been well interpreted by John Stuart In his book on the subjection of women, Mill says: "What marriage may be in the case of two persons of cultivated faculties, identical in opinions and purposes, between whom there exists that best kind of equality, similarity of powers and capacities, with reciprocal superiority in them-so that each can enjoy the luxury of looking up to the other, and can have alternately the pleasure of leading and being led in the path of development,—I will not attempt to describe. To those who can conceive it there is no need; to those who cannot, it would appear the dream of an enthusiast. But I maintain, with the profoundest conviction, that this, and this only, is the ideal of marriage; and that all opinions, customs, and institutions which favour any other notion of it, or turn the conceptions and aspirations connected with it into any other direction, by whatever pretences they may be coloured, are relies of primitive barbarism. The moral regeneration of mankind will only really commence when the most fundamental of the social relations is placed under the rule of equal justice, and when human beings learn to cultivate their strongest sympathy with an equal in rights and in cultivation."

For the restoration of the family to the place it should occupy in human society, I know of no better methods than those which are embodied in the proper relations of marriage to the civil law, in the increasing of the social obligations embodied in wedlock and family, in the domestic sanctions which marriage imposes, and in the religious duties and opportunities which it represents; but, besides these sanctions, love itself is fundamental. Without it, the other helps for the restoration of the family are of small value; with it, the other supports gain in worth.

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RELIGION IN JERUSALEM AT THE PRESENT HOUR.

A RESIDENT IN JERUSALEM.

"IT were better to be of no Church, than to be bitter for any," said William Penn. Had he lived in Jerusalem, the capital of Christendom, he might have substituted "religion" for "Church." In that place, whose bewildering complexity of life and manifold charm and variety make it indeed the centre of the world, are seen at once, and in vivid contrast, the strength, the vitality, and the unloveliness of Christianitythe Christianity, that is, of Christians; for we are gradually beginning to realise that the Christianity that Christ taught and lived, and the Christianity that men teach and live, are as diverse as heaven and earth. This is partly because Christianity has come to mean the Church; generally, our own particular branch of it, though the wider-minded amongst us include the sister Churches, with reservations. Now, if Christianity were not a much greater, more divine thing than any Church or group of Churches, it had perished long ago; as it is, it lives to-day, triumphant alike over the narrowness of party, dogma, and creeds variously rendered and understood, of priestcraft and religious wars and persecutions, of the feuds of nationalities, of the dead level of mentality which regards Theology as a topic for table-talk or a means of livelihood. This article shuns such wide fields of controversy, intending rather to describe the present state of religion in the Holy City, and to show how a Christianity does yet somehow

survive, though in sore straits. That it survives at all abuses such as we shall describe, is, we submit, a proof of its vitality; and that it is trying to raise itself, a proof of its divineness.

The Greek, representing the Eastern side of the Church, and the Latin, representing the Western, are the largest and most important of the Communions at Jerusalem. besides the English, the Russian (which bears to the Greek Church much the same relation as that of the Colonial or the American Church to the English, i.e. a nationalised branch of the same Communion), the Syrian, the Coptic, the Armenian, the Abyssinian, and the Lutheran. There are also various recognised forms of Christianity, and others whose peculiar claims are known only to themselves. The Greek Church is the Church of the country, but centuries of war and change have reduced it to a state of absolute indifference-a Church in name only. The monasteries have gradually absorbed the wealth of the Church, and, as their rules allow the monks the personal use for life of monastic funds without account, they have been able to live smoothly and to benefit their relatives. Much of this wealth comes through the pilgrims, who pay whatever they can afford to the guardian monks of the holy places, in exchange for masses. The Church of the Holy Sepulchre gets the main share. The pilgrims bring their doles to the office of the chancellory of the Holy Sepulchre, with scraps of paper bearing the names to be mentioned at mass. The money is laid on the table; a monk in charge takes the papers. This goes on for hours, a goodly pile of money rising by degrees. Finally, the money is swept into a drawer, and the papers torn up and thrown away. The scene is described by eyewitnesses.

A monastery on a holy site owns a large olive-grove surrounding it. Single trees are sold to the pilgrims so that the oil may feed a lamp to burn for ever in their name before the altar. Perhaps a number of pilgrims, or a village, will join to purchase so rare a privilege. Every tree in that grove has been sold times over for the same purpose; and the monks probably eat the olives into the bargain.

The Bishop of —— lives in a large house within twelve hours of his diocese, life in Jerusalem being more comfortable and convenient than anywhere in his see. He has an ingenious way of augmenting the episcopal income. He fills hundreds of large envelopes with tiny olive-sprigs, or with stones marked as from this or that holy place, or with his photograph, printed cheaply in large quantities. These envelopes are inscribed "From the Bishop of ——." They are sold in hundreds, the pilgrims taking away with them the treasured contents and leaving in the envelope whatever they can afford. It is surprising how these small offerings will swell to quite a respectable sum.

A little boy lay dying of a long and wearisome illness. He wanted the priest to come and tell him things that would make the long hours of pain seem less long, and the great change under whose shadow he lay less terrible. Twice the priest came, but each time before he entered the house he extracted a mejideh (about 4s. 6d.) from the child's widowed mother. As the illness progressed, and the claims of food and medical necessities became more urgent, the priest ceased to come: the mother could no longer pay him.

An old man has been bedridden for over two years; during that time he has been visited twice by the priest. The family are too poor to pay, and the priest will not come without.

A wealthy Orthodox Arab 1 died, leaving three houses and some land in trust to a monastery to be administered for his children, who were all young. The monastery annexed the entire property. The children were educated with great difficulty at foreign schools; they were too poor to move in their own circle, and two of the girls were married to poor working

¹ Orthodox Arabs, i.e. Syrians belonging to the Greek Orthodox Church. I use the word Arabs as distinguishing them from members of the Syrian Church, though, correctly speaking, they are by nationality not Arabs but Syrians.

men below their own station, while the boys had a very hard struggle to live. Of this property, left in trust for their benefit, they have not had one farthing's use.

In every church and chapel the monks keep a store of tapers, which the pilgrims buy when they come in, and set alight in a stand while they pray. When they leave, the tapers are extinguished and sold to the next comer. Each pilgrim pays one metallik for the use of a taper, that is, about three farthings; and in the season a taper will be sold ten or twelve times.

At a funeral, besides the usual fees, the mourners have to buy the tapers used from the officiating priest—a source of small but positive gain.

Of the appalling ignorance of priest and people I need give but two instances. A Greek priest was much struck by a picture of St Peter walking on the sea, and asked the Church of England missionary in whose house it was, to tell him the story. He had never heard it before. An Arab woman wanted to go down to Jericho for the Epiphany, to attend the midnight service at the Jordan. "It is a great feast," she informed her English mistress, "because there Christ baptized Mohammed." Indeed, so little are the people taught and cared for that changes of Church are frequent and easy, upon the most trivial causes. For instance, a Greek was engaged to be married, but in the interval his brother secretly married the younger sister of the bride-elect, which brought the first couple within the proscribed degrees of relationship. He and she therefore joined the Latin Church, and were married without any further trouble. Again, the Germans were building on a large scale in an Orthodox Arab village; as long as the building was on hand the working part of the village joined the Lutheran Church, and a fair-sized church was built to accommodate the congregation of "converts." As soon as all this was finished, however, the congregation, almost to a man, returned to the Greek Church: employment was at an end. Men will go over by the hundred or the

thousand to any Church if they are vexed or thwarted by their own, and as easily return. Many a large English Church congregation could have been formed thus, from pique, or the belief that British political protection would be ensured by the change; but the present Bishop in Jerusalem has steadily set his face against the reception of any such frivolous "converts."

But there is a hopeful side to these abuses. For some ten years past there has been growing up within the Church a body of young Arabs, devoted to their Church, who would neither leave her not yet countenance abuses they were powerless to prevent. These men were brought up in foreign schools, being denied education by the Greek monks, whose policy was to keep them under and prevent their raising awkward questions. This selfish policy has proved their own undoing, for, driven to seek for education elsewhere, the Arabs eagerly adopted views they could not reconcile with the state of their own Church. A self-respecting Arab would rarely receive a monk into his house; the younger generation went further, and refused to confess to men who were notorious evil-livers. The monks retaliated by denying them the Communion. Matters remained thus until the Turkish Revolution of 1908, by granting religious freedom, made it possible for the Arabs to advance their claims. These were, representation on the governing bodies of the Church, control in the finance, a national share in the episcopate, and a resident episcopacy; these things were granted to them in 1872, but had lapsed in the interval. The contending parties were all the Arab congregations of the Greek Church and the Hellenic clergy, especially the monks; it thus became largely a national movement. Undoubtedly the Arabs claimed rights, for till the sixteenth century all Church property having the Wakuf (religious entail) was in their hands, and also the chief ecclesiastical posts. About 1534 the Hellenic monks came in, and from that time everything was gradually drawn into their control. Sophronius, who was Patriarch when Omar took

Jerusalem, was a native of Damascus, to whom (say the Arabs) Omar gave a charter, never repealed, empowering him to keep out "Greeks, thieves, and heretics." The last Arab Patriarch, Anthemos, died in 1807, since when they have all been Greeks.

Matters came to a crisis on 6th November 1908, the Feast of St James, when the Patriarch takes service in St James's Church, a chapel in the Holy Sepulchre Church where the vernacular is used. The monks, by secretly accusing the Arabs beforehand of murderous intents against them, had obtained troops from the Government to protect them. They also carried on to the roofs of the Church and convent stones and boiling water, ready to throw down upon the crowds assembled in the great courtyard below. But the plot leaked out in time; the Arabs did not attend the service, but carried the whole matter straight to the Patriarch and the Governor. and vowed that they would never attend any service until their rights had been restored, and openly confessed by the Patriarch and the Government. The Patriarch, though himself a Greek Islander, had the courage to side with the reformers; in consequence, his life for weeks was in danger from the vengeful fury of the monks. He was practically a prisoner in the convent, guarded now by soldiers, now by the Arabs. The Arabs elected a Council of Forty, the members of which were chosen from the leading Greek-Arab families in Jerusalem after prayer in the Church of St James. According to the new constitution, the Council, to be legal, had to be acknowledged by the Patriarch and the Governor; but their petitions to each in such a time of uncertainty remaining unanswered, they telegraphed to Constantinople, and received recognition. The Greek Synod thereupon deposed the Patriarch (16th January 1909), and the news was carried to his Beatitude by the triumphant monks. He, hardly believing it, yet not sorry to be quit of the strife, sent word to the Governor that if it were true, he should prefer to retire peacefully to Mount Sinai. His message

reached the Governor as "The Patriarch wishes to retire to Mount Sinai." The Arabs, hearing this, rushed hotfoot to the Governor and threatened to kill the monks if the Patriarch were removed; and it is not wonderful that at this point the Governor declared himself unable to decide the case, and appealed for a commission from Constantinople. Government confirmed the Patriarch in his position, denying the Synod's right to depose, and sent commissioners, who for weeks patiently and cautiously investigated the case. The whole city seemed to hang upon this momentous question and its issues in an extraordinary way. The situation was picturesque, but full of danger: the Patriarch was a close prisoner; the monks were furious, fighting hard with backs to the wall; the Arabs were determined to abate nothing of their claim; the churches were all closed; and, in the few monasteries where services were held, the monks absolutely refused to pray for the Patriarch. The monks also ceased the weekly dole of bread to the poor, and took away the rooms they allot rent free; the Arabs retaliated by paying shop-rents, which were due to the convent, to the Patriarch direct. There were some dark days in January when bloodshed seemed unavoidable, and but for the remarkable self-control of the Arabs it must have followed; but though the monks once threw vitriol into the crowd, the only deed of violence on the part of the Arabs was a beating administered to one of the monks. Stealthy interference from outside, under the guise of help, added the usual political complications to the crisis, and delayed settlement. At length, after sitting till early in March, the commission failed to settle the question, beyond the expulsion of some of the monkish ringleaders; the representatives of the Forty at Constantinople had been equally unsuccessful. One of the exiled monks had a peculiarly odious name for his greedy appropriation of Church funds; his luggage was searched at the Customs, and, under a decent covering of monkish garments, were found various articles of Church plate, very valuable, which were certainly not private

property. A seminary for training Greek and Arab youths for the priesthood was closed about this time; there were then three Arab students out of a possible one hundred and fifty. It has lately been reopened, somewhat under full numbers, without one Arab on the roll.

The question is not yet settled, though there is hope of its being so. Since that fateful 6th of November 1908 to the present date, not one in twenty of the Arabs has attended service, even at great festivals; they remain true to their vow. The Patriarch cannot do more than he has done; and every one of the three hundred monks nominally under his rule is a dead obstacle to progress and reform. No one can define the future of the Greek Church, unless its great past and its present survival may be taken as a promise. It may be that to it will be given the evangelisation of the East. But not yet. There are dark days before it ere it dare aspire to teach truths it has so long neglected and forgotten; perhaps its chief hope lies in the fact that from the ashes of spiritual deadness is rising a spirit of reform. English sympathies (not sentiment) will probably be with the Arabs, who are now fighting the battle that we in England fought four hundred years ago-and won.

Side by side with the movement in the Greek Church an equally strong hatred of monkish rule is growing up amongst the Latin Arabs. The oldest Western Order is the Franciscan, dating from 1219; it is also the most powerful and important. The Intendant or Warden, who ranks as Abbot, is styled "Reverendissimo," and is "Guardianus sacri Montis Sion et Custos Terræ Sanctæ." He must be an Italian, and is appointed, or confirmed in his post, by the Vatican every three years. He is assisted, and in absence represented by, a Vicar or President, whose appointment is triennial, and who succeeds him in case of death. The affairs of the community are managed by a "Discretorium," consisting of the Custos, Vicar, Procurator (who is always a Spaniard, and whose election is for life), and three monks called "Patres discreti." Until the Latin

Patriarchate was founded in 1847, the Custos was the spiritual head of all Latin Churches in Palestine, except Mount Carmel and the Jesuits in the Lebanon. The Franciscans still take precedence of all Latin Orders, and the Patriarchate priests are not appointed to places occupied by them. The Franciscan monastery at Jerusalem accommodates one hundred monks; they have also a fine church, with clock and bells, a hospice, primary schools for both sexes, doctors and dispensaries, and they do carpentry, shoe-making, ironwork, printing, and bookbinding. They give rooms free and bread to their own poor. There is a special novitiate at Nazareth, whence students pass to study philosophy at Bethlehem, the humanities at Ain Karim, and theology at Jerusalem. They pursue agriculture at Kubeibeh and at Ain Karim, and own a large part of the Kedron Valley. They have houses also at Ramleh, Tabor, Cana of Galilee, Tiberias, Acre, Sidon, Tyre, Beyrout, Damascus, Tripolis, Aleppo, and Larissa.

Other Latin settlements in Palestine, with dates of their foundation, are:—

- 1. Carmelites (alleged date of founder, Elijah, B.C. 900). A monastery on Mount Carmel. A contemplative Order, having spiritual jurisdiction over Haifa. There is a Carmelite sister-hood on the Mount of Olives (1875).
- 2. Jesuits (founded 200 years ago). A college at Beyrout and theological seminary in the Lebanon.
- 3. Latin Patriarchate (1847). Theological seminary at Beit Jala (the ancient Zela); settlements at Nablus, Medaba, Taibeh, Gaza, Jifna, Ramallah, Salt, and Kerak. The priests are mostly Arabs, and the aim is to live as far as possible with and like the natives.
- 4. Sisters of St Joseph (1848). Orphanage at Jerusalem, where they also work the French Hospital.
- 5. Notre Dame de Sion (1856). One of the Ratisbon Institutions, founded for the conversion of the Jews. Convent and girls' school at Jerusalem, and orphanage at Ain Karim.

- 6. Brotherhood of Notre Dame de Sion. Also a Ratisbon Institution. Boys' schools at Jerusalem and Ain Karim.
- 7. Frères des Écoles Chrétiennes (1876). Schools at Jerusalem, Bethlehem, Haifa, Nazareth, and Beyrout.
- 8. White Fathers (1878). Belonging to the Order founded by Cardinal Lavigerie for mission work in Africa. A seminary in Jerusalem for priests of the Greek-Uniat Communion, of 130 students; also a good Biblical museum.
- 9. St Jean de Dieu (1879). An independent community, which works a hospital at Tantur near Bethlehem, and also one at Nazareth.
- 10. Fathers of the Sacred Heart (1879). Houses at Bethlehem, Latrun, and Nazareth.
- 11. Sisters of the Rosary (1880). The sisters are Arabs, who do educational work in most of the places where the Patriarchate priests are.
- 12. Dominicans (1884). A learned Order, who study the history and archæology of Palestine in connection with the Bible. A large college and museum at Jerusalem. They bear an excellent name.
- 13. Sisters of St Claire (1884). A house and about forty nuns at Jerusalem.
- 14. Sisters of St Vincent de Paul (1886). Orphanages for girls and boys, a blind asylum, home for the aged poor, for foundlings. They also visit the villages for medical work, have charge of the Turkish Military Hospital, and treat the lepers at Siloam. Houses at Jerusalem, Bethlehem, and Bir Zeit.
- 15. Augustinians (1887). Seminary for missionary priests at Jerusalem. They also organise the great Latin pilgrim caravans.
- 16. Sisters of St Charles Borromeo (1887, German). Girls' school and hospice at Jerusalem, where they also keep house at the Austrian Hospice.
- 17. Sisters of Ste Marie Réparatrices (1888). A large convent at Jerusalem, with an inner circle of nuns who are

never seen. They make vestments for poor churches, which the Latin Patriarch distributes. The inner nuns "make reparation" by prayer for the dishonour done by Protestants and unbelievers to the Blessed Virgin and the Holy Sacrament.

- 18. German Lazarists (1890). Chiefly educational work. A large hospice at the Damascus Gate, and a monastery and cathedral on Mount Zion.
- 19. Salesian Fathers (1891). School for one hundred boys at Bethlehem, and two agricultural schools.
- 20. Sœurs Auxiliatrices (1891). Affiliated to the above Order; they do the domestic work of the houses.
- 21. Trappist Fathers (1891). Agricultural establishments at Latrun and near Alexandretta.
- 22. Benedictine Nuns (1896). An orphanage for fifteen Greek-Catholic girls.
- 23. Benedictine Fathers (1899). A seminary for fifteen Syrian-Uniat Catholic boys. They have acquired nearly the whole of the Mount of Offence, where they are building, at Jerusalem; and have an agricultural establishment at Abu Ghosh (Kirjath Jearim).
- 24. Our Lady of the Enclosed Garden (1901). An Italian Order, but coming from South America. A convent at Artas, "Solomon's Garden" (Cant. iv. 12); and an orphanage for Armenian Catholic girls.
- 25. Passionists (1903). A contemplative and preaching Order; they are building at Bethany.
- 26. French Lazarists (1904). A missionary and preaching Order, established in Jerusalem, Beyrout, Damascus, and the Lebanon.

The French "Associations Bill" (1901) caused a great influx of monks and nuns into Palestine, the population of which is about 700,000. From this we can gauge something of the deadly proportion of these religious houses to the working, industrial, and commercial population.

The Franciscan, which is the most wealthy and influential of the Orders, is also the most unpopular. The monks have

the whip-hand by reason of their gifts of bread and roomswhich, while tending to pauperise the people, also make them afraid to risk their loss by incurring the monks' displeasure. It is, "You do this, or you lose your room"; and the threat is never an idle one. A man was threatened with excommunication if he continued to send a younger brother to a "Protestant" school; he persisted, and he was excommunicated. His living as a guide was also taken away from him by the monks for another offence, Latin pilgrims being forbidden to employ him. Another protégé of the monks started a small social club for young men; there were about twenty, who met to read the newspapers and for debates. The monks insisted upon one of their number always being present, and so severe was the censorship that all interest was checked. They therefore decided to do without the monks; the membership rose almost at once to two hundred, and the debates (which dealt pretty freely with monkish rule and its abuses) became exceedingly lively and interesting.

A Greek boy was removed from a Latin school by his uncle, a Greek priest, who disapproved of his increasingly Latin proclivities. He fretted very much after his old school, and one half-holiday he disappeared. The last time he was seen was just outside his old school. A few days later word was brought by one who had seen him near Haifa, driving with a large Latin pilgrimage. Months elapsed before he was heard of again; then came a letter from the boy to his mother (whose only child he was), bearing neither date nor address but postmarked "Naples." The letter simply said that he was well and happy. From that day, six years ago, to this, absolute silence.

Monks and nuns have done good work in the past, when they reclaimed waste lands and kept alive a little flickering spark of learning. But now the world is more generally educated, learning is safe, the waste places are waste no longer. The monastic day is over; the profession now is but a cloak to conceal the slothful lives of those who have

either no wish or no capacity for work. The monks of the twentieth century have degenerated into beggars of the most abhorrent type; they are drones, living on charity wrung from the workers of the world; most horrible of all, they proclaim themselves a channel whereby men can give to God (and by no means of that which costs them nothing). The proportion of these religious houses to the population of Jerusalem, about 75,000, is overwhelming. There cannot be work for all, and there is not; and it is cruelly unfair to the pilgrims to live upon their devout credulity. If there were work, or if the work professed were done, we should possibly hear less of the luxury of certain houses, whose "cells" are comfortable separate rooms, and whose table on gala nights shines with plate presented by rich or princely pilgrims. Nor should we blush as Christians over those scenes of strife and bloodshed wherein Christians display the nakedness of their religion to the biting scorn of the Moslem and the Jew.

These small frantic stands made by laymen against monkish rule may herald the dawning of reform, but day is yet far off. It is due to the ignorance, the wilful carelessness, the utter unspirituality of the monks, whose lives have long made the name of Christianity a byword, that there is now growing up a generation of absolute non-believers. They have been taught by the monks to regard religion as inseparable from themselves, and therefore they loathe the very name, and will have none of it. Every country has found that the suppression of the monasteries is essential to progress and reform, whether civil or religious. When Jerusalem, too, is freed, she will be no longer Mater Dolorosa, but in very truth Mater Mundi.

JERUSALEM.

DOSTOYEFFSKY AND NIETZSCHE.1

OTTO JULIUS BIERBAUM.

WHEN first I came under the spell of Dostoyeffsky, I was very young and immature, a schoolboy, in fact, with three forms still between me and the curious "maturity examination" that admits to the German University.

I read so much in those early days that I might well be exempted now from reading anything at all. I read, too, not perhaps with full understanding, but with what I may call unerring instinct, choosing only such books as opened up new worlds to me and set some new aim before me, books which were the artistic expression of the author's personality. Much, of course, of what I then read has now escaped me. Dostoveffsky, however, remains; and the more I ceased in after years to recognise as really great the writers of the day, who had at first appealed to me only because their art was pleasing and stimulating to my boyish mind, the more the true greatness of Dostoyeffsky came home to me, in spite of the fact that he is not sympathetic to me, that he depresses rather than uplifts. I know now that he is more than a hilltop; I see in him a mountain-peak, measured by whose loftiness all other writers of our time, with one sole exception, look small indeed. In comparison with his huge, rough bulk, Nietzsche, the one who towers above him, affects us in a way that we might call disquieting, as a finished work of art, as something constructed beside something elemental.

¹ Authorised translation.

This figure of speech, for that is all it claims to be, expresses no real comparison, nothing, in fact, beyond the impression made upon me by the juxtaposition of the two only really great minds in modern literature since the days of Goethe and Byron. It is possible that Nietzsche is a sublime end, and Dostoveffsky a great beginning; the former marks, perhaps, the downfall of Western European culture, which has its roots in the antique; the latter, the rise of Russian civilisation, which is derived from the Empire of the East. It is precisely Nietzsche's artistic force that suggests this disturbing, even tragic, thought; and the paralysing power wielded by the Slavonic writer, the mouthpiece of a vast and chaotic mass of primitive Christians, who are barbarians as well, converts the thought into a hazy feeling of disquietude. The question concerns those national and social forces of which both men are the expression. If Nietzsche-Zarathustra be in reality that for which he took himself, a new dawn, then Dostoveffsky, the light in the East, has for us no significance beyond that of a distant spectacle, the last dying gleam of Byzantine light shining through Slavonic mists. Every good European, in Nietzsche's sense of the word, will hope and pray that this is true. Our hearts are not with Dostoyeffsky, whose ideals have nothing in common with our own; and there is no better way of asserting the strength of those social instincts we have derived from Greece and Rome than by calmly facing the Eastern storm, and proving that we are able to resist it, even while admiring, as a magnificent spectacle, the unfettered and elemental power of this Russian genius.

These are the considerations which make me welcome the publication in a good German edition of Dostoyeffsky's complete works, one of the most praiseworthy undertakings of the German publishing trade in recent years. All who desire to understand European civilisation must see to it that they study Dostoyeffsky, and that exhaustively, for, though contradictions are not wanting in his works, he is a mighty entity,

¹ Messrs R. Piper & Co. Munich.

to be understood in all his powerful significance by those alone who study him as a whole. The expression "world literature," first used by Goethe in the sense of a postulate of German culture, has no meaning on the lips of those who, to their knowledge of the classic authors belonging to the outstanding periods of international art, have not added a knowledge of this great modern; for, like his classic predecessors, he reveals a new world. This world, it is true, is not ours; it is, indeed, at bottom inimical and antagonistic to our own; but for this very reason we must try to understand it. The more intense our conviction that we have here to do with some power quite foreign to us, against which we must fortify ourselves within our own boundaries, the more useful to us will an acquaintance with Dostoyeffsky be. Nor shall we find attraction lacking, for it is the most marked characteristic of this strange writer that he never wounds-for that, he is too great. He oppresses us like a thundery atmosphere, but he makes up for the oppression when the torrents of his sovereign energy are let loose. The main reason, however, why the antipathetic, pathological qualities in his writings ultimately attract us, must be sought and found in the elemental nature of his mind and work. It would be a mistake to regard Dostoyeffsky as a purely subjective writer; he is, on the contrary, a writer with a purpose-but on a gigantic scale possible only to a genius whose intelligent purpose is made visible not as a conscious tendency but as something inherent in the subject-matter he has in hand. After the first few pages, as with Shakespeare, we have guessed his drift; we recognise the naïve tendency of the man of genius. We may compare his art in this respect to the ingenuous desire to please of a lovely and unaffected woman; it is a bit of herself, and operates without conscious effort on her part, for which reason it does not offend. The coquette, again, displeases our finer sense by the obviousness of her determination to attract; and, just in the same way, any deliberate, apparent purpose in a work of art offends the reader's æsthetic taste. In studying

Dostoyeffsky we are exposed to a danger of a different kind; however much our instincts may at first lead us to reject him, there is a risk that we may come at last so completely under the spell of his strong personality as to be unconscious of all the strange and dangerous elements his art contains. His charm seduces us; whoever knows even one of his books knows how he can captivate and carry us away. That is why the world so long overlooked the fact that this great enchanter, whose power to entertain and thrill equals Balzac's, is something more than a deeply interesting portrayer of Russian life, a wise and poetic interpreter of Russian character, that he is, as well, the conscious apostle of the hidden forces at work among the Russian people, forces destined, as he believes, to make of Russia a mighty and consolidated power, and to turn the tide of Western culture from its present course, diverting it into channels of their own. It is Dostoveffsky's conviction that Russia is called to be the saviour of the world; in his eyes the West is diseased, the Russian nobility already infected; the Russian people alone are sound. This belief of his passed at first unnoticed, partly because his mission is that of the artist rather than the preacher, partly because he possesses the rare creative power, found only in the greatest, that works unbiassed, and with inexhaustible resources, on Olympian heights. All his creations—the just and the unjust, the wise and the foolish, the sound and the diseased, those worthy of reverence and those beneath contempt—he leaves, with impartial serenity, to follow their own course, giving no hint of any higher significance save in the direction of the whole towards a universal harmony. Were it not that he betrays at times the purely human element in him—as in his Possessed, for instance, where his wrath (a wrath like that of Jehovah) breaks forth-his European readers would have been longer still of discovering how inexorably he points the way. We required to know Tolstoy before we could understand Dostoyeffsky, the Tolstoy who had ceased to be an artist and had become a preacher and apostle. The differences in their

respective tendencies do not concern us here. Tolstoy, by far the smaller of the two, became a sectary because he was in a sense a renegade to the West; Dostoyeffsky's development was constant and without a break. Never leaving the national path, he grew into a great Russian prophet; with a comprehension, loving and entire, of his own people, he kept ever before him the way they had to tread, registering with analytic art (and with a cruel accuracy unattained before) every fault, weakness, and excrescence, yet never making these an object of attack. In his eyes they too are a part of the Russian people, the needful shadows in his picture. We who have little in common with the Russian character, often imagine that Dostoyeffsky's men and women, seen in all their naked frailty, must repel; yet, as we read, we feel that their creator is on their side, and, before we are aware of it, we too are thinking of them with anything but disgust. There takes place within us a perversion of our natural modes of feeling, a perversion, it is true, on Christian lines, in accordance with ideals with which we ourselves have been inoculated, but which, in some way difficult to explain, have here taken on a Slavonic or, to speak more accurately, a Russo-Byzantine tinge.

I speak from the standpoint of one to whom Nietzsche's doctrine of the transvaluation of all values is something more than an empty phrase; and I assume that it indicates the direction in which the most potent forces of Western culture are moving to-day. Those by whom this doctrine is rejected (as it may be by men of great intellectual power) should welcome Dostoyeffsky at once as a kindred spirit; for in him Christ speaks, and we must go back very far in the history of the Christian faith to find one in whom he speaks so forcibly as here. I, for my part, would need to go back to St Francis of Assisi. Germans, Catholic or Protestant, no matter how genuine their Christian feeling be, will hardly be able to affirm with a good conscience that this Christ is theirs. By them He will be felt as a caricature of their own, a distorted

Christ, dismal and ghostly, the product, they will probably declare, of His Russian apostle's fervent but morbid mysticism.

Yet the Christ of Dostoyeffsky is one of terrible reality genuine and gigantic, dwarfing our own completely. What indeed, is it, our conception—even that born in the strong soul of Luther-but a compromise, a figure shaped to suit the religious needs of nations to whom the teaching of the Nazarene came as something strange? As true an incarnation of the Russian national spirit as Nietzsche of the re-awakened Western conscience, Dostoyeffsky has embodied his Christ in a thousand different forms, each a manifestation of his own soul; and this re-birth of Christ is an event of even greater importance to us than to Russia itself, the land of primitive Christian faith. We must bear this in mind if we would grasp its full significance, which far transcends any purely æsthetic considerations. On one hand we have Nietzsche, breaking in his Zarathustra the tables of the Mosaic Law: on the other, Dostoyeffsky, raising up out of the depths of his Russian heart the primitive Christ.

Incorporated in these two great thinkers and artists, two social forces of the first magnitude are confronted, an imposing spectacle, the full bearing of which we can as yet but dimly guess, not wholly understand. No wonder that, in comparison, the rest of modern literature affects us like a puppet-show.

What contradictions are here implied! There is, in fact, little else; let it suffice to note the one in which all others are comprised. In Nietzsche we have the will to power; in Dostoyeffsky, the will to humility.

All Christendom has tried, consciously or unconsciously, to effect a reconciliation here; in one thing Nietzsche and Dostoyeffsky are agreed, that reconciliation is impossible, and in this recognition lies the secret of their power. It seems, at first sight, an easy thing to recognise; but all great truths are simple and, once perceived, appear self-evident. The vast majority of men incline to compromise; they cannot, indeed, do otherwise—compromise is for them a condition of life; but

it is the office of genius at certain critical moments, when the principle of compromise is worn out and can no longer work, to recognise and re-establish the natural antinomies. Genius, we may say, always begins at the beginning; it is genius just because it knows the sources of things and draws its life from these, while the ordinary mind is satisfied with something blended or derived. Knowledge, however, is not enough; there must be feeling too, and complete devotion to an idea as well, before that which is known and felt can take effect; for this, a creative passion is demanded, to which must be unhesitatingly sacrificed all the powers of life. Nietzsche might declare and declare again that he would not be a saint; this passion made of him not only a hero but a holy prophet.

In creative minds like his, to use his own words, the highest consciousness of humanity has become flesh and blood; such minds are doomed to consume themselves in the creative act, evolving humanity out of themselves anew. Nietzsche did this by creating the figure of Zarathustra, the final incarnation of all his thought. He foresaw and gave life to the vision of the superman; he left behind him, to speak in terms of art, a colossal statue. Dostoyeffsky, again, gave birth to a whole world of men, all, despite their apparent naturalism, over lifesize, yet without one Colossus among them. They do not assert themselves, these figures of his, they suppress themselves instead; but, if we view the total work of the Russian master in its true perspective, what we see is a huge figure, like that of an Indian god, of both sexes, and with a thousand heads and arms, the gigantic figure of the Russian people.

All who are capable of being deeply stirred by art will regard this achievement with feelings of admiration touched with fear. There is one alone with whom, in wealth of productive power, Dostoyeffsky may be compared; he is the Shakespeare of Russia and of fiction. Both masters have greater and minor works, neither has one of no importance. Like Shakespeare, Dostoyeffsky is never above a jest, but let us see what manner of jests his are. They are often comic

rather than humorous; to a gloomy German mind, indeed, they may sometimes appear exaggerated and burlesque. That melancholy which, parading in æsthetic dress, is nothing but sentimentality of the shallowest kind, will probably lament the cruelty that leads Dostoyeffsky at times to make things sad and tragic the foundation of his sport. A certain convulsive violence is, in fact, characteristic of his humour; it oversteps the bounds of customary gaiety, inclining, like that of the ancients, to caricature and the grotesque. Our mild humorists, with their smile of easy-going, Philistine tolerance (a tolerance that is arrogance at bottom), have travelled so far from the dark springs of all true humour that they believe it to be something identical with their so-called "optimism." They exaggerate nothing, it is true, not even "humour" itself; but they falsify life when they represent it as something merry.

Dostoyeffsky's humorous tales are an integral part of his work, stamped no less than his other writings with a love of human frailty as strange in its nature as in the manner of its expression. This love is seen alike in the inexorable cruelty that spares no humiliation, and in the pity that pardons all. What is masterful alone, even when it is allowed to triumph, is made contemptible and pursued by the artist's hate.

All "that is low" has Dostoyeffsky's sympathy; he abases when he loves. It is not, however, compassion in the ordinary sense he seeks to arouse, after the fashion of our Western sentimentality, which evades, in a manner miserably cheap, the most tremendous demand of the Christian faith; it is humility triumphant he desires to set before us. He is never weary of depicting the inward ecstasy of humility as man's highest happiness, as indeed the only happiness really worthy of him, any other being but illusion and vice. When we see him leading his characters from agony to agony through the depths of their own nature, it is, we feel, the self-torture of a spiritual voluptuary at which we are looking on. Our ideal may be the man who develops his personality without restraint,

shaping and directing outward circumstance to his own ends; Dostoyeffsky compels our admiration for those who develop their personality in another fashion, forcing it to expand within, outwardly despised and downtrodden, inwardly victorious and sublime. It is not our compassion that the Russian master would evoke when he shows us these humble souls, it is our sympathetic joy.

Here, however, we reach the point at which a man of Western culture instinctively revolts, refusing to follow this enchanter any longer. Deeply moved as we are, we resolve to be drawn no further by the spell of this moral epilepsy. Paying to Dostoyeffsky's devotees of humility the ready tribute of our admiration, and recognising the saint-like quality of their power, we reject them utterly as an ideal for the whole human race, we even doubt if they may rightly serve as an example for the Russian people; and we rejoice with confidence to think that, if the Russian spirit be in reality one of perverse passivity, sublime but morbid in its kind, there is no danger that we shall be mastered by it. A train of flagellants will never conquer the world.

How, then, can we explain the fact that the world has been conquered by Dostoyeffsky's books? I gave some hint of the answer to this question when I spoke of the greatness of his art, an art veiling his purpose, and of the Shakespearean wealth and fascination of his characters, which enrich and subdue us as we read. To this hint, however, something must be added. Compared with even the greatest of our German poets, with Goethe himself, Dostoyeffsky impresses us as a fuller, purer revelation of primitive force. After his writings, the literature of the West seems like a draught of distilled and bottled water after the freshness of a bubbling spring. The antithesis of the Greeks, the great analyser, agitator, and destroyer, Dostoyeffsky possesses that quality of true originality our older living authors have almost wholly lost. Whatever outside influences may have aided his artistic growth (for there is a sense in which every author is not only

born but made), he leaves us with the impression that he is a pioneer of art, tilling a virgin soil. This is a charm to which no one who has any understanding of literature can be insensible; even the untrained reader, really the best, feels himself moved and stimulated by it at once. To characterise this modern master who ignores the technical traditions of his art, we might employ a figure borrowed from primitive architecture, calling him a Cyclops working with huge, unhewn blocks, fitted together, edge to edge, without the aid of mortar. But he is a Cyclops with a difference, for his work is adorned with an endless wealth of fine detail. In the failure of the attempts just made to define Dostoveffsky's art, we get a further explanation of the spell he casts on us in his books. Their noble and lofty simplicity, the purity and originality of their epic quality would constrain us to cold admiration, but to nothing more, did we not find in them so much as well for modern taste and brains. The problems he suggests, the subtlety of his psychological detail, the vein of fantasy running through his pages, all are of a purely modern kind, the more welcome to us for being also new. Perhaps we may venture on a formula, "Simplicity plus nervosity," or, to make use of Lamprecht's phrase, "An ancient seer with modern susceptibility."

Let me say, further, that those Russo-Byzantine tendencies which are so evident as local colour, when we consider Dostoyeffsky's writings as a whole, are less apparent in the individual books, sometimes but faintly visible, being balanced in each work, without detriment to their significance, by contrasting artistic elements. We even feel in Dostoyeffsky at times some presentiment of Nietzsche, of whom we catch a glimpse repeatedly, as a distorted image, beside his great counterpart. Nor should this excite our wonder; for, as in Nietzsche the Christian was concealed, so in Dostoyeffsky, the anti-Christian. This mighty prophet of the Russian Christ had in him something of the Russian devil too. A super-Christian, he yet gives to the very devils their due—

superior here to the prophet of the West—and in his pages they spend their fury on a titanic scale.

The humility of Dostoyeffsky, it will be seen, is something different from the asceticism of Tolstoy. How poor a thing, too, beside his fierce passion is the erotic theorising of the "Young Russian" writers! Not sensual passion alone, but passion of every sort sweeps through his stormy world, which, though informed with mind, is no mere product of a bloodless brain, but has been experienced in the brain and heart alike of one who carried a pandemonium within.

Thinking of Dostoveffsky thus, we arrive at the conception of a man who suffered and fought against himself, before he achieved that humility he depicted so often, in characters of a fervency as formidable as his own. It is the conception of a saint after the fashion of St Francis of Assisi, schooling into holiness an unruly heart, from which he had more than one devil to cast out. I do not know if the Greek Church possesses a saint like the old Italian one, the first to take Christianity with a seriousness absolute and complete; Dostoyeffsky, one feels, might have been a saint like this, had not the conditions of our time, even in Russia, made the activity of the saint impossible, had not his own many-sided modern spirit compelled him to influence the world less by the force of his personal example than by his imaginative power. Perhaps, too, he never quite succeeded in driving all the devils out, but remained, in his own sense of the word, "possessed" until the end. His works are in part a crucifixion of himself. All literary confessions pale before the recital of his passion, and no words avail to express our admiration when we watch this man of sorrows pass on his way without complaint to some new station of the cross, when we see how he loves suffering and, along with suffering, humanity, and how, in moments of transfiguration, he shines with the glory of one who has tasted the bliss of comprehending and communicating the deepest mysteries of the soul.

All this, too, without either pose or pathos. He reminds

us for a moment of the Byzantine pictures of Christ, but the splendour and beauty of early art are wanting; for Dostoyeffsky is the antithesis of a "beautiful soul"—for that, also, he was too great.

"All art is consolation," says Nietzsche. To Dostoyeffsky it might seem difficult to apply these words; yet there is a sense in which it may be done, a sense as deep as that of his work itself. The consolation of his art lies in the proof it offers that man may rise above his own frail humanity, not only in Nietzsche's heroic fashion, but also in Dostoyeffsky's way, slavish though it may appear to us. This thought opens up once more before us those abysmal depths, a glance into which constrained me to attempt this review of Dostoyeffsky's work, forcing home on us, at the same time, the sure conviction that there is, after all, a bond of union between these two antagonistic spirits—the will to overcome the base.

It was of Dostoyeffsky, the man, I meant to speak, and I find myself speaking once again of his books; this, perhaps, is unavoidable, for the man and his work are one. He who so often wrote to live, lived only to write; it was more than the main function of his life, it was his very being. All life consumes itself, and his—the life of the artist—was no exception to the rule. He is immortal because he brought to the service of his art not only his genius and his powers, but also an emotional experience and an innate capacity for suffering of an intensity wellnigh peculiar to himself. It is for this reason that a word about his personal history must be said.

Those who have read his Life (I know only the one by Nina Hoffmann) will recognise three determining influences in the development of his genius.

In the first place, this man was, for a trifle, condemned to death. For an eternity of ten minutes, he had stood on the scaffold awaiting the fusilade, when he was told that the sentence of death was commuted into one of hard labour in Siberia; here he spent nine years in all, four in a convict prison. Read his books, and you will know what is implied

by such an experience, with all it brought in its train; read his books, and you will learn that his humility is nothing purely theoretical, but something actually achieved; nothing base, but the unparalleled triumph of a soul we are forced to recognise as super-Christian. We clench our fists as we read of the cruel and shameful perfidy of this so-called "pardon,"1 and of the sufferings of a mind like his in a convict prison; he was able to endure it all, to think of it as something just and merited, and to speak of it in after years with the supreme mildness of the saint. Nor did it ever once occur to him that there was anything unusual in all this; to him it seemed a matter of course to feel and speak in such a way. This kind of "amor fati" is not that of Nietzsche; it is in essence Russian, with an added sublimity that is Dostoyeffsky's own. Yet he was not crushed in prison, he was uplifted; he did not become another man, he became more fully himself; andmost important point of all—this was effected not as a result of pain, not in an intoxication of suffering, bringing with it pardon and inspiration alike, but quite obviously by the victory of the will. He was not filled with humility by the power of an unparalleled experience; he fought his way to it, not weakened by that experience, but strengthened and inspirited by it instead. He was not overcome by his sufferings; by means of them he conquered his own nature and entered into possession of his inmost self.

Secondly, Dostoyeffsky was an epileptic. Does this mean only that he had fits like many another, and may be pathologically explained? Surely it means far more; genius can be as little accounted for by epilepsy as by a rachitic formation of the skull. It does seem, however, that epilepsy, when it occurs in men of genius, lends to their genius a demoniacal cast. Its conditions throw on the sphere of the sub-conscious a mystic light, inducing momentary states of ecstasy which become productive later in the brain, and result in that vehement

¹ The sentence of death was a mock one, intended not for execution but as a "lesson" to the condemned.—*Translator*.

capacity for seeing mental visions and that spiritual second sight so eminently characteristic of Dostoyeffsky, who, for days after an attack, felt a mysterious demoniacal power within.

Lastly, this writer who had at his command vast treasures of the mind and heart, was forced almost continually to work at the bidding of the direst need; this man of royal intellect had to lead the life of a literary drudge. In his letters we get a glimpse of hell; it is a hell known to many, before and since, who have attempted the bold task of living by their pen without selling it, and have been too proud for the rôle of a practised borrower; and it is just out of this inferno that has come the greater part of what we prize most in art. For long, the inferno in which Dostoyeffsky lived was that of the exile as well, whom poverty had driven from his native land, of a man without a home, who had taken on himself the voluntary task of providing for children not his own; the inferno, too, of the man who is before his time, a man of huge ambition to whom recognition came very late, one slandered and misunderstood. It may be that there was reserved for him also that deepest hell of all, the hell of strong passions he was forced to curb, not by the inward compulsion that uplifts but by an outward constraint from which there was no escape. Read his books, and the miracle of Dostoyeffsky's humility will seem to you a mystery of mingled light and shade. He was crucified and loved the cross; he even sang upon it and glorified it, pierced by the nails of poverty and shame. Yet he thought of himself as a sinner, not a saviour; it was not his own cross he glorified; it was the Cross set up outside Jerusalem on the place of skulls. The shame and need that often made him groan aloud in the anger and agony of a spirit driven almost to despair, were for him, at the moment he wrote, the shame and need of all his people—nay, of every wretched and downtrodden soul; he was above self-pity; it is even possible that, in the white heat of creation, he felt his own sufferings no longer, but those of others alone. Still, it was his own need and pain that enabled and inspired him to paint his spiritual picture of a world which

has its foundations deep in misery, a world full of heights and depths, of abysses and wide prospects, of hopes and despairs, of devils and of God. In life, doubtless, he was faint-hearted often enough; in his writings we find no trace of such a thing, though it is the depths, and not the heights, whose praise he sings. It is misery that has made his works sublime; and so, perhaps, that life of his they half conceal and half reveal may lead us to the belief that the forces of oppression in this world, and their willing sufferance by humble souls, are as potent in the moulding of great characters as those contrasting forces embodied in Nietzsche's law. In himself, Dostoyeffsky showed the positive power of the Christian negation; but we must remember that the genius and the saint may point the way for their own people, but not of necessity for all mankind. which made Dostoyeffsky great is, perhaps, the very thing that will hinder the Russian people from proving their greatness against us. Even if it be conceded that the spirit informing him is, for Russia, fit and salutary, it does not follow that it is the same for us. We to whom Dostoyeffsky remains at bottom a stranger, are not born to absorb it; to attempt this would be to deny Goethe and to regard Nietzsche as a disease.

It is a divergent path that we are called to tread. Our wanderings in the Catacombs are over, although we still remember them and reverence the great Russian who discovered there a rich and living world, seen with a like intensity by no Western eye.

If it be true that the German has a genius for understanding the different nations of the world, that in this capacity there lies his mightiest power, the pledge of his intellectual sovereignty—an *imperium germanorum ingenii*—then we may hope that Dostoyeffsky's works will one day become familiar to us as those of other authors whose tongue is not our own.

A visit to his world is like a descent to the mystic "Mothers" of whom we hear in *Faust*; for the weak it may be dangerous, for the strong it is a great experience.

LANCELOT ANDREWES AND JOHN BUNYAN.

A STUDY IN DEVOTION.

THE REV. R. H. COATS, M.A., B.D.

Among the crowd of dissolute and fawning time-servers who for the most part made up the court of King James the First, it is pleasing to find so erudite and saintly a figure as that of Lancelot Andrewes, bishop first of Ely and then of Winchester. He appears before us, in the chronicles of the time, in many aspects. Now we see him as a man so learned that Bacon himself was well content to submit to him the proofs of his greatest work; and now as one so human withal, that Casaubon was glad to entreat his company at Stourbridge Fair, and beg that he would shut up his books and come and shoot a buck in Downham Park. Anon he is walking to Chiswick for recreation, with "a brace of young fry" from Westminster School, and "beguiling that wayfaring leisure by filling their narrow vessels with a funnel." Anon he is strolling through the aisles of St Paul's Cathedral, to impart spiritual counsel and comfort to the distressed. The good man would sometimes warm the hearts of his chaplains, when they preached, by asking them at the close if they would favour him with a perusal of the manuscript from which they had discoursed, and he encouraged them still more by professing, without shame, that "if he preached twice on a Sunday at St Giles, he prated once."

Fuller tells us that his gravity of manner greatly awed

King James, "who refrained from that mirth and liberty, in the presence of this prelate, which otherwise he assumed to himself." But it seems this awe and gravity were sometimes relaxed, for we read of Andrewes having entertained the King at Farnham Castle, and in the space of three days spent on him the sum of £3000, "to the extraordinary contentment of his Majesty, and the admiration of all his followers." indeed, made good use of his episcopal courtier, and employed him, as the mood was on him, to answer Cardinal Bellarmine, or to accompany him to Scotland, or to save his face in the scandalous affair of the Earl of Essex. But the true Andrewes, the Andrewes who has come down the centuries and appeals to us to-day, is not Andrewes the hospitable prelate, nor Andrewes the learned controversialist, nor even Andrewes the mighty hunter before the Lord, but Andrewes the humbleminded Christian saint, as, leaving behind him the distractions of high place and the vexations of a corrupt court, and turning his back on James, Bacon, Bellarmine and everybody else, he retires to his closet and shuts to the door, and "spends a great part of five hours every day in prayer," pouring out his soul in a little book of devotions, which before the end was to be "slubbered with pious hands, and watered with penitential tears."

Andrewes was fitted in many ways to be a typical representative of Anglican piety. He came at a time when the Prayer Book had recently been compiled, and had distilled into itself the quintessence of all the liturgies of the historic Church. The Church of England was in a state of pristine purity, having emerged from that slovenly condition of worldliness and neglect into which it had been allowed to fall during the reign of Elizabeth. Hooker had just completed his monumental work, in which he had walked about Zion, and gone round about her, told the towers thereof, marked well her bulwarks, considered her palaces, to tell it once for all to the generations following. Laud, too, was beginning to rise into prominence, stemming the tide of Puritanism and robing

the Church once more in her goodly garments. It was the age of Shakespeare and Drake and Raleigh, when a strong tide of patriotism was running, and the fear of Roman supremacy, as it had been successively embodied in Mary Queen of Scots, in Cardinal Allen, in Philip II. of Spain, and in Guy Fawkes, had been done away. It was the age, too, of the authorised version of the Bible, when the wells of our national speech were pure and undefiled. And in the courage and confidence of the nation the Church of England shared. It only wanted a man of great learning and distinguished piety, who should follow up the work of Hooker, prove that the Church, now securely Protestant, was also Catholic, and turn the hearts of her children to the Fathers, and away from Calvin.

The man for such a work was Bishop Andrewes. His encyclopædic learning, his knowledge of fifteen languages, his minute familiarity with the Scriptures, his reverence for antiquity and tradition, his love of nature and of ceremony, his first-hand acquaintance with the secrets of the human heart, peculiarly fitted him to embody the best ideals of Anglican devotion. He is the expression, says one of his biographers, of "the true tone and character which the Church of England aims at forming in her children, largeness of sympathy, self-restraint, soberness, fervour, the spirit of continuous but not unhopeful penitence." 1

It is this which makes the perusal of the *Preces Privatæ* the best substitute, in secret, for a cathedral service. It has the same chaste majesty and ordered beauty; the same gradual preparation and raising of the soul from the level of the world to the loftiest heights of meditation; the same well-thought-out marshalling of our spiritual needs according to their related parts; the same abasement for sin, and adoring, exultant wonder at the grace of Christ; the same personal note of direct and individual access to the Father, combined with the sense of being at one with the Holy Catholic Church throughout the world. The *Preces Privatæ* are the compilation of

¹ R. L. Ottley, Lancelot Andrewes, p. 180.

one who has always in his public devotions sought to be clothed upon and upheld by the appointments of the Church, who has loved to feel that the Lord was round about him, as the mountains are round about Jerusalem, in all goodly ceremonial and seemly ritual, and who in his private devotions would fain call upon the same aids and suggestions to his spirit. His book of prayers is a personal transcript of the offices of the Church, and registers afresh in the closet those influences which have streamed upon him in the cathedral. There is nothing casual in his prayers or slipshod in his praises. His words are a mosaic of the finest spiritual outpourings of prophet, psalmist, apostle and evangelist, with here and there a gem from the ancient liturgies. Andrewes draws his treasures from all sources, precious things from the heavens above and from the depth that croucheth beneath. The Thirty-nine Articles and the Creeds drop fatness, and lo! wild honey is found to be concealed even in the rocky crevices of the Quicunque Vult.

What impresses one most in Andrewes' Devotions is his carefully methodical survey of the whole ground. The division of the prayers according to the day of the week; the association of each with an opening meditation on one of God's wonders in the creation of the world; the scrupulous care with which he differentiates prayer into adoration, supplication, confession, thanksgiving; the exhaustive enumeration of sins to be deplored and graces to be desired; the copiousness and conciseness of his Scriptural phraseology; the minute dwelling on the elements of our human nature, or on the doctrines of the Church, with the devotions which these severally suggest—how painstaking, and orderly, and comprehensive it all is!

Especially is this particularity and definiteness noticeable in his intercessions. These are no vague generalisations, but patient recollections of all who have a claim on him, from whatever cause. His household and benefactors are studiously remembered. He includes in his review all sorts and conditions of men, from the king on his throne and the members

of his court, to farmers, graziers, tradesmen, mechanics, artisans. Virgins and voyagers are not forgotten, nor are those "in bitter servitude, in mines and galleys." He prays for the peace of Jerusalem and the prosperity of Zion. He prays, too, for propitious weather and fruitful seasons. Over all one is reminded of angels and archangels, thrones, dominations, princedoms, powers. It is a vast, well-ordered universe into which the soul is led. Andrewes passes nothing over, gives nothing undue prominence, and never loses sight of the distinctions between high and low, king and subject, rich and poor. All are gathered with him into the one temple, and are given their appropriate pleadings before the throne of grace.

Andrewes, then, has all the Anglican virtues of restraint, tranquil moderation, and chastened calm. He is importunate and yet measured, personal yet catholic too. He avoids excessive individuality in his approach to God, and has no liking for a piety of unregulated spontaneity or disjointed licence. He is content to put himself to school with the great classical examples of the piety of the past, and, with all his wide learning and devout temperament, feels no longing to stray beyond the loved confines which the Church of his baptism provides. Her service is perfect freedom. His highest wish is to be found worthy to be called her son.

"Vouchsafe me
in the Holy Catholic Church
to have my own calling, and holiness, and portion,
and a fellowship of her sacred rites,
prayers, fastings,
groanings, watchings,
tears, sufferings,
for assurance of remission of sins,
for hope of resurrection and translation
to eternal life."

To turn from the *Preces Privatæ* to *Grace Abounding to the Chief of Sinners*, by John Bunyan, is to step out of a quiet evening service in Westminster Abbey on to the burning crater of a volcano. We feel the earth rock and reel beneath our feet, and can see faith in the act of removing mountains.

All the great forces of the soul are in a tumult of upheaval, and we are made awed spectators of a mighty elemental struggle between sin and grace, in which deep calleth unto deep with much noise of waterspouts.

The tinker's little book is in a sense more self-revealing than that of the bishop. It is more designedly autobiographical, and abounds more in vivid pictures of the outer as well as of the inner life. We see its author brooding over the fire at home, or walking to and fro in a neighbour's shop, or reclining on some wayside settle in an adjoining town. He shows himself to us now crouching under a hedge in an agony of doubt, now picking up pins on the open road, now talking to some crows on the ploughed field, now suddenly laying down his knife and fork that he may rise and seek some place where he may pray to God. Anon he is bending over puddles, wondering whether he has enough faith to command them to be dried up, or he is clenching his teeth to keep back the awful sin against the Holy Ghost. We discover him in stables, in barns, in milkhouses, at suits with God. We are present when he overhears the conversation of four poor women in the town of Bedford, engaged in savoury talk of the sweetness of the Gospel. And we even come upon him when he is lying in bed beside his weeping wife, who is travailing with child.

The temperaments of the two men were not dissimilar. Each was of imagination all compact. Andrewes had an imagination of the comprehensive universal order, and could summon to his presence saints, angels, and archangels, and all the gathered ranks of the Church, visible and invisible. These he could marshal in meet forms of worship, interpret all their needs, and set them in their several relationships one to another. Bunyan's imagination was of the more intense, pictorial sort. He could visualise transcendent spiritual realities with extraordinary vividness, especially as they affected his own soul. To him heaven and hell were real, and the earth a shadow, and the most important personages in all the universe were Satan and Jesus Christ. The former would

pull him by the clothes occasionally, telling him he had prayed enough, and that he might as well bend the knee to a besom or to a bush. At the coming of Christ, however, Satan would perforce retire, and Bunyan could see him leer as he stole away. Jesus Christ Himself was far more real a person to this visionary than King Charles on his throne or Justice Keelin on his bench, and he could actually behold Him leaping from the grave, or looking at him with disappointment through the tiles of the roof. Peter and John and Paul also glanced down upon him with derision and with scorn, to think that he should pick and choose among their recorded words. Texts spoke loud in his ears, as though some one had halloaed after him or clapped him on the back, and they would even at times so urgently vociferate that he must needs turn his shoulder to see who was calling. Some of the most fascinating paragraphs in Grace Abounding are those in which Bunyan tells us of his dreams. He sees the warrant of his pardon hanging from heaven, with pendants of gold seals; or he has visions of the saints sunning themselves on the delectable mountains of Paradise, while he himself is without, shivering in the cold, and, oh! how glad he is, after much "sidling striving," to get first his head and then his whole body through a little doorway in the wall!

But while in temperament Andrewes and Bunyan were not dissimilar, in their mode of approaching God they were widely different. The former is a striking example of the ecclesiastical or Catholic type of piety, the latter of the strongly evangelical or individualistic. Andrewes, as we have seen, even in his most intense moments was never forgetful of his place in the universal order. But Bunyan was throughout oblivious to all else but the momentous and absorbing dialogue that was going on between God and his own soul. We do, indeed, here and there in his book have a glimpse of the wider world in which he lived, and the Quakers, Ranters, Perfectionists of the time occasionally cross its pages. But even these are introduced only as minor characters remotely con-

nected with his own inner drama, which swells in its proportions till it fills heaven and earth. Bunyan in one place expresses his surprise that men should make such an ado about losing wife or child. What does that matter, when compared with the losing of the soul? We are throughout called upon to witness the paroxysms and struggles of a drowning man, who feels himself sinking beneath his own blasphemies and the divine judgments, so that all God's billows go over him, and he has no thought for anything but to cry from the depths that a hand should be stretched out to rescue him from his distress.

And a hand is stretched out, but it is not the hand of the Church, with its rites and ceremonies and disciplinary hygiene. With others of a like faith, Bunyan had a prejudice against help from that quarter, and turned from it deliberately to the Bible, and the Bible only. Here we come upon another fundamental difference between him and Andrewes. latter had learned in the school of Hooker to associate Reason and Tradition with the Bible as a source of authority. From his pastor, John Gifford, Bunyan had learned "not to take up any truth upon trust—as from this, or that, or any other man or men-but to cry mightily to God that He would convince us of the reality thereof, and set us down therein, by His own Spirit, in the Holy Word." To Andrewes, accordingly, the Bible was as an inexhaustible quarry from which might be fetched innumerable many-coloured chips to frame the exquisitely wrought mosaic of his devotions. To Bunyan it was nothing less awful than the scroll of doom.

What course Bunyan might have run had he had a kindly Jesuit to advise him at this point, or could he have listened to and trusted some father-confessor, such as Dr Pusey, we do not know. All he had to guide him to the Celestial City were the Scriptures and his own conscience as illuminated by the Holy Spirit. He desired nothing more. Of all the temptations that assailed him, the worst was that Satan should use sleights to make him doubt the written word, and

they had many a tug and pull together for "that blessed Sixth of John." It is true he was hard put to it at times, because of his belief that the Bible was the authentic voice of God from Genesis to Revelation. The Scriptures would "look grimly" at him, or stand like a spear against him, every refractory text being like an army of 40,000 men to afflict his spirit. The fact that the Scripture cannot be broken, he tells us, would rend the very caul of his heart, and he was weighed down into despair for days and months and years by that verse in Hebrews which says that Esau "found no place of repentance, though he sought it diligently with tears."

This and other passages "pinched him sore." They were a flaming sword to keep him from the tree of life. What was perhaps worse, he was "something daunted," on a certain occasion, to find that one of the most comforting verses that had visited his mind was not in the canon of Scripture at all, but only in Ecclesiasticus! And, oh! how he fainted with sickness and fear to come across the statement in Mark's Gospel that "Christ goeth up into a mountain, and calleth unto him whom He would"—and only them!

Yet this Scripturalism had its advantages. The saying, "this sin is not unto death," was "as a mill-post" to poor Bunyan's back for a whole day and a half, and there were seasons when he was "wondrously led into the Scriptures" in contending with the Quakers. Bunyan was helped through the greatest crisis of his life by applying spiritually to himself the incident of the two milch kine who left their calves behind when they carried the ark of God. At other times he found inexpressible comfort in the discovery that Joshua's cities of refuge availed for protection against the avenger of blood in cases where a man had been guilty of murder not of spite nor of malice, but unwittingly. The feelings of Esther when she went to petition the king, or of Benhadad's servants when they went with ropes on their heads, exactly fitted the needs of the sorely tried tinker of Bedford, and were great encouragements to him. One passage of Scripture was

particularly helpful, and that was "where Christ prays against Judas, that God would disappoint him in all his selfish thoughts, which moved him to sell his master; pray read it soberly, Ps. cix. vs. 6–20." We smile at this allegorising and literalism of interpretation, a literalism which made Bunyan very puzzled to know how God Himself could surmount the difficulties it presents. "I could think thus with myself," he writes, "why, how many Scriptures are there against me? There are but three or four, and cannot God miss them and save me from all of them?" Yet it was just this same Scripturalism and absorption in one book, and in one book only, which has given us the pungent, pithy, and pregnant English of one of the greatest classics in the whole religious literature of the world.

It is interesting to note that though Andrewes and Bunyan were as the poles apart in ecclesiastical theory and theological outlook, they were yet wondrously near in the great fundamental experiences of the Christian life. There is very little difference between them when they come to speak of their sense of sin. Andrewes could call himself "an unclean worm, a dead dog, a body of death." As he looked into the red chasm of his guilt, he could only plead to God piteously for the grace of tears. "At least give me a dropping eye: let me not altogether be a flint. If I may not water my couch nor wash Thy feet; if I may not weep bitterly as Peter, plentifully as Jeremiah (and yet, oh! that it might be even thus!), give me at least one or two little tears which Thou mayest put into Thy bottle and write in Thy book." As we read these words, so poignant and sincere in their spiritual anguish, the printed page seems to swim before our eyes, and we almost see instead that soiled original manuscript which he moistened with his tears. Bunyan, too, sank into the same deep waters of spiritual dejection and self-loathing, and there are passages in Grace Abounding which are very painful reading. God scares and affrights this poor sinner with fearful dreams, and surrounds him with devils and

hellish fiends. He is more loathsome in his own eyes than a toad. He describes himself as sticking on the jaws of despair, racked on the wheel, tossed to and fro like a broken vessel. He envies the very beasts and birds and fishes because they cannot be punished in hell-fire, and is convinced that even the sun in heaven and the very tiles of the houses and stones of the streets are bending themselves against him. He is one dwelling in tombs who cuts himself with stones, and at whose heels a tumult of evil thoughts roar and bellow like masterless hell-hounds. Sins keep bubbling up within him as from a fountain, and he feels he would thankfully exchange hearts with anybody.

But if they were alike in their sorrows, they were alike also in their delights. Andrewes and Bunyan held very different views as to the nature of grace and the emphasis in salvation. One was all for the Church, and the priesthood, and the mediating sacraments. The other clung desperately with the grasp of justifying faith to the arm stretched out to save him in the one atoning sacrifice of the redeeming Christ. The one species of belief carried Andrewes into the presence of the great white throne in the company of a mighty rejoicing host of saints and angels. The other led Bunyan to exclaim: "Oh, it is a goodly thing to be on our knees with Christ in our arms before God! I trust I know something of these things." Who shall say which was the happier, or which indeed the safer of the two?

It would be idle to deny that the stream of Andrewes' piety was much more tranquil and unruffled than that of Bunyan. His wide learning and extensive studies, his broad outlook upon the world and life-long acquaintance with the teaching and discipline of a great historic Church, saved him from those torments to which poor Bunyan was subjected through his private interpretation of a maze of Scripture texts. We should never forget, in comparing the two, that while the Bishop of Winchester was so erudite that Fuller could say of him that "some conceive that he might, if then living, almost

have served as an interpreter general at the confusion of tongues," Bunyan, alas! had little on his shelf but the Bible, Luther on Galatians, Foxe's Booke of Martyrs, and those excellent manuals which his wife brought him as her dowry-The Practice of Piety, and the Plain Man's Pathway to Heaven. Yet may it not be claimed that Bunyan's piety, if narrower and more troubled, was the robuster of the two? His experiences, if less measured and even, surely abounded more in those extremes, both of rapture and despair, to which the evangelical type of piety is peculiarly exposed. Andrewes was not unlike the elder brother in the parable, to whom the father said, "Son, thou art ever with me, and all that I have is thine." Bunyan rather resembled the poor demoniac boy, of whom we are told that he had a spirit which tore him grievously, and cast him into the fire and into the water to destroy him. But who shall measure the extent of his exultant joy when "Jesus took him by the hand, and lifted him up, and he arose"?

The two types of piety which we have endeavoured to sketch in the preceding pages, and of which Andrewes and Bunyan afford admirable examples, are types which will always be found within the Church of Christ. There will always be those whose hearts yearn for the beauty of God's house, and who are ever most at home in the fair and goodly ceremonies of Zion. These turn with a kind of shivering horror from the bare and jejune worship of Evangelical Protestantism, feeling how graceless and naked it all is, and having the desire, not to be unclothed, but to be clothed upon, and wrapped round in their worship with all that is seemly and reverent and suggestive of the divine. They shrink from the unfettered licence of a "free" service, and crave the calm restraint, the ordered. chastened beauty of a stately ritual. They ask for nothing better or nobler than that the ancient and solemn services of the Church should be repeated in their ears; that her suggestive and symbolical ceremonies, hallowed by the faith of centuries, should be performed before their eyes; that they should voice their needs to heaven in praises and in prayers whose language has sufficed for all their fathers; and that they should be permitted to rest quietly in the cool and solemn shade of deftly coloured glass or chiselled stone. These demand that all the accessories of worship shall be in keeping with its object, and that the incomparable sacrifice of the Cross, especially, shall be set forth visibly, with such enriching accompaniments as are its due. It is meet and right that the Bride of the Most High should have her clothing of wrought gold. Her garments must smell of myrrh, aloes, and cassia, if God is to anoint her with the oil of gladness above her fellows.

There will always be those, on the other hand, who demand only that the King's Daughter shall be all glorious within. These will turn away with some impatience from what they deem the distractions of an impertinent and oppressive ritual. to seek at first hand for some more immediate experience of the pure and naked majesty of the truth as it is in Jesus. Being made children of God by an act of redeeming grace and responsive faith, they will feel that the instinctive, spontaneous expressions of love and praise, however stammering and halting they may be, are more acceptable to the Father than the most chastely ordered ritual that remains cold and formal. Nor will they feel that they are missing anything by not surrounding themselves in worship with the glories of wrought stone or of painted windows. Enough if, within bare walls or out upon the lone and windy moor, they can soar into those chambers of celestial imagery, all tapestried and hung round with the counsels of the Eternal Father, which sufficed for the writer of Grace Abounding on Elstow Green, or the author of Paradise Lost in Bunhill Fields.

R. H. COATS.

BIRMINGHAM.

THE INVASION OF THE SKY.

THE REV. J. DAWSON.

How regretful the paradox that the men of to-day should hail with enthusiasm the desecration of one of their most invaluable possessions! The sky is man's oldest inheritance, his mother in a much deeper sense than the earth to which he gives the name, for out of it the earth was born. And with what benefactions has she not enriched her offspring! From her he caught the earliest whispers of religion and science in his worship of the sun and his study of the stars, and of his yearnings for freedom and justice she has been the unfailing nurse, the abiding prompter. He has seen the earth divided into empires and kingdoms, provinces and estates, while the sky has remained unappropriated, an ancient commonwealth, the monopoly of none, the heritage of all. The first child called it his, and the latest-born claims it by a right the ages have failed to abrogate. To its breast have clung the poets of all times and all lands, drawing from it the milk of their finest inspirations. Out of it swam the gods of Homer, the sprites and elves of Shakespeare, the angel hosts of Milton; darken its glow in Wordsworth, Coleridge, Shelley, or any of our later bards, and the light of more than half their pages is eclipsed. And what pictures have hung upon these walls: pranks of clouds and winds, light and shade and mist, morning splendour and evening glow! Of every great landscape the sky forms half. The mountains have climbed into it and grown conscious of their magnitude in blocking out their shadows against its gleam; the sea has caught its glory and

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wrought it into its daily sport, its nightly dreams; and lake and river and stream have been struck to music by its shine. There is no speech nor language where its voice is not heard. It was the ear into which we whispered the prayers of childhood, and in spite of all that science has done to delocalise our thinking, it remains the sacred realm where still we build our paradise. How dread the outlook were it suddenly to dissolve! Bid us wake some morning without the shelter of its folding arms, and earth would be a naked rock to which we should cling like frightened children scared by the unfathomable abyss of space.

It is of this heaven-born dominion that the aviator is fated to deprive us. He is, perhaps, unwittingly, the greatest of the Vandals, smiting from our hands, not the fruits of civilisation, but that which lies at the back of our civilisation, that which was one of the strongest inspirations in wooing us from barbarism. The sky is the light of all our seeing; blacken that, and may we not say, If the light above us be darkness, how great is that darkness?

These are not the forebodings of a distorted fancy. It is the ambition of the man who flies, and the men who with money and mechanism provide him wings, to sow the sky with machines as thickly as the sea is sown with ships; and when once this fleet of steel-built frames has spread itself across the heavens, the beauty of the firmament will die. It may be said that the sky is vast, and man will no more spoil it with his iron keels than he has disfigured the sea by dotting it with a myriad sails. The answer is that we behold the sea in patches while the whole sky is ours at a glance, and no blot upon its face can remain unobserved. There may be compensations in store for us which it hath not yet entered into the heart of man to conceive, a beauty of the future may rise phœnix-like out of the ashes of the past; but before we shout a welcome to those who rob us of what we have, would it not be well to ask whether what they bring is comparable in any degree with what they take away?

This, condemnatory as it may seem, is by no means the whole of the count to be made against the new barbarism. It is matter of common knowledge that motor traffic has converted the highways of rural England into a peril, made the lives of cottage-mothers a misery owing to the risks of their children, and the crossing of London streets a terror; and similar, if not worse, consequences are certain to follow from the spread of aerial locomotion. Perils aloft will become as rampant as perils aground. Insurances are already offered against this peculiar form of misadventure—sure sign that the practical commercial mind is far from counting it an imaginary contingency. Death and injury will drop from above as certainly as they spring from below. And let it not be forgotten that these are inconveniences to be inflicted on the many for the indulgence of the few, for in the nature of things it cannot but be that those who climb the heavens on wings of steel will always be a minority of the population. Hitherto man's upward glance has been one of wonder, admiration, worship; sad if in future it is to be one of apprehension and alarm. John Ruskin lamented that so few people looked at the sky; the Ruskin of coming days may have to base his plaint on the fact that because of its terrors few will dare to look elsewhere.

Another point, also, deserves consideration. We live in an age of stress. Never before were such demands made on the recuperative energies of both body and mind. The noises bred of our civilisation are distracting. Town life is more or less of a racket, and the traditional quiet of country lanes is broken by alien sounds. Up to now, however, one region has escaped intrusion. The sky, "that haunt of ancient peace," has remained inviolate. Are we conscious of how far such restfulness as still soothes our spirits is due to the stillness overhead? How precious, even without being measured by our thought, that stillness has grown to be, and how our nerves resent its withdrawal, is made evident when out of its heart the thunder crashes on our startled ears. We dread the quake that heaves

the earth; shall we smile at the clamour that is about to shake the sky? Flying machines, however deftly constructed, are terrific in their clatter, and when they become as common overhead as motors are beneath, we shall have such commotion in the air as will din our senses to distraction.

Nor is this the worst with which we are threatened. The crowning triumphs of aviation are to lie in military achievement. The new science is to carry the god of war in waxing prowess through the astonished heavens. We are to sing, "Glory to Mars in the highest, and on earth slaughter and ruin to men." Already experiments have been made in the art of dropping murder and destruction down on slumbering cities, and guns devised by which the murderers in their turn shall be rent to pieces among the clouds. War having steeped the earth in blood, is now to be lifted up exultingly to splash the skies. This may be deemed exaggeration. It is, however, but a vivid rendering of the spirit in which these new methods of slaughter are glorified in the Press of every European country.

What is the moral significance of this attitude of the public mind? Is it a comforting reflection that a beauty we may not estimate, a peace which once lost will be unregainable, can be surrendered without a protest? Is it a sign of intellectual sanity that we can be content to accept mere increase of speed, accelerated locomotion, multiplied facilities for transit, as a recompense for so tremendous a forfeiture? Why is there no demand for an international agreement to prevent such an unspeakable consummation as the conversion of the heavens into a manufactory for the swifter slaughtering of men? Are we Christians, or only Pagans under a veneer? If the world be dumb, should not the Churches speak? Surely this is not the coming of the Son of Man in the heavens for which they have waited so long!

J. DAWSON.

ASHFORD.

THE PRE-CHRISTIAN JESUS.

THE REV. W. WOODING.

DR Anderson's contention, in the Hibbert Journal of January 1910, that the Jesus or Christ of the New Testament has always been a divinity, may be allowed. But he does not appear to consider the probable coalescence of some pre-Christian divinity with a real man whose human life was the nucleus about which notions of the human and divine were confusedly gathered and combined. And when he says that the Christian cult was from the first distinguished from the many other religious cults by its ethical content, and by this ethical content both deserved and secured its success, he appears to underestimate two important factors: the human personality, whether actual or imagined, which forms its central force, and the fact that our knowledge of the other cults is mainly, if not entirely, derived from the polemical representations of the orthodox advocates of a successful Church.

We are not here concerned with the genesis of the literary tradition of Christianity; but unquestionably it presents us with an incomparable ideal; and even in those parts that must be regarded as legendary or mythical, there is a purity and restraint which cannot elsewhere be found in documents of their own order. With so fine a literary expression, its attractive social appeal, its expected crisis in all mundane affairs, the devotion of its itinerant agents, the discipline of its converts, and the upgrowth of a masterful and democratically spiritual organisation, its outward success is not specially phenomenal.

It will hardly be contended that the ethical content of the Salvation Army is superior to that of other religious movements of our age; yet in the matter of success some of the latter remain comparatively sterile, whilst the former would seem to need only the intellectual and secular conditions of those early times to be able to rival all that is accredited to Christianity. We are always in danger of confusing ethical content with historic success. It is probable that Christianity as a system is the resultant of rivalry, contest, adaptation, and absorption, in which process alien elements were allowed to find a home, and in which contributions were accepted from outside doctrine, customs, and ethics; but of some elements of its pre-eminence and success the less said the better.

The attempt to get back to the real human Jesus of the Gospels may fail; the more so as we are not likely to discover authentic documents that may go behind the marvellous idealisation of the Gospels. Liberal Christianity is not therefore in a state of collapse. It will probably arrive at the definite conclusion that some short but beautiful human ministry, ending in martyrdom, formed the nucleus of that movement which developed into Christianity. In which case, the doctrines of the incarnation, sacrificial death, resurrection, and second coming to judgment will take common rank with other myths of the same character, and will have the same value as these, neither more nor less. Myths are but the picturesque form in which certain great ideas are presented. But the mysteries which they thus present are not solved by their dramatic form. In especial, the genesis and irregular development of the Christ-idea—assuming its identity with the Jewish Messiahship—is now fairly well known; but unless such uncertain development be regarded as a revelation of the existence, qualities, and functions of a being already in existence before and apart from revelation, the personification of the idea does not thereby make it a real person. And if such impersonation be made identical with the absolute God—as seems to be a present tendency of thought—we have but changed the

name of the one and sole object of human worship, be it Jesus or Christ; and this mythical centre of the cult must stand on the same ground as Mithra, Serapis, or any other cult-nucleus of that creative epoch.

The main contention, however, of Dr Anderson has been anticipated by Professor Wm. Benjamin Smith of Tulane University, Louisiana, who in 1906 published in German his Der vorchristliche Jesus. It was issued at Giessen, and has a very non-committal preface by Professor P. W. Schmiedel of Zurich. So far as the above title is concerned, the general propositions of the book are as follows:—

- 1. That there was a pre-Christian Jesus-cult, of a more or less mysterious and secret character, which was widely spread in and about Palestine, and whose time-limits may be taken as from about 100 B.C. to 100 A.D.
- 2. That Christianity arose from the coalescence of several nearly allied cults, and not, as Luke endeavours to show, from one source and one place of origin, viz. Jerusalem.
- 3. That the word Nazarene is not derived from the name of a town called Nazareth, which probably did not then exist, but from a word-stem which is common in Hebrew and Aramaic, the meaning of which is guardian or protector.
- 4. That this term Nazarene, which was the universal appellation of the early Christians, was the name of a Jewish sect before the date assigned to Jesus, and that both Jesus and Paul either were or were asserted to be members of this sect.
- 5. That the Greek Naζωραΐος or Naζαραΐος represents the Aramaic Naṣaria, and probably combines the two words Naṣar and Jah, and means Guardian Jahweh—which again is represented by the phrase "Jesus the Nazarene."

These propositions are supported by a most minute examination of the New Testament text, and of the authorities concerned with this subject, both ancient and modern. Moreover, his readers have the opportunity of drawing their own conclusions from the full text of those passages on which Mr Smith bases his arguments.

The starting-point of the investigation is the phrase $\tau \hat{a} \pi \epsilon \rho \hat{i}$ τοῦ Ἰησοῦ, which occurs four times in the New Testament: Mark v. 27; Luke xxiv. 19; Acts xviii. 25 and xxviii. 31. The phrase may of course mean reports or rumours of the doings of Jesus; but a careful examination of the passages induces the belief that the phrase refers to a doctrine or cult of which Jesus was the centre. Phrases of similar construction point in the same direction: Acts i. 3, xix. 8, xxiii. 11, and xxiv. 22. This similarity does not appear in English, but it is clear enough in the Greek, and they evidently point to a propaganda of the "Kingdom of God," "of the Lord," and "of the Way." So far, there is nothing very remarkable about these passages by themselves, except that, in Mark v. 27, the woman with the bloody issue is made to say σωθήσομαι instead of ιαθήσομαι, where the former suggests dogma whilst the latter would more naturally suggest healing.

There are, however, in the Acts, certain events narrated which are of such striking character as to demand special inquiry. In xviii. 24-28 we read of Apollos the Alexandrine Jew, a man learned in the Jewish Scriptures and endowed with great eloquence and missionary zeal. This man preaches in the synagogue of Ephesus τὰ περὶ τοῦ Ἰησοῦ, while as yet he knew nothing beyond the teaching of John the Baptist. It seems to require very little to bring him into line, for, after some talk with Aquila and Priscilla, he is commended to the "brethren" of Achaia, where he preached that Jesus was the Christ. It is certainly curious that, so long after the supposed events, Apollos should be found preaching the Jesuscult, and yet know nothing of the historic person Jesus, or of the events attached to his name. He accepts the formula "Jesus is the Christ," and is straightway one with the brethren. In xix. 1-7 we find Paul for the second time at Ephesus. Apollos has left, and we hear no more of Priscilla and Aquila. But there appears to have arisen a small company of disciples who would not have been distinguished from any others that Paul knew, only that he happened to ask them if they had received the Holy Ghost on their conversion. They had never heard of such a thing, and knew only the baptism of John, or the propaganda of the *Coming One*.

Here, then, appears to be evidence of the existence of sporadic groups of persons very nearly akin in dogmatic standing: these were members of the cult of the Coming One, and members of the Jesus-cult who knew nothing about the Jesus of Galilee and Jerusalem; and for that matter it does not appear that Paul knew much about him either.

Acts viii. 9-24 is even more remarkable. We are told that, in consequence of the persecution, Philip went to Samaria and made convert of a certain notorious Simon, whom the author of the Acts charges with sorcery and blasphemous pretensions to a species of emanation of the Deity-not very unlike what has been all along attributed to the Christ. That he became a devout follower of Philip would seem to argue an open mind, and one singularly free from the jealousy that not infrequently appears in men who are otherwise great. It is also remarkable that, though Ananias of Damascus can confer the Holy Ghost on Saul the persecutor, no such phenomenon follows the baptism of Simon by Philip the Apostle. Nor, although Philip is subsequently led by the Spirit to meet and convert the Ethiopian eunuch, and baptizes him in the name of Jesus the Son of God, is it said that the Holy Ghost was thereby conferred. Was, then, the propaganda of Philip in some way different from that of Peter, and again from that of Paul? That some difference existed seems implied in the visit of Peter and John to Samaria. The word was preached there by Philip and accepted by Simon and others, but apparently not to the satisfaction of the authorities in Jerusalem. Peter declared that Simon had no part or lot in this word; the reason given being that he had offered money for the bestowment of that gift which should render his own equipment as a teacher complete.

Here Mr Smith calls attention to the ecclesiastical tradition of the wide, powerful, and long-continued influence of the socalled Simonite heresy. Simon is called the father of all the heresies, is opposed with the most bitter animosity, and is caricatured with venom. Irenæus asserts that Simonism was an older contemporary and spurious form of Christianity. But then heresy is only a heterodox form of the faith: it is not necessarily younger, it may even be older, than that standard which stamps it as heresy: in some cases it may have been itself the standard from which the new orthodoxy has diverged. That Simon was a mere religious quack, or what is vulgarly called a sorcerer, can hardly be maintained. On the contrary, he appears to have been a serious philosopher, and neither ecclesiastical tradition, nor the statement that he wished to buy the power of conferring the Holy Ghost, is free from the suspicion of jealousy and unfair partisanship.

A similar incident, and of like significance, is given in Acts xiii. 6-12. At Paphos, in Cyprus, Barnabas and Saul come into conflict with Elymas-another so-called sorcererthough Magus simply means wise, and has no more to do with sorcery than Nathan der Weise. Yet the writer evidently wishes to attribute sorcery to Elymas. He is called a false prophet, a Jew, a son of Jesus. They meet at the house of the Roman deputy, one Sergius Paulus, who is called a sagacious man. Elymas has so far interested this man in religion that, on the appearance of the new missionaries, he desires to hear the word of God from them also. Elymas does not attempt to prevent this; but he appears to have disputed with Barnabas and Saul in the interest of that form of faith in which he had instructed the deputy. There is no evidence of insincerity or falseness about him; he only differs in opinion from these strangers, and would protect his disciple from what may have appeared to him a religious extravagance. Saul's controversial language certainly does not err on the side of charity, for he addresses Elymas as a man full of subtlety and mischief-a child of the devil and enemy of all righteousness, perverting the right way of the Lord. But why? It is probable that Elymas was a son of Jesus in the sense of being

a member of the Jesus-cult, another of those sects which, being so nearly akin to, was yet different somehow from, the propaganda that Paul preached, and was all the more offensive from its similarity. He had apparently taught the deputy the way of the Lord-but not the right way-and for this was called a child of the devil and an enemy of all righteousness. Our modern sects have done pretty much the same thing in their own way. Elymas, however, is not equal to Simon. In some way or other he is overborne by the Apostle; his blindness may be supposed to be metaphorical, and the writer suggests that in due time and under fit guidance he may come to know the true way of the Lord. Now Cyprus appears to have been an old centre of the new religious ferment of that age, as was also Cyrene. From these places the Jesus-cult first came to Antioch, and was attended with such success that Barnabas-himself a Cypriot-was sent to knit up the new converts to the Jerusalem Church in the same way and for the same reason as Peter and John were sent to Samaria. We hear, moreover, of the Cypriot Mnason, who had long been a believer. So that in all probability, in coming to Cyprus, Barnabas and Saul were coming into conflict not merely with the individual Elymas, but with an older sect of which Elymas was the representative. Nor is it without significance that later on, Saul - who had now unaccountably become Paul-and Barnabas cannot agree to continue their labours together. Paul has now the lead, and Barnabas seems to object, and therefore goes home to Cyprus. The occasion of this separation appears too small to be the chief motive; it was most likely some form of dogmatic divergence that rendered their relations incompatible.

Further, in Acts xvi. 10 we come upon a very notable change in the form of the narrative, in the so-called we passages. It is suggested that the writer has here incorporated certain parts of a diary of some itinerant preacher. We do not know what was the relation of the we to Paul, but it appears to be more or less accidental. The we may have

been engaged in commerce, but, if so, they seem to have combined with it some kind of religious mission that was neither identical with nor hostile to that of Paul. They were at least interested in Paul's work whenever their paths crossed. They were several times in his company as fellow-travellers, and were once with him at the Proseuche at Philippi. Yet they do not seem to have been of Paul's party, though they journeyed with him to Rome. It was with their friends that Paul stayed at Puteoli, and it was to meet them that brethren, hearing of their arrival, came from Rome as far as Appii Forum. In what respects the we agreed with or differed from Paul we do not know, nor how far back that Roman community dated to which they belonged; but it was certainly earlier than Paul's visit, and was probably the nucleus of what was afterwards known as the Roman Church.

On the whole, a careful examination of present materials seems to point to the existence of religious communities similar to, but other than, that which has monopolised the Christian name: groups that were as early as, and in some cases earlier than, the Christian era. Nor need one be surprised at controversies between sects so nearly akin, wherein the more progressive and better organised should regard with suspicion, and refuse association with, those who could not be converted—and who could not or would not come into line with the more revolutionary party.

These cumulative evidences of the existence of very early religious brotherhoods that had no connection with the Apostles or the Jerusalem Church raise another point of great interest. What is the worth of Luke's evidence for the claim of Jerusalem to be the one and sole centre of origin of the Christian Church? His divergence from the other Gospels in respect of post-crucifixion events looks less like ignorance than contrary assertion. Instead of the very natural return of the disciples to their home in Galilee, we are told that they are commanded to remain in Jerusalem in expectation of a miraculous endowment for their Apostleship. The ascension

takes place on Olivet, and not in Galilee. Their world-mission is to start from and centre in Jerusalem. Consistently with this we have the solemn gift of tongues, as if for subsequent practical use—an event which takes place in a private assembly, to which place, nevertheless, are gathered strangers from far remote lands, all of whom understand in their native tongues what these unlearned men of Galilee have to say. Read the list of nationalities represented as present: Parthians, Medes, Elamites, and dwellers in Mesopotamia, all of which lie beyond the bounds of the then Roman Empire; Judæa, Cappadocia, Pontus, Asia, Phrygia, Pamphylia, Egypt, Libya, Rome, Crete and Arabia, besides Jews and proselytes; it is, as Luke says, the whole known world of that period.

Passing by the question of the historic credibility of this representation, we may well ask for the motive beneath it. It is suggested that Luke really knew nothing of the actual origin of that religious movement which in his day was beginning to command the attention of the world. All the gospels connect Jesus with the Baptist, but none of them seem to know who this Jesus really was. In Mark and John this stands confessed. Matthew has to invent; and, with the same freedom, Luke also invents, but invents differently. If Luke knew anything of the conclusion of the other gospels relating to the return to Galilee, he seems not to have taken it seriously. His theory is that Christianity had but one local centre of origin, Jerusalem; and his narrative is constructed either in the light of, or in furtherance of, this idea. Hence his denial of any return to Galilee, the continuance of the disciples in Jerusalem, with occasional interviews with Jesus and conversations on the affairs of the Kingdom of God, their waiting in solemn conclave for the heavenly endowment, the extraordinary success of the new movement in Jerusalem even among the priests, the dispersion of the rank and file of the Church by persecution, whilst yet the Apostles remain behind as a sort of permanent board of directors. All this is to account for the spread of Christianity

to the whole of Luke's world. To the modern secular historian this is incredible; nor can the narratives which suggest so marvellous an issue stand the test of critical examination.

It is thus clear from Luke's two books that some considerable mystery attached to the origin and spread of Christianity even in his own day. That mystery may never be fully solved, now or hereafter; but there is here the clear suggestion of the existence of diverse religious fellowships that did not spring from the activity of any one man, nor historically centre in any one place: the very efforts of Luke to show that they did, carry with them the evidence to the contrary. Yet were these brotherhoods so much akin that in some of them nothing but the acceptance of a formula was required to bring them into line; whilst others who could not accept the formula were characterised as heretics, and their chief men as sorcerers. The conflict of these with one another issued at length in a predominant and powerful Church that owned allegiance to a personality that was probably partly mystical and partly human; but, whilst it could not obliterate all differences, it could and did become an overbearing Catholicism that would tolerate neither the divergences that previously existed nor those that subsequently arose.

What then were these various sects? Epiphanius, Bishop of Constantia, in Cyprus, 367–402 a.d., discusses the tenets of no fewer than eighty heretical communities, several of which are divided into sub-sections. Of these, twenty are pre-Christian and sixty belong to Christian times. Of the former group, five are Samaritan, besides the Hemerobaptists and the Nasaræi or Nazaræi; and amongst the latter are the Simonists, Gnostics, Nazaræi or Nazoræi, and the Ebionites. Some of these were mere varieties of Judaism, whilst others were rather of the Gnostic order, but all the above-mentioned must be regarded as pre-Christian in origin. We may pass by the abuse which the bishop pours on some of these as not argument; but it is important to notice the practical identity of the two names Nasaræi and Nazoræi. Epiphanius

asserts of the former that they were Jews who as a sect sprang from Galaatis, Basanitis, and other regions east of the Jordan. They were heretics chiefly in respect of the Hebrew canon of Scripture, sacrifices, and the disuse of flesh as human food. We are expressly told that these Nasaræi existed before Christ and had not known him. The latter, or Nazoræi, Epiphanius places about the time of Cerinthus—circ. 98-117 A.D.—but confesses that he does not know their real date or order. His account of them is such laboured confusion that it is not possible to reduce his statements to any fair logical sequence. In brief, however, we gather the following: "These Nazoræi were previously known as Jessæi, either after Jesse the father of David, or after Jesus, from whom they sprang as his disciples." Epiphanius appears to identify them with those whom Philo connects with the Essenes. He then goes on: "But shortly after the ascension of the Saviour, and the preaching of Mark in Egypt, there arose people who were really followers of the Apostles, but according to all appearance were these Nazoræi. They were Jews by race, obedient to the law, and advocates of circumcision. As soon as they heard the mere name of Jesus, and had seen the divine wonders which were wrought at the hands of the Apostles, straightway they believed on Jesus; and when they learned that he came from Nazareth, and was therefore in the Gospels called Jesus the Nazoræus, they assumed this name-not Naziræi, which means devoted -such as were Samson and John the Baptist. They were not the same as the Nasaræi who existed before Christ and did not know him; but they were Nazoræi-a name by which all the Christians were known prior to the adoption of this latter name at Antioch. Paul was so called, and indeed all the heretics who are no true Christians took this same name as a cloak of honour. But yet these Nazoræi are Jews and nothing else. They differ from the Jews in that they believe on Christ; and from Christians in that they maintain Jewish observances. When they heard that other people called them

Nazoræi, they made no objection, because it was for Christ's sake; for the Lord Jesus himself was called Nazoræus, because he lived in the town of Nazareth. And this heresy of the Nazoræi prevails in Berœa, Cœle-Syria, Decapolis, in the neighbourhood of Pella, and in Basanitis, which is called Kokabe. Here they had their origin. For when the disciples left Jerusalem, according to the warning of Jesus, and settled in Pella, these established themselves in Peræa, where they continue to exist."

Even so, the story is by no means clear. One is led to ask what was the relation of these persons, who seem to have left Jerusalem at the same time as the body of Christians, to the Church. Were they at that time heretics or not? And if they became a separate sect at this time, what of Paul's connection with them some years before? Jesus was a Nazoræus, and so was Paul; indeed, it was at first the name that was supplanted by "Christian," and has not died out even yet. Though more widely spread, this later sect occupied generally the same area as the earlier. It is fairly evident that the two names are mere variants, and may be regarded as identical. The evident trouble that Epiphanius takes to differentiate them only shows how nearly alike he felt them to be. That the former knew not Christ, and the latter did, is no proof of their separate existence as sects, but only that in their earlier history they knew not him who later on was one of their own members. So trifling a difference of spelling can hardly carry so great a conclusion as Epiphanius evidently desires it should. The names are practically the same, and the only explanation of this attempt to make them different would seem to be that, by the time of Epiphanius, the Church had so far departed from its primitive conditions as to place these Nazoræi in the category of heretics. But even this does not show why he denied the connection of these later with the earlier heretics of the same name. The answer to this appears to be that the old identity of Christians and the Nazoræi cannot be denied; but if the Nazoræi are the same as the older Nasaræi, the position of Christianity as a new movement springing from Christ as a historic human person of known date is seriously impaired. Epiphanius cannot dissociate Christianity from all connection with the Nazoræi, and he can only dissociate it from the Nasaræi by denying the identity of these two. This appears to be the meaning of deriving the name Nazoræus from the town name Nazareth. By this means it was supposed that the tradition connecting the two could be broken, though it passes the limits of credibility to suppose that a widely-spread sect should suddenly change its name for such a reason.

In his chapter on the incarnation Epiphanius lays very great stress on Nazareth as the home of Joseph and Mary, and therefore of Jesus. He makes the annunciation to Mary take place at Nazareth, though Matthew implies that Bethlehem of Judæa is the home of both, and that they came to Galilee only to be out of the jurisdiction of Herod's son Archelaus, and pitched upon Nazareth for the more than doubtful reason of fulfilling the prophecy, "He shall be called a Nazarene-Naζωραĵos." We are then told that after the presentation in the temple, as recorded in Luke ii. 22-39, Jesus was taken to Nazareth. In the following year he presented himself before God at Jerusalem, and was taken to Bethlehem by Mary to see their relations, and back again to Nazareth. Towards the end of the second year he is taken again to Jerusalem and on to Bethlehem, where he receives the adoration and gifts of the Magi, thence to Egypt, and back again to Nazareth.

It comes, therefore, as a momentous surprise to be told that Nazareth is a mere geographical fiction; that it is not once mentioned in the Old Testament, nor yet in the Talmud, though the latter gives a list of no fewer than sixty-three Galilean towns; that it occurs neither in Josephus nor in the Apocrypha; and that its first appearance outside the New Testament occurs in Eusebius (270–340 A.D.), and then only in an incidental reference to Julius Africanus (second century) as

saying that, when Herod had destroyed the Hebrew registers, "certain connections of the Saviour, coming from Nazara and Kokabe—Judæan villages—restored them from memory."

Now, it is to be observed that Mark only once mentions Nazareth. We are told (vi. 1) that Jesus came into his own country, and the subsequent mention of his relations sounds very local; but no special town is mentioned, and (iii. 31) it has already been assumed that they were living at Capernaum. So that Mark here seems a little confused. In all the four other cases Jesus is simply called the Nazarene, a name that much more readily connects itself with the pre-Christian sect of the Nazarenes than the town of Nazareth. The chief codices vary between Naζωραίος, Naζοραίος, and Naζαρηνός, the last form being most frequent; but none of them need be a derivative from Nazareth. Matthew (ii. 23) says that Joseph and Mary went to live at Nazareth (Ναζαρέθ) that Jesus might be called a Nazarene (Naζωραίος), which is a curious motive, as it does not in the least fit the only prophecy that can in any way be recalled. After the imprisonment of John (iv. 13), Jesus goes into Galilee, and, leaving Nazareth, or Nazara (codices B and Z), he makes his home in Capernaum, which later on (ix. 1) is called his own city, where also (xii. 46) his mother and brethren seem to be dwelling. But again, as in Mark, Jesus comes to his own country (xiii. 54), with no mention of any town: again there is the same reference to his relations, who yet are assumed to be in Capernaum. Here then is the same confusion as in Mark. Further on (xxi. 11), in describing the ride into Jerusalem, the crowd call Jesus the prophet of Nazareth (ὁ ἀπὸ Ναζαρέθ) of Galilee, where a town is evidently intended, though why this town is mentioned is hardly intelligible, for all his work as a prophet is associated with Capernaum. But when the maid charges Peter with complicity with Jesus (xxvi. 71), the latter is simply called the Nazarene (Naζωραίος), and clearly this is the important matter: in the maid's mind it is membership of a sect that becomes the

means of identification, and not an insignificant village that was of no manner of importance to the matter in hand. Yet three times Matthew drags in this name of a supposed town: the first of them is quite forced, and the other two simply carry out whatever purpose Matthew had in using a town name at all. If then Nazareth be a geographical fiction, we must attribute its invention to Matthew or the writer to whom we owe the Gospel under his name; and the only guessable motive for it is something of the same nature as that which appears in Epiphanius, viz. to break the tradition between the Nazarenes that existed before Christ and those that were subsequently identical with the general body of Christians. Luke accepts without question the position created by Matthew and takes Nazareth as a matter of course. He says (ii. 4) that Joseph and Mary went from Nazareth of Galilee to Bethlehem of Judæa, and that after the presentation in the temple the family returned to Galilee, to their own city Nazareth (ii. 39), to which place also they returned after the visit of the twelve-year-old boy to Jerusalem (ii. 39-51). Again, as a famous man, Jesus visits Nazareth (iv. 14, 16), but it is implied that his place of residence was at Capernaum (23). In iv. 34 Jesus is the Nazarene, or Nazorene, as also in xviii. 37 and xxiv. 19, where the words vary between Ναζωραίος, Ναζαρηνός, and Ναζορηνός. The references of Luke to Nazareth as a town are more natural than those of Matthew, as he has nothing to do with Matthew's supposed motive. By Luke's time the town had probably become a literary tradition that there was no reason to question. Nothing seemed to hang on so trivial a matter, and in an uncritical age the creation of the name might easily pass. Again, in Acts x. 38 Luke speaks of Jesus as coming from Nazareth (τὸν ἀπὸ Ναζαρέθ); but in all other cases—ii. 22, iv. 10, vi. 14, xxii. 8, and xxvi. 9-Jesus is simply called the Nazarene, Ναζωραίος or Ναζοραίος, and in xxiv. 5 Paul is called a ringleader of the Nazarene heresy, In all these instances the word is only varied in Codex D to Nazopaios; and it is clearly to the sect and not the town that reference is made. In John i. (45 and 46) Nazareth is twice mentioned, of which one instance is curious: "Can any good come out of Nazareth?" This might be a point against the ascription of this Gospel to the Apostle John, if Nazareth be a geographical fiction, for a man of Galilee ought to know. But in xviii. (5 and 7) Jesus is Naζωραΐος, and in the inscription on the Cross (xix. 19) he alone there calls Jesus the Nazarene, Nazwpaios. Beside these instances there appears to be no other use of the word in one form or another. Thus the town is mentioned eleven times, and all seem derived from Matthew. But the sect is mentioned eighteen times. And it is observed that, whilst the name of this sect is inherent to the very earliest strata of Christian tradition, the town name belongs to the latest, and has little or no significance, except such as may be supposed to lie in the purpose of Matthew's expression, "He shall be called a Nazarene," which is equally untrue to prophecy and probable derivation. We can easily see why Jesus should be called a Nazarene, but the only reason that can be surmised for this stress laid by Matthew on Nazareth is that the movement at the head of which Jesus stood should be dissociated from an earlier sect, which is the more remarkable in Matthew as he, more than anyone else, connects that movement with its radical Jewish source, which again is an argument for separating the first two chapters from the body of his Gospel. It may well be supposed that there is some significance in the apparently accidental reference to the change of name at Antioch. Previously the sect were Nazarenes, and these Nazarenes dated further back than the time assigned to Jesus of Galilee: they were, however, largely conservative of Jewish traditions and observances. This did not suit the forward party, hence the new name Christian was adopted by the Gentile section of the Church. The conservatives gradually became the heretics of Epiphanius, and probably of those to whom we are indebted for the present form of Matthew's Gospel. Once pushed into this position by the progressive

party, it became necessary to break into the continuity of Nazarene tradition. This is ineffectively done by the invention of Nazareth as the home of Jesus: ineffectively, for the sect name still persists in the Mohammedan world, where all Christians are called Nazarenes.

If these considerations are valid, there must surely be some other reason for calling Jesus and his followers Nazarenes than that he came from Nazareth. It is most probable that the word Nazarene had a dogmatic significance. And if the explanation is somewhat remote, it is certainly more satisfactory than the attempt to derive it from some paltry and insignificant village, even if it could be proved that such a village existed by that name in the time of Jesus of Galilee. It is now assumed that the terms Nasaraios, Nazaraios, Nazoraios, and Nazarene are all variants of the same word, and have all the same meaning. The Talmudists call the Nazarenes Nôsrîm—a word familiar to the Hebrew for centuries. and which in various forms appears many times in the Old Testament. Its root, N-S-R, is one of the best known in Semitic speech, and has the sense of watching or protecting. When, therefore, its equivalent Nazwpaios was used, it must have carried with it the well-understood meaning. But the Aramaic form of the word is Nasaria, which is parallel with such words as Zacharia, Barachia, and others, where the final syllable appears to be a fragment of the divine name Jah. So that Nasaria should simply mean Servator Deus, and this apparently is the meaning of Nazaraîos:-"God is my protector," or "Protector Jahweh," was the watchword of the Nazarenes both old and new. But the Jessaîoi were apparently a very nearly allied sect, and their name, as derived from Jesus, had pretty much the same significance as Nazaraĵoi. It may be that they were indifferently used. To this sect apparently belonged Elymas of Cyprus, who is called Barjesus. Now the name Jesus was used by certain persons in Ephesus (Acts xix. 13-17) as a means of exorcism, which would hardly be the case with the name of one who was recognised as an actual and recently living man. Baptism in this name points in the same direction; and frequently it is the name Jesus, as a symbol or formula, upon which great stress is laid. And curiously the word Jesus appears in the Parisian Magic Papyrus—a document that dates from the early part of the fourth century of our era, but whose original was certainly much older, probably earlier than the origin of Christianity.

Line 1549, ὁρκιζω σε κατα του μαρπαρκουριθ· νασααρι. 3119-3120, ὁρκιζω σε κατα του θεου των Εβραιων Ιησου—

where $va\sigma aa\rho\iota$ is evidently the same as Naṣaria. So that in early, and probably even in pre-Christian times, the names Naṣaria and Jesus were interchangeably used in the exorcism of demons, as we have seen the latter to have been so used at Ephesus.

There is, moreover, a sect which Epiphanius did not include in his list, but which Hippolytus (early third century) describes somewhat fully and places it as early as, if not earlier than, our era: the Naassenians. They appear to have been of the Gnostic order. In one of their hymns occurs the name of Jesus in a celestial scene. After describing the chaotic storms by which the soul, wandering in life's wilderness, is beset and tormented, the hymn proceeds:—

"Then up spake Jesus: Behold, my Father, How war with evil has arisen on the earth. It rises from thy breath and moveth on. Man seeks to escape the dread disorder, Yet knows not how he shall safely do it. Therefore do thou send me, my Father: I will descend with thy seals in my hand: I will pass through all the ages; And I will make clear all mysteries. I will also unveil the form of deity; And all that was hidden of thy holy way Will I make known by the name of Gnosis."

This is not unlike the "saving knowledge" of the Song of Zacharias, and the part here played by Jesus is that of a representative of deity. And it is pertinent to this inquiry to observe that Gnosticism has a somewhat large place in the New Testament, e.g. the Ephesians, Colossians, Philippians, John's Gospel, and the Hebrews. Indeed, Gnosticism in one form or another was a very early form of religious speculation; and though some of its extravagances were condemned as heresies, its essential elements are involved in all religious transcendentalism; indeed, Christianity is what it is to-day largely because of its Gnostic elements.

So, then, the upshot of the whole matter seems to be this:-That at about the beginning of our era there existed sporadic religious communities of greater or less divergence from one another; that of these we may distinguish the Naassenians, Nazarenes, and the Jessæi as being very nearly related. And with these may be associated those who expected the Coming One-who were apparently followers of John the Baptist. The Jesus-cult appears to have been practised by all the above, except, perhaps, the earlier Nazarenes, whose cult-name was very similar in meaning to that of the Jessæi. Out of the collision of these sects a more or less common consensus was gradually evolved, which included the elements and thoughts attaching to the names of Jesus and Nazarene. How this was produced we can but guess. Probably the determining factor was the appearance amongst the Nazarenes of some remarkable person, whose spiritual and magnetic attraction, whose lofty teaching and tragic death, were just the one thing wanted to create a valid historic basis for the great Christian edifice. Probably-for the name was not uncommon-his name was actually Jesus; in which case his identification and confusion with the divine nucleus of the Jesus-cult becomes the more intelligible. It is not, however, to be expected that we can now, or that we shall hereafter, be able to withdraw the veil that hides from us the actual personality of this wonderful man; all we have or can have is the common traditions of the Synoptic Gospels, between the lines of which each must read as best he can. But whoever and whatever this man may have been, the great human movement that now for ages has gathered Vol. X .- No. 4.

to his name had its vital antecedents beyond his own time and character, and only awaited his attractive and compelling personality to coalesce into organic unity. These antecedents were associated with NaSaR the protector and Jesus the Saviour, as the legendary portion of Matthew's Gospel seems to imply. So that the vast energy of the Church spent in proving the divinity of Jesus has been entirely superfluous. According to such evidence as we have, Jesus was an object of worship (as a representative of God) before the great prophet of Galilee appeared on the scene. The worship of the latter has thus been due partly to accident, partly to the preeminence assigned to him in the Church, and partly to the ignorance in which the actual man was shrouded from public knowledge. Christian worship thus began with a divine person at its heart and centre, which worship was transferred to a man who in some way or other became confused with the divinity. That, however, is no reason why we should perpetuate a confusion which, though fraught with good as well as ill, is none the less confusion, and ought not for any human purpose to be maintained. If any man be found really worshipful, reverence him according to his worth; but it serves no useful or legitimate purpose to break down the distinction between the human and the divine. They are not the same, however true it may be that God is in all that exists, and that we live and move and have our being in Him.

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DANTE AND THE NEW THEOLOGY.

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In substance the New Theology represents an attempt to restate the vital contents of the Faith in the sphere of Christology. "What think ye of Christ: whose Son is He?" is the problem which it raises. Those who framed the phrase a "New Theology" (which is not perhaps to be taken au pied de la lettre) are dissatisfied with a dogmatic statement that He is the Son of God. They would emphasise rather His own claim to be the Son of Man. They believe that the Dogma of Incarnation has obscured that claim by dwelling too exclusively upon His Divinity. It is in vain, they believe, that Theology labours to define the Divine Being of Christ, to plunge into the Infinite, to elaborate a Dogma of the Trinity. Man must leave that alone for ever. The vital thing in Christianity, they say, is the Humanity of Christ. There must be a New Theology, which should deal exclusively with a doctrine of the Christ in His relation to Man. And so far the spiritual motive behind this movement is in accord with other powerful and spiritual motives at work within as well as without the Church—with the desire (to particularise one) to "Socialise" Christianity, or to regard it as pre-eminently the leaven of modern social regeneration. We have seen recently how powerful such a motive is by the response accorded to the "Socialistic" propaganda in the Pan-Anglican Congress by the public Press in our own country. The "New Theology" may not represent great vigour of thought, but it can count on

a wave of public feeling; and the "Old Theology" has certainly to reckon with a general estrangement from its terms and methods.

But there are undoubtedly other elements at work in favour of this movement towards a New Theology. Foremost among these is an intellectual conviction, which is not confined to any one school of thought even within the Christian Communions, that the old documentary and historical foundations of Dogma are being mined by the new critical method in the domain of History as well as Literature, and that the basis of Dogma in Christology, to wit, the unique character of its Divine Person, is doomed to fall before the comparative method when applied to the Evolution of Theology. There can indeed be little doubt that the latter Science, essentially constructive and positive as it is in character, has yet to develop its attack on the Old Theology, and is a more dangerous enemy than any negative criticism.

There is another motive-power at work in favour of a New Theology. Closely connected as it is in origin and form with the idea of a "Natural Evolution" in Theology, it is wholly distinct in essence. Along with the apparent weakening of the older belief in the historically unique character of the Christ there has arisen a new conception of the possibilities latent in the evolution of a "Christ-consciousness" in Man. In part this conception is due to the increasing knowledge of the higher human records in the history of mankind, and of the religious experience which they enshrine. But our own immediate horizon in the sphere of spiritual experience is also daily widening, thanks to the growth of a new psychology of religion which has to a certain extent absorbed the attention formerly centred upon the historical Christ as the unique revelation of Divine immanence.

The tendencies of our own time are not so peculiarly modern as is often imagined. In substance, if not in form, they were certainly familiar to Dante's age. Our insistence upon the Human and Social aspects of the Faith was one of

the chief notes in the Religious Renaissance of the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries. It was the soul, for instance, of the Franciscan Gospel and of the Fraticelli ferment. Again, the revolt of this age against the principle of dogmatic and ecclesiastical authority was far broader and deeper than the garbled records of the triumphant party allow us to perceive, or than general history has recognised. Indeed, all serious students of history now acknowledge that Oriental freethought then threatened to submerge dogmatic and ecclesiastical authority, and that Scholasticism, whether on its Rationalistic or Mystical side, was the outcome of this Oriental leaven, working from within upon the material of the Faith. The New Theology of this culminating period in Scholasticism involved a New Psychology based on a searching intellectual apprehension of Aristotelianism, as dissected by the New Platonists in the great contending schools of Arabian Metaphysic. Metaphysic of Christian Dogma has never been handled so scientifically since. But this New Psychology of the supreme Schoolman was at least in some cases backed by an Intuitional Mysticism, within and without the Schools, of independent, immediate, and intrinsic value. Equally active was the impulse to compare, if possible to reconcile (though in no shallow Eclectic fashion), the Faith with the deeper thought of other Creeds and Ages. Nor can this age, which gave birth to the "Everlasting Gospel" and its claim entirely to supersede the Old Theology by a new Dispensation of the Holy Ghost -this Age in which a host of "Spirituals" (many of them possessed of spiritual genius as well as with the spirit of martyrdom) claimed to have superseded the Revelation of the Historical Christ-be considered to have lacked a popular New Theology. The extraordinary career of a Rienzi at its close, though better known to most of us because of the dramatic though somewhat vulgar character which these claims assumed in his case, was but a ripple on the surface of a deep and permanent current which surged throughout the Middle Ages between the East and West.

Now, to trace the course which Dante steered in these perilous seas would be an intricate task, but certain marks in that course are clear. Nobody will gainsay the fact that Dante sympathised with what we must call in its true sense the Rationalising or Sceptical spirit of his age. Hear how he speaks of the highest quest in *Paradiso* (iv. 130–132):

"Nasce per quello a guisa di rampollo, A piè del Vero il Dubbio: ed è natura Che al sommo pinge noi di collo in collo."

("Wherefore there springeth, like a shoot, questioning at the foot of Truth: which is a thing that thrusteth us towards the summit, on from ridge to ridge"). I pass with a single word the evidence of his intense enthusiasm for the human aspects of the Faith in its relation to the reformation of Society, his unfettered and everywhere original criticism of the mediæval themes of Church and State—his bold philosophy of history—his conception that humanity is ordained for a goal towards which the Incarnation itself was a stage. The bearing of all this on his own New Theology is momentous, but beyond our scope. And the evidence, at all events, has been recognised, although the conclusions to which it leads us have not been pursued.

I return to more direct evidence and to more immediate conclusions about this New Theology of his. I only desire to note, with reference to what I have already said about the "modernism" of Dante's Age, that Dante has explicitly declared himself in favour of a comparative treatment of the highest theological truth. Speaking, for instance, of "the human excellence which is the principle of all goodness in us" (Convito, bk. iv., c. xxi.), according to what he calls "the natural" (or Philosophic) and "the Theological" way, he adds, "concerning the diverse reasonings that have been held by philosophers as to the difference (i.e. the diversity in origin and

¹ Here and elsewhere I avail myself of Mr Wicksteed's lucid but restrained renderings (*Dent's Classics*): although Mr Wicksteed hardly perhaps allows its full weight to the word "Dubbio," and is inclined everywhere to minimise Dante's "invidiosi veri" (*Par.*, x. 138).

virtue) of souls," that if each (Pagan) philosopher were to defend his own opinion, it might be that truth would be seen to exist in all of them, although (inasmuch as on the surface they seem somewhat remote from the truth) it is better not to proceed by way of them." Such language is startling, and it betrays an attitude which is distinct from the speculative freedom even of the most daring scholastic, though it is not alien to that of the allied mystic, theologians. But it is certainly characteristic of the Theologian of the Commedia.

I pass now to the New Psychology of the Commedia itself, and there I shall confine myself chiefly to its "crowning victory," the Paradiso. I am aware, of course, that the Old Theology supplies the Paradiso with the form of its engrossing theme and its faultless beauty. Often in a single canto the whole body of Christian Dogma lies embalmed. Well might the epigraphist write: "Theologus Dantes, nullius dogmatis expers." "To enjoy God for ever," to sink voice and thought and heart in the contemplation of Divine Being, to gaze into that abysm of Consciousness, is the goal of this God-intoxicated seer. To him there seems no rest for the spirit of man save in the Beatific Vision. He looks back upon the world from the "Starry Heaven" in disdain as upon a tiny threshing-floor. Where, we may well ask, is there room in this Transcendental triumph for the claim of a New Theology, that the Divine Immanence in Man is the "raison d'être" of religion?

And yet on the threshold of the *Paradiso* (c. i.) we find Dante's own answer to such a doubt.

"Surge ai mortali per diverse foci La Lucerna del mondo"

("The Lantern of the Universe riseth unto mortals in divers straits") he sings mystically of the Earth's High Sun; and then presently he adds:

"Trasumanare significar per verba Non si poria; pero l'esemplo basti A cui esperienza grazia serba." ("To pass beyond humanity may not be told in words, wherefore let the example satisfy him for whom Grace reserveth the experience.") Such is at once his confession and conviction when he preludes this "swan-song" of his lifelong Vision. "Transumanare" is within the power of Man, though beyond the reach of human language. Art may but shadow it in symbol. Yet the symbol will suffice for him to whom Grace has in store an "Experience" like his own. A real apprehension of the Paradiso will convince us, too, that this proud confession of his impotence to express, yet of his assurance that he had achieved, was not uttered in vain. And Shelley, an intuitive lover of Dante, although no intellectual lover of the Old Theology, has in the terza rima of his Triumph of Life twice recorded his homage to this "wonder worthy of the rhyme," when he sings:

"Behold a wonder worthy of the rhyme
Of him who from the lowest depths of hell
Through every paradise and through all glory
Love led serene, and who returned to tell
The words of hate and care, the wondrous story
How all things are transfigured except Love;
For, deaf as is a sea which wrath makes hoary,
The World can hear not the sweet notes that move
The Sphere whose melody is light to lovers—
A wonder worthy of his rhyme."

The reader will, however, desire something more definite as to the substance of this claim of Dante's—not for himself alone, but for all "to whom Grace has this experience in store"—to "pass beyond humanity."

Now Dante's own response to that desire cannot be provided apart from a consideration of the Transcendental unity of his Thought and Art. The New Psychology of Dante pervades both. We encounter it upon the first page of the Vita Nuova, in such phrases as these—"the book of my memory," "the glorious Lady of my mind, made manifest to mine eyes." Significantly he transcribes there the rubric of that "book of memory." "Incipit Vita Nova" (Here beginneth the New Life). The Vita Nuova is a "modern"

version of the ancient theme of Eros (the Heavenly Eros) and Psyche, that mind which, as Dante tells us in the Convito, is "bound and imprisoned in the organs of the body," yet is "the culmination and the most precious part of the soul-which is Deity." It is of her that he vows, in the last words of the Vita Nuova, "to write concerning her that which hath not before been written of any woman." And it is of her that he sings in diverse forms throughout the Canzoniere and Commedia, until at length she returns to the "Eternal Fountain" ("Poi si tornò all' Eterna Fontana") in the Paradiso; while Dante, too, like all the sons of men whom in the Purgatorio he compares to the chrysalis-"born to form the butterfly of a human angel "-is summoned to "consummate his journey perfectly."

That Dante did indeed claim there to have initiated a revolution in the form and substance of Art and Theology (to him they are identical) cannot be disputed, though there is a tendency among his modern commentators (due to their strange ignorance of the Mystics' consensus in every age and clime) to set Dante at variance with himself, and to regard the Commedia itself, forsooth, as a recantation of the Convito. I do not attempt here to enter into that question. Dante's own words are significant enough. He says in the last words of his Introduction to the Convito (bk. i.): "This shall be the new light, the new sun, which shall rise when the wonted sun shall set, and shall give light to them who are in darkness and in shadow as to the wonted sun, which shines not for them." I imagine that no words could express better the attitude to-day of the partisans of a New Theology towards the Old. And there is a single passage in a context (bk. iv., cxxi.) which will suffice to indicate the substance of his New Theology. Quoting certain words from Cicero's De Senectute, "where Tully," he writes, "speaking in the person of Cato, says: 'Wherefore a celestial soul descended into us, coming down from the loftiest of habitations into a place which is counter to the divine nature and to eternity," Dante adds, "in the (human) soul there

exists its own proper virtue, and the intellectual virtue, and the divine." This threefold division of the faculties of the soul, which he gives authoritatively as his own, he fortifies from a famous mediæval book, *De Causis*, by Albert the Great, whom Milman characterises as "the most illustrious of the Schoolmen," the precursor of the Inductive Method in Physics and Philosophy. And he concludes his whole account of what he calls the "natural science" of the soul in these startling terms:

"There are some of such opinion as to say that, if all the preceding virtues were to accord in the production of a soul in their best disposition, so much of the Deity would descend thereon that it would almost be another incarnate God." Well may Mr Wicksteed exclaim in a note upon this passage; "This singularly bold attempt to bring the Incarnation within the range of Natural sequences seems almost to anticipate certain speculations of modern theologians."

The Commedia itself, and especially the Paradiso, contain in their deepest sense—that "Sensus Anagogicus" which Dante himself has declared to be the ultimate and true interpretation of all his Art, and which Boccaccio, although the author of the current historical romance about Dante's relations with Beatrice, has embodied in his "Commento"—a representation "after the manner of the poets" of this New Psychology. The "Sensus Anagogicus" derives its very name from "anagogia," the ancient Greek name for Initiation into the mysteries. His "Theology" or "Theurgy," however Neo-Platonic in its form, was the outcome of a Psychology based upon his own experience—that "esperienza" which, as he says in the true inductive spirit, is "the fountain-head of all the streams of Art":

"Ch' esser suol fonte ai rivi di vostr'arti."

And that Psychology of his own Experience is still as New as when he tells "Marco the Lombard" in *Purgatorio* that he "is going upwards in the very swathings of mortality," and

adds that "God in His grace has granted him to behold His Court in a fashion altogether beyond the use of our own time":

"Per modo tutto fuor del modern'uso."

This New Psychology of Dante, as I have said, "swims like some new planet into our ken" in the Vita Nuova. "New Life" is his own name for it. But the true glory of this revelation is reserved for his "vere laude" of Beatrice in the Commedia. There "Dante," the representative Man, when he "gives" himself irrevocably to "Beatrice," the giver of this final blessedness, tells us that his own name of "Dante" is of necessity enrolled:

"al suon del mio nome Che di necessità qui si rigistra" (Purg., xxx. 61-62).

It is the one occasion on which he imparts to us his mystic name, when he "surrendered his heart and vision to her will." His baptismal name, of which indeed we have no record, was, according to Boccaccio, not "Dante" at all, but Durantes. As "Dante" he is here enrolled, "citizen of that Rome where Christ is Roman." And as his name is enrolled, like that of the Historical Christ in the Gospel, among the citizens of Eternal Rome (his symbol of Universal Humanity after the flesh), so he re-enacts in the Commedia the part of the Mystic Christ after the Spirit, by his mystic Death and Resurrection and Ascension, which are severally the theme of its three great canticas.

"Ritornato di là fa che tu scrive" ("When thou art returned from yonder, see to it that thou write"), exclaims "Beatrice" (pointing him to the "Mystic Wain")—at the close of the Purgatorio—in those splendid cantos which are the critical point of his pilgrimage and the scene of his mystical reception as an Initiate. And the purpose of this Revelation which "Beatrice" charges him to bring back to his age is to be primarily a Social Reformation: "In pro del mondo che mal vive" ("For that world's weal, which liveth ill"). Now this primary "social" purpose, which is also, as I have insisted, a note of our own "New Theology," has been amply recognised by all students of Dante. But its "presuppositions" (to use

a German phrase) in Dante's Theology have not been so recognised. I write to emphasise these. The Commedia is one great symbol of the Mystic's triumph, a triumph vouchsafed to Dante as the Representative man in his human body—his "vera carne."

This idea of the Representative Man cannot be appreciated at all apart from the fundamental doctrine in Mediæval Theology of "Universals" on which, and its intimate bearings on the symbolism of the Commedia, I have not space here even to touch. But anyone familiar with this root of Theological thought in Holy Scripture and the Fathers, as well as in the Middle Ages, would do well to weigh such a single point in this symbolism, as "Dante's" identification of himself in certain passages with "Adamo." The most interesting matter in this connection is Dante's masterly treatment of the Atonement. Dante conceives of a Universal Nature in man, which involves all individuals in the Fall of Adam, and included all mankind in the Restoration of the Second Adam. And he conceives this Fall and Restoration as an Eternal fact, re-enacted wherever the Universal Christ is revealed in man. Christ was "judicially executed" as Man, but as God He has "reinstated Man in his full life." Yet more striking and daring is his sublime handling of the theme of Incarnation in its connection with the "goal of all his longings" in those praises of the "Virgin-Mother" which form the (exoteric) climax of the Paradiso. But I must content myself with the impertinence of bare assertion. The essential purpose of the Commedia is the daring though disguised representation of an Eternal Incarnation in every Son of Man who mystically awakes to the secret of his Divine Being, and seeks to energise within himself the mystery of the Eternal Trinitythat is, of a Hypostatic Unity in which personality is preserved. Translated into the terms of human consciousness, this implies an equation of Self-consciousness with All-consciousness, and involves the reconciliation of knowledge and love in a condition of Transcendental Being. Such

is Dante's interpretation of the Aristotelian Entelechy of Being-in-Perfection, as it relates to the human body and soul. This aspect of the Commedia has been hardly recognised. Perhaps we ought rather to say that its Psychological basis and its Metaphysical issues have been overlooked, and that its Theological tendencies have been consequently ignored. For the fact that Dante does thus equate Self-consciousness and All-consciousness, that he does reconcile Knowledge and Love in his conception of Transcendental Being, can escape no student of the Paradiso who pursues Dante's representation of the Soul's Pilgrimage to its close. Nor has it escaped mystical students in any age. I may refer the reader to Gabriele 1 Rossetti's very rare Mistero dell' Amor Platonico, which entirely superseded the inferior Commentary by which he is generally known, a work which, amongst much doubtful matter, contains the materials and even the principle of a true interpretation which is at once old and new, past and to come.

Lack of space compels me to leave the bare indication which 2 I have given as to the substance of this New Theology to speak for itself. To pursue this subject, even within the confines of the Commedia, would involve the consideration of Dante's thought in all his works, for even the De Monarchia and the De Vulgari Eloquio are equally mystical at heart, and the whole of his work is a unity with one purpose—the development of his primal conception of the "New Life." I desire, however, to add here one last remark upon the temper of Dante's New Theology. "Pectus facit Theologum" is a deep as well as a broad saying, and Dante has set his seal to its truth. "Questo decreto" (this decree) exclaims Beatrice, speaking of God's counsel in Redemption (Paradiso, vii. 58-60),

"Questo decreto, frate, sta sepulto Agli occhi di ciascuno, il cui ingegno Nella fiamma d'amor non è adulto."

¹ The father of our own Dante Gabriel Rossetti—the translator of the Vita Nuova, and the author of Dante and his Circle.

² I may refer to an article in the Contemporary Review (Nov. 1908), "Dante's Intuition of the Infinite," which contains some further notes upon this point.

("This decree, my brother, is buried from the eyes of everyone whose wit is not matured within Love's flame.")

That thought is the key to Dante's Theology. It unlocks both his Metaphysics and his Art. His Art is "matured" in Love; his Metaphysics, as I have tried to suggest, are essentially an attempt to reconcile the claims of Knowledge with those of Love by the transcendental experience of the Lover. But the thought that the Theologian must be "matured" in Love is also the key (here we are concerned with a fresh aspect of this truth) to the temper of his Theology. And this question of the temper, the "personal equation," of the student, is no mean consideration in the pursuit of Theology or Philosophy. Theologians, like Philosophers, are, it is said, born pessimists or optimists: they certainly become reverential or selfassertive. And the value of any school in Theology depends perhaps more, in its day and generation, on what we may call its moral development than on its metaphysical depth. It is this matter which I have in mind when I speak of Dante's temper in Theology. Dante's temper is not that of every New Theologian. The New Theologian, the Gnostic of our own Age, often accentuates the "Scientific" element in Theology; Dante accentuates the Devotional. It cannot be denied that Dante is in full accord in the Gnostic claim that the final court of Truth is not dogmatic tradition, but psychical intuition. By the very form of his Theologic Art he changes the "venue" of Theology from the Schools, with their dogmatic basis, to the Soul, with its intuitional experience. His impassioned Creed is the Creed of one who believes that the Soul has the potentiality of Universal Being, and is in immediate contact through this potentiality with the Divine. The Church exists (such is the goal of his reasoning in the De Monarchia) to guide, not to control, the spirit of Man. Knowledge supersedes "Faith" with Dante: he believes that, in the mystery of "Union with the Infinite," Man may "know as he is known." And Dante claims as the protagonist of the Commedia to have "attained" this goal of Beatific Vision:

Knowledge again precedes Love, according to Dante, in the order of attainment. It is an essential feature in his conception of this "Yoga," that the "Yogi" loses himself in God only by the act of Contemplation. It is the order of Being. The Seraphim (who in heaven embody the Love-aspect of Being), as well as the Cherubim (who embody its Knowledge-aspect), "enjoy God in measure as their sight sinketh more deep into the Truth wherein all Intellect is stilled."

And Dante does not shrink from the corollary that it is even so on earth: "Hence may be seen how the being blessed is founded on the act which seeth, not that which loveth, which after followeth."

Yet, on the other hand, we too must remember (ricordare) that such Knowledge (his "Science," Intelletto,) is rooted in Love (his Devotion), that this "Seat of Authority" is exalted in Dante's heart as well as in his mind—that it is at the feet of "Beatrice" (who embodies his conception of Immediate Inspiration) he learns all his theology.

"Cosi Beatrice; ed io, che tutto ai piedi De suoi commandameti era divoto La mente e gli occhi, or' ella volle, diedi" (Purg., xxxii. 106-108).

The New Theology will do wisely to recover Dante's spirit of Devotion, and to find there that "Seat of Authority," apart from which no Theology can morally and spiritually develop.

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DISCUSSIONS

N.B.—The contributions under this heading refer to matters previously treated in the "Hibbert Journal." Reviews of books are not open to discussion. Criticism of any article will, as a rule, be limited to a single issue of the *Journal*. The discussion ends with a reply from the original writer.—Ed.

"SUBCONSCIOUS AND SUPERCONSCIOUS."

(Hibbert Journal, April 1911, p. 477.)

PROFESSOR PERCY GARDNER analyses the unconscious mind into two parts, the subconscious and the superconscious, which are distinguished as respectively lower and higher according to their ethical values; and religions he classifies into three orders (p. 493) according as they are mainly concerned with (1) the subconscious, (2) the conscious, or (3) the superconscious.

It is worth considering how far this phraseology helps us with the I think Professor Gardner is to be congratulated on having dropped the somewhat mystic words "subliminal" and "supraliminal," and on having substituted for them the words "unconscious" and "conscious," thus disposing of the fiction of a fixed threshold. We have to bear in mind that the threshold is not fixed in the same place with different people, nor at different times with the same person; and that what really happens when a new range of vision opens is that the attention has been turned in a new direction, supposing that there is a faculty for reception from that direction. But if this is the case, and it is recognised that the unconscious thus often comes into consciousness by the shifting of the boundary-line between the two sorts of mind, we are still far from determining what the moral value of a religion of the "conscious" order is (class 2); nor is it convenient to talk (p. 495) of the "influence of intellect on life" until we know whether that intellect is in the service of the higher or lower nature, or whether (in the phraseology of the writer) it is guided by the "subconscious" or the "superconscious."

Again, it does not seem to be quite fair to the pagan religions to say (p. 493) that they are "mainly concerned with the subconscious," and contain "many of the instincts which lie at the roots of our animal life,"

as if in the "necessary natural functions of man" there were something peculiarly close to the non-moral. The worship of Diana, in its inception, is not a bad worship; at all events it is a high remove from anything possible to the brutes. It involves the idea of a sternly chaste huntress, a type of the moral vigour attaching to healthy physical work. It is in its degeneration that this worship becomes bad; with the unspeakable Astarte, or the commercially profitable divinity of Ephesus. But precisely the same sort of degenerations are possible to Christianity itself. The truth is that even in the old pagan worships there was a spark of the divine. And by a curious coincidence a Christian writer in the same number of the Hibbert Journal (pp. 617-618) has described the "exaltation" which he felt at the sight of natural scenery as comparable with a religious experience. In paganism men saw God in Nature. The deeper revelation is when Nature is seen in God.

EDWARD WILLMORE.

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THE CLERGY AND FREE INQUIRY.

(Hibbert Journal, January 1911, p. 365.)

Cardinal Newman, in a well-known passage, describes his bewilderment at certain moral difficulties by saying, "It is as though I looked in a mirror and saw no reflection of my face." This is my feeling when I look into Professor Knight's criticism for some reflection of my views. I find therein some unexpected things—hard words like hypocrisy and perjury; inferences, in brackets, which I am quite unable to follow; remarkable statements, as that Thirlwall, Lightfoot, Westcott, Creighton, Robertson, Maurice, Stanley, Jowett, were obscurantists and emissaries of darkness. I find these surprising things doubly surprising from a seat of learning in the home of freedom. What I do not find is an appreciation of the drift or gist of my paper in the January Hibbert.

It was an attempt to deal with a phase of the double conscience which is in us all, the individual conscience and the social or corporate conscience, the sense of duty to self and of duty to the community. Sometimes these are or seem to be in conflict, and in proportion as both are quick and tender the conflict becomes distressing and bewildering. Men who have a strong desire to be loyal to truth have sometimes also a profound sense of their obligations to the religious community to which they belong. Men who think fearlessly are sometimes of humble spirit, and deeply aware of the historic growth and present value of a national institution like the Church of England, and so are slow to separate themselves and proclaim their provisional views as final. If the Church tolerates their freedom of inquiry and moves, however gradually, in the direction of free inquiry, they legitimately feel that they are right in remaining with their Alma

Mater, and strengthening the force by which she moves. I tried to follow the anxious debate on this matter which takes place in the minds of young men, and to offer them counsel. Professor Knight complains that in my paper, which was entirely concerned with conscience, I have omitted the part of conscience. It is a curious accusation. He seems to think that the liberal clergy are constantly declaring their belief in what they disbelieve. I would suggest a further acquaintance with their utterances. He is apparently unaware that the terms of subscription to the Articles were officially relaxed half a century ago, and that most of the legal decisions have been in their favour. It would be as unreasonable to look for the "higher criticism" in the Reformers of the sixteenth century as to expect Copernican astronomy in Ptolemaic days. Nevertheless, the Reformers, by their protest for freedom, were the real fathers or ancestors of the latest critics. The liberal clergy are more truly their successors than those who inherit their formulæ without being inspired by their spirit.

There is such a thing as hypertrophy of the private conscience and atrophy of the social conscience, and those in whom the latter is strong will hesitate many times before deserting the Church of their baptism and love, the Church which they regard as the widest and most tolerant in the world, because the great advance of knowledge has made some of her phraseology obsolete. Bishop Creighton (whom Professor Knight declares to be an obscurantist, but whom Lord Rosebery called "one of the most alert intelligences of the age") remarked that some people were much too fond of growing consciences, and he wished they would grow something else-for instance, cabbages. He was thinking of those who grow their private consciences in a forcing-house and their social consciences in a winter-garden or a cellar. Finally, that readers of the Hibbert Journal may form an estimate of Professor Knight's fairness in controversy, I will make a quotation. He writes: "The next paragraph (of my paper) says that the strict constructionists, apparently including Lord Morley, belong to a 'lower level of thought,' to 'an extinct order.'" Here is the passage to which he refers: "Those who are so ready to say, 'If you cannot swallow every Article in the Thirty-nine without qualification you have no right in the Church's ministry,' are speaking from a lower level of thought, as men who have read no history, or, reading, have not understood. They belong to the company who believe in the verbal inspiration and in the scientific and historical infallibility of Scripture-which is to say, they belong to the past, to an intellectually extinct order." Does Professor Knight think, or think that I think, that Lord Morley holds these beliefs? And if not, what inference should we draw about Professor Knight?

WILLIAM DANKS.

JUDAS ISCARIOT.

(Hibbert Journal, April 1911, p. 529.)

My own piccioletta barca is unadapted for the trying voyage to which Professor W. B. Smith calls us. To speak plainly, I think him sometimes not critical enough. It is worth while, however, to discuss the matter, because I can go a part of the way with him. That the God-man, whose cult in certain Jewish circles was probably pre-Christian, was called by a name which underlies Jeshua, has become to me, on grounds of my own, very possible, and it is to me much more than merely possible that Jesus of Nazareth was not betraved or surrendered to the Jewish authorities. whether by "Judas" or by anyone else. The "Twelve Apostles," too. are to me (and I should think to many critics) as unhistorical as the seventy disciples. But I fail to see that it is "obvious" that the Judas "who also delivered him up" "typifies the Jewish people in its rejection of the Jesus-cult" (p. 543). The surrender of the person of Jesus cannot be separated from the end of the surrenderer; if the one is symbolical. so also ought to be the other. Even if we take Ahithophel's end to have been that of Judas in the earlier tradition, yet it would be offensive enough, interpreted symbolically, to the Jews. But the Jews do not appear to have had any inkling of Judas's symbolical character. Dr Smith, however, is convinced that he has caught the meaning of the original narrative, and that he has discovered fresh textual evidence of the astonishing dispassionateness with which the early worshippers of Jesus regarded Judas, and which can only, as Professor Smith thinks, be explained in one way. This new evidence is derived from the surname of Judas (Iscariot), explained "the Surrenderer" (not "the Traitor").

This explanation of Iscariot is indeed novel, but is it true? Even if true, it hardly involves our admitting the symbolic character of Judas; the title might mean "the destined Surrenderer," or "the Surrenderer spoken of in the pre-Christian scheme of the acts and sufferings of the Messiah." But the new explanation of Iscariot is, in my opinion, untenable. It involves supposing that the "artist" who produced the phrase was familiar with the Hebrew of the Book of Isaiah, where, in xix. 4, a rare word sikkarti occurs, rendered in the Septuagint παραδώσω, a form of the very word used of the "delivering-up" of Jesus. This artist in words, we are told, produced a new noun-form based on sikkarti. I reply that this might perhaps pass if sikkarti occurred in a passage like Psalms xli. 9, one of the stock-passages on which a pre-Christian scheme of the life of the God-man would be based. Otherwise not, for the conjecture is (in my opinion) as arbitrary as it is improbable. The only safe course is to proceed methodically, and apply some theory which will explain whole groups of similar names in the Old and New Testaments. Of such theories there are not many. My own leads to this result—that all the surnames of the apostles in the gospels come from old names of regions or

districts with which the families of the bearers had been connected, and the true meaning of which generally had long been forgotten. Iscariot, then, is a corruption of an old name, the full form of which was Ashhart, or, with the gentilic suffix, Ashhartai. The same word underlies the corrupt forms Kiriath and Kerioth, and, in its masculine form, is represented by the Askar which still persists in the nomenclature of the neighbourhood of Nâblûs.

I am sorry, too, to differ from Professor Smith as regards the title Nazoraios applied to Jesus. Need I remark that, in Hebrew, "the Guardian" would be ha-noser, not ha-nosri? And surely nothing is gained by assuming that Nazareth was the new name of the old city Hinatuni (the Hannathon of Josh. xix. 44), and by supposing that both place-names mean "defence." Why, surely neither name does (see Enc. Bib., "Hannathon," "Nazareth"). The most natural view is not always the best known. But it is in the highest degree probable that Nazareth, or (better) some name which underlies this corrupt form, is an old synonym for Galil, i.e. Galilee. The name underlying Nazareth is clearly Resin (or Rezon). That, as I have said, would mean "Galilee"; "Galilean" might be Rezoni (Rezonai). The people, however, according to its wont, transposed letters to produce a more pleasing or obvious sense, and Nazareth (place of shooting plants) and Nazorai (Nazarene) were the results. One place, however, preserved, even in the late form of its name, a record of the old form. This was Chorazin (Matt. xi. 21, cp. Enc. Bib., "Chorazin"), a name which has been, I think, hitherto unexplained, but which very probably comes from Achor-Rezin, i.e. "the Galilean part of the region called Achor." I think, therefore, that, neither as regards Iscariotes nor as regards Nazareth and Nazoraios, has Professor W. B. Smith proved his case. He has seen rightly the historical importance of these names, but has not, I am sure, applied right critical methods in their explanation.

T. K. CHEYNE.

OXFORD.

PRAYER.

(Hibbert Journal, January 1911, p. 385.)

THE comments appearing in the April number of this Journal on my paper in the previous number are what one might expect from critics reared in the strictly orthodox school. I respect their orthodoxy, but I cannot accept their appeal to the Bible teaching on Prayer as the final and conclusive word on the subject. Long before the Christian era, as Old Testament history shows us, ardent prayers, in which devout men even "wrestled" with the Deity, accompanied sometimes by bloody sacrifices of men and animals or by propitiatory gifts, were addressed either to the God of heaven or to pagan deities of wood and stone. The practice of

petitioning the divinity for whatever the supplicant happened to need or desire was customary, and probably universal, among religious people, and there was no cessation or interruption of it down to the birth of Christ. It was habitual among the Jewish and Gentile contemporaries of Christ, and it received a great stimulus when Jesus, the founder of our religion, was born at Bethlehem. Prayer continued to be addressed to God in heaven by Christ himself; and from his example and precept it was natural and to be expected that no innovation should be introduced. The fervent spirit of early Christianity confirmed the pious practice, and it was cemented by the unreasoning ritualism of the Middle Ages. But long habit and the practice of centuries, worthy of respect as it certainly is, cannot, in theological any more than in any other science, stand fast against the results of rational inquiry. Beliefs and forms essentially improbable and irrational do not become probable or rational by the lapse of centuries. As a humble and, I trust, faithful member of the Christian Church I do not, I dare not, feel myself debarred or precluded from suggesting a modification in its service which I believe to be conducive to true religion.

The Bishop of Ossory is certainly more orthodox than I in believing literally "that not a sparrow falls to the ground without God's knowledge and care," but I regret that I am unable to agree with him in regarding that pious belief as "worthier" and more "philosophical" than the doubt which I have ventured to express, whether serious attention and consideration can be given by God to the countless selfish and misguided petitions which are daily and hourly addressed to Him. So far as I understand the Bishop's thesis, that "in the actual world reality is always concrete and individual: the law is a mere abstraction," I do not dispute it, though I hardly see how it affects the argument in my paper on Prayer.

If we are honest and sincere in saying "Thy will be done," and in believing that God knows all and is actuated by supreme benevolence, I must still regard it as proof of mistrust and doubt, and as presumptuous self-confidence, to particularise the objects and results we blindly wish for, or to attempt, in our ignorance, to guide or influence His actions. It seems to me, moreover, that our trust in God, if it is real, and not merely pretended, requires us to reject as impious the notion that He, seeing and knowing what is best for us, or for those for whom we intercede, should yet withhold it unless we ask for it. What should we think of such an attitude in a human father to his son? Are we to ascribe to our Heavenly Father qualities which we should be sorry to see in our best friend?

The Bishop of Ossory lays down the dogma that "the highest and best gifts (and this, he says, may include physical benefits as well as spiritual) can only come to those who are morally fitted to receive them." This seems to imply that prayer is hopeless of results for any but good men, but the Bishop can hardly mean this. And are there not righteous men who abstain from beseeching God for selfish ends because they trust in Him?

A man can, of course, and does in a hundred ways, help his fellow-man.

The help given by God is incomparably greater. But the question which I have ventured to discuss is not that, but whether the powers necessary for the conduct of mundane affairs has not already, and amply, been given to us at our birth, and whether resolution and action is not better than beseeching, either for what we already have or for what we may desire.

With deference to my kindly critic, Mrs Watson, I cannot think that it is impertinent to inquire what we may or may not rationally pray for. I have heard it urged that the possession of a diamond tiara, the success of a particular horse for the Derby, for a rise in Rubber Company shares, or the success of some doubtful commercial venture, are permissible subjects for prayer. Such extreme instances show that some discrimination is necessary, and I do not feel myself to be guilty of rashness in attempting to exclude such petitions, as well as others obviously objectionable. It is right that we should sympathise with "the bitter pains, the grinding miseries of human life around us"; but, valuable as prayer may be in some cases in formulating our energies, I cannot but think that resolution and helpful action are more in accordance with God's plan for the governance of the world.

I scarcely think that Mrs Watson can be serious in asking me to produce proof that prayer is not answered. Innumerable instances could, of course, be cited in which the occurrence of a not improbable event has followed prayer for its occurrence. There are probably quite as many instances in which the event prayed for has not followed the prayer. In either case it would, of course, be impossible to prove that the result was or was not occasioned by the supposed cause.

I fear that I am merely repeating myself in saying that, while I am satisfied of the deep and unquestionable *subjective* benefits of the habit of supplicatory prayer, I believe for myself, as I suggest to others, that those benefits may be retained, and others added, by a variation of the formula from beseeching to resolution; that while the tendencies of the former may be, and indeed are in many cases, towards debilitation of the Will, the tendencies of the latter are towards its bracing and fortification, and, moreover, are more in accordance with the reality of things.

I am grateful, however, for the comments that have been made, for I hope and believe that they conduce to a better understanding of the problem under consideration.

CHARLES STEWART.

ATHENÆUM CLUB.

REVIEWS

Time and Free Will. An Essay on the Immediate Data of Consciousness.

By Henri Bergson, Member of the Institute, Professor at the Collége de France. Authorised Translation by F. L. Pogson, M.A.—
(Library of Philosophy)—London: Sonnenschein & Co., 1910.—
Pp. xxiii+252.

Matter and Memory. By Henri Bergson. Authorised Translation by Nancy Margaret Paul and W. Scott Palmer.—(Library of Philosophy)

-London: Sonnenschein & Co. 1911.-Pp. xx+339.

Creative Evolution. By Henri Bergson. Authorised Translation by Arthur Mitchell, Ph.D. — London: Macmillan & Co. 1911. — Pp. xv+425.

On the eve of the appearance of M. Bergson's chief philosophical works in English dress, it was entirely appropriate that the Hibbert Journal should prepare the way for a suitable reception of them by articles such as those which have already appeared. It was further entirely appropriate that these should be by writers who are in enthusiastic agreement with him in his supposed antagonism to British Idealism. Yet there is a danger of doing the illustrious French writer some wrong in mingling with our welcome anything which is likely to give an exaggerated impression of the difference which separates him from older established forms of thought in England and America. More particularly the enthusiastic acceptance of his leadership by writers whose names are associated with the pluralism towards which so strong a current has recently been setting, is not unlikely to have had the result of establishing by anticipation a prejudice against him in the minds of those to whom that whole movement seems to be founded on error. It may not, therefore, be out of place to endeavour to try to adjust the perspective by a more critical examination of M. Bergson's relation to current pragmatism and neo-Kantianism, from which the latter is so largely a revolt. This is the more necessary owing to M. Bergson's own reticence on the subject. Though he frequently alludes to the associationist philosophy represented by J. S. Mill, and though his whole philosophical contention may from one point of view be regarded as a criticism of Berkeleyan or, as he calls it, "English" Idealism, there is a singular absence of allusion to the Anglo-Saxon movement which, while it has inherited from Berkeleyanism the name of Idealism, is in reality

 $^{^{1}}$ Vol. vii. p. 562 sqq , by Professor W. James ; and vol. viii. p. 873 sqq , by H. W. Carr.

founded on the "Refutation" of it and the vindication of external reality by which Kant sought to set it aside.

A.

Pragmatism in the wider sense of the term may be said to stand for the revolt against the "intellectualism" which marked, though in a different degree, alike the empirical and the a priori philosophy of the middle of the nineteenth century. But as the discussions, to which its more recent crystallisation into a definite creed gave rise, proceeded, it became evident that with the entirely legitimate reaction in favour of a sounder psychology and a more fluid conception of the world as a whole, there were mixed up more ambiguous elements drawing their strength from the popular but misleading distinctions between theory and practice on the one hand, liberty and necessity on the other. Granted that the ultimate test of truth, as pragmatism maintains, is: whether or not it works, what, we may ask, in particular are the works by which we shall know it, what are the ends by which its "workings" must itself be tested? Are these confined to the ends commonly known as practical and social, or must we add to those others, which, like art, science and philosophy, though definitely related to them, are deeply misrepresented when taken as merely instrumental? Granted again that the universe cannot consistently be conceived as a closed sphere, composed of parts, that shift as the colours of a kaleidoscope, but have no power of shooting out into new created forms: granted that we are required to conceive of it, on the contrary, as having an open front to the void that gives room for change and development: granted, in other words, that we can no longer be satisfied with the idea of a merely static perfection, are we thereby committed to thinking of reality as in essence indeterminate and characterless, devoid of any overruling quality or virtue that implies unity of direction? What is characteristic of pragmatism in its most popular form is the opening it leaves for ambiguity in the answer to both of these questions. It has been apt to assign an altogether too narrow sense to the practical, and, on the ground that the world is not a unity of one kind, to deny to it unity of any kind. It is because M. Bergson's authority has been claimed on behalf of both of these errors that it becomes important to realise the precise bearing of his philosophy upon the assumptions which underlie them.

1. There can, of course, be no doubt as to his general view of the place and function of scientific theory. If there is one doctrine that can be said to dominate his thinking in all the three volumes, it is the subordination of the distinctions and methods of the logical understanding to the needs of practical life. For practical purposes it is essential that we should be able to analyse effects into causes, equate events with their antecedent and coexistent conditions, reduce qualitative differences to quantitative variations of homogeneous units. But the success of these methods in dealing with the world which we "use" ought not to blind

us to the process of simplification which they involve and which renders them wholly inapplicable to the apprehension of the reality of things as they are in themselves, where all is the precise opposite of the assumptions that underlie them. Instead of simplicity, reality gives us complexity; instead of the externality of part to part, permeation; instead of extension, intension; instead of identity, difference; instead of relativity and dependence, absoluteness and individuality. Yet so habituated have we become to the methods of the physical sciences, so obsessed with the idea of their all-sufficiency, that we carry them unhesitatingly into the region of metaphysics to the falsification of all true knowledge. To escape from the shadow to the reality what is needed is a complete reversal of the scientific attitude. Starting from the unity of the whole, we have broken it up into parts. But by no mere piecing together of the parts can we restore the whole that we have lost any more than we can restore the rocket from the rain of cinders it leaves behind it as it rises, or the pressure of the watch-spring from the swings of the pendulum and the jerks of the hands in which it disperses itself. For the analysis, isolation, pulverisation (the ideals which are also the idols of the intelligence) we must substitute an altogether different process which is much more analogous to the immediacy of sense than the elaboration of science.

So far we are on firm ground, and there seems every justification for identifying Professor Bergson with the view which subordinates theory to practice, contemplation to life. Yet any candid examination of his philosophy as a whole will make it clear that there is another equally characteristic side to his teaching. So far from limiting reality to what we find to be consistent with our practical purposes in the narrower sense, he holds that these purposes themselves form but an insignificant fragment of what we may assume to be real. How, indeed, could it be otherwise with a philosophy which finds the principle of spirit in a region of purity or "virtuality," to which the "facts" of our practical and social life bear much the same relation as physical facts bear in turn to them. There are doubtless difficulties, perhaps insuperable difficulties, in the distinction that is drawn between "pure memory" which is of reality, and the practical memory, which is a merely mechanical habit of mind in its dealings with phenomena. But there is no doubt as to the general meaning of the doctrine or as to the consequences that flow from it. It means that outbordering and overlapping the will to live in the narrower sense, as the soul's inner life outborders its material existence, is the will to know, to be conscious, self-contained, self-enacting spirit. Besides the outgoing movement represented by practical life there is a return movement of the spirit upon itself. In this movement knowledge in the ordinary sense is indeed condemned, but only that it may give place to a deeper kind of knowledge at once the test and the disposer of the other's achievements. We are told, it is true, that metaphysics or philosophy —the name that is given to this form of knowledge—is "an attempt to transcend human conditions," to put off, as Aristotle expresses it in

a similar connexion, our mortality. But it is an attempt to which we are committed by the deepest human instincts. As such, it is identical with true empiricism "which proposes to press as close as possible to the original itself, to deepen its life, and, by a kind of intellectual sounding, feel the palpitation of its soul." I do not urge this with a view to identifying M. Bergson with any form of modern intellectualism, but merely in order to show that he approaches this question from a plane wholly different from that of ordinary pragmatism, and, while perhaps consistent in rejecting Platonic idealism on the ground that "it assigns more reality to the immovable than to the moving," yet allies himself on this side of his philosophy with the great line of gnostics of which Plotinus was the founder.

2. In trying to answer the first of our questions we have already anticipated to a certain extent the answer to the second, but it is necessary to go rather more into detail in order to show that neither from the side of his theory of reality nor from that of his theory of the faculty which apprehends it, is there any conclusive ground for identifying M. Bergson with an out-an-out pluralism. Here, too, I believe it can be shown that he approaches the problems of philosophy from a plane and with reservations of which ordinary pragmatism knows nothing. That there is a pluralistic side to Professor Bergson's philosophy has been already admitted to the full. He is the champion of process. He carries on an incessant war against the conception of a "bloc universe." His very difference with ordinary dualism and its doctrine of independent things is made the basis of a new form of pluralism. "There are no things," he says, "but only actions." If all is thus movement, "incessant life, action, liberty," what room is there for the fixed thoughts and purposes that theists attribute to the Creator, or for the all-embracing and therefore all-limiting absolute of the pantheist? Pluralistic, too, is his conception of the two currents within this creative movement. Life, we are told, is one movement, matter is the inverse movement; each is simple and individual in itself. Life itself separates into the two divergent lines of the unconscious and instinctive, and the conscious and intelligent. Finally, intelligence divides itself between the downward or outward path that leads to the organisation of matter for practical ends, and the upward or inward that leads to the extension and organisation of experience to feed the life of

But we have already seen reason to be on our guard against the mere form of expression in so many-sided a writer. In connection with the distinctions just enumerated it does not require much research to find evidence of the purely relative validity which he attaches to each of them, and of persistent efforts to subordinate them to a deeper unity. To set against these may, indeed, also be found passages in which he protests explicitly against the very idea of unity, but this is because of the peculiar

^{1 &}quot;Introduction à la Métaphysique" (Révue de métaphysique et de morale, Jan. 1903), par H. Bergson.

meaning he attaches to the "one" as the contrary of the many, and thus as constituting itself by a kind of paradox a difference in a deeper unity. So far from resting in any facile pluralism, he is led by the very depth of his own monism to reject the current statements of it. His philosophy may be said to be in reality an appeal from a shallower to a deeper form of unity.

It is in this spirit that, while insisting on the reality of the new and the unforeseen in the processes of creation as a whole, he refuses to conceive of the world at any moment as mere indeterminate possibility. If there is no definable end, there is, at least, unity of direction in the creative impulse. It is this which he at one time calls freedom (Creative Evolution, p. 285), at another the union of individuality and association (ibid., p. 273), at another "reflection." Looked at from without, the cosmic process appears to be dispersed among millions of individuals; looked on in itself it is measureless promise and potency ("une immensité de virtualité"). It is like an inspiration that falls on the outer ear in multitudinous words, verses, and strophes, but within the soul preserves its unity through them all and moulds them to a form which is a symbol of itself. Similarly from the side of the antithesis between liberty and necessity. Amid endless diversity the stream has a unity of direction without which history would be impossible. The problem of history has ever been "to create out of matter, which is very necessity, an instrument of liberty, to make a machine which may triumph over mechanism, to employ the fixity of nature to pass beyond the meshes of the net which it had spread" (ibid., p. 278). A like overruling power makes itself manifest in the apparently opposite tendencies of animate life upon earth. Life, as we know it, begins in a form which is neither instinct nor intelligence, but the unbroken unity of both. Thereafter it seems to divide itself between them; but, after the division, it reaches a point where union again is possible, and moves forward to the goal of a state in which instinct no longer wastes itself in conflict with reason but passes back into the stream of intelligent life to give it volume and energy. So, at least, I interpret the suggestive passage in which the "creative thrust" is compared to the currents that disperse themselves in a partly closed basin, only to be beaten back from the sides and find their way as reinforcing tributaries into the main stream that rushes out towards freedom (ibid., p. 273). Even between the races of creatures that represent the abortive effort of nature to escape from necessity, and the human species that represents its success, there is no such absolute opposition as appears. Remote from us, enemies even to us, as the animals may appear, they have not failed to prove useful companions of the way, relieving consciousness of useless burdens and enabling it to rise into a purer air.

The relation of the life of conscious action and the apparently unconscious yet psychical existence of the spirit in the world of "pure memory" remains, indeed, to my mind, obscure, though not so much because of the difficulty of conceiving how we can have awareness without

physiological substratum,1 as of the relation of this "virtual" existence to the actual life from which it has become detached. Yet even here, as in the case of Aristotle's active and passive reason, of which we are reminded, it seems clear that the relation is not one of mere difference and duality. It is from the life, of which the body is the centre, that the spirit draws the widening circle of experience which is the content of pure memory. On the other hand, it is in proportion as past experience with the wider outlook on the laws and tendencies of life which it makes possible becomes available for the interpretation of the present, that the supreme vital ends of individuality and freedom are achieved. Again, I do not wish to press the point unduly. It would be a distortion of M. Bergson's meaning to seek to involve him in any of the more familiar forms of monism. He has a rooted suspicion even of the conception of end or purpose which gives a monistic tinge to pragmatism itself. What I have sought to show is that it is equally a distortion to seek to involve him in the paradoxes of current pluralism. To insist upon the inexhaustibleness, and with it the unsearchableness, of the riches of creative life is one thing, to deny to the operations of the creative spirit any intelligible direction, still more to attribute to them an essential vacillation or ambiguity, is quite another. The first is the keynote of the whole of M. Bergson's work, the second is excluded by that form of spiritualism of which he has made himself the spokesman.

B.

Granted that, as I have sought to show, M. Bergson attacks the problem of knowledge and reality from an altogether different level from current realism and pragmatism alike, do we thereby bring him any nearer to the neo-Kantian idealism of which these are in the main a criticism? M. Bergson's relation to neo-Kantianism in general ought not to be difficult to determine. Kant, it is commonly agreed, represents a fixed point in the philosophical heavens from which latitudes and longitudes may be taken. Fortunately, there is no subject on which neo-Kantians have spent more care than on their own orientation with respect to him. Fortunately, also, M. Bergson has devoted some of the most luminous sections of his latest work to the task of taking his own bearings from the Critique of the Pure Reason (cp. Creative Evolution, p. 376 seq.). He begins by attributing to Kant the merit of having arrested the tendency of his predecessors to "hypostatise the unity of knowledge" after the manner of Spinoza and Leibniz-"to conceive of God as the synthesis of all concepts, the idea of ideas." Kant held that modern science rests on the idea not of substance or of things and their attributes, but of law, in other words, of relation. And, inasmuch as relations can be nothing else than connections established by mind between two or more terms, all that is needed for the establishment of science is to assume a uniform relating activity in the human understanding as the

¹ See Professor Alexander's criticism of this point, Mind, N.S., 68, p. 523.

basis of the laws of nature. True, this unification under law is not the work of any individual mind nor of the collective mind of humanity as a whole, but it affords no ground for the dogmatic assumption either of an immanent substance or a transcendent monad. All that is required is a "formal deity," a kind of demi-god working in the medium of human intelligence and giving to the whole of our science a relative and humanistic character. Kant's criticism thus consists chiefly in limiting the dogmatism of his predecessors. He accepts their conception of science, but reduces to a minimum the amount of metaphysics which it implies (ibid., p. 377). His error lay in the sharp distinction he drew between the form and the matter of knowledge, which forced him to attribute the terms, between which the understanding seeks to establish relations, to an extra-intellectual source. On such a view there can be no inherent relation between matter and intelligence. Whatever harmony exists between them is the result of a tour de force for which the intelligence is itself responsible. From this it follows not only that the intellectual form of knowledge appears as a species of absolute, whose genesis it is impossible to trace, but also that the matter of knowledge is too much pulverised by the intelligence, too hopelessly polarised and refracted in passing through our atmosphere, to permit of our ever recovering it in its original purity. The way out of these paradoxes is not to fall back on the dogmatic methods and metaphysical structures of Kant's predecessors, but to follow Kant's own critical method to its conclusions, and seek for the origin or, as Kant would have said, the deduction of the intellectual world itself in a deeper knowledge of the inner life. Experience, we must admit, is one, but it is not all of one type. Besides the material world there is life, and besides life there is mind. Why may there not be a form of apprehension appropriate to these, as the forms of the physical sciences are appropriate to inorganic body? This must, indeed, be different from ordinary sense knowledge, whose immediacy it otherwise shares, but it need not therefore be discontinuous with it any more than perception of the ultra-violet ray in the spectral scale is discontinuous with that of the infra-red. To realise this we have merely to understand, first, how matter and form generate each other in a single process of reciprocal adaptation, intelligence moulding itself to body and body to intelligence; and, secondly, how the first condition of knowledge of life, as it truly exists, is to reverse the process of diversion and spatialisation of the homogeneous, which is the pulse of physical science—to reascend the path we have descended and to place ourselves in the stream of life, that knows nothing of spatial fixity and homogeneous parts.

This criticism only needs to be stated to show the close affinity it bears to much that neo-Kantianism has made familiar among ourselves. According to this, Kant stands for a Copernican revolution of thought. In him we have passed from the submerged infinite of Spinoza to the emerging infinite, the "springing to be" which we meet with in our own lives—in Hegel's phrase, from "substance to subject," from the transcendent

mind of Leibniz to the mind as we know it in the everyday world of theory and practice. To the neo-Kantian also Kant's fundamental error is the hard and fast line which he draws between form and matter, understanding and intuition, from which it follows that as knowledge always works in the refracting and dispersing medium of the intellect, the matter of experience can never come before us as it is in itself. This is to ignore that the mind has known reality from the first beginnings of sensation and perception, and that, if there is reason to think that it has lost touch with reality in the world of conception, this is only because it insists on taking forms of thought that are of relative value for one limited field of experience as of absolute value for the whole of it.

So far, without straining, it may be said that the criticisms coincide. It is at this point that divergence begins. We have seen that by M. Bergson the difficulties and contradictions which follow on the attempt to interpret reality in terms familiar to science are laid to the account of the understanding itself. Escape from them is only possible by a reversal of its methods, a return from them to the immediacy of intuition.

There is no difference in the starting-point. Neo-Kantians agree that the real is the individual, and individuality is just that which escapes the meshes of concepts, which seek to capture it through measure or mere attributes or relations of dependence upon other things. If these, therefore, were the only modes in which thought operates, we should have to agree to its bankruptcy as a mode of apprehending reality. But it is just here where philosophers have gone wrong. Because the lower forms of thought have shown themselves inadequate to reality, they have imagined that the defect is inherent in thought itself instead of in the particular kind of thought on which reliance is placed. The error is to be corrected not by cancelling the work of thought but by completing it; submitting ourselves, if you will, to the guidance of the reality, but to a guidance it can only give if we carry the results of our experience as a whole, including our thinking, with us and are prepared to enlarge it by new forms of intelligent apprehension.

If, going a step deeper, we look for the source of this error, it is not difficult to see that it lies in the failure to understand the true nature and place of identity in human thought. If we assume (and this is the assumption that underlies the whole opposing contention) that thought consists essentially in the reduction of all difference to identity, it clearly follows that to seek in thought for a clue to the nature of a thing whose very being depends upon its differences, its changes or inner development—as must be the case with every true individual—is to seek the living among the dead. But in spite of the endorsement which the assumption in question has received, in this country, from Jevons, in France, from such writers as Boutroux and Tarde, it is, I believe, no longer possible to regard it as other than a survival. It could only hold its own owing to a preoccupation with the forms of equational thought of which mathematics is the type, and even here only by resolutely ignoring the element of difference

that underlies and sustains the terms of an equation in their separation. When it is realised that, throughout the whole course of its development, the ideal of thought is the perception not of abstract unity but of unity in difference, and that the differences can never disappear without involving the disappearance of the unity as well, the whole ground of the mistake and of the suspicion of thought that is founded on it is seen to fall away. The distinction between one form or one aspect of reality and another is not that in one the differences are unessential and identifying thought has, therefore, free passage among them, while in the other thought is obstructed and ultimately brought to confusion by the differences. The distinction is in the character of the identity that unites and expresses itself in the differences—varying through all degrees from the more abstract principle of mechanical equivalence, as we have it in thermo-dynamics, to such forms of concrete or individual identity as appear in human will or personality.

Returning to the proposed severance of intuition from intelligence, it is admitted that our thinking can never give us of itself the reality of anything. At the lowest stage reality is presented to us-meets us in sense-perception; at the highest it calls upon us to meet it by an effort of sympathetic imagination, to feel ourselves in it,—in a sense to be it. But this imagination, this "Einfühlung," as recent psychology has called it, is not forwarded by shutting the eyes of the mind on the reality into which we seek to enter. It is merely a popular error to think of our world as reduced to artificiality by being brought under conceptions. The function of thought is not to impose rigidity on an otherwise fluid world, but, on the contrary, to break down the hard outlines of the "facts" that the senses press upon us-to dissolve, extend, and deepen their significance for us. It is true that at each stage in the process of knowledge science is tempted to linger. Success in manipulating a particular subject-matter breeds a prejudice in favour of the particular method to which success is due. In this way the mind may seek to treat everything in the world as measurable quantity, or as externally conditioned by something else, or again as having some purpose outside itself. But this is merely because thought is false to itself and seeks to dominate instead of following the lead of reality. Reality, when left to itself, overflows all these definitions, carries us, if we but resign ourselves to it, beyond them. But to follow reality to a fuller revelation of itself is not to give up the revelation we already have. We do not simply fall back into the stream as into a river of forgetfulness, The examples of life and art themselves, which are the instances most frequently appealed to, in reality offer no support to such a view. Art, it is true, in its higher forms seems to share the directness of feeling and perception. Yet it would be a mistake to interpret this as meaning the absence of analysis. It may very well be that the highest art in a Raphael or a Shakespeare is unconscious of any intermediate intellectual process. Raphael's well-known answer to Leonardo's complaint of the burden of thought, "I never think," may very well represent his own view of his method. But it may be doubted if it represents the fact. The psychologist

must always find the greatest difficulty in drawing any hard and fast line between imagination and thought. Some, at least, of those who know most about it assure us that there is none to be drawn and that Art is "fundamental conception." What differentiates imaginative from ordinary thought is not that it is a separate faculty, but that it holds its own distinctions and divisions in solution, maintaining itself at a level above them and dominating them with its own concrete ideal.

What is true of art is true of life. Nothing, it is true, falls more justly under suspicion than the pretension of the intellectualist or the man who "knows the world" to sum up life in a formula. Yet no one, "except in support of a thesis," would propose to mend the defects of such a philosophy by falling back on mere instinct. What, as a matter of fact, we do is to seek the correction of narrower conceptions in more comprehensive. The search is, indeed, often prompted by the pressure of instincts which have been ignored; and an understanding of the instincts, for which room must be made, is a necessary element in all political wisdom. But it is the form of life to which the instincts as a whole point, the idea or universal that underlies them, that supplies the standard. It may very well be that since life is a constant development, no clearly outlined "whole" or end is discernible. But because the light is dim and we can see but a little way ahead, that is no reason why we should put it out and fall back on the mere insistency of instinct and feeling. Just at the present stage of civilisation, when we are beginning to understand what can be done for individual and corporate life by intelligent prevision and organisation, there is something particularly self-stultifying in a philosophy which, speaking in the name of practice, devotes itself to the proof that life is unintelligible.

It is for this reason, among others, that before attributing these paradoxes to a thinker of M. Bergson's breadth of view, it seems only fair to ask how far we are justified in doing so by the spirit and full letter of his work.

I have admitted that there is much in what he has written that allies him with the view of the nature of thought that underlies them. On the ground of it Professor Bosanquet 1 seems well within his right in identifying him with that view, and in insisting that it is fundamental to his philosophy. Indeed, if we were confined to his earlier works, there would be little to set on the other side. But in his latest work, as well as in the brilliant article in the Revue de métaphysique et de morale already quoted, he seems to me to have broken new ground and given more than a hint of an entirely different view.

Mr Carr has already commented on the important passage in the Évolution Créatrice in which M. Bergson analyses the implications of logical negation in order to prove that all denial proceeds on a basis of affirmation. This is the point in which the author is interested for the purpose of his argument. But it is clear the statement involves the converse truth, that

¹ Philosophical Theory of the State, 2nd ed., Introd. xxxvi.

all affirmation implies denial: "all determination is negation." Nor, further, does it need to be proved that "sameness and difference" is only a special case of affirmation and negation; as there is no negation except on a basis of affirmation, and vice versa, so there is no difference except on a basis of sameness, or of sameness except on a basis of difference. It is impossible to affirm that A differs from B except in the assumption that they have something in common (M); it is equally impossible to affirm that A is M except on the assumption that it is so, subject to the particular limitation that makes it A instead of B. There would be no sense in saying that A is an Englishman unless there were other kinds of men, or that abc is an isosceles triangle unless there were other forms of triangle. But if this be granted, we clearly have the germ of a theory of thought entirely different from that which confines it to the region of abstract identity. To one who clearly grasps the point that to judge whether immediately or mediately is to see the element of sameness in and not independently of difference, it is no longer open to define thought, of which judgment is the active function, as concerned merely with identity.

Turning to the Introduction à la Métaphysique, there are indeed even here phrases which suggest that thought is opposed to intuition as identity is to difference, but what I find characteristic of the essay is that the emphasis is on the unity rather than on the difference between them. In this sense the author describes intuition in terms of the intellect as a species of philosophy or metaphysic. It is the result of an "intellectual sympathy." In the same spirit he defines philosophy as an effort not to dispense with the concepts of science, but to transcend them. Philosophy cannot itself work without concepts, but these are of a different sort from the concepts of science—not, like them, stiff and unalterable, but supple, mobile, almost fluid: appropriate to real things in that they mould themselves on their substantive aspect. It is for concepts of this kind M. Bergson tells us that all the great philosophers have stood. True, their followers and even their own explicit teaching have too often belied their real spirit. But it is the spirit—the sympathetic insight which enabled them to rise above the abstractions of their predecessors—that has given them life. Holding this view, it is therefore not surprising that M. Bergson, when he comes at the end of the essay to the question of the precise relation of the intelligence to knowledge of reality, answers it not as an uncompromising dualist must have done, by rejecting the intelligence as mere distortion, but by interpreting it as a necessary preparation for the work of the other. Scientific concepts are to philosophy what the notes and observations that precede any constructive effort of the mind are to the result. Nothing, indeed, can be produced or reproduced by merely piecing together the fragmentary views that are accumulated in a notebook. Insight only comes by an act of the constructive intelligence. Nevertheless, in order that the facts may be fluidified and prepared to enter the new construction, it is necessary to break down their "brute materiality." This is so in knowledge of any kind. It is true even of that knowledge which seems the most intuitive, the knowledge of ourselves. The kingdom of knowledge, like the kingdom of heaven, suffereth violence, and the violent take it by force. Philosophy, M. Bergson tells us, is no mere passive submission, as in sense-perception; rather it is something "essentially active, almost violent." Its type is found in the infinitesimal calculus of mathematics which springs just from the necessity to substitute movement for rest—something in the making (se faisant) for something already made (tout fait). The task set philosophy as a whole is the systematic application of just this method to all reality. Its recent eclipse is not owing to any failure to cut itself loose from the facts as science explains them, but to the failure to rise from the mass of them to the "integral experience" of which they form the material.

Having gone so far in the direction of reconciliation, why, we may ask, does Professor Bergson seem to stop short and leave his position in the end ambiguous?

The reason lies partly, I venture to suggest, in the fact that we have as yet only a portion of his thought on the theory of knowledge before us. What we have of it seems to me to place him in line with recent neo-Kantian philosophy at a point considerably in advance of that at which he appears elsewhere to break with it. The hints it contains can hardly be worked out, as all his readers hope they may hereafter be, without exercising a profound influence on other parts of his philosophy.

A second reason is, I believe, the real ambiguity of the present position of the idealistic philosophy itself and the suspicion that M. Bergson shares with many, that vital interests of the human spirit have been placed in jeopardy by some of its recent developments. Idealism stands or falls with the doctrine that while the whole of reality is never present in knowledge, knowledge always presupposes that there is a whole which gives significance to the parts. But how are we to conceive of the relation of the whole to the part and to the mind that knows it? Two answers have been given by recent idealists. By some the whole is conceived of as a universal and infinite mind and will, whose nature, complete in itself, is reproduced in the finite mind. By others the idea of will and intelligence is discarded as inappropriate to the whole which yet is conceived of as spiritual—as a form of experience irreducible to any one of the factors-least of all to Nature or Matter-which enter into the structure of our experience. These doctrines have the advantage of all forms of spiritualism. By asserting a community of nature between the individual and the Whole, they offer a basis for the sense of dependence for the preservation beyond the confines of time of all that we value most as men which is the essence of religion. Their bearing on ethics is not so clear. The first seems to reduce human effort to a mere reproduction of a perfection that already exists. The second differs from it merely in the explicit acknowledgment that its achievements must therefore be "appearance." But if this is so, what are we to say of the consistency of the whole movement with its own startingpoint? Starting from the reality of "subject," it seems to have ended by reinvolving us in all the difficulties of the conception of "substance."

That this is M. Bergson's view of it is clear not only from his protest against the idea of a "complete" God, already quoted, but in the only passage in his works, so far as I know, in which direct allusion is made to the modern developments of Kantian philosophy. To interpret evolution, he seems to tell us, as the realisation of an idea or the manifestation of a will, is to rob life of the freedom and the inexhaustibleness of creative power in which its essence consists. Severe as neo-Kantianism is on mechanical theories of the universe, it yet retains the whole outline of mechanism. It merely fills in other colours. But it is the outline that has to be recast.

In such criticism it is easy, as we have seen, to find an essential opposition between M. Bergson and the whole line of thought of which T. H. Green to a former generation and Mr Bradley to a later have been the leading exponents, and to conceive of the present crisis in philosophy as of a choice between two sharp-pointed alternatives.1 My aim has been to show that this is a false issue. The real problem that faces us is to reconcile the vital truth that is contained in Bergson's plea for the inexhaustibleness of the universe with Green's equally valid claim for its purposiveness and self-determinedness and Bradley's for its unity and self-dependence. I have tried to show how far M. Bergson is from any ultimate alogism or pluralism. On the subject of the ultimate intelligibility and unity of the world he has given hostages of which only prejudice can overlook the significance. Yet I have also had to show at what point his theory of knowledge seems to me to represent an arrested development in both of these directions. From this side, I have ventured to suggest, a further approximation of the great French thinker to English neo-Kantianism may be anticipated. On the other hand, it is for neo-Kantianism to remove the ambiguity which attaches to its later developments. Neo-Kantianism is committed to the reality of subject, and with it the real possibility of novelty, creation, time in M. Bergson's sense of the word. To go back upon this is not to go back to Kant, as neo-Kantians have been recently asking us to do, but to go back from him. On the other hand, M. Bergson is pledged to the doctrine that the essence of freedom is not mere novelty but the novelty that represents a self-given and self-sustained purpose. If I am right in these contentions the way seems open to a better understanding between the important movement, which M. Bergson represents, and that which, in spite of recent criticism and much divergence among its representatives, still remains, I believe, the mainstream of Anglo-Saxon philosophy.

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¹ As in Professor James's "Bradley or Bergson?" Journal of Philosophy, vol. vii. No. 2.

Philosophical Essays.—By Bertrand Russell, M.A., F.R.S., late Fellow of Trinity College, Cambridge.—Pp. vi+185.—London: Longmans, Green & Co., 1910.

MR RUSSELL never writes on philosophical themes without throwing light upon them. Yet, as a result of studying this suggestive volume, many readers will, I imagine, be asking themselves how it comes about that the author should be in any way interested in philosophical discussion. He tells us, certainly, in one place, that "the appearance in the world of a genuinely new philosophy is at all times an event of very great importance" (p. 87), but one cannot help experiencing a feeling of surprise that he should think so. For "the weapons of doubting cynicism," to which the edifice of mathematical truths stands "unshakable and inexpugnable" (p. 85), are wielded by him unmercifully against philosophical research and those engaged in it. He is of opinion, for example, that "the more 'crude' a philosophy is, the nearer it becomes to being true" (p. 152), that "most philosophies whose conclusions are interesting turn on an unconscious play of words" (p. 143), that "few philosophers have wished to attain truth" (p. 99), and that those who have had a long training in philosophy come to doubt beliefs which non-philosophers deny only at the risk of being put into lunatic asylums (p. 145), although, curiously enough, it also appears to him that, in most of the problems of ethics, the moralist who has not had a philosophical training goes grievously astray (p. 30). What a contrast to that great science, in which Mr Russell is so eminent an authority, and for the study of which he has such unbounded enthusiasm, where all "follows inevitably from a small collection of fundamental laws" (p. 81)! Happily, however, Mr Russell has not been deterred from devoting much of his time to philosophical reflection, and nothing would be more unjust than to pass upon his own work the disparaging judgments he passes upon the work of others. A "long training" in the methods of metaphysical speculation has not led him, so far as one can see, to denials there is any need to reserve for esoteric utterance; his eagerness to attain truth, even truth about truth, is manifest throughout his book; the conclusions he reaches are unquestionably interesting, whilst their strongest opponent would hardly maintain that they turn on an unconscious play upon words: his philosophy, let us hope, contains much that is true although it is far from being, in any sense of the term, "crude."

Of the seven essays here collected together, six are reprints, with some modifications, of articles originally published in periodicals; the seventh—a very acute and searching piece of analysis—appears now for the first time. Three essays dealing with ethical subjects are given the precedence; the last four are concerned with the nature of truth. It is not perhaps a matter of much importance, but I think that the book as a whole would have gained in coherence, and that the transition from one topic to another would have been easier, if the essays had been arranged in the reverse order. Had Mr Russell commenced with a sketch of his own theory of

the nature of truth, proceeded to discuss rival theories, and have made his treatment of the value of mathematics and his delineation of "The Free Man's Worship" the means of passing to ethical problems, the separate essays might have formed chapters in one connected exposition of

a new philosophical doctrine.

A thinker's general attitude towards most of the fundamental questions of philosophy is inevitably determined by, and in large measure dependent upon, the view he takes of knowledge and of the functions involved in knowledge. Mr Russell has only gradually been led to the position as to the nature of Truth and Falsehood which he outlines in the present work, and the road by which the position has been reached is hardly less interesting than the position itself. In the author's Principles of Mathematics it was maintained that being "belongs to every conceivable term, to every possible object of thought—in short, to everything that can possibly occur in any proposition," whilst existence, on the contrary, is "the prerogative of some only amongst beings." Further, it was contended that the being of anything is a precondition, not a result, of its being thought of, and that the mind in thinking no more creates the proposition it thinks than Columbus in discovering the West Indies created the Indians. As regards being, false propositions were, therefore, said to be "on exactly the same level" as true propositions, "since to be false a proposition must already be." Accordingly, the admission could not be avoided that even erroneous judgments have a transcendent object. And, in writing subsequently upon Meinong's Theory of Complexes (Mind, N.S. xiii. 1904, p. 533), Mr Russell urged that if there were no false objectives "all deliberation as to the future would be impossible." Thus he arrived at the conclusion "that there is no problem at all in truth and falsehood; that some propositions are true and some false, just as some roses are red and some white; that belief is a certain attitude towards propositions, which is called knowledge when they are true, error when they are false " (ibid., p. 523). In later papers Mr Russell expressed himself more hesitatingly on the matter; and now, in the volume before us, he definitely abandons a contention which it required undoubtedly a considerable amount of courage to defend. It now seems to him "almost incredible" that there are in the world entities, apart from and independently of the act of judging, describable as objective falsehoods; he now feels that "there could be no falsehood if there were no minds to make mistakes" (p. 176). And in the volume before us he formulates a theory of the nature of truth which, as he conceives, "leaves the difference between truth and falsehood less of a mystery." Briefly that theory is this: No judgment consists in a relation to a single object; whether we judge correctly or whether we judge erroneously, there is always involved in judgment a relation of the mind to several objects, one of which is a relation. When, for example, we judge that Charles I. died on the scaffold, we have before us not one object, namely, Charles I.'s death on the scaffold, but several objects, namely, Charles I., and dying, and the scaffold. Similarly, if we judge

that Charles I. died in his bed, we have before us the several objects, Charles I., dying, and his bed. In the latter case the objects are not fictions; "they are just as good as the objects of the true judgment." Judgment, then, is not a dual relation of the mind to a single objective, but a multiple relation of the mind to the various other terms with which the judgment is concerned. When the relation, which is one of the objects, does, as a matter of fact, relate the other objects, the judgment is true; when it does not, the judgment is false.

Admirably clear and lucid though the exposition is, the theory requires to be worked out with much greater fullness before its significance can become apparent. Many points seem sadly in need of elucidation. When, for instance, truth and falsehood are declared to be primarily properties of judgments, I gather Mr Russell wants to have the term "judgment" understood in a sense different from that in which he has hitherto been in the habit of employing the term "proposition," but in what precise sense it is excessively difficult to determine. He does not intend, I take it, to identify a judgment with the mental act of judgingwhat, for example, he calls "constituents" of a judgment are evidently not constituents of the mental act of judging. Yet how exactly the distinction between them is to be conceived I have been unable to discover. Judging or believing, we are told, is a relation of the mind to certain objects. But then that is likewise the description which is given of a judgment. And just as the mind is said to have objects, so the judgment is said to have objects. On the other hand, we are said to have in judging a relation to each of the constituents of our judgment separately, and a relation to all the constituents of the judgment as a single unity (pp. 178 and 179). The question, therefore, arises: Is the judgment a relation of the mind to several objects, or is it that to which, as a single unity, the mind is related? It can hardly be both.

The difficulty I am indicating is not merely verbal, it connects itself closely with the fundamental issue concerning truth and falsehood. So long as Mr Russell was prepared to brave the paradox of objective falsehoods, he had entrenched himself pretty securely against the theory which he once said is "essential to every form of Kantianism"—namely, that, in respect to knowledge, "the mind is in some sense creative." From the standpoint he is now occupying, I do not see how his former opposition to this tenet of "Kantianism" is any longer to be sustained. There are, it is true, two somewhat conflicting tendencies to be detected in the reasoning by which the present position is supported, but of both what I am now saying is true. (a) Along one line of reflection, Mr Russell appears to be arguing that an act of judging is, what Kant took it to be, essentially an act of synthesis-a holding together in and through a "single unity of the mind" of several constituents as related (p. 178). If the judgment is true, the objects judged about have inter se a "corresponding" relation. The relation which enters as a constituent into the judgment would seem, then, to be distinct from the relation which subsists between the objects

judged about. Otherwise, to talk of "correspondence" would be meaningless. The former would seem to be an "entity" that has come to be in and through the act of judging. If, on the other hand, the judgment is false, there is no "corresponding" relation, and in that case the relation asserted would seem still more obviously to be a construction on the part of the mind. (b) Along another line of reflection, Mr Russell appears to be constituting an "intrinsic difference between true and false judgments" -a procedure which it was nevertheless one of the express purposes of the new theory to avoid (p. 177). On the one hand, those true judgments at any rate that are based upon perception are derived, so he tells us, by mere analysis of the immediately apprehended object; the act of judging, that is to say, is in their case an act of analysis. On the other hand, falsity is evidently not to be wholly laid to the door of defective analysis; some false judgments would seem to be manifestly products of an act of synthesis on the part of the mind that judges. Whichever line of reflection be followed, there is, therefore, apparently no escape from the conclusion that "the mind is in some sense creative," so far as knowledge is concerned.

I do not know whether Mr Russell himself intends this conclusion to be drawn. Although violently opposed to what he has previously maintained, it is a conclusion that would certainly be in keeping with various dicta scattered up and down the present work. I am particularly struck, for example, by the unhesitating manner in which the author speaks of the mind's creative function in the realms of morality, art, and religion. Although he argues that "good and bad are qualities which belong to objects quite independently of our opinions, just as round and square do" (p. 11), yet he regards goodness apparently as "the creation of our own conscience" (p. 63). He holds that our own love of the good creates for us a God worthy of worship (ib.). He insists that the insight of creative idealism can find in all the multiform facts of the world the reflection of a beauty its own thoughts first made, and that mind thus asserts its subtle mastery over the thoughtless forces of nature (p. 66). For my part, I should decline to accept any one of these propositions as they stand; but, the point is, can the thinker who does accept them any longer resist the main contentions of idealism in respect to knowledge? Indications are, indeed, not wanting in the book before us that from an extreme form of realism Mr Russell is veering round to an equally extreme form of idealism. He speaks, for instance, very dubiously about sense-data (p. 181), and the doctrine that perception, as opposed to judgment, is never in error, to which he gives his adherence, presupposes, I take it, that the immediately apprehended data of sense are mental in character. I believe the doctrine of the "infallibility of perception" to be contrary to psychological fact, and a severance such as that doctrine implies between perception and judgment to be fatal to any sound psychological analysis of either. But this is too big a subject to be entered upon here.

Seeing that Mr Russell attributes to the mind so large an amount of

creative capacity, it is perplexing to find him speaking in the way he does of the mind's origin and destiny. No one, indeed, can fail to admire the splendid Stoicism and the fine moral passion pervading throughout the presentation of "A Free Man's Worship," which make the essay thus named almost an unique utterance of its kind. In a measure, the attitude resembles that of Matthew Arnold's "Empedocles," only the note of selfsufficedness is stronger and more persistent. "The life of Man," it is urged, "is a long march through the night, surrounded by invisible foes, tortured by weariness and pain, towards a goal that few can hope to reach, and where none may tarry long" (p. 67). The world of fact is not good, the Power it contains is largely bad, and we "thirty millions" have to maintain our ideals against a hostile universe. But somehow we can maintain them; our thought is free, and from the freedom of our thoughts springs the whole world of art and science and philosophy (although the latter, according to Mr Russell's estimate of it, is, one would imagine, a questionable boon). Out of the awful encounter of the soul with the outer world, renunciation, wisdom, and charity are born; and with their birth a new life begins. To take into the inmost shrine of the soul the irresistible forces whose puppets we seem to be is to conquer them. Hence it is that the Past exerts over us so magical an influence. "The Past does not change or strive; like Duncan, after life's fitful fever it sleeps well; what was eager and grasping, what was petty and transitory, has faded away; the things that were beautiful and eternal shine out of it like stars in the night" (p. 68).

The essay embodies a noble protest of the human spirit against the supremacy of mere brute strength. But its author has not shown how, if mere brute strength be supreme, the attitude he inculcates is either rational or possible. After all, the aim of both science and philosophy is, I suppose, to determine, each in its own way, the nature of the world of fact; and if the world of fact be of the character Mr Russell depicts, how can knowledge of so criminal a monster contribute in any way to moral edification or spiritual serenity? There would, in that case, certainly be ground for the cry, "Art still has truth, take refuge there!" Yet, alas! the products of art, as dreams of the imagination, which we could but wish were not mere dreams, would only awaken and nurture the persuasion of how much better the universe might have been if we had been consulted in its making, and as worshippers we should be simply idolaters, whose idols would represent naught save our own superior selves. Refine such egoism as we may, from it no religion of spiritual efficacy will ever come.

When we ask for the reasons upon which the pessimistic interpretation here offered of nature is based, we get merely a string of assertions, every one of which is as contentious as any proposition ever advanced by the most daring of metaphysicians. "That man is the product of causes which had no prevision of the end they were achieving; that his origin, his growth, his hopes and fears, his loves and his beliefs, are but the outcome

of accidental collocations of atoms; that no fire, no heroism, no intensity of thought and feeling, can preserve an individual life beyond the grave; that all the labours of the ages, all the devotion, all the inspiration, all the noonday brightness of human genius, are destined to extinction in the vast death of the solar system, and that the whole temple of Man's achievement must inevitably be buried beneath the débris of a universe in ruins—all these things," we are assured, "if not quite beyond dispute, are yet so nearly certain, that no philosophy which rejects them can hope to stand" (pp. 60-61). One can only inquire, in amazement, where the evidence for such sweeping and tremendous propositions is to be found. It is unsafe for students of philosophy to dogmatise upon matters of natural science, but these are scarcely the things we should expect to hear Thomson or Larmor laying down as the results towards which modern physics tends, whilst Driesch (to mention but one distinguished authority) has a very different tale to tell from the point of view of modern biology. If "the world which science presents for our belief" be as Mr Russell describes, certainly these, and numerous other, investigators must be very far off the scientific track. "A strange mystery it is," we are told, "that nature, omnipotent but blind, in the revolution of her secular hurryings through the abysses of space, has brought forth at last a child, subject still to her power, but gifted with sight, with knowledge of good and evil, with the capacity of judging all the works of his unthinking mother" (p. 61). Strange mystery, indeed! But why should we be called upon in the name of science complacently to admit such occult and incredible mysteries? The alleged miracles of former days were at least ascribed to a cause that could conceivably have wrought them. For the miracles, however, we are now called upon to accept a cause is postulated which baffles every effort on our part to conceive as in the remotest way capable of producing what it is assumed to produce. "Blind to good and evil, reckless of destruction, omnipotent matter," we are informed, "rolls on its relentless way" (p. 70). Venturing to modify a well-known observa-tion of Dr Martineau's, I would ask whether such extremely clever matter —matter that is up to everything, even to gifting certain of its accidental collocations with the power of criticising the ways of its own procedure, and of condemning the evil they occasion—may not fairly be regarded as a little too modest in disclaiming any attribute inconsistent with that of blind omnipotence?

If inductive research affords no warrant for the claim of its being practically certain that mental life is but the outcome of accidental collocations of atoms, I am at a loss to understand how this view of the mental life is even compatible with the philosophic doctrine of "pluralism," of which Mr Russell is the advocate. "No empirical fact," he writes in a recent article, "is more certain, if a priori refutations fail, than that many things exist." Most true; but then so much even a pronounced monist would, in a sense, be prepared to concede. I should have supposed that Mr Russell's "pluralism" meant a great deal more

than that; that it implied not only that many things exist, but that those many things are not all ultimately of one type or character. I know it is sometimes customary to speak of materialism as a species of pluralism: but if Mr Russell simply means that the sum of existence consists ultimately of a multiplicity of material atoms, then clearly the former term would have been the less misleading one to use. I do not think, however, that that is what he does really mean. But if it is not, does he not seem to be logically driven to the admission that minds and material things are both ultimately existent, and that neither ought to be conceived as the outcome or the product of the other? In another part of his book, the author has wisely commented upon the tone of mind which has led people to regard "everything as fluid and in process of development, everything as passing by imperceptible gradations into everything else," and has pointed out how it has come to be felt that all sharp antitheses must be blurred, and all finality avoided, so that we must always be building a road by which everything can pass into everything else at a leisurely pace and with small steps (p. 120). But if this criticism is relevant in reference to certain tendencies in biology, or even in reference to the pragmatic theory of truth, with how much greater force does it apply to the attempt to effect a transition from accidental collocations of atoms to conscious life and intelligence? No one has drawn in more vivid colours than Mr Russell has done the stupendous contrast between blind mechanical power on the one hand and the thought of man free to form its own ideals and to emancipate itself from the tyranny of fate on the other. But the greater you make that contrast, the more impossible surely are you proving the task to be of showing how from the one the other has somehow come into being.

And this leads me to press a further consideration. Mr Russell emphasises, impressively and significantly, the characteristic of freedom which belongs to man as a thinking being. "In thought, in aspiration, we are free, free from our fellow-men, free from the petty planet on which our bodies impotently crawl, free even, while we live, from the tyranny of death" (p. 63). Yet, I imagine, not a few of his readers will feel themselves in a bewildering maze when they try to reconcile the stress laid upon freedom as a characteristic of thought with the denial of freedom as a characteristic of will to which Mr Russell is led in discussing the problem of Determinism (p. 30 sqq.). The discussion in question is made to turn upon the old alternative of either caused or uncaused (in the sense of capricious); and since human conduct is not capricious, the conclusion is easily reached that it must be caused. That perchance the relation of cause and effect is not the only kind of intelligible connectedness in existent reality is not so much as hinted at. A motive is taken to mean a cause of volition, and all volitions are held to be determined by causes. But if volitions are the effects of causes and are thus determined, can it be seriously contended that thoughts are not the effects of causes, and are not in like manner determined? And if the process of thinking

is causally determined, how can it be free in the sense asserted by Mr Russell—free, namely, in a sense which renders man an absolutely unique being in the world with which he is acquainted (p. 61)? Nay, if man's hopes and fears, loves and beliefs, are but the outcome of accidental collocations of atoms (p. 60), is it not clear that what a man thinks will be no less rigidly determined by the conditions which have produced him and which are operative around him than what he desires and wills? And, finally, if the principle of causal connectedness is everywhere exemplified in the world of fact, what woeful perversity is it that induces Mr Russell to talk about "accidental collocations of atoms?"

The truth is, Mr Russell is perpetually bringing us face to face with a crucial question and as perpetually thrusting it aside when we are expecting him to meet it. The question I refer to is this: What notion must we form of the world of fact, the realm of existent reality, if it is to be regarded as the field of action, as the field of development, for a being with moral and spiritual ideals? One thing, at least, evinces itself as a result of the author's whole treatment of ethical problems. The conception of the world of fact as opposed and antithetical to our ends and ideals is an unworkable and impossible thought. And though Mr Russell more than once inclines to it, yet in doing so he contradicts his own explicit statements in an early section of the book. "We know too little of the universe," he there insists, "to have any right to an opinion as to whether the good or the bad preponderates." "Optimism and pessimism alike are general theories as to the universe which there is no reason whatever for accepting; what we know of the world tends to suggest that the good and the evil are fairly balanced." Accordingly, complete suspense of judgment in this matter is declared to be the only rational attitude (p. 15). How comes it, then, that later on the world of fact is definitely pronounced to be "not good" (p. 62), and that the universe is said to exhibit a "blind hurry from vanity to vanity" (p. 68)? Take these latter assertions, and others like them, literally, and the possibility of realising moral ideals at all certainly calls for explanation. It will not do to reply simply, as Mr Russell seems disposed to do, that as a matter of fact moral ideals are realisable. The point is, whether the fact of their realisability does not compel the relinquishment of any such view of reality as is implied in the disparaging judgments he passes upon it. I am not in the least concerned to defend the thesis he attacks with so much vehemence (p. 11 sqq.), that nothing which exists is evil. It is sufficient merely to enforce the very obvious consideration that the concrete human spirit exists, and is itself a constituent factor of the sum total of reality. Somehow, therefore, the world of fact is rich enough, and of such a nature as to render the appearance and the maintenance of rational spiritual life, with all it carries with it, possible. This, at any rate, is a truth not only quite beyond dispute. but so absolutely certain, that no philosophy which does violence to it can hope to stand.

I have dealt with the more debatable portions of Mr Russell's volume,

and have left myself no space to refer to the many things in it with which I am in thorough agreement and sympathy. But I will not part with it without expressing my sense of its value and interest as a serious and important contribution to philosophical literature.

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The Gospels as Historical Documents. Part II.: The Synoptic Gospels.— By Vincent Henry Stanton, D.D., Ely Professor of Divinity in the University of Cambridge.—Cambridge: University Press, 1909.

In the Hibbert Journal for April 1904 the present writer reviewed Part I. of the above work, treating of the early use of the Gospels. He is glad now in dealing with Part II. to find himself in some respects more in accord with the author than he was then. When, for example, it is said that the Logian document "Q" was not known to the second evangelist, that Matthew and Luke drew chiefly from this document and from Mark, that the fixation of the gospel material in oral tradition deserves more consideration than it has obtained from many critics in recent times, or that none of the longer discourses of Jesus were spoken in the setting in which we read them in the Synoptic Gospels, he is in perfect agreement. But on receiving a book of 376 pages upon what is called the Synoptic Problem, we must inquire whether it contains an answer to all the questions which are important, and whether it adds to our knowledge of the origin of the first three gospels.

1. Unfortunately it has to be said that many of the most important questions are scarcely or not at all touched upon. Whether Mark or Matthew or Luke have the more original text is discussed in far fewer places than it is, for instance, in my article on the "Gospels" in the Encyclopædia Biblica (I may be allowed to cite this article, seeing that its compass, as compared with Dr Stanton's book, is very small). The little picturesque details in Mark, about which there is still so little agreement as to whether they were discarded by Matthew and Luke in their use of Mark, or whether it was only after such use that they were first inserted in the text, are nowhere discussed as a whole or classified. That the striking brevity of many of the concise narrative paragraphs in Matthew (e.g., viii. 28-34; ix. 1-8, 18-26) may have been brought about by the evangelist through omissions from the text of Mark is (pp. 324-326) very summarily maintained; whilst the contrary opinion, that Matthew made use of another source, deserves serious consideration, seeing that he presents most of the other passages with just the same fullness as Mark. Whether the canonical Matthew was acquainted with the canonical Luke, or vice versa, is discussed only in regard to those passages where both deviate in common from Mark, and is dismissed. But there are also striking agreements between Matthew

and Luke without parallels in Mark. Especially significant is Matt. vii. 28 = Luke vii. 1, because this is the concluding formula of the Sermon on the Mount, which Matthew, according to Dr Stanton's own premisses, did not come across in his source, and because here, in contradistinction to the introductory parts of the Sermon on the Mount, a great mass of people is presupposed on both sides as constituting the assembly of hearers. But also of the equally important passage, Luke xx. 27 = Matt. xxii. 23, which has a parallel in Mark (οἱ ἀντιλέγοντες instead of τῶν ἀντιλεγόντων, an infelicitous correction of the already infelicitous λέγοντες of Matthew), and of other passages of a similar nature, we learn nothing from Dr Stanton.

- 2. His deductions as to agreement or difference between the Synoptic Gospels are, in his text, for the most part extremely indefinite. Only rarely does he make any more precise statements; usually one is thrown back upon trying to discover for oneself what he may have meant by comparison of the texts in a synopsis. One finds but partial help in the "Additional Notes" at the end of the first four chapters of the book. Some of these might have been really useful if they were only complete. But in his reckoning of the doublets (pp. 54-60), quite a number are left out, which, although they are of secondary significance, vet certainly call for consideration, since among the doublets Dr Stanton actually reckons certain instances in which in no Gospel does there appear anything that is a repetition. In the enumeration of the text-agreements between Matthew and Luke as against Mark (pp. 207-219), nineteen of the cases which I have collected from B. Weiss' Marcus-evangelium (1872) are omitted, and that, too, only out of those parts of the two gospels which B. Weiss does not trace back to the influence of "Q."
- 3. The most extensive collection of details in the text has reference to the characteristics of the specific vocabulary and style of the "Lucan" writings (pp. 276-322). Certainly it contains much material that is correctly adduced, but the plan is very unmethodical. Hardly ever, for instance, are there observations such as this—Luke constantly calls the Galilean Sea \(\lambda\imu\nu_n\), never, as Matthew and Mark always do, $\theta \dot{a} \lambda a \sigma \sigma a$. On the other hand, nearly everywhere the author contents himself with a statement like this (p. 285), "προσδοκαν: Luke six times, Acts five, Matthew two, 2 Peter three." Has such a statement as that any value for ascertaining the Lucan linguistic usage, so long as we are not informed whether the word was in customary use outside of the New Testament, whether the other authors of the New Testament used another word for the same conception, and whether the two places where Matthew uses it have parallels in Luke? Or what value has the assertion (p. 316): "προσευχή only here (Acts xvi. 13), and at verse 16 in sense 'place of prayer,'" so long as the inquiry is not made as to whether other New Testament authors ever even speak of a place of prayer, and whether, if they did so, they would not have used exactly the same word?
- 4. It is, however, just this collection of details as to Luke's peculiar style on which Dr Stanton supports a decision as to whether Luke borrowed

such and such a passage of his "peculiar matter" from a written source or from oral tradition. He decides for the latter, where the number of Lucan peculiarities is particularly large. It is clear how questionable such a criterion is. Similarly doubtful is the attempt to ground upon the style of Mark a decision as to whether portions of the second gospel, absent from Luke, are nevertheless to be found in that form of this gospel which Luke had before him or not (p. 168 sq.). The procedure, I think, is doubly doubtful, because the stylistic characteristics of Mark which are collected together (pp. 204–6) are by no means numerous. A third attempt of a similar kind is the attempt to obtain from the degree in which Matthew on the one hand, and Luke on the other, alter the Marcan document lying before them, a judgment upon the question whether "Q," where they reproduce it differently, was accessible to both of them in the same Greek text or in different translations from the Aramaic Collection of

Sayings (p. 73 sq.).

5. Simpler and at the same time, according to Dr Stanton's judgment, more convincing, is another method of deciding this last question. Dr Stanton pays attention to the order of the paragraphs, because he believes that the original sequence of the single paragraphs of "Q" has been retained in Luke. Yet he himself is constrained to admit exceptions to this rule, and not only "in one or two places," as he says on p. 76. Luke x. 13-15 and 25-28, xi. 16, xiii. 34 sq., stood in "Q," in his opinion, in a later place, whilst Luke xi. 33, xiv. 26 sq., xvii. 1-4, stood in an earlier place (pp. 88, 89, 91, 95 and 96). Further, he recognises in Luke the greatest freedom in the devising of the situations in which particular declarations of Jesus might have been made (p. 229 sq.), and in the alteration of the wording in Matthew he recognises the greatest freedom in new grouping of the material of "Q." Why, then, should not Luke have altered the order of sequence more largely than Dr Stanton will allow? In that case the possibility would be open of deriving also from "Q" the scattered declarations which Dr Stanton, in order to satisfy his hypothesis, is constantly compelled to derive either from oral tradition or from a special source, e.g., Luke xvi. 15-18 (pp. 84 sq. and 99), whilst for the no less arbitrary arrangement of Sayings in xvi. 10-13, or in xi. 33-36, he is yet prepared to make the evangelist himself, it may be, responsible (p. 230). Dr Stanton, however, maintains, even of the whole of the matter peculiar to Luke, so far as it was not taken from oral tradition, that it was combined with "Q" into a document before Luke became acquainted with it; and that accordingly Luke is not to be held responsible for the places where it is introduced

6. In a similar manner Dr Stanton deals with Luke's way of handling the text of Mark. Whatsoever he has not of the present-day text of Mark, that, according to p. 151, he had not met with. Yet here also Dr Stanton is obliged to allow exceptions; e.g., Mark vii. 24–37; viii. 11–13, 15, 22–26 (pp. 156–160). Provided with other additions (which are wanting in Luke), the original text of Mark reached (according to

p. 167 sq.) the hands of Matthew; these additions come partly from "Q," or, more precisely, from a Greek translation of the Aramaic work of the Apostle Matthew. Clearly Dr Stanton's fundamental conception amounts to this, that the differences of the gospels appear as much as possible only as quantitative. So far is the idea of the want of independence of the canonical evangelists carried by him, that he says (p. 162) the condemnation of the fig-tree to barrenness, which Luke, as is well known, omits, may have been inserted in our canonical Gospel of Mark in the two parts in which it is there given (xi. 12-14, 20-25), whilst in the Marcan document used in Matthew it was inserted as an occurrence of a single day only. And yet Dr Stanton himself assumes (pp. 163-167, 275, 353) that without use of written sources Luke has re-arranged in the most unimpeded manner Mark's narrative of the Passion and the predictions of Jesus of a near end of the world, and that the canonical Matthew (who wrote contemporaneously with Luke about 80 A.D.) introduced eschatological material "in consequence of his own sense of what was fitting." The untenability of Dr Stanton's main contention would become much more evident if I, on my part, could develop the difference of the theological views of the evangelists, but this, on account of the limitations of space, I leave wholly on one side.

7. Nevertheless I must show at least by some examples how little Dr Stanton is willing to recognise such difference. That Matt. x. 5 sq. and 23 hardly accurately represent the mind of Jesus (p. 330) is apparently the single concession he will make in this direction; just this concession is, however, very extraordinary, because he holds Matt. xv. 24 to be actually the view of Jesus. He tries to reconcile the particularism and universalism in the speeches of Jesus by asserting that "the Jews have had their day of special opportunity" (as though salvation must be withheld from the heathen on that account), and that "it has been brought to a close (i.e. during the life of Jesus) in consequence of their own conduct" (p. 362). So, too (according to pp. 192-194), it is both true on the one hand that the parables of Jesus were intelligible to the multitude, and on the other hand that Jesus was desirous of making his teaching through the parables unintelligible (Mark iv. 11 sq.). The latter is merely a new method of Jesus, a method which He employed later in life, and it was not unjust; it was, indeed, merciful. In this way it is possible for Dr Stanton to regard the second gospel as the work of Mark, the companion of Peter (and before that of Paul). The so-called Ebionitic passages in Luke (xi. 41; xvi. 19-31, etc.) contain nothing but salutary instruction. As regards the parable of the Unjust Steward, Dr Stanton is in this connection wholly silent (pp. 232-237). The theory of the virgin birth is, he says, everywhere contained in Luke i. sq., because the birth of the Baptist is also announced by an angel (p. 226). And yet Dr Stanton refers here to Luke ii. 33, 48; 27, 41 and 43 (Joseph the father of Jesus), and himself says that only in Luke i. 34 sq. is the virgin birth of Jesus expressly asserted. But the speech of the angel includes, in addition, the verses i. 28, 30-33, 36 sq., in which the virgin birth is not in reality assumed.

8. The most precarious section of the book before us is, however, that section which does not treat of the gospels. In order to show that Luke, the companion of Paul, wrote the third gospel, Dr Stanton tries to prove (pp. 240-274) that he was the author of Acts. He finds an indication of the medical interest of Luke the physician, for example, in the fact that the suddenness of the cures of Jesus seems to have impressed him, or in Luke viii. 43b (pp. 280, 285). He considers the speaking with tongues fittingly described in Acts ii.; it was prompted by ecstatic joy, and contained, at the same time, "devout expressions" which the hearers "had at some time or other heard, but which in ordinary circumstances they would have been quite unable to recall or to utter" (p. 254). I must, however, confine myself to giving one more illustration of Dr Stanton's mode of argumentation, and I choose one having reference to the communication and making known of the decrees of the Apostles (Acts xv. 23-29; xvi. 4): "We can well believe," writes our author, "that St Paul, even if the form of the decrees did not commend itself to him, may have thought it wisest to raise no objection, and may have been willing to accept their imposition as a compromise, and to take part in the delivery of the letter; and yet that afterwards he should have felt perfectly justified in remaining silent about any injunctions of that Church, and in insisting that he had come out of the conference on the question of the Gentiles as free as he went into it" (p. 245). To that I will only add Gal. i. 20: "Now touching the things which I write unto you, behold, before God, I lie not."

| PAUL | \mathbf{W}_{\cdot} | SCHMIEDEL |
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The Constitution and Law of the Church in the First Two Centuries.— By Adolf Harnack, D.D., Professor of Church History in the University of Berlin.—Translated by F. L. Pogson, M.A.—Edited by H. D. A. Major, M.A.—Forming vol. xxxi. in the Crown Theological Library London: Williams & Norgate, 1910.

It is so long since any notable work has appeared dealing expressly with the organisation of the Early Church that this last book of Professor Harnack's may well arrest attention and prompt one to enquire what progress has been made, what conclusions reached, and what tendency now prevails as a result of the impartial study which has been zealously pursued for more than a generation in the field which before was the favourite battleground of dogmatic prejudice. Every battle fought of old time in that field was a drawn battle—in the sense that each combatant claimed the victory. These old battles now appear drawn—in the sense that each party deserved defeat. The most general result of modern study is that no ecclesiastical body of to-day conforms at all closely to the form of Church organisation

which prevailed in the Apostolic age. Even those who have the claims of "episcopacy" at heart find scant comfort in the modern tendency to trace back to an indefinitely early date the triple rank of bishop, presbyters, and deacons, for in its earliest form this threefold ministry appears as a parochial organisation, overshadowed by the higher offices of apostle, prophet, and teacher, which were ecumenical offices; and just because the episcopal organisation can be traced back so far, and ran so long parallel with the higher ministry, it is the more evident that it was not devised with a view to succeeding the apostolate.

The study of Church organisation emerged from the atmosphere of dogmatic prejudice when Richard Rothe, a Lutheran, advanced the theory that the episcopal system was established by a council of the Apostles. His work, Die Anfänge der christlichen Kirche und ihrer Verfassung (1837), still deserves attention. It conceives the problem of the passage of primitive Christianity into Catholicism more profoundly, it seems to me, than did Albrecht Ritschl's notable work on the same subject, Entstehung der althatolischen Kirche (1857). Bishop Lightfoot's famous Dissertation on the Christian Ministry (1873) likewise deserves the highest recognition for its impartiality and erudition; but it must be classified with the others in the earliest stadium, since it, too, failed to influence the direction of subsequent study.

Professor Hatch, with his Organisation of the Early Christian Churches (1880), did more than any one else to stimulate productive work in this field. Apart from such general stimulus, the most lasting service he rendered was to clear out of the way the exegetical theory of Jerome about the original identity of presbyter and bishop, a theory which had hitherto been accepted as an historical tradition, and created an impasse for the historical student. Professor Adolf Harnack's appreciation of Hatch's work was shown by his translating it into German (1886). But already, in 1884, Professor Harnack himself had brought new light to bear upon the subject in his Prolegomena to the Teaching of the Twelve Apostles. This, together with Quellen der sogenannten apostolischen Kirchenordnung (1886), constitutes all the strictly new material with which the modern student has to deal. It has, however, put the whole subject in a new aspect.

Taking account of a part at least of this material, Bishop (then Canon) Gore produced his Church and the Ministry (1889), and Bishop Wordsworth ten years later his Ministry of Grace (1902). These two works are closely akin. Though both are written from the High Anglican standpoint and designed to vindicate apostolical succession, they concur in attaching slight importance to the form of the ministry—for the first time in the history of Church controversy in England the form of the ministry was not made the chief issue. (In 1909—twenty years later—Bishop Gore published Orders and Unity, a book which is still more decided in its emphasis upon the doctrine of the ministry, and—to characterise it in a word—far less contemporary than his first.)

The period of greatest production in the study of Early Church Vol. X.—No. 4.

organisation is approximately comprised within the decade of the eighties. The period in question was brought to a close by the appearance of Professor Rudolph Sohm's epoch-making book on Kirchenrecht (1892). This was a work of genius as well as of erudition. It established for the old data new connections, and altered the complexion of the whole subject. The pause which followed the appearance of Sohm's book is an impressive tribute to its importance. In Germany during the following decade no work appeared which was more than an "Auseinandersetzung" with Sohm -that is, took Sohm's book substantially as its text. Indeed, the same situation has endured until the present day. For the most significant section of this last book of Harnack's is his "Critic" of a later treatise of Sohm's on Wesen und Ursprung des Katholicisimus (1909). Sohm and Harnack present a beautiful example of reciprocal reaction—a condition essential to progress in search of truth. Sohm heartily acknowledges that the genesis of his theory has its roots in Harnack's historical studies, and Harnack as generously admits his debt to Sohm, with reference especially to this present work, which is new chiefly for what it reveals of Sohm's influence—an influence both positive and negative.

In England Sohm's work made no such an impression—simply because for a decade at least it remained absolutely unknown. Bishop Wordsworth, writing nine years later his book above referred to, without the faintest suspicion of Sohm's existence, exemplifies what I mean by not being "contemporary." The year following, Principal Lindsay, in The Church and the Ministry (1902), makes large use of Sohm, yet in a way which suggests that his own theories were already solidified before he encountered this foreign influence. Dr Lindsay's book is especially valuable for the illuminating comparison it suggests between the conditions which determined the organisation of the Early Church and those which prevail now in the field of foreign missions. My own work upon The Church and its Organisation (1904) makes clear upon the title-page that it is an "Interpretation" of Sohm's Kirchenrecht. Although Professor Sohm himself magnanimously disallows the modest implication of that title, insisting that it is rather "an original creation," I dare still claim that, whatever it may be more, it at least includes a full and faithful representation of Sohm's view -both his doctrine of the Church and his theory of the development of its organisation. The book has not attracted much attention, but as a consequence of its publication I note the same pause which followed in Germany the appearance of Sohm's work. In England and America the silence has been practically unbroken until the translation of this book of Harnack's.

In the foregoing I have endeavoured to explain why Harnack's book occupies a peculiar place and must awaken an unusual interest. I turned to it with the more zest because I am as much beholden to Harnack as to Sohm for the formation of my own opinions. I must confess, however, that I found less here than I had hoped to find. The work is not so recent as it seems. For the main part of it (the whole section described by the title) is reprinted with slight change from the third edition of Herzog's

Real-Encyklopädie (art. "Verfassung," 1908); and furthermore, what we find there is only an enlargement of an article which had already appeared in the second edition. Substantially, therefore, what we have before us is one of Harnack's earliest works on the subject, and to me its defects are sufficiently explained by the fact that the author, in endeavouring to bring it up to date by taking account of Sohm's contributions, did not abandon the old ground plan. Hence much indefiniteness—indecision, I take it to be-in delineating the earliest forms of organisation. It is not perfectly clear what he accepts—if indeed he rejects anything of significance—in Sohm's account of the development of Church organisation. He does not seem to attach sufficient importance to the influence of the Eucharist in determining the form of the threefold ministry (bishops, presbyters, and deacons); but he does recognise that this lower ministry, like the apostles, prophets, and teachers, was subsumed under the idea of charismatic endowment, and was therefore a ministry in the Church, not a mere parochial office. In this he follows Sohm and sets himself in direct antithesis to Hatch. Closely related to this is his repudiation of the distinctive thesis of Hatch's work, namely, the assumed influence of the pagan religious clubs upon the organisation of the Church (cp. especially pp. 64 and 117 of the German edition—the English I have not seen). The description of the form and development of Church organisation is the least disputable part of Sohm's work, and I see no reason to think that Harnack is disposed to dispute it. I am sorry he has not endeavoured to rival it in precision of presentation, if not in completeness.

I find myself constrained often to agree with Harnack in his criticism of Sohm's absolute denial of any place for law in the Church. I am especially impressed by the consideration that the Church, as the continuation of the Jewish theocracy and as the realisation in part of God's rule upon earth, possessed in germ the idea of ecclesiastical law and to some degree found in "the Twelve" official organs of the Divine authority. Then with regard to ecclesiastical law of the second class, as we may call it,—such law as we incorporate in our canons, but by no means regard as divine and irreformable—I am eager to agree with any one who will prove to me that what seems to us so indispensable is also justified in theory. But this whole discussion, and the problem itself, is altogether new to English readers. It needs to be discussed, and if Harnack's work (incorporating as it does a clear statement of Sohm's position) avails to make the issue known, it will be an invaluable service. After all, it requires to be remarked that even upon this point Harnack agrees with Sohm far more profoundly than he differs from him. Above all, he recognises the notion which ruled the thought of early Christianity, that every assembly of Christians is a complete manifestation of the Church and not merely a part of it, and he acknowledges that this idea was a controlling factor in

the development of Church organisation.

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
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